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Judgment
Date : 25-08-2026 Heard Mr. Nilanjan Chatterjee, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Vishwanath Prasad Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party Economic Offences Unit (EOU) assisted by Mr. Vijay Anand, learned counsel for the EOU.
This application, under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing of the First Information Report (FIR) bearing Economic offence Unit P.S. Case No. 30 of 2022, dated 05.08.2022, registered for the offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Based on an anonymous computerized typed petition, levelling various allegations against the petitioner of having amassed properties disproportionate to his known sources of income containing details of movable and immovable properties allegedly acquired by the petitioner during his service career, Economic offence Unit P.S. Case No. 30 of 2022, dated 05.08.2022, came to be registered against the petitioner.
It has further been alleged in the said petition that the petitioner, having becoming successful in 56th Combined Competitive Examination conducted by the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC), joined on the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, on 10.02.2015, while, prior thereto, the petitioner had also served for brief periods as Probationary Officer in Central Bank of India in the State of Assam; Higher Secondary Teacher in B.P.S.P. Higher Secondary School, Manihari, Katihar, as also as Panchayat Teacher in Primary School, Harlajodi, District Katihar.
It has further been alleged in the said petition that the petitioner, while in the present service was also made accused in Economic Offence Unit P.S. Case No. 20 of 2022, which came to be registered with respect of paper leak in 67th Combined Competitive Examination conducted by the BPSC and remained in judicial custody in the said matter. It has also been alleged that the petitioner was also charge-sheeted in another case bearing Economic Offence Unit P.S. Case No. 23 of 2012.
It has further been alleged in the said petition that the petitioner has also been running a petrol pump in the name of his sister; he has purchased a Toyota Innova Crysta vehicle in the name of his father-in-law; he has deposited huge amounts in different bank accounts in his name as also in the name of his wife and the petitioner has kept the documents relating to properties in the house of his father-in-law. It has also been alleged that huge amount of money has been invested by the petitioner in the names of his close relatives in different banks and financial institutions.
In the said petition purported details of immovable and movable properties acquired by the petitioner has also been given, which the petitioner has allegedly acquired by resorting to corrupt practices.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has, at the very outset, submitted that the present FIR has been lodged on the basis of an anonymous petition, which was received at 13:00 hours on 05 September 2022, the diary entry was made at 13:00 hours and the FIR was also registered at 13:00 hours, without there being any independent examination of the veracity of the information, as the record does not disclose any intervening period during which the information was independently examined.
It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the very registration of the FIR against the petitioner is bad in law as the same has been registered in a mechanical manner without carrying out any preliminary enquiry and also in the absence of any material with regard to the nature or extent of any verification undertaken before 05.09.2022 or any specific material having been brought on record on the basis whereof the calculation was based or the manner in which the alleged disproportionate assets were worked out to substantiate the allegation that during the check period from 10 February 2015 to 05 September 2022, the petitioner acquired disproportionate assets valued at Rs. 63,79,700, representing 81.9% excess over the known and verified lawful sources of income, while the assets are alleged to have been found in the names of the petitioner's wife, Smt. Alisha Kumari, and his mother, Smt. Rita Devi.
It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that mere absence of a preliminary enquiry cannot, by itself, constitute a ground for quashing the FIR. In the present case, however, the opposite parties have not brought on record the detailed source report or other contemporaneous material which, according to them, formed the basis for the calculation of disproportionate assets. It has further been submitted that the position would have been different had a detailed source report containing the relevant financial particulars been brought on record showing that the same were placed before the competent superior officer before registration of the FIR.
In support of the above submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Karnataka v. Channakeshava H.D., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 753, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in corruption cases a preliminary enquiry, though desirable, is not mandatory in every case. Where a superior officer has before him a detailed source report disclosing a cognizable offence, the requirement of a preliminary enquiry may be dispensed with. The Supreme Court also made clear that the necessity of such an enquiry depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has, in support of his submission, also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by a coordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Prashant Kumar vs. State of Bihar (Cr. Misc. No. 26158 of 2025) dated 21.11.2025, and has referred to paragraph 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 40 and 41 thereof, which read as under: -
“9.Learned senior counsel submitted that as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of P. Sirajuddin v State of Madras, reported in (1970) 1 SCC 595, that before a public servant irrespective of his rank is publicly accused of acts of dishonesty amounting to serious misconduct or corrupt practice, and before any First Information Report is lodged against him, a suitable preliminary enquiry by a responsible officer is indispensable. The Apex Court has cautioned that the mere filing of such a report against an officer occupying a high position, even if ultimately found baseless, can cause incalculable harm not only to the individual officer but also to the department as a whole. The Apex Court further observed that where the Government has established a Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department, as in the State of Madras, and has entrusted it with conducting enquiries of this nature, no exception can be taken to an enquiry carried out by officers of such a department.
10.Learned counsel submitted that this principle has well been discussed by the Apex Court in case of Lalitha Kumari v Govt of UP, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1, that the essential requirement for registration of an FIR is that the information furnished to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such circumstances, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, where the information does not prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, the police are not required to immediately register an FIR and may undertake a limited preliminary verification or inquiry only for the purpose of ascertaining whether a cognizable offence is made out. Learned senior counsel submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court has further clarified that the nature and circumstances warranting a preliminary inquiry depend upon the facts of each case. Illustratively, preliminary inquiries may be conducted in categories such as: (a) matrimonial or family disputes; (b) commercial offences; (c) medical negligence cases; (d) corruption cases; and (e) cases involving abnormal delay or laches in initiating criminal prosecution, such as when the reporting of the alleged incident is delayed by more than three months without adequate explanation. The Apex Court has emphasized that these categories are merely illustrative and not exhaustive of situations where a preliminary inquiry may be justified and desirable.
11.Learned senior counsel submitted that the same principle was reiterated in the case of Charan Singh v State of Maharashtra, reported in, (2021) 5 SCC 469 and it was emphasized on the desirability and permissibility of enquiry at pre-FIR stage in corruption matters.
12.Learned senior counsel next submitted that in the present case was registered solely on the basis of an alleged secret information, and that the facts narrated therein have been incorrectly and selectively recorded with the intention of falsely implicating the Petitioner. He submitted that pursuant to the registration of the FIR, a search was carried out; however, the seizure memo does not disclose recovery of any article, asset, or document which had not already been declared by the Petitioner in his annual statements of assets and liabilities filed before the department, or in his income-tax returns filed year after year. He further submitted that even during the departmental inquiry conducted nearly two years after lodging of the FIR, no incriminating material was brought on record by the investigating authorities who themselves appeared as witnesses and no material exists with the Respondent authorities to conclude that the Petitioner was in possession of disproportionate assets, rendering the entire action of the S.V.U. to malafide in absence of prima facie case to be made out against the petitioner.
13.Learned senior counsel further submitted that although a preliminary inquiry may not be mandatory in every case, its necessity has been consistently emphasized in several judicial pronouncements, particularly in matters relating to allegations of disproportionate assets, which mandate the officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police before authorizing the Dy. S.P. to register the FIR, was required to arrive at his satisfaction on the basis of the source information and the date on which it was received. In the absence of satisfaction founded upon credible material, the whole action is violation of Section 13 (1) (b) r/w Section 13 (2) and Section of the P.C. Act. In the present case, the Respondents failed to conduct any preliminary inquiry, resulting in serious prejudice to the Petitioner and exposing him to unwarranted harassment. He submitted that the Petitioner is a well-reputed public servant serving in the Department of Prohibition, Excise and Registration, and that had a proper preliminary inquiry been undertaken, the baseless nature of the allegations would have been evident at the outset and no action would have been initiated against him.
40.From all the subsequent judgments, it appears that the Apex Court while clarifying the law laid down by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari (Supra), mandate that there should be satisfaction of the officer concerned and recording of the credible source information, reproducing such information to arrive into his satisfaction before lodging of FIR becomes necessary in such cases where preliminary enquiry is not desirable and in absence of recording the date of information and source in detail in seisin of the source information report in detail and well-reasoned, will certainly vitiate the accusation made in the FIR, if at all, the preliminary enquiry can be relaxed.
41.Considering the facts and after perusal of the record, it is noted that the FIR against the petitioner was registered by the Special Vigilance Unit (SVU) in the year 09.11.2022 allegedly on the basis of credible information alleging that Shri Prashant Kumar, who is presently serving as Assistant Inspector General, Tirhut Division, Muzaffarpur, had illicitly and intentionally amassed assets amounting to Rs.2,06,80,785/-, which are purported to be disproportionate to his known legal sources of income. However, despite the lapse of nearly three years, the investigating agency has not completed the investigation, which, in the considered view of the Court, has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner.”
Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, in the case of T.N. Chikkarayappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 1268, to submit that, in the said judgment, while considering the importance of examining the material available at the pre-FIR stage in a disproportionate-assets case, the Court has though ruled out that every corruption FIR must necessarily be preceded by a preliminary enquiry, but has held that the Court must examine whether there was adequate foundational material before the FIR was registered.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has, referring to the returns of agricultural income of the petitioner for the financial years 2020-21 and 2021-2022, brought on record by way of rejoinder, submitted that the petitioner had agricultural income of Rs. 34,55,800 for the financial years 2020-21 and 2021-22, which is supported by the certificate of the Circle Officer, Manihari, District Katihar, and which was also brought to the notice of the Commandant, BSAP-14, Patna, by letters dated 26 April 2021 and 11 July 2022. It is further stated that the said income was also reflected in the petitioner's Income Tax Returns.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of P. Nallammal & Anr. Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police reported in (1999) 6 SCC 559, and has referred to paragraph 20 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder: -
“20.The above contention perhaps could have been advanced before the enactment of the PC Act, 1988 because Section 5(1)(e) of the old PC Act did not contain an “Explanation” as Section 13(1)(e) now contains. As per the Explanation the “known sources of income” of the public servant, for the purpose of satisfying the court, should be “any lawful source”. Besides being the lawful source the Explanation further enjoins that receipt of such income should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with the provisions of any law applicable to such public servant at the relevant time. So a public servant cannot now escape from the tentacles of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act by showing other legally forbidden sources, albeit such sources are outside the purview of clauses (a) to (d) of the sub-section.”
Learned counsel for the petitioner has, at this stage, submitted that the opposite parties have not specifically disputed, in their counter affidavit, the existence of the aforesaid certified agricultural income nor has any specific reason been disclosed as to why this income was not taken into account in arriving at the alleged disproportion of Rs. 63,79,700.
In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon an unreported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., (Criminal Appeal No. 5009 of 2024), decided on 04 December 2024, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the material relating to assets and income, including Income Tax Returns, while examining the correctness of an alleged disproportion. The decision does not mean that every Income Tax Return is conclusive in a criminal investigation; its significance is that undisputed statutory returns and disclosed sources of income cannot simply be ignored while determining the foundational figure of disproportion. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 9 and 10 of the said Judgment has held as under:
“9.We are of the view that the Appellant’s wife’s income must be considered as well while calculating the total income and assets. Both the Appellant and his wife have filed the relevant income tax returns in order to show their respective incomes and assets. The Respondents in their Counter-Affidavit have not denied these income tax returns or alleged them to be forged or fabricated. Therefore, when a public servant is submitting his income tax returns, they should be presumed to be true and correct. If you duly consider the income tax returns of the Appellant and his wife for the check period of the year 1996-2020, the total income is coming up to be Rs.1,21,06,268/-(Rupees One Crore Twenty One Lakh Six Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Eight only) which is in fact more than the assets amounting to Rs.1,16,02,669/- (Rupees One Crore Sixteen Lakh Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Nine only) which is said to be the disproportionate assets in question under the present FIR.
10.Further, we have considered that the check period is from the year 1996 to 2020, which is almost twenty-five years. It must be taken into account that over such a long period of time, there is inflation and a natural progression in the changing economy that affects the value of assets such as property. This can understandably lead to discrepancies in declaring the value of assets over the years. Therefore, there should be a more dynamic approach while considering an individual’s income and assets over the span of two decades, such as in the present case. The notion that the declared value of an asset such as property or gold will remain static is flawed. This has to be considered while examining an individual’s assets and income while making a determination regarding disproportionate assets. Such an examination needs to reflect such adjustments and changes as is natural with the progression of time.”
Learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case as also taking into consideration the averment made in counter affidavit that investigation is still in progress and in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as relied upon by him, continuance of the prosecution against the petitioner is an abuse of process of the law and the Court and, thus, the same is required to be quashed.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has submitted that the prayer of the petitioner does not require consideration and this application is fit to be dismissed. He has submitted that the main contention of the petitioner is with regard to calculation which has formed the basis of the FIR, which is required to be verified through thorough investigation and the investigation in this case is still going on and, at this stage, interference by this Court is not warranted.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has further submitted that the petitioner, despite being a public servant, is not cooperating in the investigation even after being asked to do so by different written requisitions sent to him nor he has furnished the requisite details and supporting documents to the EOU. The materials brought on record by way of counter affidavit suggest that the petitioner has amassed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income and the same are still required to be verified.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has further submitted that the assets, income and employment of the wife of the petitioner is under the process of verification and the Innova Crysta Vehicle was consistently under use of the wife of the petitioner as is apparent from the materials brought on record through counter affidavit.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has further submitted that though agricultural income is sought to be shown, but no agricultural land stands in the name of the petitioner.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has further submitted that there are no documents on record to suggest that loans were taken by petitioner’s wife from the father-in-law of the petitioner and a friend.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has placed reliance on the judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Amit Lodha v. State of Bihar & Ors. (Cr.W.J.C. No. 17 of 2023) dated 22.01.2024, particularly paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41 and 46, in support of his submission.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties has lastly submitted that no interference is required by this Court at this stage.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
It is apparent from the records that the present FIR came to be registered on an anonymous letter received by the opposite parties without there being any preliminary enquiry.
It appears that, in the present case, the agricultural income relied upon by the petitioner is not merely an assertion made for the first time in the quashing proceedings. It is stated to have been certified by a government authority, disclosed to the superior authority of the department before registration of the FIR and reflected in statutory returns. The opposite parties have not brought the relevant materials on record showing that the income was false, fabricated or otherwise incapable of consideration. It’s omission, therefore, materially affects the calculation on which the prosecution case rests.
The petitioner has also disputed the inclusion of certain assets standing in the names of his family members. As regards the property standing in the name of his mother, Smt. Rita Devi, it is stated that the property had been purchased by the petitioner's late father from his own funds. No material has been brought before the Court establishing that the petitioner was the beneficial owner of that property or that the consideration for its acquisition was provided by him.
The petitioner has also raised a similar objection with regard to a Toyota Innova vehicle. The petitioner relies upon documents obtained from his father-in-law which, according to him, establish that the vehicle belongs to his father-in-law; was financed through a bank loan and was paid for from his own resources. The documents were obtained by the investigating officer on 25 September 2025, pursuant to letters dated 10 September 2025 and 25 September 2025. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that these documents were not fairly reflected in the subsequent counter-affidavit.
These objections cannot be rejected merely because the assets stand in the names of relatives. At the same time, the Court must also bear in mind that, at the stage of an FIR, the prosecution is not required to establish guilt. The relevant question is whether the material placed before the Court provides a prima facie basis for attributing the assets to the petitioner. In the present case, the opposite parties have not pointed to material demonstrating the petitioner's beneficial ownership of the mother's property or his financing of the vehicle.
The submission on behalf of the petitioner that the allegations do not identify any specific transaction through which he is alleged to have acquired assets by misuse of his official position. It is also pointed out that no superior officer or other government official has been identified as a person who can speak to any alleged misuse of office. The search conducted on 05 August 2022 pursuant to a judicial warrant is stated to have yielded no incriminating material. The counter-affidavit nevertheless states that bank account analysis and asset verification is still under progress.
The principle governing exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, and the same remains the leading authority on the circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 522, reiterates that the High Court must not ordinarily undertake an assessment of the reliability of evidence, but may interfere where the allegations, even taken at their face value, do not disclose an offence or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of process.
The question, therefore, is whether the material placed on record discloses a sufficient foundation for continuation of the proceedings. The Court is not weighing the prosecution evidence as if it were conducting a trial. It is examining whether the basic calculation of disproportion is founded upon material, which has taken into account the relevant disclosed income and whether the assets attributed to the petitioner have been connected to him by material sufficient to justify continuation of the criminal prosecution.
From perusal of the counter-affidavit, it transpires that the investigation remains ongoing and is far from completion. Nearly four years have elapsed from registration of the FIR, however, till date no charge-sheet has been filed. Though the delay by itself would not justify quashing, but it becomes relevant here because the investigation continues to remain inconclusive despite the case being founded upon a specific calculation of assets and income and the material relied upon by the petitioner directly challenges the components of that calculation.
At this stage, this Court deems it expedient to refer to a seven-judges bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578, wherein, while disapproving of setting up of strict timelines by the Courts for completion of investigation etc., the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed: “The mental agony, expense and strain which a person proceeded against in criminal law has to undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself have persuaded the constitutional courts of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial, again, would encompass within its sweep all its stages including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial, in short everything commencing with an accusation and expiring with the final verdict, the two being respectively the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, of the journey which an accused must necessarily undertake once faced with an implication. The constitutional philosophy propounded as right to speedy trial has though grown in age by almost two and a half decades, the goal sought to be achieved is yet a far-off peak. Myriad fact situations bearing testimony to denial of such fundamental right to the accused persons, on account of failure on the part of prosecuting agencies and the executive to act, and their turning an almost blind eye at securing expeditious and speedy trial so as to satisfy the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution.”
This Court also feels tempted to refer to a just recent judgment rendered by three-Judges bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering number of pronouncements, culled out the features of fair trial. The third point mentioned therein is important here. It reads, “Process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude.”.
As far as the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the counter-affidavit contains truncated or incomplete annexures, including Annexure-O.P./C, and that pages concerning landed properties and disclosures made by the petitioner have not been placed on record is concerned, the Court does not proceed on the assumption that such omission is deliberate. Nevertheless, where the Court is required to decide whether the prosecution has a sufficient foundational basis, the complete material, relevant to the calculation, ought to be available for consideration.
In the case of Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 15 SCC 488, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 13 has held as follows: -
“13.In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
At this stage, the Court deems it proper to take note of the fact that the petitioner was also acquitted in Economic Offence Unit P.S. Case No. 20 of 2022, described as the paper leak case, on 19 July 2023, and the acquittal was affirmed by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 193 of 2024 by the judgment dated 09 January 2025. That acquittal does not determine the present case and is not being treated as evidence of innocence in the present FIR, however, it has been taken note of only as part of the overall background in which the Court has considered the quality and progress of the present investigation.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in it’s judgment, in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947, in para 20, has reiterated the structured approach to a quashing prayer based upon material produced by the accused, which is as follows:
“20.The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:—
(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii)Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii)Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
(iv)Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
In the present matter, the documents relating to agricultural income, the prior departmental disclosures and the documents concerning the third-party vehicle are not being treated as conclusive proof of the petitioner's innocence. They are, however, material of a nature, which directly bears upon the calculation forming the foundation of the FIR. The opposite parties have not shown, in the counter-affidavit, why the certified agricultural income was excluded or what material connects the disputed family assets to the petitioner.
On a cumulative consideration of these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the prosecution case, as presently placed before the Court, does not have a sufficiently reliable foundation for continuation of the criminal proceeding. The issue is not merely the absence of a preliminary enquiry. The more substantial difficulty is the absence from the record of the detailed foundational material said to have preceded registration of the FIR, coupled with the unexplained exclusion of substantial disclosed agricultural income and the absence of material connecting the disputed third-party assets to the petitioner.
The record reveals that preliminary scrutiny prescribed under the Government order issued by the Government of Bihar vide Letter No. VIG. Department/ Estb./ Misc./6192005/4927, dated 29.08.2008, wherein all the Departmental Heads were categorically directed to scrutinize the movable and immovable property, return of their employees and, upon noticing any suspicious entry, to issue a show-cause notice prior to taking any further action, has not been complied with in the present case. In the present case, before lodging of the FIR, such preliminary scrutiny, if undertaken in accordance with the said government order in respect of the petitioner, who is a Deputy Superintendent of Police, belonging to the Bihar Police Service, and who, in accordance with the Bihar Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1976, had been regularly submitting his annual statements of assets and liabilities, in such circumstances, if any discrepancies were noticed, the same ought to have been clarified from him by the vigilance authority directly or through departmental hierarchy under whom the petitioner was serving.
It is well settled that the power under Section 482 CrPC/528 BNSS is to be exercised sparingly and that disputed questions of fact ordinarily fall for consideration during investigation and trial. The conclusion reached herein does not require any re-appreciation of evidence. It follows from the foundational material placed before the Court and the manner in which the alleged disproportion has been calculated.
This Court deems it relevant to note that, in it’s judgment, in the case of Harshendra Kumar D. Vs Rebatilata Kiley & Ors. reported in (2011) 3 SCC 351, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made it clear that it is not an absolute rule of law that the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Now, 528 BNSS) or, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (Now, 457 BNSS), cannot, under any circumstances, look into the nature of public document or such materials, which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in order to ascertain if the criminal prosecution should or should not be allowed to proceed. In fact, the Supreme Court has also made it clear, in the case of Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), that no greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case The Supreme Court has, therefore, held, in the case of Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), that the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the un-controverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of director of the company, which, if looked into, would have made it clear that the appellant's resignation from the post of director of the company was much before the cheques had been issued by the company. The relevant observations, which appear. in this regard, at paragraph 25 and 26, in Harshendra Kumar D. (supra), read as under:
“25.In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon be the accused, which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code it is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents which are beyond suspicion or doubt placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be a travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage.
26.Criminal prosecution is a serious matter it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the un-controverted documents relating to the appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company."
(emphasis supplied).”
The decision in the case of Harshendra Kumar D. (supra) makes it clear that when the High Court is approached for quashing of a criminal prosecution in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (Now Section 528 BNSS) or in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.PC (Now Section 457 BNSS), the Court must remain mindful that criminal prosecution directly impacts the liberty of an individual and that no greater injury can be inflicted upon a person's reputation by unnecessarily subjecting him to a criminal trial. Consequently, there is no absolute bar on the High Court's power to take into consideration any uncontroverted or unimpeachable document that is already on the record for the purpose of determining whether the criminal proceedings should be permitted to continue. Where, on the basis of such public or uncontroverted material, the Court is satisfied that allowing the prosecution to proceed would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, it is not only empowered, but duty bound to quash the proceedings.
In the facts of the present case, the omission to account for the documented agricultural income of Rs. 34,55,800, the absence of the detailed source material said to have formed the basis of the FIR, the failure to show a prima facie connection between the petitioner and the disputed family/third-party assets, and the continued inconclusive investigation, when considered together, materially undermine the foundation of the prosecution case.
In similar circumstances, the acquisitions being reflected in income tax returns, the Apex Court granted relief to the public servant in M. Krishna Reddy v. State [M. Krishna Reddy v. State reported in (1992) 4 SCC 45, it was observed as follows:
“14.We are unable to appreciate that reasoning and hold that the prosecution has not satisfactorily discharged the expected burden of proof in disproving the claim of the appellant. Therefore, on the face of these unassailable documents i.e. the wealth tax and income tax returns, we hold that the appellant is entitled to have a deduction of Rs 56,240 from the disproportionate assets of Rs 2,37,842.
15.The next plea advanced by the learned counsel is for a deduction of Rs 65,857.06 which reflects the value of the gold ornaments which according to the appellant belong to his married daughter and wife as stridhana. What the appellant would state is that gold jewellery worth Rs 32,607.06 belonged to his wife as stridhana and the remaining gold jewellery worth Rs 33,250 belong to his married daughter Dr Indira. In support of his defence that gold jewellery does belong to his wife as stridhana, reliance was placed on the evidence of PWs 51, 21, 27 and 40 and Exs. P-45, 46, 53-55. To substantiate the case that certain gold jewellery belonged to his daughter, Indira, the appellant placed reliance on the evidence of PWs 17, 23 and 27 and Exs. 56, 57 and 58. Of the witnesses examined, PWs 23 and 40 were treated as hostile. When we go through the evidence of these witnesses and documents, we are of the opinion that the defence case of the appellant is well founded. The prosecution cannot be allowed to say that the oral and documentary evidence should not be accepted, especially when the witnesses, barring witness Nos. 23 and 40 have not been treated by the prosecution as hostile witnesses. Admittedly, the jewellery which are claimed to be belonging to Dr Indira were found kept in a separate locker in the bank standing in the name of Dr Indira. Mr Madhava Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would urge that since the key of the locker was seized from the house of the appellant, it can be legitimately presumed that it was the father who had been keeping the gold jewellery in the locker, though it stood in the name of his daughter as benami. This contention of Mr Madhava Reddy was opposed by Mr P.P. Rao stating firstly that the locker could not be opened except by Dr Indira in whose name the locker stood. Secondly, Dr Indira was living with her husband at Pattanchery which is 30 kms. away from Hyderabad where the jewellery were kept in the bank. According to Mr Madhava Reddy, even the mother of Dr Indira, namely, the wife of the appellant was also allowed to operate the locker. Taking into consideration the relationship of the parties, we feel that there is nothing strange in the conduct of the daughter handing over the key to her mother at Hyderabad and also authorising her to operate the locker in the bank. Whatever it may be nothing adverse can be safely inferred that the daughter was holding this jewellery as benami for her father. To rebut the case of the appellant that the certain jewellery was stridhana, we do not find any material on the side of the prosecution. The evidence led by the appellant to substantiate that the jewellery of his wife were stridhana are more acceptable. Under these circumstances, we are unable to agree with the finding of the High Court and on the other hand, we hold that the sum of Rs 65,857.06 representing the value of the gold jewellery should be given a deduction from the value of the disproportionate assets.”
To sum up, this Court has held that in matters of corruption a preliminary enquiry although desirable, but is not mandatory. In such a case where a superior officer, based on a detailed source report disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence, passes an order for registration of FIR, the requirement of preliminary enquiry can be relaxed. This position has to be understood in the light of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.
In the facts and circumstances, as noted above, this Court is of the view that continuation of FIR No. 30 of 2022 and the consequential Special Case No. 53 of 2022 would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court as also for the reason that the case falls within the parameters governing exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra) and subsequent decisions.
Accordingly, the First Information Report (FIR) bearing Economic offence Unit P.S. Case No. 30 of 2022, dated 05.08.2022, under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is hereby quashed. Consequently, Special Case No. 53 of 2022 pending before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna, arising out of the aforesaid FIR, also stands quashed.
The present Application stands allowed.
Footnotes
- 1.CAV DATE 22.06.2026.
- 2.Uploading Date 25.08.2026.
- 3.Transmission Date 25.08.2026.