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Judgment
A.K. Shrivastava, J.
By this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the validity of the impugned orders Annex. P-1 dated 3.9.1998 and Annex. P-2 dated 29.6.2004.
The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that on account of a criminal case launched against the petitioner u/s 324, 325 and 323/149 IPC, since the petitioner was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khurai in S.T.No 12/96 his services were terminated vide order Annex. P-1 dated 3rd September, 1998. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before this Court along with other accused persons who were also convicted and an application u/s 320 Cr. P.C. to compound the offences was also filed by the petitioner as well as other co-accused persons which was allowed and the petitioner and other accused persons were acquitted from the charges. The order of this Court passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1228/98 dated 17.7.2001 has been placed on record as Annex. P-3.
After the acquittal of the petitioner he submitted requisite application before the respondents requesting them to reinstate him. However, his request was not accepted and eventually the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court which was registered as W.P. (S) No. 1628/2003 (Ramesh Kumar Shukla v. The Chairman, M.P. State Electricity Board and another) and the same was decided on 5.3.2004. This Court directed the respondents to consider the prayer of the petitioner for reinstatement.
After the above-said order of this Court the respondents have again rejected the prayer of the petitioner to reinstate him vide Annex P-2 dated 29.6.2004.
The contention of Shri Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the petitioner was acquitted by this Court on 17.7.2001 vide Annex P-3 as the application of the petitioner filed u/s 320 Cr.P.C. to compound the offences was allowed resulting in acquittal of the petitioner. Learned counsel by inviting my attention to sub-section (8) of section 320 Cr. P.C has submitted that the composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. By placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Lal Vs. The State of Haryana and others, it has been submitted that if an employee is acquitted by a criminal Court, employer may initiate disciplinary proceedings against him and may pass necessary orders. But in the present case no disciplinary proceeding has been initiated and straightway the impugned order Annex. P-2 has been passed. Thus, it has been prayed that this petition may be allowed and the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner.
On the other hand, Shri Pulok Rai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that on account of conviction of the petitioner his services were terminated vide Annex. P-1 dated 3.9.98. According to learned counsel, the case of the petitioner will not be diluted merely because on the basis of application filed u/s 320 Cr.P.C. he has been acquitted by this Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on two decisions of the Supreme Court. They are Harichand Vs. The Director of School Education, , Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and another, .
After having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be allowed.
True, after the conviction of the petitioner by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 3.9.98 (Annex.P-1) But, this fact cannot be ignored that this Court vide order Annex.P-3 dated 17.7.2001 acquitted the petitioner from all the charges levelled against him. Merely because the acquittal was made by this Court on the basis of the application filed u/s 320 Cr.P.C. would not make any difference because under sub-section (8) of section 320 Cr.P.C. the composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. Thus for all practical purpose the petitioner would be deemed to have been acquitted from all the charges.
In the case of Babulal (supra) the Apex Court has held that after the acquittal of an employee by a criminal Court the department may initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. But in the present case no such disciplinary proceeding has been initiated and the impugned order Annex. P-2 dated 29.6.2004 has been passed by rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to reinstate him, on the ground that on account of compounding of the offences the petitioner was acquitted. I have already taken the view hereinabove that for all practical purposes the petitioner would be deemed to have been acquitted, therefore, rejecting the prayer of petitioner for reinstatement vide Annex.P-2 is not only arbitrary but is also dehors to section 320(8) of Cr.P.C.
The decisions relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents Pawan Kumar (supra) and Harichand (supra), are tangentially off the point. It the case of Pawan Kumar (supra) the conviction was for offence involving moral turpitude as the employee was convicted u/s 294 IPC. In the case of Harichand (supra) the delinquent was extended to the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and, therefore, both these cases are not applicable in the present factual scenario.
Looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances, the impugned orders Annex.P-1 dated 3.9.1998 and Annex.P-2 dated 29.6.2004 are hereby quashed and the respondents are hereby directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith. However, looking to the facts and circumstances, the petitioner shall not be entitled for any back wages. However, the petitioner shall be deemed to be in service continuously. The respondents shall be free to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner shall be entitled for back wages from today.
The petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove with no order as to costs.