Rambharose Urvasa vs Bharat Refractories Ltd. and Others

Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.—In this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashment of the order passed by the Labour Court on 13-1-1994 (Annexure-P/9) and the appellate order passed by the Industrial Court on 22-2-1994 (Annexure-P/11). By the said orders, the petitioner''s application u/s 31(3) of the M.P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short ''the Act of 1960'') was dismissed on the ground that the application is barred by limitation. Indisputably, the petitioner was appointed as Khalasi on 26-5-1981 and was promoted on the post of Helper (R-2 Grade) on 2-1-1986. On the allegation that he committed murder of his wife, he was charged for offence under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and was arrested on 30th March, 1985. By judgment dated 21-11-1985, the trial Court convicted him and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life and R.I. for 4 years respectively. However, his Criminal Appeal No. 1344/85 was allowed by the High Court by judgment dated 13-12-1991 and his conviction for both the offences was set aside.

At the time when the petitioner was in jail, he was terminated vide order dated 8-10-86. From the narration of facts available in the order passed by the Labour Court, it appears that he was informed about the order of termination by the employer''s letter dated 24-10-86 whereupon he moved representation before the employer against illegal termination on 29-10-86 and 31-12-86. The employer demanded medical certificate to which he replied that since he is in jail on the allegation of committing murder of his wife, he is not in a position to produce any certificate. After his release from jail, he moved a representation before the employer on 2-1-92 which was not paid heed to by the employer.

The petitioner preferred a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court bearing M.P. No. 1322/93, which was disposed of on 19-4-93 (Annexure-P/1) with a direction to exhaust alternative remedy under the M.P. Industrial Relations Act. The petitioner thereafter moved an application u/s 31(3) of the Act of 1960 on 21-5-93, inter alia, stating that at the time when he was terminated from the service, he was in jail and immediately after his release he submitted representation, which was not taken cognizance by the employer and thereafter he preferred a writ petition in which he was directed to exhaust alternative remedy.

The employer, in its written statement, denied the allegations and stated that he was unauthorizedly absent from duties with effect from 25-3-85 without any intimation or sanction of leave. He sought leave on medical ground, however, when the medical certificate was demanded, he demonstrated his inability to submit any certificate on the ground that he is confined in jail. It has been stated in para-5 of the written statement that the petitioner had sent a letter requesting the employer to consider his removal order till the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Amongst other technical objections, it was also stated by the respondent employer that the application is barred by limitation. Inasmuch as to challenge the order of termination dated 8-10-86, he has filed proceedings in May, 1993.

By order Annexure-P/9, the Labour Court dismissed the application made by the petitioner only on the ground of limitation and his appeal was also dismissed on this ground alone. The Act of 1960 is an Act regulating relations of employees in certain matters to make provisions for settlement of industrial dispute and to provide certain other matters connected therewith. It covers the same field which is covered by the Central Act i.e. the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ''the Act of 1947''). The subject matter of two Acts fall under the Concurrent List and as the State Act has been assented too by the President, it displaced the application of the Central Act to the industries to which the State Act is applied by issuing notification u/s 1(3) of the Act of 1960. It would thus be clear that the object of enacting the Act of 1947 and the Act of 1960 is one and the same i.e. to ensure social justice to both the employers and the employees and advance progress of the industry by bringing about existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the parties. It is a piece of legislation providing and regulating the service conditions of the workers and to improve service conditions of the Industrial Labour so as to provide for them the ordinary amenities of life and by the process, to bring about the industrial peace. The object of the Act of 1947 has been highlighted by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and Others, .

In the matter of Ajaib Singh Vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another, , the following has been held in para-5:--

Before appreciating the rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties, it has to be noticed as to under what circumstances the Act was enacted and what were the objectives sought to be achieved by its legislation. It cannot be disputed that the Act was brought on the statute-book with the object to ensure social justice to both the employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the parties. It is a piece of legislation, providing and regulating the service conditions of the workers. The object of the Act is to improve the service conditions of industrial labour so as to provide for them the ordinary amenities of life and by the process, to bring about industrial peace which would in its turn accelerate productive activity of the country resulting in its prosperity. The prosperity of the country in its turn, helps to improve the conditions of labour Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and Others, ). The Act is intended not only to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial dispute but also to serve industrial peace so that it may result in more production and improve the national economy. In the present socio-political economic system, it is intended to achieve cooperation between the capital and labour which has been deemed to be essential for maintenance of increased production and industrial peace. The Act provides to ensure fair terms to workmen and to prevent disputes between the employer and the employees so that the large interests of the public may not suffer. The provisions of the Act have to be interpreted in a manner which advances the object of the legislature contemplated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. While interpreting different provisions of the Act, attempt should be made to avoid industrial unrest, secure industrial peace and to provide machinery to secure the end. Conciliation is the most important and desirable way to secure that end. In dealing with industrial disputes, the courts have always emphasized the doctrine of social justice, which is founded on the basic ideal of socio-economic equality as enshrined in the Preamble of our Constitution. While construing the provisions of the Act, the courts have to give them a construction which should help in achieving the object of the Act.

In the above case of Ajaib Singh, the Hon''ble Supreme Court was dealing with the similar issue where the Labour Court had allowed the prayer for reinstatement with back wages, but the said order was set aside in appeal and the Hon''ble Supreme Court after reiterating and stating the objects of the Act held that the limitation prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in the matter of reference of industrial dispute to Labour Court.

Keeping in mind the above stated object of legislation in question, this Court shall now consider as to whether in a proceeding before the Labour Court under the Act of 1960, the Labour Court has power to condone the delay in filing application u/s 31(3) read with Section 62 of the Act of 1960 and if it has, whether in the special facts and circumstances of the case, the delay should have been condoned by the Labour Court.

With regard to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceeding before the Labour Court under the Act of 1960, this Court need not dwell it in view of the categorical pronouncement in Full Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Mohammad Sagir Vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals and Others, , wherein their Lordships have held in paragraphs-30 and 31 of the judgment thus:--

Once we have held that the Act applies, the question of nature of proceeding becomes inconsequential. In the case of Vijay Singh (supra), the Division Bench adverted to the nature of the proceeding and expressed the view that an application u/s 5 of the said Adhiniyam is in the nature of a declaratory suit. The said conclusion was reached by the Division Bench in placing reliance on the case of Mohd. Ashfaq (supra). On a studied scrutiny of the same, it becomes quite clear that the interpretation given by the Division Bench is not correct. There is no exclusion of the Limitation Act. Solely because it has been stated in the provision that certain time gap is allowable because of section 17 of the Act, it would not tantamount to the exclusion of the Limitation Act. If such an incorporation is allowed on the language employed, it would be a narrow and truncated one which is not the purpose or intendment of the Legislature. The canvas, in our view, has been broadened by granting allowances of time u/s 17 of the Limitation Act and from that an inference in regard to curtailment should not be done as that would amount not only to causing violence to the language but would also frustrate the conception of purposive interpretation as well as defeat the essential spirit of the enactment. Hence, in our considered view, the construction endowed on the said provision by the Division Bench is not correct. As the learned Single Judge has been guided by the said decision in the case of Narayan Singh (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that the said decision is not correct.

In view of the aforesaid premises, we arrive at the following conclusions:--

(i) The exposition of law set out in the case of Vijay Singh (supra) to the effect that the provisions of Limitation Act would not apply to an application preferred u/s 5 of the Adhiniyam (Act No. 3 of 1977) the same being an original proceedings in the nature of a declaratory suit as a different type of limitation has been prescribed under the special statute, is not correct.

(ii) The decision rendered in the case of Narayan Singh (supra) docs not state the law correctly as far as it pronounces that Limitation Act is not applicable to a proceeding u/s 62 of MPIR Act.

(iii) The language employed u/s 62 of the MPIR Act docs meet the twin requisite ingredients to have the applicability of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and ergo, the said provision does get attracted.

(iv) An employee who prefers an application u/s 62 of MPIR Act beyond the limitation prescribed therein can always file an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and it would be open to the Labour Court to condone the delay if sufficient grounds have been shown.

Once it has been held that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable in a proceeding under the Act of 1960 before the Labour Court, the next question which arises is whether in the case in hand, the Labour Court could have condoned the delay in view of the pleadings set forth by the workmen in his application u/s 31 (3) of the Act of 1960 or he should at least have been granted opportunity to file an application for condonation of delay. Admittedly, the workmen was confined in jail at the time when he was terminated and immediately after his acquittal by the High Court and consequent release from jail, he moved a representation which was not replied by the Management. He then preferred a writ petition before the M.P. High Court which was disposed of with a direction to the workmen to exhaust alternative remedy. The writ petition came to be decided on 19-4-1993 and the application u/s 31 (3) read with Section 62 of the Act of 1960 was moved on 21-5-1993 i.e. in about a month''s time. Thus, there appears plausible explanation and justification for the petitioner for his failure to move application before the Labour Court within time prescribed.

However, since no application has been filed for condonation of delay, this Court is not in a position to assess the judgment in this regard and it is for the Labour Court to apply its mind on application being made for condonation of delay and then to consider whether in the facts of the case, delay deserves to be condoned or not. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the impugned order of the Labour Court as well as the Appellate Court deserve to be set aside and the matter deserves to be remitted back to the Labour Court with a direction to the petitioner to move an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in preferring application and the said application shall be decided by the Labour Court on its own merits and if delay deserves to be condoned, it shall thereafter dispose of the application u/s 31 (3) read with Section 62 of the Act of 1960 on merits, after giving due opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Ordered accordingly. The writ petition thus succeeds and is allowed in part.

No order as to costs.