Ramchandra Reddy and Others vs Rani Shankeramma

Bilgrami, J.—This is an application by Rani Shankeramma for setting aside an order of the Hon''ble Chief Minister, directing that Rs. 40,000/- for expenses of litigation in relation to a case which is pending between the parties in the Supreme Court, may be paid to Ramchandra Reddy and Rani Lakshmamma from the Court of Wards. The facts which it is necessary to relate for purposes of deciding this petition are briefly as follows:

Alter the death of Raja Durga Reddy, the estate of Papannapet was taken under the supervision of the Court of Wards. He left surviving him Rani Lakshmamma, his widow, and Rani Shankeramma, his daughter, the present applicant. Ramchandra Reddy claims to have been adopted by Rani Lakshinamma alter her husband''s death. An application was made by Rani Shankeramma in 1951 for release of the estate in her favour.

This was rejected by Hon''ble the Revenue Minister on 19-6-1951, in appeal, and he directed the Nazim of Atiyat to prepare an amended succession statement, declaring Ramchandra Reddy to be the successor of Raja Durga Reddy. Against this order, a writ application was filed by Rani Shankeramma under Article 226 of the Constitution in this High Court. On 12-8-1952, a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of Manoher Pershad and Dr. Siadat Ali Khan, JJ. granted this application, and issued a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition directing the release of the estate in favour of Rani Shankeramma.

It was held that Ramchandra Reddy could not claim any rights superior to those of Rani Shankeramma, as the virasat was already sanctioned in the latter''s name; and that since Ramchandra Reddy''s adoption was already held invalid, the Revenue Minister had no jurisdiction to pass an order releasing the estate in his favour, and under the Court of Wards Act, Clause (2) of Section 53, the estate should be released in favour of Rani Shankeramma.

Against this, an appeal was filed by Ramchandra Reddy in the Supreme Court, a certificate, for the leave of which was granted by this High Court by the order dated 8-10-1952 under Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution and in the meanwhile an ad interim order of stay was obtained from this High Court on 22-8-1952, which was to the effect that status quo may be maintained, and notice be given to the opposite party to show cause why this order should not be made absolute.

On 11-9-1952, this order was confirmed and 10 days stay was granted. On 21-10-1952, the Supreme Court ordered an interim stay and a notice was issued to the opposite party. This order was made absolute and it was ordered, that it should continue till the final disposal of the appeal, on 31-10-1952, and permission was given to Rani Shankeramma in that case to draw Rs. 50,000/- from the Court of Wards over and above her usual allowances for the expenses of litigation.

The applicant now seeks to get the order of the Chief Minister, against which this application is directed, set aside on the following grounds:

(1) that the order impugned was passed in disobedience of the stay orders of this Court and the Supreme Court; and

(2) the view which the Chief Minister has taken of the rights and claims of the parties in passing this order is inconsistent with and directly opposed to the express findings of this Court in the ease of - Shankeramma v. Govt. of Hyderabad AIR 1953 Hyd 79 (A), in its judgment dated 12-8-1952, and that this amounts to a contempt of Court.

So far as the first ground is concerned, we think that the disobedience of the stay order of his Court is out of question, as the order has expired, and the order which now stands is that of the Supreme Court dated 3-11-1952 and the proper Court to move is the Supreme Court and not this Court.

In relation to the second ground, our attention is invited to paras (1), (2) and (5) of the counter in which on behalf of the Chief Minister, it is stated that the estate is still called the estate of Durga Reddy and that Rani Shankeramma and Rani Lakshmamma are both wards, and it is argued that this is contrary to what this High Court has decided in - ''Shankeramma v. Govt. of Hyderabad (A)'', and amounts to a contempt of Court.

Alter a careful consideration of the whole judgment and the Chief Minister''s statement, we are unable to agree with this contention. It was held in the above case that the adoption of Ramchandra Reddy was invalid, and that since the virasat has been sanctioned in the name of Rani Shankeramma Rani Lakshmamma cannot claim any right against her. We do not think that the statement of the Chief Minister in his counter is inconsistent with this in such a way as to constitute a contempt of Court.

The grounds, on which the Chief Minister appears to support his order of payment, as they can be gathered from the two counters submitted on his behalf, and as elucidated by the learned Advocate General in course of his argument evidently, are, that so long as the final order in the judgment of the High Court directing the release of the estate in favour of Rani Shankeramma remains unexecuted, owing to the stay order or for any other reason, all the statutory obligations and duties of the Government towards the wards under the Court of Wards Act subsist, and all the persons who were wards then will remain wards.

The payment according to him was made in performance of the statutory duty enjoined u/s 27, Hyderabad Court of Wards Act.

It is not necessary in order to determine whether this view expressed in the counter constitutes a contempt of Court or not to see whether this view is strictly correct. If it can reasonably be taken, and it appears that in expressing this view, the Chief Minister was not prompted by any desire to defy or flout the judgment of this Court, it cannot be considered a contempt of Court.

The powers of punishment for contempt by attachment and committal are unlimited and absolute. The procedure is summary. The ordinary protections available to a person accused of any criminal act or offence are not open to a person accused of contempt. The powers being thus wide and unlimited have always been exercised with great forbearance and circumspection.

It is only in cases where the intention to offend tire dignity of the Court, or abuse the process of Court or disobey its orders is clear and obvious and the acts of the party cannot be attributed Lo any other motive, and were not done in good faith, that the extraordinary powers of punishment for the contempt of Court should be exercised.

Some of the cases in which this principle has "been enunciated are as follows: In re - Clements Casta Rica Republic v. Erlanger 1887 46 LJ Ch 375 (B), it was held that the jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched, and should be exercised with greatest reluctance, and greatest anxiety on the part of the Judges to see whether there is no other mode open to the objection of the arbitrariness, which can be brought to bear upon the subject.

Exercise of this jurisdiction, it was further held, can only be justifiable when necessary for the preservation of the dignity of the Court and for purposes of the administration of justice. It was held in - ''In re, O''Malley; Hunt v. Clark 1889 58 LJQB 490 (C), that this extraordinary jurisdiction of punishing for contempt will not be exercised if the nature of offence is trifling.

It should only be resorted to, if the act complained of is likely to cause substantial prejudice to the parties of the action, or was inspired with the motive of defying the order of Court and offending its dignity. See also in this regard (1889) 61 LT 343 (C). The following observations of Lord Morris in - Meleod v. St. Aubyn 1899 AC 549(D) are apposite:

The committal for contempt of Court is a weapon that should be sparingly used and always with reference to the administration of justice.

Jenkins C.J. in - Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghosh AIR 1914 Cal 69 (E) has summed up the conditions under which these powers should be exercised as follows:

It is not enough that there should be a technical Contempt of Court: it must be shown that it was probable that the publication would substantially interfere with the due administration of justice.

And there is good reason for this: what is charged is a criminal offence, and the trial is not in accordance with these safeguards that the ordinary procedure for the trial of a criminal offence requires, but by way of summary proceeding.

It is, therefore, no matter for surprise that the cases are full of warnings, that this arbitrary, unlimited and uncontrolled power should be exercised, with the greatest caution: That this power merits this description will be realised when it is understood that there is no limit to the imprisonment that may be inflicted, or the fine that may be imposed, save the Courts'' unfettered discretion, and that the subject is protected by no right of appeal.

Similar views are expressed by Rankin, C.J. in - Ananta Lal Singh and Others Vs. Alfred Henry Watson and Others, . According to him, these powers should not be exercised unless there is real prejudice caused to the parties or there is an attempt to interfere substantially with the due course of justice and should never be exercised in doubtful cases.

See also in this regard - AIR 1945 134 (Privy Council) and - AIR 1943 202 (Privy Council) , in which emphasis has been laid on the fact that such powers should only be exercised in very clear cases, and sparingly. The matter has been considered at great length in one of the Full Bench cases of this High Court in - Manik Reddy v. Habibur Rahman 29 D LR 162 (I). Thus, the principle that the rowers of punishment for contempt of Court being arbitrary and unlimited should be exercised with utmost restraint and caution is well established and supported by ample authority and practice of the Courts.

Bearing this in mind and giving a careful consideration to the matter, it appears to us that the view which the Chief Minister has taken in making the payment can be reasonably held, and them is nothing in the order or in the counters which clearly and unequivocally indicates any desire on the part of the Chief Minister to disregard or defy the finding of this High Court in the judgment mentioned above regarding the rights of the parties, and Consequently in out opinion, for the reasons we have at some length shown above, he is not liable for contempt.

We find no reason for setting aside the order for payment of money to Rani Lakshmamma and Raja Ramchandra Reddy. If the interests of the applicant are affected, remedies are available to her. In the result, this application is dismissed.

Shri Sadashiv Rao for the applicant says that it will take at least 15 days to obtain an order from the Supreme Court and till that period the Government may be directed to stay the payment of this amount to the opposite party. We think on the whole it will be proper in the interests of justice to do so. The Nazim of Court of Wards and the Chief Minister are directed not to make any payment to the opposite party till 15 days from the date of this order.