Ranjeet Singh vs The State Of Bihar & Ors.

Date : 18-08-2026 Heard Mr. Awadhesh Kumar Mishra, learned Advocate for the petitioner along with Ms. Vidhi Shree, learned Advocate and Mr. Mahtab Alam, learned Advocate for the State.

The challenge in the present writ petition is made to an order dated 10.06.2014 passed by the Superintending Engineer, Building Circle, Purnea, whereby and whereunder the total pension of the petitioner has been withheld. Prayer has also been made for setting aside the order dated 29.11.2019, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner came to be rejected.

The short facts which led to filing of the writ petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed as a Senior Accounts Clerk in the Education Engineering Cell Division, Muzaffarpur. While the petitioner was discharging his duty at Kishanganj, based upon complaint made by one Sarwar Alam (Contractor), a raid was conducted on 14.02.2012 in the office and the petitioner was apprehended while he was accepting the bribe. The aforesaid incidence led to institution of the FIR bearing Vigilance P.S. Case No. 22/2012 dated 15.02.2012 for the offence under Sections 7/13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner was remanded to custody. While the petitioner was in custody, he attained the age of superannuation on 30.09.2012. Upon being released on bail, the petitioner submitted all the required pension papers before the Executive Engineer and subsequently, he was extended the benefit of Gratuity, GPF and Group Insurance amount and monthly pension was also started till the impugned order came to be passed. On 13.01.2014, the petitioner was served with a memo of charge in the premise of demand of bribe of Rs. 14,000/- and furhter demand of Rs.20,000/- and Rs.1000/- for the Executive Engineer and Head Clerk respectively, in connection with payment towards work performed under contract. The petitioner was said to have been arrested while accepting bribe in the residentical house of Sri Krishnakant Kumar, the Executive Engineer.

On receipt of the memo of charge, the petitioner submitted his explanation before the Conducting Officer. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the Conducting Officer submitted his enquiry report vide its report dated 29.01.2014 holding the petitioner not guilty of the charges. Copy of the said enquiry report is marked as Anneuxre-3 to the writ petition.

Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner has been exonerated from all the charges, the Disciplinary Authority, vide letter No. 153 dated 17.02.2014 directed for fresh inquiry and accordingly, the petitioner was also informed to ensure his appearance before the Conducting Officer. However, it is the contention of the petitioner that no such letter has ever been served upon him and as such he could not appear. Second inquiry was concluded without any notice to the petitioner and finally the Conducting Officer submitted second inquiry report, wherein the charge is reported to have been proved. The copy of the second inquiry report has been brought on record by way of Annexure-5 to the writ petition. Based upon such inquiry report, the petitioner was served with the second show cause notice which was duly replied by the petitioner. However, the same could not satisfy the Disciplinary Authority and finally the Disciplinary Authority vide his order contained in Memo No. 433 dated 10.06.2014 passed the order withholding total pension of the petitioner under Rule 43(b) of the Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 (In short “Rules, 1950’).

Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred C.W.J.C. No. 13256 of 2014. The said writ petition came to be disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to prefer an appeal. In deference to the order of this Court, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 29.07.2019. The memo of appeal has also been placed on record as Annexure-10 to the writ petition. The Appellate Authority called upon the petitioner on 22.11.2019. In response thereto, the petitioner appeared and submitted his representation and requested to extend time till 28.11.2019 for producing witnesses in support of his defence. However, the same was rejected and the petitioner was deprived from examining any witness and finally on 29.11.2019, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.

Mr. Mishra, learned Advocate for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order, has primarily drawn the attention of the Court to the memo of charge and submitted that the same is wholly in defiance of Rule 17(3)&(4) of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005 (in short ‘CCA Rules, 2005), inasmuch as, it does not contain the list of witnesses by whom the charges, as alleged against the petitioner, were proposed to be sustained. Once the department has not produced any oral evidence to substantiate the charges, it could not be proved. Hence, the proceeding carried out by the Conducting Officer or the Disciplinary Authority is wholly illegal, besides any findings recorded by them are wholly perverse. To support the aforesaid contention, heavy reliance has been placed on a decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors.[(2009) 2 SCC 570].

He further argued that it is quite surprising that the Enquiry Officer has concluded the inquiry and submitted the inquiry report to the effect that charges have not been found proved and the petitioner has been exonerated; Nonetheless the Disciplinary Authority, without differing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, again directed the same Enquiry Officer under letter No. 153 dated 17.02.2014 in terms with the Rule 17 of the CCA Rules, 2005 for fresh inquiy, which, in the submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner, is wholly without jurisdiction, besides illegal and malafide.

Mr. Mishra, learned Advocate for the petitioner, further contended that the entire case suffers from serious vice of arbitrariness and illegality for the simple reason that the Disciplinary Authority has failed to consider the evidence on record before reaching a conclusion that the charge against the petitioner stood proved, besides overlooked that the complainant has also not been examined to prove the charge. To support the aforesaid contention, attention of this Court has been drawn to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh Vs. The Commissioner of Police & Ors. [(1999) 2 SCC 10]. On account of non-production of the witnesses, the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine and, as such, the disciplinary proceedings, which culminated in imposition of punishment, can therefore, in no circumstances, withstand judicial scrutiny of fairness and is liable to be set aside, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Further submission has been made that even on a perusal of the impugned order of withholding of entire pensionary benefit, it is evident that the same is neither speaking nor the reason has been assigned as to how the Disciplinary Authority has reached to the conclusion, differing with the earlier report of Enquiry Officer, albeit, there was no finding of grave misconduct or any financial loss. In such circumstances, invoking Rule 43(b) of the Rules, 1950 is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. In this regard, reliance has also been placed on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Upendera Jha Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [2017(4) PLJR 383].

On the other hand, learned Advocate for the State dispelling the aforesaid contention submitted that undoubtedly the Disciplinary Authority is empowered under the law to direct for fresh inquiry, in case, there is some defect in the inquiry or the same has not been carried out in a proper manner. Once the power is already vested in the Disciplinary Authority, in no circumstances, the order directing for fresh inquiry can be said to be without jurisdiction. The petitioner was caught red handed while accepting bribe, resulting into institution of the FIR and he was taken into custody. In the aforesaid premise, he was subjected to a departmental proceeding and the second inquiry report clearly suggests that the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved, based upon which the Disciplinary Authority, after giving proper opportunity and upon consideration of the second show cause explanation, has inflicted the punishment.

This Court has anxiously heard the rival contentions of the learned Advocates for the respective parties and also meticulously perused the materials available on record.

Now the issues, as culled out from the discussions made hereinabove, warranting determination by this Court, are summarized hereinbelow:

To answer the Issue No.-I, the charge memo contained in Prapatra (Ka) is being reproduced hereinbelow, especially the imputation levelled against the petitioner.

On a bare perusal of the memo of charge, it is evident that it neither discloses from whom the demand of bribe was made nor the name of the person giving the bribe, nor the amount that was being accepted as a bribe. Rule 17 of the CCA Rules, 2005 lays down the exhaustive procedure to be followed for imposing major penalties. Rule 17(3) of CCA Rules, 2005 clearly mandates that where the disciplinary authority proposed to hold an enquiry against a government servant under this Rule, the disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up-

the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite and distinct article of charge. It further mandates that the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of charge shall contain not only the statement of all relevant facts but list of such document by which, and a list of such witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. Rule 17(4) further puts an obligation upon the Disciplinary Authority to provide not only the copy of the articles of charge but list of documents and witnesses. Rule 17(5) further authorizes the disciplinary authority, on receipt of the written statement of defence, to inquire into such of the articles of charge which are not admitted, or, if it thinks necessary to appoint an inquiring authority.

After careful perusal of the statutory prescription provided under CCA Rules, 2005, when this Court take up the memo of charge, prima facie, it finds that besides the charges are not definite and distinct, even the memo of charge does not contain the list of relevant documents and the list of witnesses by which and by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained.

In case of charge of corruption, the Court mandates that the same must be proved to the hilt as it brings civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awarded in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be proved beyond any shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities. [Vide: Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78]. In Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh Vs. Krishnan Behari [(1996) 2 SCC 714]. The Court in no uncertain terms ruled in cases involving corruption, there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. Any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant.

However, it is well settled that to hold an enquiry on vague charges, is not permissible, as the same does not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make an effective defence because he cannot be aware as what is the allegation against him and what kind of defence he can put in rebuttal thereof. In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty Vs. State of W.B.[(1970) 3 SCC 548], the Court observed that the grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely about the allegations on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him.

The Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty (supra) further clarified that in a case where the charge-sheet is accompanied with the statement of facts and the allegation may not be specific in charge-sheet but may be clear from the statement of charges, in such a situation as both constitute the same document, it may not be held that as the charge was not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. However, where a delinquent is served a charge-sheet without giving specific and definite charge and no statement of allegation is served along with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. It would be pertinent to recapitulate para-35 of the said judgment which would be worth benefitting for the determination of the present issue:

It is not in dispute that the charge memo, in the case at hand, does not contain the list of witnesses, though the declaration of law in this regard is quite definite that unless the charges are not admitted, even if it is based on documentary evidence, mere production of such document is not enough. The contents of documentary evidence has to be to proved by examining the witnesses. In Roop Singh Negi (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while emphasizing the role of the Enquiry Officer in a departmental proceeding, which is a quasi judicial proceeding, has ruled that the charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The Apex Court clearly spelt that the purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. Considering the fact that no witness was examined to prove the said documents and the management witnesses merely tendered the documents, the Court held that it did not prove the contents thereof. Mere placing reliance upon a document without proving the same could not have been treated as evidence.

In Roop Singh Negi (supra) the Court has emphasized and reiterated the observation made in Moni Shankar Vs. Union of India [(2008) 3 SCC 484], the relevant para of which is reproduced hereinbelow:

In the light of the above referred settled legal position, on examination of the propriety of the memo of charge as to whether it confirms the statutory parameters and the requirements made under Rule 17(3)&(4) of the CCA Rules, 2005, this Court has no hesitation to hold that it does not withstand the scrutiny of the statutory requirements. Hence, this Court opines that the subjected charge memo, neither contains the distinct articles of charge nor the list of witnesses and, as such, it does not conform with the statutory prescription and accordingly stands vitiated in law.

Now coming to Issue No. II it is worth pointing out that Rule 18 of the CCA Rules, 2005 prescribed the procedure and the action on the enquiry report. Rule 18(1) of the CCA Rules, 2005, clearly lays down that the the disciplinary authority, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, may remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 17 as far as may be. However, in case, the disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report, if it disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidences on record is sufficient for the purpose.

On a plain reading of Rule 18, it is imperative that in a particular case there has been no proper inquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason. The Disciplinary Authority may ask the Officer to record further evidence. However, there is no provision for setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer is not acceptable or the Disciplinary Authority is not satisfied.

In the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited & Ors. Vs. Ananta Saha & Ors. [(2011) 5 SCC 142], the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed that a liberty was given for fresh enquiry; nonetheless, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded on the basis of charge-sheet, issued earlier. The Court thus held that the de novo enquiry meaning thereby the entire earlier proceeding including the charge-sheet issued earlier stood quashed. The Court further ruled that it is a settled legal position that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact-situation, if the foundation is removed, the superstructure would fall automatically. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

A Bench of this Court in the case of Suresh Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [2008 (3) PLJR 531] emphasizing and highlighting the Constitution Bench decision in the case of K.R. Deb v. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong [(1971) 2 SCC 102], has held that fresh/de novo enquiry can be ordered in the event of serious defect has crept or the essential witness was not examined during the enquiry or the delinquent could not get the proper opportunity of cross-examination, when there is inherent defect in the enquiry it cannot withstand judicial scrutiny. Merely because the enquiry report is not palatable, it is not open to the authorities on their ipse dixit to hold a de novo enquiry. To permit this to be done, will amount to a carte-blanche to the authorities to keep holding re-enquiries by appointing different Enquiry Officers till such time that a report to their satisfaction is furnished. It would be pertinent to encapsulate paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof:

It would also be relevant to take note of the decision of the learned co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Manorma Kumari Vs. The State of Bihar [CWJC No. No.11984 of 2025], wherein the Court finds that the first enquiry report exonerating the petitioner from all the charges has not been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority without assigning any reason and further with respect to the fresh or de novo enquiry, the petitioner has never been put to notice or afforded any opportunity of hearing; besides repeated demand of papers/documents, it was never answered and also deprived from opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. In the aforesaid factual position, the Court authoritatively ruled that the very direction of the fresh enquiry is per se illegal and against the terms of the prescription of Rule 18 of the Rules, 2005, held the entire departmental proceeding from the stage of submission of the first enquiry report as bad and illegal.

Coming to the case in hand, upon submission of the statement of defence by the petitioner, the Conducting Officer carefully examined the materials and found that on the date and time of raid, the petitioner was present in his office, discharging the duty in relation to tender invitation and, as such, he returned the finding of exoneration from the charges and recommended accordingly. The inquiry report was duly submitted before the Disciplinary Authority but to the utmost surprise, on a bare perusal of letter No. 153 dated 17.02.2014 (Annexure-A) to the counter affidavit, it appears that the Disciplinary Authority has directed the Conducting Officer to submit a fresh enquiry report as he was not satisfied with the report. Dissatisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority to the inquiry report, has neither been scribed nor it has been pointed out as to on which issue the fresh enquiry is required that has not been dealt with by the Conducting Officer. It is also the admitted position that with respect to the subsequent inquiry, the petitioner has also not been informed; nor, reason has been assigned which necessitates a fresh enquiry. It also deserves attention that on this time, the same Conducting Officer has submitted a fresh enquiry report with the finding of proof of charge, based upon which the Disciplinary Authority issued second show cause notice and inflicted punishment on being found the explanation of the petitioner not satisfactory.

Rule 18 of the CCA Rules, 2005 clearly mandates for further enquiry upon the reasons recorded for the same. It is not open for the authorities, merely because the enquiry report is not palatable, on their ipse dixit to hold a de novo enquiry. To permit this to be done, will amount to a carte-blanche to the authorities to keep holding re-enquiries by appointing different Enquiry Officers till such time that a report to their satisfaction is furnished. To assign reasons for fresh enquiry, that too, when the earlier enquiry report exonerated the delinquent from the charges, is more necessary and even mandatory and failure to do so would clearly violate the principles of natural justice; besides contrary to the fair procedures established under the law and, thus transgresses Article 14 of the Constitution. If the Disciplinary Authority was not satisfied with the inquiry report, instead of giving direction for fresh enquiry, on the basis of materials available on record, could have recorded the finding of disagreement and may issue show cause notice upon the petitioner to file his show cause. Only on account of the fact that the disciplinary authority could not achieve the desired result, a direction for a second inquiry would not only defeat the principles of fairness, equity, and good conscience but also such action suffers from the vice of illegality. If this be allowed, then the enquiry proceedings would never come to an end until a favourable report is submitted by the Enquiry Officer in favour of the employer.

In the light of the aforesaid discussions and the facts of the case at hand, this Court finds that the order of the Disciplinary Authority directing for fresh enquiy without assigning any reason not only violates the statutory prescription, as prescribed under Rule 18 of the CCA Rules, 2005, but also suffers from vice of illegality and violates the principles of natural justice. This Court answered the issue accordingly.

To answer Issue No. III this Court is of the firm opinion that in any view of the matter, it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to have considered the evidence on record before reaching a conclusion that the charge against the petitioner stood proved in the departmental proceeding. Once this Court has exhausitively deliberated that since the memo of charge suffers from serious illegality as neither the article of charge was definite and distinct nor the oral evidences have been produced to sustain the charge and, as such, in absence thereof charges could not have been proved in the departmental proceeding, the order of the Disciplinary Authority based upon such inquiry report is per se illegal and perverse. The reliance on a judgment rendered in the case of Kuldeep Singh (supra) would also be applicable and give quietus to the aforesaid issue and thus the same are reproduced hereinbelow:

After recapitulating the aforesaid legal position, this Court once again examined the impugned order of punishment. There is neither any whisper nor any deliberation or discussion therein with regard to the inquiry report, which had returned a finding exonerating the petitioner. Nonetheless, there is no explanation as to what compelled the Disciplinary Authority to order a fresh enquiry to be carried out by the same Conducting Officer; who, upon direction, submitted a report finding the petitioner guilty, on the basis of which the impugned punishment has been inflicted. The impugned order of punishment is prima facie based upon the criminal case instituted against the petitioner, which has not even been proved by producing any witnesses. It is also significant to note at this position that admittedly the complainant was not examined. No other person, who could have supported the allegation in respect of bribe, was examined. No member of the raiding party was examined. No person present at the place of occurrence was examined. In such circumstances, the inquiry report holding the charges of acceptance of bribe and based upon which the punishment is inflicted, in the opinion of this Court, is wholly perverse and based upon no evidence. Similar mistake has been committed by the Appellate Authority, who upheld the order of the Disciplinary Authority without there being any material/evidence to prove the charges.

In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority is a non-speaking and cryptic and, as such, perverse. This issue is also answered accordingly.

So far the (IV) and final issue with regard to the entitlement of post retiral benefits of the petitioner is concerned, once this Court has held that right from issuance of the memo of charge, the inquiry report as well as the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are per se illegal and not sustainable in law, the petitioner is obviously entitled to get all his admissible retiral benefits and the pension

After having answered the issues, this Court comes to the conclusion that besides the charge memo served upon the petitioner stands vitiated in law as it does not contain the distinct articles of charge and list of witnesses, the action of the respondent authorities in conducting two enquiries for the same disciplinary proceeding, on the basis of same materials and evidence, with former leading to exoneration, without giving any cogent or definitive reason for a fresh inquiry, the disciplinary proceeding is per se illegal and unsustainable.

Besides the aforesaid facts, the Inquiry Officer has failed to prove the charges as neither any oral evidence has been produced nor the witnesses were examined and based upon such Inquiry report, the impugned order of punishment has been inflicted, the same is also cryptic and perverse. Accordingly, the orders of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority are hereby held to be unsustainable and fit to be interfered with. Accordingly, the order contained in Memo No. 433 dated 10.06.2014 passed by the Superintending Engineer, Building Circle, Purnea as well as the appellate order, passed by the Engineer-in-Chief-cum- Additional Commissioner-cum-Special Secretary, Building Construction Department, Bihar, contained in Memo No. 10435 dated 29.11.2019 are hereby set aside.

After setting aside the impugned orders, the petitioner, who has already attained the age of superannuation on 30.09.2012 itself, shall be entitled to all consequential admissible retiral benefits, including pension and arrears thereof, as entitled in law. It is directed that all the benefits must be paid to the petitioner, preferably within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt or production of a copy of this order.

The writ petition stands allowed.

The parties shall bear their own cost.