Ramswaroop vs State Of Rajasthan

It is also noteworthy that the appellant was originally charged with a number of serious offences under the Indian Penal Code as well as the Arms Act, but the prosecution failed to establish those charges during trial. Consequently, the appellant came to be acquitted of all the said offences and his conviction ultimately remained confined to the offence punishable under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act.

On an overall consideration of the evidence and the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the conviction recorded against the appellant. The finding of guilt, therefore, deserves to be affirmed.

Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act is affirmed.

A prayer was made before the learned Trial Court for extending the benefit of probation. The said prayer, however, came to be declined without recording any specific reason for such refusal.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid aspect assumes significance. The exercise of sentencing jurisdiction is distinct from the determination of guilt. Once a person is found guilty, the Court is required to consider not merely the nature of the offence but also the circumstances in which it was committed, the antecedents and character of the offender and, wherever the statutory scheme permits, the possibility of his reformation and rehabilitation. The sentence imposed must consequently reflect a conscious judicial assessment of all relevant circumstances rather than being treated as an automatic consequence of conviction.

The provisions relating to probation are an expression of the reformative dimension of criminal jurisprudence. They recognise that, in an appropriate case, the ends of justice may be better served by affording an offender an opportunity of reformation than by subjecting him to incarceration.

Section 360 Cr.P.C. specifically contemplates consideration of release on probation having regard, inter alia, to the age, character and antecedents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed. The statutory scheme is further reinforced by Section 361 Cr.P.C., which mandates that where the Court could have dealt with an accused under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, but chooses not to do so, it shall record special reasons for such course.

The requirement of recording reasons is of substantive significance. It obliges the sentencing Court to demonstrate that the question of probation has not been overlooked and that its rejection is founded upon circumstances germane to the case. The discretion undoubtedly remains with the Court, but such discretion has to be exercised judicially and upon relevant considerations.

In the present case, the circumstances which were brought to the notice of the learned Trial Court were not inconsequential. The appellant was a first-time offender; no previous conviction or criminal antecedent was attributed to him; he had remained involved in the criminal proceedings for nearly nine years; and, most importantly, the prosecution had failed to establish the other charges with which he had initially been charged. These circumstances were certainly relevant for determining whether the appellant deserved the benefit of the reformative provisions.

Yet, the impugned judgment does not disclose any specific reason as to why the prayer for probation was considered unmerited. There is no meaningful discussion of the appellant's antecedents or of the circumstances which may have rendered probation inappropriate in his case.

This Court is conscious of the fact that the benefit of probation is not to be extended as a matter of course merely because an accused has no previous conviction. The nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission remain relevant considerations. Nevertheless, where the plea for probation is specifically raised and the circumstances of the offender call for its consideration, the Court is required to deal with the plea in a reasoned manner. A mere rejection, unsupported by any special or cogent reason, does not satisfy the statutory requirement.

Viewed in that perspective, this Court finds that the sentencing exercise undertaken by the learned Trial Court, insofar as the prayer for probation is concerned, falls short of the statutory requirement. The learned Trial Court ought to have recorded reasons disclosing why, despite the circumstances attending the appellant, the benefit of probation was considered inappropriate. To this limited extent, therefore, the sentencing part of the impugned judgment warrants interference. There is, however, a subsequent development which has a material bearing upon the relief that can now effectively be granted.

As noticed at the outset, this Court has been informed by the learned Trial Court that the appellant has already undergone the entire sentence imposed upon him, including the sentence awarded in default of payment of fine.

In view of the said subsequent development, the question of remanding the matter for reconsideration of the sentence or for passing any further substantive order has substantially lost its practical significance. The appellant has already undergone the sentence which was imposed upon him and, therefore, no further incarceration can usefully be directed at this stage.

Since the appellant has already undergone the entire sentence imposed upon him, including the sentence awarded in default of payment of fine, no further order with regard to the sentence is required to be passed. If the appellant is presently in custody pursuant to the impugned judgment and is not required in connection with any other case, he shall be released forthwith.