Ramlakhan Mishra vs Ankit Gupta & Ors.

This miscellaneous appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”) has been preferred by the appellant/claimant against the award dated 11.03.2026 passed by learned Member, Shri Prakash Kaser, First Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sidhi, in MACC No.03/2019, whereby the claim application preferred by the appellant under Section 166 of the MV Act seeking compensation of Rs.3,15,000/- has been dismissed.

The appellant/claimant had instituted the claim application under Section 166 of the MV Act on 13.05.2019, impleading Ankit Gupta as non-applicant No.1, Ramvishwas Gupta as non-applicant No.2 and United India Insurance Company Limited as non-applicant No.3. The claim arose out of an accident dated 05.07.2018 at about 11:30 a.m. at Village Amdad, District Sidhi, involving motorcycle bearing registration No.MP-53-MI-6636. According to the claimant, while he was standing near the house of Bala Prasad Mishra, the motorcycle, being driven by non-applicant No.1, hit him from behind in a rash and negligent manner, causing bodily injuries and consequent difficulty in undertaking agricultural work. Thus, the claim was one arising from injuries sustained in a motor accident.

The learned Claims Tribunal has returned the claim application by dismissing the same on the ground of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the CPC”). Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed.

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Member has committed a fundamental error in dismissing the claim application on a purely technical ground relating to the representation of minor non-applicant No.1. It is submitted that the claim application itself disclosed the minority of non-applicant No.1 and specifically described him as having been impleaded through his natural guardian/father, namely, Ramvishwas Gupta. It is further submitted that the claimant was never directed, at any stage during pendency of the claim proceedings, to take steps for appointment of a guardian or to comply with Order 32 CPC. It is also submitted that the learned Member has referred to Order 32 Rule 3(Ka) CPC, although the provision relating to appointment of a guardian for a minor defendant is contained in Order 32 Rule 3 CPC. It is contended that, even assuming that some further step regarding representation of the minor was necessary, the appropriate course was to secure such representation and thereafter adjudicate the claim on merits, rather than dismiss the claim itself.

Learned counsel appearing for non-applicants No.1 and 2 has supported the impugned award and submitted that, since non-applicant No.1 was a minor at the relevant time, proper compliance with the provisions relating to representation of a minor was necessary before adjudication of the claim.

None appeared for non-applicant No.3.

At the outset, it is necessary to notice an aspect apparent from the record. The claim application disclosed non-applicant No.1 Ankit Gupta as a minor and further disclosed that he was impleaded through his natural guardian/father, namely, Ramvishwas Gupta. The appeal record also contains the said description. However, while preparing the cause title of the impugned award, the portion disclosing such representation through the guardian/father appears to have been deleted. The learned Member thereafter proceeded on the premise that the minor non-applicant was required to be dealt with in accordance with Order 32 CPC. While considering the claim application, the learned Member observed that, since non-applicant No.1/driver was a minor, it would be appropriate to decide Issue No.4 first. Issue No.4 reads as under:

The learned Member thereafter proceeded to decide the said issue by referring to the alleged requirement of compliance with Order 32 Rule 3(Ka) CPC and, on that basis, dismissed the entire claim application. The correctness of this approach has to be examined in the context of the statutory scheme governing proceedings before the Claims Tribunal.

A claim application under Section 166 of the MV Act is not a regular civil suit. The Claims Tribunal conducts a statutory inquiry in accordance with the provisions of the MV Act and the rules framed thereunder. The proceedings are intended to provide an expeditious and efficacious mechanism for determination of claims arising from motor accidents and cannot be equated in all respects with proceedings in an ordinary civil suit. The Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta & Ors., (2011) 10 SCC 509, has explained the nature of proceedings before the Claims Tribunal and the distinction between such proceedings and an ordinary civil suit. The relevant observations read as under:-

The same statutory character has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Vimla Devi & Ors. v. National Insurance Company Limited & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 186. The relevant observation reads as under:-

The aforesaid position assumes significance when the applicability of the CPC to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal is considered. Rule 240 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 specifically prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry and enumerates the provisions of the CPC which may be applicable to such proceedings. The relevant provision reads as under:

A plain reading of Rule 240 shows that the provisions of the CPC intended to be applied to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal have been specifically enumerated. Order 32 CPC does not find mention amongst the provisions so enumerated. Thus, the learned Member, before proceeding on the assumption that the claimant was mandatorily required to comply with Order 32 CPC, was required to examine whether the said provisions were attracted to the claim proceedings at all. The impugned award does not disclose any such examination.

Even otherwise, the learned Member has referred to Order 32 Rule 3(Ka) CPC. The provision relating to appointment of a guardian for a minor defendant is contained in Order 32 Rule 3 CPC, whereas Rule 3A operates in a distinct field and deals with the consequences arising from adverse interest, misconduct or gross negligence of the next friend or guardian resulting in prejudice to the minor.

Order 32 Rule 3 CPC, as applicable (amended) to the State of Madhya Pradesh, reads as under:-

The bare provision makes it clear that, where the question of proper representation of a minor arises and the minor has no guardian representing him, the Court is required to take appropriate steps for securing such representation by appointing a guardian. The provision does not contemplate dismissal of the substantive proceeding merely because the formal process of appointment of a guardian has not been undertaken by the claimant.

In the present case, non-applicant No.1 was admittedly a minor and was impleaded as the driver of the offending vehicle. His father, Ramvishwas Gupta, was impleaded as non-applicant No.2 and was disclosed in the claim application as his natural guardian/father. The offending vehicle was owned by non-applicant No.2 and was insured with non-applicant No.3. Thus, the claim application itself disclosed the manner in which the minor was sought to be represented.

It does not reveal that non-applicant No.2 ever declared himself, at any point of time, to be unwilling to represent the minor. The learned Claims Tribunal has not recorded any finding at any stage that non-applicant No.2 was unable or unwilling to act as guardian, or that his interest was adverse to that of the minor so as to render his representation prejudicial to the minor. More importantly, the record does not disclose that the learned Member ever directed the claimant to comply with Order 32 CPC or to take steps for appointment of a guardian. Thus, the claimant was non-suited for an alleged procedural omission which was never pointed out to him and which he was never directed to cure. More so, when securing proper representation of a minor is primarily the duty of the Court/Tribunal. If, in the opinion of the learned Member, the representation of the minor through his father was not sufficient or the father could not continue to represent the minor on account of any adverse interest or likelihood of prejudice, the duty of the Claims Tribunal was to address that issue and secure proper representation of the minor in accordance with law. The entire burden could not have been shifted upon the claimant, followed by dismissal of the claim for non-compliance.

The question of representation of a minor in such circumstances has also been considered by the High Court of Gujarat in Sarjubhai Kantilal Patel and others v. Bhikhubhai Maganbhai Patel and others, 2000 SCC OnLine Gujarat 536. The relevant observations read as under:-

The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that the absence of a formal order of appointment of a guardian cannot, in every situation, be treated as fatal. What requires consideration is whether the minor is properly represented and whether there is any likelihood of prejudice to his interest. Where the Court finds that proper representation is required, the appropriate course is to secure such representation rather than terminate the substantive proceeding.

The same principle has significance in the present case. Even though Order 32 CPC is not expressly included amongst the provisions made applicable by Rule 240, the Claims Tribunal, while conducting a statutory inquiry, cannot remain oblivious to the requirement that a minor participating in the proceedings must have proper representation. If the Tribunal finds that the minor is not adequately represented, it can and, where necessary, ought to take appropriate steps suo motu to secure such representation. What cannot be permitted is to notice the requirement of representation, take no step to secure it during the pendency of the proceedings, and thereafter use the very omission as a ground to dismiss the claim.

The Madhya Pradesh amendment to Order 32 Rule 3 CPC also assumes significance in this context. The amended provision specifically indicates the course to be adopted where a minor defendant is not represented by a guardian. The statutory scheme therefore places the obligation of securing proper representation upon the Court when the circumstances so require; it does not warrant dismissal of the substantive proceeding merely for want of a formal application by the claimant.

Consequently, even if it is assumed that the question of representation of non-applicant No.1 was required to be examined under Order 32 Rule 3 CPC, the learned Member ought first to have secured proper representation of the minor. If non-applicant No.2 was willing and competent to continue as guardian, the position could have been dealt with accordingly; if he was unwilling, unable or his interest was found to be adverse to that of the minor, appropriate steps for appointment of a proper guardian could have been taken. No such exercise was undertaken.

The statutory object of the MV Act furnishes an additional reason why such a procedural issue could not have been permitted to defeat the claim. In Rajo Devi & Anr. v. Manjeet Kaur & Ors., 2025 INSC 741, the Supreme Court has reiterated the beneficial nature of the compensation mechanism under the MV Act and the need to ensure that the rigours of procedure do not defeat its object. The relevant observation reads as under:-

In the present case, the claim application was instituted on 13.05.2019 and remained pending for several years before the award dated 11.03.2026 was passed. The claimant had also placed on record medical bills, treatment papers and police records in support of his claim. In such circumstances, bringing the entire claim to an end on the basis of a procedural requirement which was neither properly attracted nor ever directed to be complied with would defeat the substantive adjudication contemplated by the MV Act.

There is yet another circumstance which assumes significance in the present case. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 3 CPC could be invoked in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, the Tribunal was required to take note of the subsequent change in the status of non-applicant No.1. Though he was a minor at the relevant stage when the claim petition was instituted i.e. 13.05.2019, he had attained majority by the date on which the impugned award dated 11.03.2026 came to be passed. Thus, on the date of the impugned award, he could no longer be treated as a minor for the purpose of requiring his continued representation through a guardian. At the least, the Tribunal was required to take note of his attainment of majority, appropriately deal with the change in his status and afford him an opportunity to participate in the proceedings in his own capacity, rather than dismissing the claimant's substantive claim on the ground of an alleged failure to obtain appointment of a guardian for a person who had ceased to be a minor by the time the award was rendered.

There is another fundamental infirmity in the impugned award. Having decided to take up Issue No.4 first, the learned Member dismissed the entire claim application without recording findings on the remaining material issues. The issues relating to negligence, entitlement to compensation, quantum and insurance liability were left undecided and recorded as “Findings Not Necessary”.

The Claims Tribunal is required to adjudicate the issues arising for determination in the claim application. Rule 238 of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 also requires the Tribunal to record findings on the issues arising for determination and the reasons therefor. A procedural issue, particularly one which has itself been decided on an erroneous premise, cannot furnish a justification for avoiding adjudication of the substantive issues. Thus, the impugned award suffers from a fundamental legal infirmity at more than one level. The learned Member proceeded on the assumption that Order 32 CPC was mandatorily applicable to the claim proceeding without examining the statutory scheme under Rule 240, thereafter, the learned Member referred to Rule 3(Ka), which is not the provision concerning initial appointment of a guardian; and, even assuming that proper representation of the minor required further attention, no opportunity or direction was given to the claimant to cure the alleged defect and no steps were taken by the Tribunal itself to secure proper representation. The approach adopted by the learned Member has, in effect, allowed a procedural technicality to eclipse the substantive adjudication of a claim arising from bodily injuries sustained in a motor accident. Such an approach is inconsistent with the nature and object of the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal.

This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned award suffers from an error of law and material procedural infirmity and cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned award dated 11.03.2026 passed by the learned Member, First Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sidhi, in MACC No.03/2019 is hereby set aside. The claim application is restored to its original number and position. The matter is remanded to the learned Claims Tribunal for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the claim. Since the claim application has remained pending for considerable time, the learned Claims Tribunal shall endeavour to decide the same expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment.

The parties are directed to remain present before the Claims Tribunal on 23.09.2026.

The appeal stands disposed of.

The Registry of this Court is directed to send back the record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned Claims Tribunal forthwith.