Rama Vanti vs Bal Kaur

D.K. Mahajan, J.—This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Senior Sub Judge, Hoshiarpur, rejecting the objections of the judgment debtor against the execution of the decree dated the 12th March, 1923. The judgment which is the basis of this decree is reported in Mussammat Bal Kaur v. Msf. Devki ILR 4 Lah. 236 and the entire fate of the present objection petition hinges on the true interpretation of that decree.

Mukand was the last male holder. He was a Joshi Brahamin of Hoshiarpur. He died in 1914. On his death he left a predeceased son''s widow Mst. Devki and a daughter from her Mst. Rama Banti. He also left two daughters Mst. Bal Kaur and Mst. Jamna Devi. His daughter took out a succession certificate and also claimed that they were his heirs in preference to the pre-deceased son''s widow and her daughter. They also brought a suit far a declaration to that effect. The defendants to that suit were Mst. Devki and her daughter. Their plea was a that by special custom the predeceased son''s widow was a preferential heir as. against the daughters of the last male holder and in the alternative that she and her daughter had a right of residence in the family house and had to be maintained out of the estate of Mukand. It was also pleaded that the money required for the marriage of granddaughter was to be paid out of his estate. In the trial Court, the right of residence etc. was conceded, but there was disagreement as to the amount of maintenance allowance and also as to what sum was to be fixed for the marriage expenses The trial Court held that the pre-deceased son''s widow and her daughter were preferential heirs to the daughters of the last male holder Mukand. On appeal by Mst. Bal Kaur, one of the daughters of Mukand, the decision of the trial Court was reversed and it was held that the pre-deeeased son''s widow and her daughter were not preferential heirs in presence of the daughters of the last male holder. But by consent of parties, it was settled that one house and two shops would be made available for maintenance to the pre-deceased son''s widow and her daughter. A sum of Rs. 1,000/- was also fixed for the marriage expenses of the pre-deceased son''s daughter. The income of the two shops was Rs..16/-, Rs. 10/- from the one and Rs. 6/- from the other. The cost of repair of the shops was to be paid by the pre-deceased son''s widow and her daughter. On the marriage of the daughter, the shop carrying Rs. 6/- as rent was to revert to the appellant (Bal Kaur) and her sister. The house and the second shop were to remain in possession of the pre-deceased son''s widow for maintenance till her death. It is not disputed that the pre-deceased son''s widow (Devki) continued to live in the house and also continued to enjoy the rent of the shop. The daughter was married and one of the shops has gone back to Bal Kaur and her sister. The present dispute only concerns the house and the shop, which were left for maintenance of Mst. Devki Mst. Devki died admittedly after the year 1956 and after the coming into force of Hindu Succession Act. After her death, execution of the decree dated 12th March 1923 was taken out by Mst. Bal Kaur. Her application was objected to by Mohan Lal on behalf of Bal Kaur''s sister and the daughter of Devki. I am not concerned with the objection petition of Mohan Lal. His objections were rejected. He has not appealed. I am only concerned with the objection petition of Mst. Devki''s daughter, whose objections were rejected by the executing Court. Her case is that her mother died after the Hindu Succession Act had come into force and she was in possession of the property in dispute in lieu of maintenance and therefore, she had become its absolute owner by reason of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. This contention was controverted by Mst. Bal Kaur and the following issue was framed :

What is the effect of Act No. 30 of 1956". The executing Court applied Section 14(2) and held that the mere fact that the property, in dispute, was for maintenance by a decree clearly indicated that the decree prescribed a restricted estate in such property. Against this decision, Mst. Devki''s daughter has preferred the present appeal.

Mr. Aggarwal who appears for her has raised the contention that the learned Sub Judge was in error in applying Section 14(2) The Learned Counsel''s contention is that Mst. Devki was in possession of the property in dispute at the commencement of the Act and she had acquired the same in lieu of maintenance and the decree under which she had acquired it did not prescribed a restricted estate in such property and therefore, the exception engrafted on Section 14(1) by Section 14(2) does not come into play and the trial Court was in error in holding that. Mst. Devki had not become its absolute owner after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Mr. Ram Rang, who appears for Mst. Bal Kaur, on the other hand urges that the mere fact that Mst. Devki got the property by way of maintenance itself indicates that the decree prescribed a restricted estate in such property. According to him, after the death of Mst. Devki, the property was to revert to Mst. Bal Kaur and therefore, that fact by itself is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the decree prescribed a restriction of estate. After hearing the Learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the contention of Mr. Aggarwal is sound and that of Mr. Ram Rang cannot be accepted. Whenever a property is given in lieu of maintenance, the clear implication, is that the holder will enjoy it for life. The, object of grant is to maintain and the moment the object is fulfilled, that is by death of the grantee, the property necessarily must return to the grantor unless of course the grant provides otherwise. For instance, a property can be granted for maintenance absolutely when on the death of the grantee, it is the heir of the grantee who is allowed to succeed to it. In the present case, the grant was only for the lifetime of the grantee and on the death of the grantee, the property was to revert to the grantor. No other limitation or restriction was placed on the grant. The grant was by reason of the decree and in order that Section 14(2) should apply, the decree must prescribe a restricted estate in such property. The decree in the instant case does not prescribe any such restriction. Before the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, all females, whenever they suceeded to property, held it as life tenants. The object of Section 14 (1) is to make life tenants absolute owners. Therefore, from the mere fact that the property was held by a female as life tenant, it cannot be spelled that after the Act she still continues to hold the property as life tenant. In order to bring the case within Section 14 (2), it must be found that the property acquired by way of gift, will or instrument, or under a decree or an order of the Civil Court or under an award prescribes a restricted estate. Here I am only concerned with an acquisition under a decree. So far as a decree is concerned there may be implicit indications in it which may lead to the conclusion that the grant was of limited estate or a restricted estate. I am very doubtful whether in face of the language of Section 14 (2), there can be an implied restriction particularly when the words used in the statue are "prescribes a restricted estate", which indicate that the restriction must be express. In any event so far as the present decree is concerned, it does not either in express terms or by necessary implication prescibe a restricted estate. Mr. Ram Rang drew my attention to a number of authorities, namely, Mali Bewa Vs. Dadhi Das, Karumuri Seetharamayya Vs. Patcha Peraiah and Others, , Somthim Veerabhadra Rao and Another Vs. Duggirala Lakshmi Devi, Mst. Kirpo v. Bakhtawar Singh (1964) 66 P.L.R. 846 and Thatha Gurunadham Chetti v. Smt. Thatha Navaneethamma (died) and another (1967) 1 M.L.J. 454 In none of these cases, there was a decree in terms of the decree in the instant case. In all these cases, either the power of the grantee of maintenance was restricted vis-a-vis the property, namely that an embargo was placed on sale or mortgage of the property, or the decree or the instrument provided that the holder of maintenance will hold the property as a life estate only. As already stated, all maintenance grants are really for life unless they provide otherwise. Therefore, the words in the decree that she was to hold these properties till her death do not bring the case within the ambit of Section 14 (2). In my opinion, the case falls clearly with in the ambit of Section 14 (1). I am unable to agree with the Learned Counsel for the respondent that the mere fact that a property was granted by the grantor by way of life maintenance, necessarily implies that the grantor prescribed estate in this property. If that were so then in the explanation to Section 14 (i) the words property acquired in lieu of maintenance'' would not have figured and there could be no question of making those grants absolute so far as females were concerned. Before the commencement of the Act all such grants to female for life, unless they provided otherwise there would be a contradiction in terms if the language of Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) is not read together. It is now well settled by a large number of decisions that Section 14 (2) is an exception to Section 14 (1) and the entire provision of Section 14 has to be read together to give meaning to it. It cannot be read piecemeal and in watertight compartments.

For the reasons recorded above, I allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial Court and allow the objections of the appellant. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.