Ramineedi Ramachandra Rao, minor by Mother and Guardian, Tayaramma vs Sri Rajah Inuganti Rajagopala Venkata Narasimhanarayanamgaru and Others

Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.—The main point urged before me by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this second appeal, the third

defendant in the suit, was that the lower appellate Court was not entitled in law to dismiss the appeal with costs on the ground that he had not

deposited "" the admitted amount"" in the trial Court. He urged that the trial Court had not exercised its powers u/s 192(5) pf the Madras Estates

Land Act and refused to take cognizance of the appellant''s plea that the rent claimed was in excess of the amount due, and that, therefore, the

lower appellate Court had no power to exercise that power, and dismiss the appeal, without at least passing an order directing the appellant to pay

into Court the amount so admitted to be due, or such reasonable portion of the amount which the Court might direct, as the section itself requires. I

agree. Neither side is able to tell me now what was the rent admitted as due by this appellant, except that he admitted it to be Rs. 600 per year;

but, as he has claimed that the plaintiff was the "" land-holder "" only for every alternative year, the defendants being landlords in the intervening

years, and as he has also contended that some of the instalments of rent claimed in this suit have become barred by limitation, it is not clear what

exactly was the amount of rent admitted by him to be due to the plaintiff landholder. It had to be worked out. The trial Court and the lower

appellate Court did not mention the amount due, and did not work it out. Hence the inability of the Counsel on both sides to tell me at once what

the admitted amount is.

It is also clear that, once the trial Court tries the suit on merits, taking also this plea of excess rent into consideration and discussion, and does

not take the powers conferred on it by Section 192(5) for refusing to take cognizance of the plea regarding the excess rent, due to failure to

deposit the admitted rent, the appellate Court can exercise that power only after going through the procedure prescribed by Section 192(5) of the

Madras Estates Land Act. There is nothing unreasonable in this. It is only like giving reasons every time a judgment-debtor is ordered to be

arrested and sent to a Civil jail, whether by the trial Court or by the appellate Court. It is not even enough if reasons are given once. They must at

least be referred to again in unmistakable terms, and accepted once more, when ordering the arrest again. The lower appellate Court did not at all

advert to this, and pass an order directing the appellant to deposit the admitted amount, naming it specifically, or such reasonable portion of it, as it

may direct, within the time to be named by it. When a Court has got powers under the statute to reduce the amount to be deposited and may order

the whole amount or a part of it to be deposited, it is obvious that it must pass an order stating the amount required to be deposited before

enforcing the prescribed penalty.

Besides as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant Section 192(5) only takes away the right of the appellant to raise the plea that

the rent claimed is excessive, if he fails to deposit the amount directed to be deposited u/s 192(5) of the Estates Land Act. All other pleas raised

by him will be open to him, and must be discussed, and findings given, before the suit or appeal can be dismissed. Such pleas, to name a few, are

that he is not a tenant, that the amount due from him is barred by limitation, that he has paid all amounts due from him, that a statute has wiped out

the whole or a portion of the amount due by him, etc.

4.In the end, therefore, I set aside the lower appellate Court''s order of dismissal of the appeal, and remand the appeal to the lower appellate

Court for fresh disposal in the light of the above observations, and after passing an order u/s 192(5) if it deems fit, naming the amount required to

be deposited, and giving the appellant three months'' time from the date of its order for such deposit. When disposing of the appeal, it will, of

course, consider also the other pleas of the appellant and the alleged error in the trial Court''s decree in giving a decree only in the name of the

plaintiff and not in he name of defendants 1 and 2 also. In the circumstances, the costs of this second appeal will abide and be provided for by the

lower appellate Court, when disposing of the appeal afresh.

Court-fee paid on the memorandum of this second appeal will be refunded.