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Judgment
Gita Gopi, J
Rule. Mr. Pranav Trivedi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, waives service of notice of rule on behalf of respondent No.1.
This petition has been filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing and setting aside the first information report bearing C.R. No. I- 11191012200835 of 2020 registered with Danilimda Police Station, Ahmedabad City, under sections 323, 294(b), 427 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Amendment Act 2015 and the proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof.
Mr. Jaydeep Sindhi, learned advocate for the applicants, submitted that the parties have amicably settled the dispute outside the Court. The applicants have preferred the present application seeking quashment of the impugned first information report. It was submitted that the injury was not of a grievous nature. The complainant has preferred to compromise and therefore, a settlement affidavit has been executed by and between the applicants and the complainant. Therefore, there remains no dispute or grievance between the parties. Learned advocate, therefore, submitted that the Court may even verify the said aspect from the complainant herself through video conferencing.
Considering the facts of the case, under instructions, a link was sent to learned advocate Mr. Hemant Raval, at whose Office the complainant was reported to be present. The virtual Court verified the contents of the compromise with complainant- Maniben W/O Manojbhai Ajabhai Vaniya and she affirmed about the execution of said settlement affidavit before the Notary. She also admitted that she has no grievance against the applicants and has consented to the quashment of the first information report filed by her. Since the parties have settled the dispute and the complainant has also affirmed about its execution on verification, the settlement agreement is taken on record.
Mr. Pranav Trivedi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that any first information report should be quashed in accordance with the guidelines of the Apex Court and the parameters laid down therein.
This Court has heard the learned advocates on both the sides and has perused the material on record. The Apex Court in the case of Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs. Union of India & Others, Writ Petition (C) No.1015 of 2018, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat has observed as under:
"3. It is this idea of India, - a promise of oneness of and for, all people, regardless of caste, gender, place of birth, religion and other divisions that Part III articulates in four salient provisions : Article 15, Article 17, Article 23 and Article 24. The idea of fraternity occupying as crucial a place in the scheme of our nation's consciousness and polity, is one of the lesser explored areas in the constitutional discourse of this court. The fraternity assured by the Preamble is not merely a declaration of a ritual handshake or cordiality between communities that are diverse and have occupied different spaces: it is far more. This idea finds articulation in Article 15. That provision, perhaps even more than Article 14, flashes out the concept of equality by prohibiting discrimination and discriminatory practices peculiar to Indian society. At the center of this idea, is that all people, regardless of caste backgrounds, should have access to certain amenities, services and goods so necessary for every individual. Article 15 is an important guarantee against discrimination. What is immediately noticeable is that whereas Article 15(1) enjoins the State (with all its various manifestations, per Article 12) not to discriminate on the proscribed grounds (religion, race, caste, sex (i.e. gender), place of birth or any of them), Article 15(2) is a wider injunction : it prohibits discrimination or subjection to any disability of anyone on the grounds of religion, caste, race, sex or place of birth in regard to access to shops, places of public entertainment, or public restaurants, (Article 15(2)(a)). Article 15(2)(b) proscribes the subjection of anyone to any disability on the proscribed grounds (i.e. discrimination on grounds of religion, caste, race, sex or place of birth) with regard to "the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.."
In a similar vein, the court in Nandini Sunder v. State of Chhatisgarh again commented on this aspect and said that "t(T)he Constitution itself, in no uncertain terms, demands that the State shall strive, incessantly and consistently, to promote fraternity amongst all citizens such that dignity of every citizen is protected, nourished and promoted."
Considering the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303, the present matter would fall under the criteria laid down therein. In paragraph-61 of the said judgment, it has been observed thus:
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the issue as to whether an FIR lodged for the offences punishable under sections 307 and 34 IPC could be quashed on the basis of the settlement between the parties. While considering the said issue, the Apex Court observed in para-13 thus:
"13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
(i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
(ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
(iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
(iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
(v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non- compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."
The FIR alleges that the Son of the complainant Ravi, who runs his business of Eggs and Omeletts at a stall, opposite to the milk shop of present applicants, who had asked the son of complainant not to place stall in front of their milk shop. It is alleged that applicants-accused got furious and abused him by his caste and vandalized his stall. It is alleged that the present applicants have even beaten the Son of the complainant. As per the complaint, the son of the complainant and the accused were having their business at same place. The complainant - Maniben W/O Manojbhai Ajabhai Vaniya has stated that upon the intervention of the prominent members of the society and elder member an amicable settlement has arrived at with the applicants accused. She further stated that the offences are personal in nature not affecting any interest of the State Government, it has been agreed to compromise the entire dispute and thus, has given her consent to quash the FIR and consequently all other proceedings arising out of the FIR qua the applicants. Ravi Manojbhai Vaniya, the Son of the complainant,states in the affidavit that a bystander had made a call to the police without his knowledge and as police arrived his mother got the complaint registered against the applicants. He also stated about the amicable settlement by the prominent members of the society and has given his consent for quashing of FIR and all other proceedings initiated thereunder.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Gian Singh and Laxminarayan Case (Supra) observed that the inherent power of the High Court in quashing an FIR is distinct and different from the powers given to the Criminal Court for compounding offences under section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such inherent powers is of wide plenitudes with no statutory limitations, but such powers are to be exercised when it is for to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of law. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the referred judgments has observed that the power to be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings or complaint or FIR, where the offender and the victim have settled the dispute, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. Here, the parties have settled the dispute which had arosen because of their businesses, in their business area. The disputes have been resolved and the settlement would permit them to peacefully undertake the business activities without any gurge or grievance. The Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been brought into force under object and reasons to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Indian Constitution promises oneness of and for, all people regardless of castes. The settlement between these parties can be appreciated, as a step to achieve this promise of oneness. Hence, the settlement between the parties resolving the disputes is required to be appreciated and accepted.
Here, in the present case, the complaint was filed on 16.07.2020 and settlement affidavit came to be executed on 27.07.2020. This petition for quashing was filed on 18.07.2020. There is nothing on record to show that any dangerous weapons was used in the commission of the alleged offence.
Admittedly, the dispute is a private and personal affair. The parties have arrived at the settlement to live peacefully. Thus, in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, there exists no scope for any further proceeding in the matter. The continuance of proceedings would lead to wastage of precious judicial time as there would remain no possibility of any conviction in the case. Hence, the Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where the inherent powers of the Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Could be exercised for securing the ends of justice.
In the result, the petition is allowed. The first information report bearing C.R. No. I- 11191012200835 of 2020 registered with Danilimda Police Station, Ahmedabad City and the proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.