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Judgment
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND MALVIYA)
Date : 10-08-2026
Heard learned counsel for the appellant (informant), learned counsel for the opposite Parties and learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State.
The present criminal appeal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C) arises out of the judgment dated 26.07.2023 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge-III, Bhojpur, Ara (hereinafter referred to as the ‘learned Trial Court’) in Session Trial No. 10 of 2021 arising out of Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 127 of 2020 by which the opposite parties No. 2 to 8 have been acquitted of all the charges.
Prosecution Case
The prosecution case is based on the written application of the informant, namely, Ramjee Yadav, who is the son of the deceased, namely Ram Ayodhya Yadav, recorded on 04.06.2022 wherein he alleged that on 04.06.2020 at 06:00 PM, in evening father of informant was at his door, in the meantime ten persons named in the First Information Report armed with lathi, danda, rod and spear came and started abusing and assaulting the father of the informant. Meanwhile, Ravi Kumar Yadav and Bijendra Kumar Yadav assaulted at the head of the informant’s father by iron rod and repeated the blows due to which the informant’s father fell down and on alarm when the informant came out from his house, accused Munna Yadav assaulted him with iron rod on his head causing injury and all the accused persons fled away where upon the informant brought his father to Sadar Hospital, Ara but in the way died.
On the basis of the above-mentioned allegation in Jagdishpur P.S. Case No. 127 of 2020 registered under section 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 504, 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as IPC). After investigation, the police submitted a charge sheet vide charge sheet No. 306 of 2020 on 30.11.2020 against the Opposite parties No. 2 to 8 under section 147, 148, 149, 447, 341, 323, 337, 338, 504, 506, 307, 302 of the IPC.
Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate- 1st class, Ara took cognizance against the Opposite Parties 2 to 8 under Section 147, 148, 447, 341, 323, 337, 338, 504, 506, 307 and 302 of Indian Penal Code read with 149 of IPC on 13.01.2021 and on that day case of opposite party No. 2 Ravi Kumar @ Ravi Kumar Yadav was committed to the Court of Sessions and on 27.07.2021 rest of the opposite parties were committed to the Session Court and after that the Session Case No. 10 of 2021 and 167 of 2021 was constituted against the opposite parties 3 to 8.
Upon commitment, Session Trial No. 167 of 2021 was amalgamated with original Session Trial No. 10 of 2021 vide order dated 18.02.2022 and considered for the seven opposite parties aforementioned. On 28.01.2021 and 10.09.2021 the Learned Sri Suresh Kumar Singh, Additional Session Judge-XV, Ara framed charge against the aforementioned opposite parties for committing the murder of the deceased, namely, Ram Ayodhya Yadav with common intention under Section 302 of IPC read with 149 of IPC and additional charge of Sections 147, 148, 447, 341, 323, 338, 504, 506 and 307 of IPC read with 149 of IPC. Further, on 18.07.2023, the statements of the opposite parties were recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C., in which the opposite parties denied the charges.
In the course of the Trial, the prosecution examined as many as eleven witnesses and exhibited various documentary evidence. The defence has not produced any oral, documentary, or material evidence. The description of the prosecution witnesses and the list of documents exhibited on behalf of the prosecution are provided here under for ready reference in a tabular form:-
List of Prosecution Witness
Prosecution witness No. | Name of Witness | Description |
|---|---|---|
| PW-1 | Suresh Kumar Singh | Other Witness |
| PW-2 | Jitendra Yadav | Hostile Witness |
| PW-3 | Godhan Ram | Hostile Witness |
| PW-4 | Vishwanath Singh @ | Viswanath Hostile Witness |
| Yadav | ||
| PW-5 | Nandjee | Other Witness |
| PW-6 | Phuleshwari Devi | Other Witness |
| PW-7 | Ramjee Yadav | Informant |
| PW-8 | Dr Ashutosh Kumar | Other Witness |
| PW-9 | Dr Tej Narayan Rai | Other Witness |
| PW-10 | Santosh Kumar Singh | Other Witness |
| PW-11 | Ram Swarup Ram | Other Witness |
List of Exhibits
Exhibit No. Description
Exhibit- 1 Signature of witness Suresh Yadav on inquest report Exhibit-1/1 Inquest Report Exhibit-1/2 Signature of Ram Babu on inquest report Exhibit-2 Signature of Dr Ashutosh Kumar on post-mortem report Exhibit-2/1 Signature of Dr Arun Kumar on post-mortem report. Exhibit-3 Fardbeyan Exhibit-3/1 Signature of witness Santosh Kumar Singh on fard-beyan Exhibit-3/2 Signature of witness Ram Babu on fard-beyan Exhibit-3/3 Short signature of Ishwaranand Pal on FIR Exhibit-4 Signature of Santosh Kumar Singh on death challan Exhibit-5 Signature of Ishwaranand Pal on FIR Exhibit-6 Handwriting and signature of A.S.I Saurav Kumar on charge sheet No. 06 of 2020 dated 03.11.2020.
Findings of the learned Trial Court
Learned Trial Court examined the evidence of eleven prosecution witnesses (PW-1 to PW-11) on the point of facts. PW-2 Jitendra Yadav, PW-3 Godhan Ram and PW-4 Vishwanath Singh @ Vishwanath Yadav are declared hostile during the course of the Trial. PW-1 Suresh Kumar Singh is the son of the deceased, PW-5 Nandjee is a known to the deceased, PW-6 Phuleshwari Devi is also a known to the deceased; PW-7 is the informant; PW-8 Dr. Ashutosh Kumar, is the member of committee of the Medical Officers who conducted post-mortem; PW-9 Dr. Tej Narayan Raj conducted the post mortem examination of the deceased body; PW-10 Santosh Kumar is the A.S.I who recorded the fard-beyan and prepared the inquest report; PW-11 Ram Swaroop Ram investigated this case after taking charge and in between he gave charge to another S.H.O.
Learned Trial Court found from the evidence of PW-7 Ramjee Yadav (informant) that on the date of occurrence, at about 6:00 p.m., while he was hauling soil along with Nandjee, Suresh and Kulla Devi, accused Ravi came and asked why soil had been spread on the road, to which the informant replied that he would pick it up immediately; thereafter Ravi returned with Bijendra, Pramod, Vinod, Praveen, Dadan, Surendra, Dharmraj and Munna, who assaulted the informant and his father Ram Ayodhya Yadav, in which Ravi and Bijendra assaulted Ram Ayodhya Yadav and all the accused fled after a halla was raised. Ram Ayodhya Yadav was taken to Sadar Hospital, Ara, where he died on the way. This version was substantially corroborated by PW-1 Suresh Kumar Singh, son of the deceased, who deposed that Ravi, Vinod, Praveen, Pramod, Jitendra, Munna, Bijendra and Surendra arrived armed with iron rod and assaulted his father, and by PW-5 Nandjee and PW-6 Phuleshwari Devi, who similarly described the accused persons arriving and assaulting the deceased and the informant following the altercation over the spreading of soil.
However, the learned Trial Court noted material contradictions in the ocular evidence as to the identity of the assailants: PW-1 Suresh Kumar Singh stated in his examination-in-chief that Ravi and Bijendra assaulted his brother with an iron rod, while his father was assaulted with a lathi, and that PW-7 Ramjee Yadav was also assaulted by Munna with an iron rod; PW-5 Nandjee, however, stated and contradicted this by saying that Vinod and Ravi had assaulted his father and brother; and PW-6, in her examination-in-chief, contradicted this further by stating that accused Putul and Ravi had assaulted Ayodhya Yadav with an iron rod, without naming any other assailants. The Trial Court held that there were material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. The Court further found that PW-2 Jitendra Yadav, PW-3 Godhan Ram and PW-4 Vishwanath Singh @ Vishwanath Yadav were declared hostile at the request of the learned APP, and their testimonies were accordingly held unreliable.
On the testimony of PW-1, the Trial Court observed that he had admitted, in cross-examination, to having full brothers namely Ramjee Singh, Dinesh Singh and Sri Ram Singh, and Nandjee Singh, and that twenty to twenty-two members were in their family; that he could not state the distance and direction of Ramjee from the deceased, nor the distance and direction of his father from the alleged hand-pump; and that there was no mark at the alleged place of occurrence on which basis the Court held his testimony not reliable. As regards PW-7, the informant, the Trial Court found that although he had deposed to blood stains at a distance of one beeta at the place of occurrence, the Investigating Officer (PW-11), in cross-examination at para no. 4, stated that there were no blood stains at the place of occurrence and that he had not tried to investigate the same owing to the darkness of the night. The Court also noted that while the informant, in his examination-in-chief, stated that the deceased was assaulted on the forehead and died on the way during the course of being taken to hospital, the medical report showed that the deceased had died due to head injuries which, the Court held, clearly showed that the informant had failed to fully corroborate the prosecution case, rendering his testimony also not fully reliable.
The Trial Court further observed that none of PW-1, PW-5, PW-6 and PW-7 had stated anything about brick-batting or stone-pelting, but the I.O. (PW-11) stated that he found bricks and stone in the Courtyard, roof and door of the informant, which the Court held also created a serious doubt. The I.O. further failed to recover the used iron rod and lathi with which the deceased was allegedly murdered, either during investigation or during Trial, which the Court held reflected a casual approach adopted by the prosecution in taking appropriate steps to prove its case. The Trial Court additionally noted that the informant, in his examination-in-chief at para no. 5, stated that there was previous enmity with the accused persons over land. Applying the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1958 AIR 465 for attracting Third Clause of Section 300 of IPC, the trial Court held that although the prosecution had been able to prove the bodily injury and its nature through the testimony of PW-9, the doctor who conducted the autopsy, it had miserably failed to establish the complicity of the accused persons in the said act, and that neither the intent nor the act had been proved against the accused persons.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
Learned counsel for appellant submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal, to the extent it acquits the accused persons charged under Sections 147, 148, 447, 341, 323, 337, 338, 504, 506, 307 and 302 of the IPC read with Section 149 IPC, for committing the murder of Ram Ayodhya Singh and attempt to murder of informant Ramjee Yadav, is bad in law, erroneous on facts, based on perverse findings, and fit to be set aside.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the defence had not produced any oral, documentary or material evidence, and that during Trial PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 were declared hostile, whereas PW-1 and PW-7, both sons of the deceased Ram Ayodhya Singh, were eye-witnesses to the whole incident, who identified the accused persons and deposed that accused Ravi Kumar Yadav first threatened them, whereupon all the accused came to the house and assaulted the deceased’s father with a hard-blunt substance on the head, as evidenced by Exhibit 2/2. He next submits that during Trial, PW-8 Dr. Ashutosh Kumar stated that he was a member of the committee of the post-mortem of Ram Ayodhya Yadav, but stated in cross-examination that he had no documentary proof of being a member of the board, and that his not having disclosed about the death of the deceased was highly suspicious. He further submits that PW-9, Dr. Tej Narayan Raj, who conducted the post-mortem examination, found injuries on the body of the deceased and stated that the cause of death was head injury caused by a hard-blunt object, marked as Exhibit 2/2.
Learned counsel submits that during the Trial, PW-10 Santosh Kumar Singh, A.S.I, took the fard-beyan at Ara Sadar Hospital and prepared the inquest report in the presence of Suresh Yadav and Ram Babu Yadav, who put their signatures, and stated in cross-examination that he did not verify his address, and continued to give evidence. It was further submitted that during the Trial, PW-11 Ram Swaroop Ram investigated the case after taking charge, and in between gave charge to another SHO, and stated a concordatory statement in cross-examination. It was submitted that the Trial Court, after conclusion, had acquitted all the opposite parties of all the charges. Learned counsel next submits that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the statement of the eye-witnesses of the case, and failed to appreciate that there was no contradiction as regards the place of occurrence or the fact that the incident took place.
It was submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the contradictory statement of the Investigating Officer, and the contradictory statement of the Medical Board, and further failed to appreciate that the charge had been framed under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 149 IPC, along with other additional sections, including Section 307 IPC. It was also submitted that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the deposition of all official witnesses stated about the head injury of the deceased and, consequently, the cause of death. Learned counsel submits that the order of acquittal of the opposite parties was passed by the Court below only in a routine manner, and that the order impugned is accordingly bad in law as well as on the facts.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
Learned counsel submits that the accused persons are innocent and have committed no offence, and that they have been falsely implicated in the case by the informant on account of previous enmity. He next submits that the prosecution witnesses are interested and hearsay witnesses, and that none of them is an eye-witness to the occurrence. On a perusal of the statements of the prosecution witnesses, it was submitted that no prosecution witness was present at the place of occurrence at the time of the alleged incident. He further submits that the prosecution has fully failed to bring forward witnesses who could corroborate its case against the accused persons, and that the case has been falsely lodged against the named accused persons due to mala fide intention and previous enmity. Learned counsel lastly submits that there are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, which clearly show that no occurrence took place as alleged by the prosecution.
Consideration
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the Trial Court records along with the impugned judgment dated 26.07.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 10 of 2021. In the instant case, PW-7, Ramjee Yadav, who is also the informant of the case (PW-7), is not an eyewitness to the occurrence. The law on this point is well settled: oral evidence, to be relevant and admissible, must be direct, and must be given by a person who has himself seen, heard, or otherwise perceived the fact deposed to. Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) reads as follows:
“60. Oral evidence must be direct.
Oral evidence must, in all cases, whatever, be direct; that is to say, -If it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it;
If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner;
If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds:
Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable.
Provided also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection.”
In the instant case, it has come on record that the informant PW-7, though deposing to the occurrence, was not himself an eye-witness to the actual assault on the deceased, and his testimony stands materially discredited and uncorroborated on the very facts constituting the occurrence. It has come on record that though PW-7 deposed that blood stains were at a distance of one beeta from the body at the place of occurrence, the Investigating Officer (PW-11), in cross-examination, categorically stated that no blood stains were found at the place of occurrence, the same not having been properly investigated owing to the darkness of the night. It has further come on record that while the informant, in his examination-in-chief, stated that the deceased was assaulted on the forehead and died on the way while being taken to hospital, this stood at variance with the medical evidence, which showed the cause of death to be head injury. Being evidently a witness whose account does not satisfy the requirement of direct, first-hand perception contemplated under Section 60 of the Act, and his version being materially uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence on record, the informant's testimony cannot be treated as that of a reliable eye-witness, and no implicit reliance could be placed upon it by the Trial Court.
There is no direct or ocular witness present, and the case of the prosecution is, therefore, completely based on circumstantial evidence. It is well settled that where a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must be fully established, must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, and must form a chain so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystallized in the judgment of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein the Apex Court held:
“152.Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71: AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091: 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198: 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625: AIR 1972 SC 656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in the Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71: AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091: 1953 Cri LJ 129]:
“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”
153.A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned
“must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between
“may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2)the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5)there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
154.These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”
Further in the case of Vishwajeet Kerba Masalkar v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2024 INSC 788) it was held that:
“22.It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted solely on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Bearing these principles in mind, we have examined the reasoning of the learned Trial Court, which we find to be sound and well-founded on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The learned Trial Court has, in the first instance, rightly declared that the testimonies of PW-2 Jitendra Yadav, PW-3 Godhan Ram and PW-4 Vishwanath Singh @ Vishwanath Yadav, who were declared hostile during Trial, cannot be relied upon. The Trial Court has, thereafter, undertaken a close scrutiny of the testimony of PW-7 Ramjee Yadav, treating him as the most important witness of the case, and has, for the reasons noted above, found him to have failed to fully corroborate the prosecution case, rendering his testimony not fully reliable.
The Trial Court has similarly analysed the testimony of PW-1 Suresh Kumar Singh, another son of the deceased, and found that he belonged to a large joint family of interested witnesses, that he could not state the distance and direction of the informant from the deceased, nor of his father from the alleged place of occurrence, and that there was no mark at the alleged place of occurrence, circumstances which led the Trial Court to hold his testimony also unreliable. The Trial Court has, further, correctly identified material contradictions between the prosecution witnesses as to the identity of the assailants and the weapon used PW-1 having attributed the iron-rod assault to Ravi and Bijendra, PW-7 to Munna, PW-5 to Vinod and Ravi, and PW-6 to Putul and Ravi none of the witnesses being consistent with the others on this material particular going to the very root of the prosecution case.
Significantly, the Trial Court has also taken note of the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-11), who, while stating that no blood stains were found at the place of occurrence owing to darkness, admitted to having found bricks and stones in the Courtyard, roof and door of the informant a circumstance not spoken to by any of the other witnesses, and one which the Trial Court rightly held created serious doubt as to the truthfulness of the prosecution version. The Trial Court has further correctly weighed the failure of the Investigating Officer to recover the iron rod or lathi allegedly used in the commission of the offence, either during investigation or during Trial, holding the same to reflect a casual approach adopted by the prosecution in proving its case.
We find that no explanation whatsoever has been furnished by the accused persons regarding the circumstances leading to the death of the deceased, despite the same having been put to them in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. This silence, in our considered view, would ordinarily furnish an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence tending to establish the guilt of the accused, provided the other links in the chain stood cogently and conclusively established by the prosecution. However, as rightly found by the learned Trial Court, the chain of circumstances in the present case is riddled with material contradictions, absence of corroboration, non-recovery of the weapon of offence, and inconsistencies between the ocular and medical evidence, coupled with the informant himself not being an eye-witness within the meaning of Section 60 of the Act, such that it cannot be said to be complete or to exclude every hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. The additional link arising from the accused persons’ silence cannot, by itself, repair an otherwise broken and incomplete chain of circumstances, nor can it substitute for the want of cogent, reliable, and corroborated direct evidence connecting the accused persons with the crime.
Applying the ratio in Virsa Singh (supra) for attracting Clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 IPC, the Trial Court has rightly held that though the prosecution proved the bodily injury and its nature through the testimony of PW-9, it miserably failed to establish the complicity of the accused persons in the said act, neither the intent nor the act having been proved against them (Para 24 of the impugned judgment).
It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court is required to bear in mind the double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and should be slow to interfere with the findings of the Trial Court unless the same are found to be perverse, illegal, or wholly unreasonable. We find no such infirmity in the reasoning of the learned Trial Court, which has meticulously analysed the evidence, weighed the contradictions, and arrived at a plausible and well-reasoned conclusion of acquittal. The findings of the Trial Court call for no interference by this Court.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the present Criminal Appeal filed under proviso to Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
