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Judgment
Thanikachalam, J.—The writ petition was filed to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the respondents relating to
the case of the petitioner in G.I.No. 1025 dated August 1, 1978, and to quash the same and for a consequential direction to the respondents to
grant full quick succession relief in the estate duty assessment of the estate of Rangammal Krishnamachari in C.I.R. No. 1025.
The facts are one Ramaswamy, son of the deceased, Rangammal Krishnamachari, died intestate on October 18, 1969. On his death, all his
properties devolved on Mrs. Rangammal Krishnamachari as the sole heir of V. K. Ramaswami. V. K. Ramaswami''s properties were subjected to
estate duty by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Madras, in his assessment order dated may 31, 1972 in G.I.R. No. 703. The properties
subjected to estate duty comprised, apart from the other properties, immovable properties, viz., a house at Lloyds Road and a vacant site at
Mowbrays Road, Madras-18. The vacant site was sold for a sum of Rs. 1,30,000 and the estate duty of V. K. Ramaswami was partly paid out of
the sale proceed. The house at Lloyds Road, Madras, was also sold on November 29, 1972, for a sum of Rs. 4,50,000 and the sale proceeds
were invested in fixed deposit account in banks, deposits in public companies and units of the Unit Trust. Out of the sale proceeds, a sum of Rs.
50,000 was paid as advance towards the estate duty besides tax on capital gains was also paid.
Mrs. Rangammal Krishnamachari passed away on June 27, 1973. She had three sons and two daughters. One of her sons, V. K. Ramaswami,
predeceased her and he died intestate on October 18, 1969. As already stated, since Rangammal Krishnamachari inherited the properties of the
said V. K. Ramaswami as his sole heir, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Madras, determined the principal value of the estate of the late V.
K. Ramaswami, at a sum of Rs. 7,74,917 by his estate duty assessment order in G.I.R. No. 703 dated May 31, 1972, and levied estate duty in a
sum of Rs. 1,44,665.09 and the duty was fully paid.
As Mrs. Rangammal Krishnamachari died within five years of the death of V. K. Ramaswami, section 31 of the Estate Duty Act was attracted.
u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, the estate duty is payable for any property passing if on the death of any person and that subsequently
within five yeas estate duty would again become payable on the same property or any part thereof as a result of quick succession. However, some
relief will be granted u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, as provided therein.
The question for our consideration in this case is whether the respondents have levied proper estate duty u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act on the
passing away of Mrs. Rangammal Krishnamachari. To be more precise, the question is whether the concession contemplated u/s 31 of the Act is
available to the investments, representing the sale proceeds of the immovable property, made in banks or otherwise. According to the Revenue,
the concession contemplated u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act will be available only when the identity of the property is maintained. In other words,
the identical property to which a person succeeded must be available at the time of the death of such person within five years from the first death. If
the identity is lost by conversion or otherwise, the concession is not available, is the contention of the Revenue. On the other hand, the contention
of the accountable person is that so long as it is possible to link or connect the investment made to the property left by the deceased (death of first
person), then the concession u/s 31 is available. In other words, ""same property"" does not mean ""identical property"" but means ""similar property
or ""representative item"". Let us consider the issue. The term ""property"" is defined in section 2(15) of the Act as including in respect of any interest
in property, movable or immovable, the proceeds of sale thereof and any money or investments for the time being representing the proceeds of
sale and also includes any property converted from one species into another by any method. In view of the provisions contained in the above said
two sections of the Estate Duty Act, the accountable person claimed quick succession relief in respect of the sale proceeds of the properties which
are sold and converted. The second respondent completed the estate duty assessment of the estate of Rangammal Krishnamachari determining the
principal value of the estate at Rs. 9,76,591. The above-said sum determined includes also the value of the immovable properties inherited by the
deceased from her son, V. K. Ramaswami. However, the second respondent did not grant the quick succession relief as claimed. It was stated
that on letters written by the accountable person, the second respondent on August 1, 1978, revised the original order of assessment and re-
determined the principal value at Rs. 9,85,386 and in the revised order of assessment,he granted the quick succession relief. But, he restricted the
relief to a sum of Rs. 3,879 as against Rs. 23,884 claimed by the accountable person. The second respondent in restricting the relief has acted on
the order of the first respondent who is the authority to grant relief.
Now, it is to be seen whether the accountable person is entitled to the quick succession relief as claimed in its entirety. However, in the orders
passed by both the respondents, there was no reasoning given in the matter of restricting the relief as asked for. Only in the counter filed by the
respondents, it was stated that quick succession relief as contemplated u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act cannot be granted to the accountable person
in respect of the sale proceeds of the above-said two immovable properties since, according to learned standing counsel for the Department, the
words ""same property"" occurring in section 31 of the Estate Duty Act which would enable to claim the benefit u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act would
apply only to those properties whose identity is not lost on the second death. According to learned counsel appearing for the accountable person,
the words ""same property"" has relevance only to the properties of the person who died earlier and it need not be identical for claiming quick
succession relief. Learned counsel further submitted that the terms ""property"" contained in section 31 of the Estate Duty Act is to be read subject
to the definition as given in section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act which includes both movable and immovable properties and property converted
from one species into another by any method. Learned counsel appearing for the accountable person placed relience on certain passages
contained in the text book ""Dymond''s Death Duties"" (14th Edition), wherein at pages 992 and 993, while explaining what is ""property"", it was
stated that ""it applies not only to property of every description including cash, but also to property which is identifiable on the second death as
having passed on the first death, on assumptions which are drawn generously in favour of the tax payer.
Learned counsel also placed reliance on P. Ramanatha Aiyar''s Law Lexicon, at page 1151, wherein it was stated as under :
same ''does not always mean identical. It frequently means of the kind or species, not the specific thing.
As ordinarily understood, the word ''same'', when used in comparison, means of like kind, species, sort, dimensions, or the like, not differing in
character, or in the quality or quantities compared, corresponding not discordant, similar, like.
Learned counsel also placed reliance on a judgment of the Punjab High Court in the case of Deva Sharma Vs. Laxmi Narain Gaddodia and
Others, , wherein it was held that :
The words ''similar'' and ''same'' are undoubtedly often loosely used in the same sense, and a large number of instances have been collected under
the word ''same'' in Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary in which it has been held that ''same'' has been used in the sense of ''similar''...
The conclusion would, therefore, appear to be that although the word ''same'' is frequently loosely used in the sense of ''similar'', the word ''similar''
never means ''same'' in its strict sense, and, in fact, it cannot, since similarity implies the existence of two or more objects for comparison.
Learned counsel further placed reliance on the following passage occurring in Green''s Death Duties, Seventh Edition, at page 19;
The expression ''property'' in the Finance Acts includes real property and personal property, and the proceeds of sale thereof respectively, and
any money or investment for the time being representing such proceeds. It includes also the benefit conferred by the extinguishment at the expense
of the deceased of a debt or other right.
However, learned standing counsel for the Department contended that what is stated in section 31 of the Estate Duty Act should be strictly
construed and where the property subject to estate duty on the first death has been sold in between two deaths, the relief will not be available for
such accountable person but learned counsel for the accountable person contended that while the proceeds of sale are clearly identified as arising
out of the property, which was subjected to estate duty earlier, the relief can be granted. We have heard both the parties.
It remains to be seen whether the accountable person is entitled to the quick succession relief as contemplated u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act.
As we have already pointed out, section 31 of the Estate Duty Act enables the accountable person to get quick succession relief under
circumstances mentioned therein. In this context, the meaning of the words occurring in section 31 of the Estate Duty Act, viz., ""same property
assumes importance. According to the various authorities cited supra, we have seen that the ""same property"" does not mean the identical property.
The property can be either in the form of movable or immovable including property converted from one species into another. The term ""property
is defined in section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act as including in respect of any property movable or immovable, the proceeds of sale thereof and
any money or investment for the time being representing the proceeds of sale and also includes any property converted from one species into
another by any method. It may also be noted that section 31 of the Estate Duty Act does not separately define the term ""property"". Therefore, for
the purpose of understanding the meaning of the word ""property"", we have to rely upon the definition section, viz., section 2(15) of the Estate Duty
Act.
It is well known that the Estate Duty Act of 1953 is based upon this branch of law prevalent in England. According to Green''s Death Duties
(Seventh Edition, at page 19), ""property"" mentioned in the Finance Acts includes real property, personal property, and the proceeds of sale
thereof, respectively, and any money or investment for the time being representing such proceeds. Our attention was also drawn to the fact that
neither the Estate Duty Officer nor the Central Board of Direct Taxes, while refusing to grant relief of quick succession in respect of certain items
of sale proceeds of immovable properties, did not give any reason for such refusal. It may also be noted that even in the counter filed by the
Department, it was stated that the sale proceeds are identifiable as the sale consideration of the abovesaid two immovable properties. Where the
sale proceeds are clearly identified as arising out of the sale of the said immovable property, the relief as contemplated u/s 31 of the Estate Duty
Act cannot be denied in view of the meaning to be given to the term ""property"" as per section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act and other authorities
cited supra. In view of the above said finding that the term ""property"" includes both movable or immovable and the sale proceeds thereof, we
consider that the respondents are not correct in restricting the relief as claimed by the accountable person u/s 31 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. In
such circumstances, we direct the respondents to grant the relief of quick succession in entirely towards the sale proceeds of the above said
immovable properties to the accountable person as prayed for.
In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Though the relief of certiorarified mandamus is asked for, it is enough if a mandamus as indicated
above is granted. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with costs to the limited extent indicated above. Counsel''s fee Rs. 500.