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Judgment
K. Chandru, J.—These batch of Appeal Suits were filed u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act by the Appellants, challenging a common
judgment and decree made in various LAOPs starting from 550 of 1986 and batch cases, dated 16.10.1998 rendered by the Sub Court,
Thiruvallur.
In all the LAOPs, the Court below rejected the claim of the Appellants for their demand of payment of compensation on account of acquisition
of lands for the purpose of setting up Manali Oil Refinery Project in the village of Manali coming under Saidapet Taluk. The Special Tahsildar-
cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Oil Refinery Project was the acquiring authority.
The State Government by an order in G.O.Ms. No. 114 (ILC), dated 20.1.1965 approved the draft notification u/s 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act from Manali and its adjoining villages. After following due procedure, various awards were passed starting from Award No. 1 of
1986 for acquiring the lands. There was hardly any dispute regarding the quantum of compensation. However, since there was a dispute regarding
the demand for compensation from various quarters, the amounts were deposited and the matter was referred to for determination u/s 30 of the
Land Acquisition Act. The said references were registered as various LAOPs starting from LAOP No. 550 of 1986 by the Sub Court, Thiruvallur.
On behalf of Appellants, a claim statement was filed. The contesting Respondents staked their claim on various grounds.
Before the reference Court, on behalf of the Appellants (who are rival claimants), the first Appellant Ramakrishna Mudaliar (since deceased)
was examined as C.W. 1. On behalf of original claimants (contesting Respondents), M/s. Venugopal Pillai, Krishnamurthy and Thyagarajan were
examined as C.W. 2 to C.W. 4. Since it is only a dispute for payment of compensation, the acquiring authority who is the first Respondent in all
appeals did not make any statement. On behalf of all claimants, 56 documents were filed. It is unfortunate that the Reference Court generally
numbered all the exhibits as claimants'' exhibits without indicating as to whose behalf those exhibits were filed.
The Reference Court on the basis of the evidence by a common judgment, dated 16.10.1998 rejected the demands of rival claimants, i.e.
Appellants herein and permitted the claimants who are contesting Respondents to receive the compensation. It is as against this common judgment,
these appeals were filed.
Pending the appeals, this Court granted an interim stay of execution of judgment and decree passed by the Court below. The result was the
parties to which amounts were entitled to, could not enjoy the fruits of such Award of compensation for over 10 years. During the pendency of
appeals, the first Appellant died and his L.Rs. were brought on record. Even though notice was ordered on all appeals, in number of cases, the
contesting Respondents are no more and no steps were taken to bring proper L.Rs. In some cases, contesting Respondents are yet to be served
and the appeals are not in complete shape. Likewise, in some cases, where notices were ordered, Appellants had not paid processing fees so as to
send notices to contesting Respondents.
Since these appeals were of the years 2000 to 2002 and more than 9 years have elapsed and also the fact that the order of the Court below
was of the year 1998 and the LAOPS of the year 1986, this Court is not inclined to show any further indulgence. Under these circumstances,
those appeal suits are liable to be rejected on a short ground.
In cases where there was contest and matters were argued, it is necessary to deal with the same on merits even though those appeals could also
have been rejected on short technical ground. That in respect of some claims, the Award became final and that will operate as res judicata in
respect of the other claims.
History of land acquisition:
Manali village in Saidapet Taluk was not taken over as an Inam Estate. But after the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was made
by the State Government, the said village was taken over on 15.12.1966 under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estates (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1963, by G.O.Ms. No. 3265, Revenue, dated 22.11.1966. Though soil classification and fixation of assessment
were done, the proceedings for acquisition of those lands were not finalised. At that juncture, Ramakrishna Mudaliar (original first Appellant) filed
a writ petition before this Court being W.P. No. 2816 of 1966 questioning the validity and applicability of 1963 Act to Inam village which is
Manali. Initially, this Court granted stay of further proceedings of taking over Inam village. Though interim stay was granted from taking over the
village, the State Government considered whether that can bar the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act to be completed.
Therefore, the Government issued G.O. No. 1111, Revenue, dated 3.6.1969 and directed the acquiring authority to pass an Award without
waiting for the final decision in that writ petition.
Subsequently, the interim stay granted by this Court was vacated and Manali village was taken over by the Government on 15.4.1970. The
ryotwari settlement was introduced in Fasli 1382 (1.7.1972) and settlement proceedings were completed under 1963 Act during the year 1976.
The contesting Respondents filed applications for the grant of ryotwari patta in their favour. As against the order passed by the settlement
authorities, the Appellants filed appeals in various civil miscellaneous appeals before the Tribunal constituted under the 1963 Act. The Tribunal
dismissed the appeals filed by Appellants and confirmed the orders of the settlement authorities. The Appellants did not challenge those orders
before the Special Appellate Tribunal (which is this high Court) u/s 46 of the 1963 Act. Thus, those proceedings came to an end on 31.7.1978.
In the meanwhile, the Award enquiry was completed. The writ petition filed by the Appellants challenging the acquisition of lands was also
dismissed by this Court in W.P. No. 2816 of 1966 on 1.12.1969. The contesting Respondents were in physical possession and enjoyment of the
lands in question and were directly cultivating those lands. The acquiring authority, i.e. first Respondent completed the acquisition proceedings and
passed the Award. As against the Award passed by the acquiring authority, the State Government filed writ petitions before this Court being W.P.
No. 489 of 1971 and batch cases and contended that the market value fixed by the acquiring authority was exorbitant and was done by fraudulent
exercise of power. In those writ petitions, two acquiring authorities were named in their personal names and the Appellants were also made as
party Respondents. Before this Court, two contentions were raised, i.e. the State Government is stopped from contending that the market value
fixed by the authorities were erroneous and that the writ petitions were not maintainable. This Court by a final judgment, dated 20.6.1974
dismissed those writ petitions. This Court held that the market value fixed by the authorities can still be questioned, but a writ petition challenging
the Award passed by the acquiring authority was not maintainable since the subject matter of valuation can be referred for determination by a
reference Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Order of Reference:
During the award enquiry, the Appellants on one side (henceforth known as rival claimants) and contesting Respondents on the other side, i.e.
claimants, staked their claims to get the compensation. Therefore, the authority referred the matter for determination u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition
Act. The order passed by the authority reads as follows:
...the land owners above mentioned have objected to the apportionment of any amount in favour of the Ex-land holder towards melwaram share
and requested that the entire compensation be paid to them. Whereas the ex-land holder has claimed entire compensdation in favour of himself and
his brothers as explained earlier. Since there is dispute in the apportionment of compensation, a reference to the Court will be made u/s 30 and the
compensation 31(2) of the L.A. Act.
It was thereafter these separate references were registered and separate LAOP numbers were assigned.
Claim made by the Contesting Respondents:
Before the Reference Court, the claimants contended that lands in Manali village became an estate and it was notified on 15.12.1966 u/s 1(4)
of the Tamil Nadu Act 26/1963. The challenge made by rival claimants was dismissed by this Court in W.P. No. 2816 of 1966. Subsequently, the
area was surveyed and brought under settlement account. Notice under Form 5 was issued for an enquiry and interested persons were issued with
Form 6 notices. During the course of the said enquiry, claimants and rival claimants appeared before the settlement authority. The village munsif
and the other witnesses deposed before the settlement authority. The rival claimants though appeared through their staff never produced any
documents. The settlement authority held that claimants are in possession of lands. They are cultivating the lands by paying necessary kist and cash.
The kist receipts were also produced before the authorities. The authorities found that they were tenants covered by tenancy agreement having
short term lease was not accepted and held that claimants (contesting Respondents) are entitled for patta in respect of lands. The rival claimants
being Appellants appealed before the Tribunal. But it was also rejected on 31.7.1978. They are also in continuous possession of the lands for over
a long period and cultivating the lands by putting their own physical labour. They were also having UDR patta.
It was also contended that in the settlement proceedings as well as before the Tribunal, Chengalpet, the rival claimants did not prove their title
to the property. The possession with reference to the land acquisition was taken only from claimants. After settlement proceedings, the rival
claimants had received compensation for loss of their right under the Inam Act 26/1961 and the present claim that they are owners of lands cannot
be accepted.
The case put forth by rival claimants (Appellants):
The Appellants contended that Manali is Inam village and they are grantees of Shotriem from the Nizam of Hyderabad. The grant was given
even before the advent of East India Company and they are Mirazdars of the village. They also owned Kidivaram right in respect of lands. In
respect of Thumbivaram, tenants were given permission to cultivate and they are bayakarries. u/s 9 of the Estate (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, 1948, it was held that Inam would attract an Inam estate in terms of Section 2(7). As against the said decision, Appellant''s father
filed an appeal before the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Madurai. The Estate Abolition Tribunal by its judgment, dated 28.11.1950 held that Manali
and two other Inam estate are not Inam estate liable to be notified under Act 26/1948. Therefore, all lands in the village are private lands of
Inamdars. The claimants never challenged and proved before any tribunal their right to have any ownership in the land. The Government did not
collect any reduced rent from the tenants of Appellants in terms of Tamil Nadu Act 30/1947. Therefore, when acquiring authorities took over the
acquired lands, they ought to have paid compensation only to the true owners of lands, i.e. Appellants. The Act 26/1963 has no application to the
case on hand. They were in possession and enjoyment of acquired land and possession was taken over only from them. They did not lose their
occupancy right in terms of Section 6A of the Madras Estate Land Act, 1968 and the lands are private lands in terms of Section 3(10)(b) of the
Estate Land Act 1968. At no point of time, Kudivaram interest was taken over from them and given in favour of tenants. Therefore, they are
eligible to get the entire compensation.
Decision by the Reference Court:
The Reference Court found that the Appellants did not establish that they are in possession and enjoyment of properties consequent upon
partition among family members in terms of Section C(2). They had not produced any kist receipt to prove the same. C.W. 1 Ramakrishna
Mudaliar in his evidence admitted that rents were not collected from contesting Respondents. In terms of Ex. C. 56, it is found that the Appellants
had received compensation for abolition of Inam under Act 26/1963. C.W. 1 feigned ignorance about the appeal being filed against settlement
proceedings. Though a claim was made that they were cultivating the entire 300 acres and certain properties were sold, no document was
produced including Adangal. The Court below also found that C.W. 1 though claimed that they were cultivating the lands, they had not produced
any document to show that they were paying Agricultural Income Tax. Therefore, as a matter of fact, it was found that the Appellants were not in
direct cultivation of lands. On the other hand, after going through the documents and evidence of C.W. 2 Venugopala Piullai, the Court below
found that as against patta proceedings, appeals were filed and the same were rejected by the Tribunal and no further appeals were filed to the
Special Appellate Tribunal, i.e. this High Court.
The contesting Respondents had also filed patta in their favour as well as kist receipts. Ex. C. 54 shows that after proceedings issued by the
Survey and Settlement Director, compensation was received by the Appellants for abolition of Inam estate. C.W. 3 Krishnamurthy had filed
documents to show that he had purchased the property on 10.10.1923 which was marked as Exs. C. 20, 21 and 22. The ryotwari patta and the
assessment receipt show that it is the contesting Respondents who are in enjoyment of lands in question. The Court below also found that Ex. C.
25 was an encumbrance certificate for the periods from 1926 to 1938 showing their ownership. Ex. C. 26 is a copy of SLR. Exs. C. 27 and 28
are orders passed by the settlement officer. Exs. C. 29 and 30 are pattas. Therefore, it held that there has been proper proceedings by the
settlement authorities. The appeal filed in CMA No. 105 of 1977 was also rejected in terms of Ex. C. 31 and no second appeal was filed before
the Special Appellate Tribunal.
The chitta register is filed as Ex. C. 32 and having obtained compensation in terms of the 1963 Act for abolition of Inam, the very same
persons, i.e. Appellants cannot ask for second compensation as if owners of lands. Even under UDR scheme, notices were given only to
contesting Respondents for grant of UDR pattas and the same was filed as Ex. C. 37. Under these circumstances, the Court below found that
going by sale deed, chitta, adangal, kist and assessment receipts clearly show that it is the contesting Respondents who are owners and they are in
possession and enjoyment of lands. They are also directly cultivating the lands. It is under these circumstances, the Reference Court passed the
judgment rejecting the claim of Appellants and directed the acquiring authority to grant compensation to contesting Respondents.
Case of the Appellants:
Assailing this judgment, Mr. C. Hanumantha Rao, learned Counsel for Appellants in all appeals contended that orders passed in Revenue
Appeal Nos. 264, 265 and 266 of 1950 by the Estate Abolition Tribunal, Madurai, dated 28.11.1950 will show that Manali village is an
exempted village and not covered by the Inam Estate Land Act. The Appellants are Egaboga Mirazdars of three villages including Manali. They
also owned Kudivaram rights and no other person can claim right in those villages. Therefore, it cannot be held to be an Inam Estate. Since this
order was not challenged and became final, they need not produce any other document to show their ownership of the lands, which are acquired
by the first Respondent.
They also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Aluru Kondayya and Others Vs. Singaraju Rama Rao and Others, . The Supreme
Court while dealing with the history of the land tenure in South India as well as the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, in
paragraphs 22 and 23 observed as follows:
The Legislature with a view to define the relations between landlords and tenants in inam villages promulgated Madras Act 1 of 1908. The
material part of Section 6(1) as amended by Madras Act 8 of 1934 and 18 of 1936 provided:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land
situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding.
Explanation (1).- For the purposes of this Sub-section, the expression ''every ryot now in possession'' shall include every person who, having held
land as a ryot continues in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act.
Explanation (2)-(3) ***
Section 3 Sub-section (2) defined the expression ""estate"" within the meaning of the Act and insofar as it is material for this case, it provided as
originally enacted:
In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context-
''Estate'' Means-
(a) any permanently-settled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari;
(b) any portion of such permanently-settled estate or temporarily-settled zamindari which is separately registered in the office of the Collector;
(c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;
(d) any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has
been made, confirmed, or recognised by the British Government, or any separated part of such village;
(e) any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the estates specified above in Clauses (a), (b) and (q) which is held on a permanent
undertenure.
Kudivararn"" is a Tamil word, which signifies the cultivator''s share in the produce of land as distinguished from the landlord''s share received by
him as rent, which is called ""melvaram"". ""Kudivararn"" has acquired a secondary meaning, it means the cultivator''s interest in the land, and
melvaram"" the landlord''s interest in the land. The definition of ""estate"" in Clause (d) gave rise to considerable litigation which called for
determination of two questions: (1) whether there was a grant of the whole village so as to make the area granted an estate; and (2) whether the
landlord to whom the land was granted owned the ""kudivararn"". In cases which came before the Courts it appeared that apart from the grant
which was claimed to be a grant of an estate, there were in each village other grants, religious, service and personal, and evidence about the
commencement of these minor grants and the terms on which they were granted was not forthcoming.
In G. Narayanaswami Nayudu v. N. Subramavyam in a suit filed by the receiver of the Nidadaole estate for possession of certain lands the
tenant claimed that he had acquired occupancy rights u/s 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908. There were in the village minor inams of
three classes: archaka service inams, village service inams, and dharandaya inams, and there was no evidence whether the grant to the Plaintiff''s
estate of the village was made first, or whether the minor inams were granted first. It was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff estate that inasmuch
as there were minor inams in the village, the Venkatapuram agraharam could not be said to be ""a village of which the land revenue had been
granted as inam within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the Act"". The Court rejected that contention and observed:
The definition in Sub-Section 2, Clause (d) was obviously intended to exclude from the definition of ""Estate"" what are known as minor inams,
namely, particular extends of land in a particular village as contrasted with the grant of the whole village by its boundaries. The latter are known as
''whole inam villages''. The existence of ''minor mains'', in whole inam villages is very common and if these inam villages do not come within the
definition of ''Estate'' almost all the agraharam, shrotriyam and mokhasa villages will be excluded.
This certainly cannot have been the intention of the legislature. These minor inams are generally granted for service to be rendered to the village or
to the owner and that seems to be the nature of the minor inams in this case.
The Court therefore held that Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act excludes from the definition of ""estate"" minor inams, and a grant
which purports to be a grant of a whole inam village is an estate within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 3(2), even though it may be found that
there are lands held by grantees under minor inams. The Legislature in 1936 substituted for Clause (d) of Section 3(2) the following clause by the
Madras Estates Land. (Third Amendment) Act, 18 of 1936:
(d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognized by the British Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the
grant, the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees.
In paragraph 31, the Supreme Court further observed as follows:
Section 23 was added by Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act 18 of 1936. It reads:
Where in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary to determine whether an inam village or a separated part of an inam village was or was not
an estate within the meaning of this Act as it stood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, it shall
be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that such village or part was an estate.
The presumption u/s 23 in terms applies only to cases in which the question whether an inam village was an estate before the commencement of the
Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. Under the Act, before it was amended in 1936, a grant of a village could be deemed a grant
of an estate where only melvaram was granted to the inamdar and not where both the melvaram and the kudivaram were granted. By enacting
Section 23 the Legislature intended to declare that in determining whether under a grant of an inam village both varama were granted or only the
melvaram was granted, it shall be presumed, until the contrary was shown, that such village or part thereof was an estate, that is, only the melvaram
was granted. Under the Act before its amendment, one of the conditions of the applicability of Section 3(2)(d) was that the grant in favour of the
inamdar was only of the melvaram, and that it did not include the kudivaram. and the Legislature by Section 23 as amended provided that in a
dispute arising between the landlord and tenant whether an inam village was or was not an estate, it was to be presumed that it was only of the
melvaram....
He further referred to a division bench judgment of this Court in Vedaranyeswaraswami Devastyhanam by its Executive Officer, Vedaranyam,
Nagai Q.M. District v. A.C. Dharma Devi and Ors. reported in (2003) 1 L.W. 663 for the purpose of contending that the person holding ryotwari
patta before introduction of Inam Abolition Act can be subjected to provisions of the 1963 Act and his rights can be abolished by virtue of the
Act. In fact, far from abolition to so-called Inam, the claim of persons entitled to grant of ryotwari patta has to be examined and settled.
Contentions of the Respondents:
Per contra, Mr. M. Venkatachalapathy, Senior Counsel appearing for some of the contesting Respondents contended that in the absence of
any other evidence disclosing title of either party, the patta standing in the name of persons can be taken as good record on possession and
authority u/s 30 in deciding the rights of parties in terms of pattadar. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Lakshmana Gounder
v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) Salem and Ors. reported in 2003 (1) LACC 277. The following passages found in paragraphs 10 and 12 may
be reproduced below:
The Act 26/63 provides for acquisition of rights of the land holders in inam estates in the State of Tamil Nadu and the introduction of ryotwari
settlement in such estates. u/s 3(b) of Act 26/63, on the date of notification of taking over of the estate and the interests of the land holders therein
would completely extinguish except the sites on which buildings have been erected either by the land holder or by any other person. Such rights
have been separately dealt in Section 15 of the said Act. u/s 9, in the case of an existing inam estate, the land owner shall with effect on and from
the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta and such person should be owning an estate or a part thereof or a person entitled to collect rents of
the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner or his predecessor in title or by any order of a competent Court or
by any provision of law. u/s 10 of the said Act, in the case of existing inam estate, every ryot shall with effect on and from the notified date be
entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of his lands. u/s 11, ryotwari patta can be issued on the basis of personal cultivation in certain cases. Section
12 contemplates the determination of land in which a person is entitled to ryotwari patta. In this case, the officer, on examination of the claim of the
parties has issued patta in favour of Respondents 2 and 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the Appellant herein has preferred an appeal u/s 12(2)
before the Inam Abolition Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal directing for issuance of joint patta in the name of the Appellant and
Respondents 2 and 3 which is evident from Ex. A14. Later, the Tahsildar issued regular patta Exs. B2 and B3 in favour of Respondents 2 and 3
each to an extent of 3.73.5 acres. The balance extent is 1.76 acres as both sides have admitted the total extent as 9.23 acres. The Appellant has
not challenged the said Exs. B2 and B3 till date.
A patta is a record of possession represents a distinct fractional part of lands. The said presumption has its roots in the system of land tenure
and in the custom of the area in which the lands are situate. Each pattadar manages his lands and pays fixed share of the Government Revenue.
Entries in revenue records are not conclusive, but their importance in a case for possession cannot be denied, until contrary is shown. Though one
cannot challenge the entry in revenue records as incorrect but can always impugn it as having been made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Followed
the decision in Vishwa Vijay Bharati Vs. Fakhrul Hassan and Others, . In this case, the Apex Court has held the entries in the Revenue records
generally to be accepted at their face value and Courts should not embark upon an appellate enquiry into their correctness. But, the presumption of
correctness can apply to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. When, in a particular case, facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone
will decide the right of the parties.
On the basis of this, he submitted that since before the Reference Court, the Appellants had failed to prove their entitlement, they cannot rely upon
the decisions cited out of context.
Issue for consideration:
In the light of the rival contentions, it has to be seen whether the Appellants have made out any case for interfering with the judgment passed by
the reference Court?
What the law says?
The jurisdiction of the reference Court u/s 30 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in several decisions which may be usefully referred
to.
In case of dispute the power to be exercised by the reference Court u/s 30 had been dealt with by the Supreme Court vide its judgment in
Arulmighu Lakshminarasimhaswamy Temple Singirigudi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . The following passages found in paragraph 2 may
be extracted herebelow:
...The question, therefore, would be: what would be the proper procedure to be adopted in case of dispute as to the title of the land acquired
under the Act? The learned Single Judge declared title of the Petitioner in the writ petition and the Division Bench directed the civil Court to decide
the title. Both views are obviously erroneous in law. The Land Acquisition Officer has to determine the extent of the land, the persons entitled to
compensation and the compensation to be determined u/s 23(1) of the Act. If he finds that there is any dispute as to the person entitled to receive
the compensation, necessarily he has to deposit the amount u/s 31 of the Act into the Court to which reference would lie. On such a dispute having
arisen, he has to make a reference to the Court u/s 30 of the Act to decide the dispute between the competing persons who set up rival title to the
compensation. Under those circumstances, the only legal course open is that a direction be issued to the Land Acquisition Officer to make a
reference u/s 30 to decide the inter se title to receive the compensation either by the Appellant or by the fourth Respondent, as the case may be
and the Reference Court would decide the matter in accordance with law.
The Supreme Court once again dealt with Section 30 in its subsequent decision in P.K. Sreekantan v. P. Sreekumaran Nair reported in (2006)
13 SCC 574. In paragraphs 12 and 13, it was held as follows:
In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. Vs. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and Another, the question related to the
exercise of jurisdiction u/s 30 of the Act vis-a-vis Section 18. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit....
Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction
comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or
circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its
jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, it goes without saying
that before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seising of that matter have
in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan
Bahadoor (1855) 6 MIA 134 (PC), wherever jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon
certain specified terms contained in that Act it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the
jurisdiction for if they be not complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. (See Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, .
Holding that the reference Court did not have original jurisdiction and it derives its power only from reference, the Supreme Court in its
decision in Muthavalli of Sha Madhari Diwan Wakf S.J. Syed Zakrudeen and Another Vs. Syed Zindasha and Others, further in paragraph 13
observed as follows:
A Reference Court is not a Court of original jurisdiction. It derives jurisdiction only in terms of the order of reference. The Act being a self-
contained code, the manner in which the reference is to be made and the statement required to be made by the Collector has been specified in
Section 19 of the Act. The his between the parties to the reference meaning thereby a person interested and the State is with regard to the quantum
of compensation. No other question can be raised therein. The Reference Court exercises a limited jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction from the
terms of reference.
Findings:
In the present case, apart from the possession and direct cultivation by contesting Respondents, the Court below also found that they have
patta under settlement authorities and a challenge made to the proceedings of the settlement authorities were negatived by the Tribunal constituted
under the Act 26/1963. The Appellants did not even challenge the same by way of an appeal provided to the Special Appellate Tribunal. It also
found that for the abolition of Inam, the Appellants had received compensation which was not denied by them. To prove that they were in
possession and cultivation, they had not filed any acceptable document. It also found that certain Respondents had purchased the lands in their
own names. The encumbrance certificate also shows that they are owners. The fact that they are cultivating the lands were proved by chitta,
adangal as well as by kist receipts. These findings of fact cannot be negatived.
Further, under the Tamil Nadu Act 26/1963, u/s 68, it has been held that the decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal shall be
binding on parties in any proceedings or suit proceedings and they will operate as res judicata. u/s 71, finality has been given to orders passed
under the provisions of the Act and to that extent, the jurisdiction of Courts in questioning the authority''s order has been barred. However, the
provisions of the Act viz-a-viz power of the civil Court to determine the title of parties came to be considered in certain decisions of this Court and
the Supreme Court.
In N. Krishna Chettiar alias Krishnaswami and Others Vs. C. Subbiah Ambalam and Another, , this Court in paragraph 18 observed as
follows:
In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide questions of
title is not ousted even though patta was granted under the provisions of the Minor Inams Act. Therefore, in view of the abovesaid decisions, it is
not possible for the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners herein to contend that after the patta was issued by the Settlement Officer, the
jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted in the matter of deciding the title. This decision was not over-ruled by the Supreme Court in the later
decision in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat Vs. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and Others, .
Subsequently, a Full Bench of this Court in Srinivasan and Ors. v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Tiruchirapalli District by its
Executive Officer, Pettavaithalai Devasthanam and 5 Ors. reported in 1998 2 MLJ 722 after referring to the earlier decision, in paragraphs 14 and
15 observed as follows:
...A careful analysis of the scheme underlying these Abolition laws would go to show that the vesting on abolition under everyone of these
legislations is subject to the pre-existing rights of the occupants, except in respect of what are known as public or comunal properties, meant for
common use and the grant of patta has been always considered and held to be in recognition of their pre-existing rights. The provisions relating to
abolition and vesting, of the properties do not have the effect of obliterating or destroying such pre-existing rights, if any, except in respect of public
or comunal properties and the rights which entitle a person to preferentially get patta under these legislations, and the same could not be equated to
the grant of patta by way of assignment under the Revenue Standing Orders or under rules of assignment outside the scope of the statutory
enactments. Similarly, a meticulous analysis of the scheme underlying the provisions of the Act dealing with the nature of rights dealt with by the
various authorities, the manner in which such authorities adjudicate such rights and the consequences of such adjudication, disclose that they do not
mean and even intend to be a substitute or alternate mode or resolution of the ordinary civil right of a citizen or for that matter persons asserting
competing claims, in their attempt to project a claim for patta. Consequently, in our view, the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court reported in
State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, , R. Manicka Naicker Ors. Vs. E. Elumalai Naicker, and Sayyed Ali and Others Vs. Andhra
Pradesh Wakf Board Hyderabad and Others, and that of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramanujam Katiyyar v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa
Pandara Sannadhi Avargal (1988) 2 LW 513 and of a learned single Judge of this Court in Samsuddin Rowther v. Avvammal (1992) 1 LW 207
would squarely apply and govern the case and consequently (it has to be necessarily held that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot be held to
have been completely ousted or barred at any rate in respect of adjudication of claims of tide and questions or issues which are not obliged or
required to be adjudicated for the purpose of enforcement of these laws which have, as their object and aim, to implement ryotwari settlement in
the areas governed by them.
Further, the mere fact that the orders passed or decisions rendered under these Acts were given finality for the purposes of those Acts or that
the issues, which they are obliged or required to be decided, when so decided are ordained to bind the parties to the proceedings or their privies
and successors-in-interest applying the principles of res judicata does not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court once and for
all. It is by now well settled that even in cases where finality is accorded to any decision or order, there are certain well settled exceptions and
proved the existence of such exceptional factors, the Civil Court is entitled to nullify any or all such decisions. Similarly, even in cases where the
principles of res judicata are rendered applicable, the jurisdiction of the competent Civil Court to go into the question and find out whether the
necessary ingredients to apply the principles of res judicata exist in a given case or not cannot be denied to the Civil Court and from the mere fact
of according finality to the orders or decisions rendered under the Act or the application of the principles of res judicata a total or complete bar or
ouster of the jursidction of the Civil Courts for all and any purpose cannot be automatically inferred or implied. Before a plea of res judicata can be
given effect to, it must be sufficiently pleaded and established that the litigating parties must be the same, that the subject matter of the suit and the
other proceedings also are identical, that the questions arising in the suit and the other proceedings were directly and substantially in issue and the
same was finally decided and that too by an authority or Court of competent jurisdiction.
Though it has been held that Section 68 will operate as resjudicata in a regularly constituted civil suit, the Appellants have not instituted any
such suit for any declaration of their title to the properties. On the other hand, before the reference Court which is empowered to decide the matter
due to reference made by the acquiring authority, the Appellants did not lead any evidence about their so-called title by taking advantage of
interpretation of Act 26/1963 made by the Courts. But, in the present case, the order passed by the Tribunal in various CMAs filed by the
Appellants before the Court of Chengalpattu can certainly be put against Appellants. Even otherwise with reference to findings of fact regarding
their possession and direct cultivation, no evidence was let in. Therefore, the contentions raised by Appellants cannot be countenanced by this
Court.
Result:
In view of the above legal precedents and the factual matrix involved in this case, this Court is not willing to upset the well considered judgment
rendered by the Court below. Therefore, all appeals are liable to be dismissed not only on the ground of merits, but also in cases where parties
were not served and where in respect of dead persons, no L.Rs. were brought on record, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on additional
grounds. Accordingly, all Appeal Suits will stand dismissed. However, under the peculiar circumstances of the cases, parties are allowed to bear
their own costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand dismissed.