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Judgment
P.D. Sharma, J.—This is an appeal from the award and the statement of the grounds of the award of the learned District Judge of Bhatinda whereby he affirmed an award given by the Collector, Bhatinda, determining the compensation payable to the Appellants for their land taken into possession by the erstwhile Patiala State.
The Appellants owned 19748 square yards of land situate in Bhatinda. This was taken into possession by the Patiala State somewhere in 1904-1905 A.D. In spite of earnest efforts, the owners could not persuade the Patiala State to pay them compensation for acquisition of their land till in obedience to the direction of the Revenue Secretary on 25th May, 1953, the Collector Bhatinda district assessed compensation at the rate of Rs. 2/- per square yard and in addition allowed interest at the rate of Rs. 6/- per cent. per annum from the date of their dispossession from the land. Thereafter they applied u/s 19 of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Land Acquisition Act (Act No. IV of 2006 Bk.) for reference of the matter to the Court for determination of the amount of compensation payable to them. In consequence the Collector referred the matter u/s 20 of the Act to the District Judge of Bhatinda on 17th December, 1953. The District Judge after due enquiry affirmed the award given by the Collector.
The Appellants attacked correctness of the award and the statement of the grounds of the award of the learned District Judge for the reason that the compensation should not have been determined at the rate prevailing in 1904 but at the rate obtainable on the date of award or the date of the first notice given to them on 14th January, 1953, or the notification issued in 1950. According to them this rate in no case was less than Rs. 130/- per square yard. They further averred that the land could not be deemed to have been acquired before the above three dates.
The learned Counsel for the Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was not competent either u/s 56 of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Land Acquisition Act (Act No. IV of 2006 Bk.) or u/s 39 of the Punjab Courts Act as entered in the memorandum of appeal.
The Punjab Courts Act was extended to the Pepsu area in 1957 by the Punjab Courts Laws (Extension) Act, 1957 (Punjab Act No. 38 of 1957). The appeal was filed on 5th November, 1956, and as such, it could not have been instituted u/s 39 thereof.
It is common ground that the land was not acquired under the provisions of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Land Acquisition Act (Act No. IV of 2006 Bk.) or the Patiala State Land Acquisition Act (Act No. III of 1995 Bk.). There is also no dispute about the fact that the Patiala State took possession of the Land somewhere in 1904. The law under which it was so done is not clear and determination of this fact is not even necessary for disposal of the present appeal. Suffice it to say that the actual acquisition proceedings were not initiated under the provisions of the aforesaid two Pepsu Acts.
The learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that as the land was not acquired under the provisions of the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act No. IV of 2006 Bk., therefore the appeal could not be entertained under any one of its provisions. We are not inclined to agree with him. The Appellants moved the Collector u/s 19 of the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act No. IV of 2006 Bk. to refer the matter for determination of the Court and while doing so they specifically mentioned that preliminary steps before making of the award had not been taken and further that they reserved their right to take any other legal proceedings that might be available to them on the facts of the case. The same points were pressed by them in their objections lodged against the award before the Collector. The District Judge did not go into the question whether preliminary steps before making the award had been taken or not. He also omitted to determine his competency to entertain the reference from the Collector. When the land had not been acquired under the provisions of the Pepsu Land Acquisition Act, the Collector was precluded from making the reference to the District Judge and the latter from determining it. The reference and the award of the District Judge in the matter are bad in law. As provided in Section 27 of the aforesaid Act, the award is to be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of the award a judgment within the meaning of Clause (2) of Section 2 and Clause (9) of Section 2 respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal against the award is competent u/s 56 of the Act. This Court, therefore, has the jurisdiction to set aside the award as the District Judge was not vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the reference and announce the award. In Bhagwandas Nagindas v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (1915) 28 I.C. 489, a part only of a certain piece of land was notified under the Land Acquisition Act to be acquired for the Railway. Under Clause (1) of Section 49 the owners expressed a desire that the whole lands loud be taken and not a part. The Collector assented to the acquisition of the whole, but did not consider it necessary for Government to declare its intention for acquiring the whole. An award was made, objected to, and the matter was referred to the Court. There, in addition to objections relating to the amount of compensation, the owners alleged that the whole proceedings were ultra vires, as there was no notification to acquire the whole land. It was decided that the proceedings were illegal and must be set aside. The principles enunciated therein support our view point. The reference by the Collector to the District Judge was misconceived and without jurisdiction and need be quashed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the award given by the District Judge, Bhatinda, in the matter is set aside. The reference made by the Collector to the District Judge is also quashed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
Tek Chand, J.
I agree.