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Judgment
Rajeev Kumar Shrivastava, J
This Review Petition has been preferred against the order dated 11/02/2020 passed in Writ Appeal No.1846/2019.
The facts, in short, are that Writ Appeal No.1846/2019 was filed by the appellant challenging the order dated 4/9/2019 passed by the writ Court in
Misc. Petition No.3425/2019 whereby the Collector Shivpuri was directed to take possession of the land of the petitioners. Against the aforesaid part
of the order, the Writ Appeal No.1846/2019 was filed and the impugned order has been passed. The Collector Shivpuri, vide order dated 9/8/2016,
granted permission to the appellant to alienate the land which was leased to him, in compliance whereof, one sale deed was executed. Despite that,
the permission granted by the Collector was not considered at the time of passing the impugned order, hence, this Review Petition has been filed.
Heard learned counsel of the review petitioner and perused the impugned order.
This Court has observed in the impugned order as under:
“10. Section 165 (7-b) of MP Land Revenue Code reads as under:-
''165(7-b). Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), a person who hold land from the State Government or whom right to occupy land is granted by the
State Government or the Collector as a Government lessee and who subsequently becomes Bhumiswami of such land, shall not transfer such land without the
permission of a Revenue Officer, not below the rank of a Collector, given for reasons to be recorded in writing.''
In the teeth of aforesaid section, the sale deed dated 7.7.2005 executed by petitioners in favour of Smt. Vidya Devi was void being in violation of the provision of
section 165 (7-b) of MP Land Revenue Code.
On the basis of above, learned Writ Court has not committed any error as the sale deed dated 7.7.2005 was void ab initio in the teeth of mandatory provisions of
Section 165 (7-b) of MP Land Revenue Code and act of selling patta land shows that there is no further need of leased land for survival of the petitioners, hence the
object and purpose of lease stood over. Hence, we do not find any infirmity in the order as well as direction given by learned Writ Court about taking of possession
of land in question from the petitioners.â€
It is apparent from the provisions itself that the provisions made under Section 165(7-B) of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code are mandatory
provisions, the word 'shall' has been used and permission, which may be granted by the Collector with regard to property so leased, may not authorize
the lessee to sell out the property so leased because as per Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act, lessee has limited right over the property to enjoy
the possession only. Ownership is not shifted under Section 111 of Transfer of Property Act and if a person is not having right as owner over the
property, he cannot sell it out rather Collector cannot grant permission to the lessee to sell out the property which was leased out under Section 111 of
Transfer of Property Act and under Section 165(7-B) of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC reads as under :-
Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved, -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or
error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.â€
In Board of Control of Cricket India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club (AIR 2005 SC 59,2 )it is observed that “the words “sufficient reasonâ€
occurring in Rule 1 of Order 47 of CPC is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate. An application for
review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'â€. Similarly, in Union of India Vs. Harinagar Sugar Mills
Ltd., (AIR 2008 (Gau) 161, it is observed that the review is not an appeal in disguise. The scope of review as well as the appeal is completely
different. While the review petition is limited the appellate jurisdiction is wide. In Akhilesh Yadav Vs. Vishwanath Chaturvedi & Ors. reported in
(2013 AIR SCW 1316), the Apex Court held that scope of review petition is very limited and submissions made on questions of fact cannot be a
ground to review the order. It was further observed that review of an order is permissible only if some mistake or error is apparent on the fact of the
record, which has to be decided on the facts of each and every case. Further held that an erroneous decision, by itself, does not warrant review of
each decision.
The scope of compass of review of an order by a Court of Civil Judicature, is circumscribed by Section 114 of the Code which provides that a
review of an order is permissible upon a discovery of new and important matter of evidence. But in the present case no new and important matter has
been brought before the Court by the petitioners. It is also well settled that only errors apparent on the face of record are liable to be reviewed and
such errors must state one in the face where no elaborate arguments are necessary to pin point those errors. (See: Abhijit Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
M/s Terai Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1995 Cal 316).
It is well settled in law that in the guise of review, rehearing is not permissible. In order to seek review it has to be demonstrated that order suffers
from error apparent on the face of record. The Court while deciding the application for review cannot sit on appeal over the judgment or decree
passed by it. The review petitioner cannot be given liberty to readdress the Court on merits because it is not an appeal in disguise where the
judgment/order is to be considered on merits. [See: J.R. Raghupathy Vs. State of A.P. (AIR 1988 SC 1681, )S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman
Catholic Mission, (2009) 10 SCC 464 and State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Sengupta and Another, (2008) 8 SCC 612 ].
In view of above, the judgment passed by this Court does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record warranting review of the
same by this Court. Accordingly, the review petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
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