Rama Shankar Yadav & Ors. vs State Of U.P. Through Principal Secy. Revenue & Ors.

Heard Mr. Syed Wajid Ali, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. S.C. Upadhyay, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State respondents.

The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, assails the judgment and order dated 14.05.2019 passed by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.U.Khan in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26692 of 2006, whereby the writ petition instituted by the appellants was dismissed for the following reasons:

The brief facts giving rise to the writ petition are delineated hereinbelow:

The appellants, who are petitioners, were admittedly appointed as Seasonal Collection Amin in District Maharajganj on different dates. Appellant Nos. 1 to 3, namely, Ram Shanker Yadav, Mahesh Singh and Prahlad, were appointed on 21.01.1976. Appellant No. 4, Sita Ram Yadav, was appointed on 03.02.1976, whereas appellant Nos. 5 to 7, namely, Ram Narayan, Buchunu Prasad and Babu Lal, were appointed as Seasonal Collection Amin on 01.05.1976. The appellants claim that they were duly qualified for appointment to the post of Amin, having rendered more than 14 years of service as Seasonal Collection Amin.

The Tehsildar, Farenda, District Maharajganj, submitted a report saying that, out of the 22 sanctioned posts of Collection Amin in the Tehsil, 8 posts had been lying vacant for more than 10 months on account of promotion of the various incumbents.

Further, 8 posts had fallen vacant due to the retirement of various incumbents. Pursuant to the report of the Tehsildar dated 01.02.1990, the process for appointment of the appellant-writ petitioners on an ad hoc basis was set in motion. The relevant portion of the report reads:

The recommendation of the Tehsildar appears to have been made on the basis of the exigency of work, the availability of vacancies, and the provisions contained in Government Order No. 15/18/85-Karmik-1986 dated 29.03.1986.

The Government Order dated 29.03.1986, providing for appointment on an ad hoc basis, was not issued with a view to changing the status of Seasonal Collection Amins to that of ad hoc employees. However, the recommendation of the Tehsildar was acted upon by the then Sub-Divisional Officer, Farenda, who was the appointing authority for the post of Collection Amin. Consequently, an appointment order dated 09.02.1990 was issued, appointing the appellant-writ petitioners to the posts of Collection Amin on an ad hoc basis. The said appointment order, on reproduction, reads as under:

The Government of U.P. framed rules and brought Amendments to the U.P. Collection Amins Service Rules, 1974 for appointment of Collection Amin from the feeding cadre of Seasonal Collection Amin, titled as U.P. Collection Amins Service (Amendment) Rules, 1984 (in short ‘the Rules, 1984’). Rule 14 of the Rules, 1984 mandates the constitution of a Selection Committee, which had to prepare a list of eligible candidates in terms of Rule 17 and then, based on such exercise under the statutory rules, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, being the appointing authority, was vested with the power to make appointments to the post of Collection Amin.

In the meantime, the District Magistrate Maharajganj, terminated the services of the appellant-writ petitioners vide order dated 31.03.1990 i.e., within two months from the date of appointment on ad hoc basis, stating therein that there was a ban imposed by the Government as well as restriction imposed by the Board of Revenue in filling up the vacant posts of Collection Amin.

Being aggrieved by the order of termination dated 31.03.1990, the appellant-writ petitioners instituted Writ Petition No. 10010 of 1990, titled Mahesh Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others. This Court stayed the operation of the order dated 31.03.1990 passed by the District Magistrate, Maharajganj, which was under challenge in the writ petition.

The termination order dated 31.03.1990 passed by the District Magistrate was recalled, treating it coram non judice, since the appointing authority of Collection Amins is the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

In the meantime, confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 qua the appellant-writ petitioners was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Farenda, District Maharajganj but said fact inadvertently could not be mentioned in the proceedings before the learned Single Judge. The order dated 13.03.1991, confirming the appellant-writ petitioner and certain other employees by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Farenda, District Maharajganj is reproduced hereinbelow:

The further case pleaded by the appellant-writ petitioners is that, on 15.06.1993, a consolidated seniority list of Collection Amins was published, inviting objections to the seniority position of the incumbents. The appellants claim that their names were mentioned therein at Serial Nos. 103 to 109.

It was on 06.11.1995 that the services of the appellant-writ petitioners were terminated by invoking the provisions of the U.P. Temporary Government Servant (Termination of Services) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules, 1975').

The appellant-writ petitioners claimed that they were made permanent as Collection Amin way back on 13.03.1991, and thus, the order of termination dated 06.11.1995, being illegal on the face of it, ought not have been passed. The said order dated 06.11.1995 was subjected to challenge in Writ Petition No. 32381 of 1995. After exchange of pleadings, the termination order dated 06.11.1995 was quashed, and the writ petition was allowed with liberty to the respondents pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The operative portion of the order dated 26.05.2004, allowing the writ petition is extracted hereinbelow:

Alleging non-compliance of the order dated 26.05.2004, the appellants-writ petitioners filed Contempt Petition No. 2133 of 2004. On 25.01.2006, in pursuance of the order passed by this Court dated 26.05.2004 on the writ side, treating the same to be a remand order as liberty was granted to proceed afresh, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Tehsil Farenda, District Maharajganj, issued a show cause notice pointing out inherent flaws in the order dated 13.03.1991, by which status of permanence was accorded to the appellant being Seasonal Collection Amin/ad hoc Amins without any statutory rules.

The reply to the show cause notice dated 25.01.2006 was submitted by the appellant-petitioners on 27.02.2006 and on 19.04.2006, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Farenda, District Maharajganj, decided the matter holding the appointment and confirmation of the appellants to be ex-facie illegal. The appointment as well as confirmation order was annulled. The operative portion of the order dated 19.04.2006 reads as under:

Refuting the claim of the appellant-petitioners, the State respondents filed a counter affidavit by emphasizing that their initial appointment itself was dehors the Rules, perpetuated an illegality, and non est, being in contravention of provisions of the U.P. Collection Amin Service Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules, 1974')

The Seasonal Collection Amin could be appointed as Collection Amin, the feeding cadre being only against the 35% quota fixed for them, and that too, through the Selection Committee; not otherwise. There is no provision for treating an ad hoc Collection Amin for confirmation just after a year as an ad hoc appointment can only be regularized through some statutory rules, but in place of following the Statutory Rules, a blanket confirmation order was passed on 13.03.1991 during the pendency of Writ Petition No. 10010 of 1990. The ad hoc appointment cannot be said to be service rendered by a probationer, as even a probationer having been appointed under the Rules, 1974 can only be confirmed after passage of two years.

A Seasonal Collection Amin can be made a confirmed Amin through the process of recruitment recognized under the Rules, 1974, by constituting a Selection Committee, which is not the case of the appellant-writ petitioner; rather, they have claimed that they boarded altogether a different bus, which is appointment on ad hoc basis on the strength of the Government Order dated 29.03.1986 followed by their confirmation just after a year.

Being aggrieved by the order dated 19.04.2006, the appellant-writ petitioners invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by instituting Writ Petition No. 26692 of 2006. The said writ petition came to be dismissed, affirming the order dated 19.04.2006 whereby the appointment and confirmation of the appellant-writ petitioners had been annulled.

Aggrieved this Special Appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioners.

The learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioners submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the report of the Tehsildar dated 01.02.1990, which is the foundation of their initial appointment as Collection Amin, and later on approved/confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer Farenda, District Maharajganj, on 13.03.1991 being the appointing authority, after considering the vacancy position. Thus, neither the initial appointment of appellant-writ petitioners on ad hoc basis nor subsequent confirmation can be termed as dehors the rules.

A further submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the source of the procedure for appointment as Collection Amin on an ad hoc basis is contemplated under Rules 14 and 17 of Collection Amin Manual, as well as the Government Order dated 29.03.1986. It has also been emphasised that at the time of the appellants being appointed as Collection Amin on an ad hoc basis, they were the senior most in the district.

The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that the appointment of the appellant-writ petitioners on an ad hoc basis was made against substantive vacancies pursuant to the Government Order dated 29.03.1986. Their appointment on 09.02.1990 was thus on a temporary basis and was made by the competent appointing authority, namely, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerned, who was the appointing authority for Seasonal Collection Amin. It was, therefore, submitted that the order dated 31.03.1990 passed by the District Magistrate, saying that there was a ban on ad hoc appointments imposed by the State Government and followed by the Board of Revenue, was non est in law, as the District Magistrate was not the appointing authority and, consequently, lacked jurisdiction to pass the said order.

The order of termination dated 31.03.1990 was challenged before this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10010 of 1990, wherein the operation of the said order was stayed vide order dated 18.04.1990. The District Magistrate, having realised that he had no authority to pass the order of termination, subsequently withdrew the order dated 31.03.1990 vide order dated 10.09.1990. In the meantime, the appellant-writ petitioners continued to discharge their duties and were thereafter confirmed on 13.03.1991 by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Farenda, District Maharajganj.

The learned counsel for the appellants laid much thrust upon the fact that the names of the petitioners figured in the consolidated seniority list prepared for Collection Amin in the District on 15.6.1993 bearing serial numbers 103 to 109. The interim order granted on 18.04.1990 in Writ Petition No. 10010 of 1990 continued to operate until 06.11.1997, and the same was made absolute. The passing of order of termination was on 06.11.1995, in the teeth of proceedings before the Writ Court and during subsistence of the interim order was a nullity. The services of the petitioners ought not have been terminated treating them as temporary employees in the exercise of powers under Rules of 1975. The termination order dated 06.11.1995 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerned was found to be one without following the procedure established by law as the appellant-writ petitioners could not have been treated to be temporary employees in view of confirmation made on 13.03.1991. The operative portion of the order dated 26.05.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 32381 of 1995 reads:

The learned counsel for the appellants further stressed that the appellants-writ petitioners were confirmed employees working as regular Collection Amins and were discharging their duties as such. They were enjoying the constitutional protection available to them being permanent employees by virtue of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India.

The learned counsel for the appellants contends that it is not the case of any of the parties that any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the appellant-writ petitioners was practised for securing either an ad hoc appointment or thereafter the order of confirmation dated 13.03.1991. Thus, the order dated 13.03.1991 cannot be questioned at such a belated stage in the year 1995 vide order dated 06.11.1995, which too has been quashed by this Court.

The appellant-petitioners further stressed that their long and continuous service, particularly the services rendered by them as Seasonal Collection Amins from 1976 to 1990, i.e., 14 years and then thereafter ad hoc service for a shorter period followed by the service rendered under the strength of interim order could not altogether be brushed aside. The nature of the duties which the appellant-petitioners were performing are perennial in nature, and more so their appointments being against the substantive vacancies cannot be annulled in such a cursory manner.

The further contention advanced by the learned counsel for appellant-writ petitioners is that, even if any fault could be attributed to the appointing authority in making an ad hoc appointment followed by confirmation, then in that situation also, the appellant-writ petitioners cannot be victimised for a fault on the part of the State officials.

The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that, even if the services of the appellant-writ petitioners are found to be dehors the rules, the long period of their service is required to be saved by extending consequential fruits in the shape of permanence. The learned Counsel has relied upon the guidance of the Supreme Court in Jaggo Vs. Union of India and others, 2024 SCC OnLIne SC 3826, Bhikhani Devi and etc. Vs. Union of India and others, 2026 INSC 612, U.P. Power Corporation Limited Vs. Satyanarayan, 2005 2 UPLBEC 1779, Vikas Pratap Singh and others Vs State of Chhatisgarh and others (2013) 14 Supreme Court Cases 494, Kaluram Vs. State of U.P. , 2000 1 UPLBEC 85, Mohd. Zamil Ahmad Vs. State of Bihar, 2016 (2) ESC 242 (SC), Ram Devi Vs. Director Bal Vikas Sewa Avam Pushtahar and others, 2005 0 Supreme (All) 1576, Buddhi Nath Chaudhary Vs. Abhay Kumar and others, (2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 328, Vivek Kaisth and another Vs. State of Himanchal Pradesh and others, 2023 0 Supreme (SC) 1163, Suresh Chandra Sharma Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court IV, Kanpur and others, Neutral Citation No. 2003:AHC:469 and Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya, 1987 AIR 2186.

The learned counsel for the appellants lastly submitted that, although no formal order of regularization was passed by the competent authority, the services of the appellant-writ petitioners would be deemed to have been regularized ipso facto under the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979, as amended from time to time (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules, 1979’).

No other point has been pressed by learned counsel for the appellant.

Learned counsel or the State-Respondents invited the attention of this Court to the Rules, 1974 (Collection Amin) particularly Rule 3(h) 'member of service'; 3(i) 'Seasonal Amin'; 3(j) 'service' and 3(1) 'substantive appointment' and submitted that 'Seasonal Amin' do not come in the category of 'Cadre of Service', nor is there any provision for ad-hoc or officiating appointment from 'Seasonal Collection Amin' to 'Collection Amin'.

The further submission is that the Appellants/Petitioners were initially engaged as 'Seasonal Staff', pursuant to which, their names were placed in list of year 1983. At this juncture it would be relevant to say that District Maharajganj was carved out from District Gorakhpur on 02.10.1989. Therefore, if any list as mentioned under the provisions of Rule 17-A is to be maintained/drawn/prepared the same would be one after 4 'FASAL' i.e., not before the year 1991, which is 2 years after formation of new District. The list relied upon by the Appellants-Petitioners is one from District Gorakhpur whereas the adhoc appointment order is made by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Farenda, Maharajganj. It has also been emphasized that initial engagement of the appellant- petitioners was as seasonal collection amin under the Uttar Pradesh Collection Manual which is a bundle of executive instructions without any statutory force.

The next submission advanced is that mere continuance every year of seasonal work would not lead to permanent status for an employee, unless there exist posts and regularization is done which has admittedly not been done in the instant case. Reliance has been placed in this regard upon State of Maharashtra Vs. R.S. Bhonde (2005) 06 SCC 751 following Mahatam Phule Agricultural University Vs. Nasik Zila Sheth Kamgar Union, (2001) 07 SCC 346 and Gram Sevak Prashikan Kendra Vs. Workmen.

Learned counsel for the State-Respondents laid much emphasis on the fact that for permanent status of employment, the appointment must be against a substantive vacancy, in a substantive capacity done in according with recruitment or regularization rules, but all these conditions are missing in the case of the appellant-petitioners. Reliance has been placed upon Union of India Vs. Ilmo Devi (2021) 20 SCC 290 and State of Rajasthan Vs. Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi, (2009) 12 SCC 49, wherein it has been held:

The further submission is that from a bare perusal of Paragraph 19 of the Uttar Pradesh Collection Manual, it is clear that the engagement of 'Seasonal Collection Amin' is a stop gap arrangement, done after due approval from the Commissioner of the concerned Division, and this engagement/appointment is only limited to that season/period only or for 89 days whichever is earlier. Upon expiry of the said season/period, the engagement/appointment automatically comes to an end. Furthermore, the initial engagement/appointment of the appellants/petitioners as “Seasonal Collection Amins” was neither a substantive appointment in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Collection Amins Service Rules, 1974, nor does the service rendered by them as “Seasonal Collection Amins” fall within the ambit of “service” as contemplated under the Uttar Pradesh Collection Amins Service Rules, 1974, as amended from time to time.

The learned counsel for the State laid emphasis that 1974 Rules, nowhere confers any power upon the Appointing Authority to make temporary, stop gap or ad-hoc appointments on the post of 'Collection Amin'. The Rules only lay down the procedure for appointment on the post of 'Collection Amin' by direct recruitment through competitive examination for 50% posts and 15% through promotion from the cadre of 'Collection Peons'; and the remaining 35% from 'Seasonal Collection Amins' are to be appointed in accordance with the Rules 1974.

The original record pertaining to appointment as a seasonal collection amin followed by ad hoc appointment followed by a confirmation order and a termination order has been placed before this Court on being summoned.

The learned counsel for the State-Respondents submitted that the finding returned by the learned Single Judge is that the appellants-petitioners did not work after 08.11.1995. This fact is substantiated from a perusal of the old Bill Books available in the office records. No interim order was granted by this Court in the second round of litigation i.e., in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32381 of 1995 and also in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 26692 of 2006.

Lastly, the learned Standing Counsel submitted that since the petitioner-appellants were never appointed in terms of Rule 20 of Rules, 1974, there is no question of them being on probation for two years as per Rule 22 and thereafter their confirmation. An ad hoc appointment can never lead to a confirmation in service but only regularization, which has not been done in case of the petitioner-appellants. The learned counsel for the State has brought to our notice the order dated 25.01.2006 by which the erring official who passed the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 was punished. Thus, the order dated 13.03.1991 which is void ab initio may not be maintained by quashing the order impugned in the writ petition as quashing of same would revive and perpetuate an illegality.

In the backdrop of the rival submissions advanced by the parties, the questions that arise for our consideration are :

The entire controversy hinges upon a pivotal point, i.e. the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991. If the order dated 13.03.1991 does not confer any right being dehors the rules, then of course the appellant-petitioners would acquire no enforceable right; and that too, enforceable in the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under 226 of the Constitution.

The first question that has cropped up before this Court is being examined in the light of the admitted facts that the initial appointment claimed to be an ad hoc one made on 09.02.1990, followed by confirmation vide order dated 13.03.1991 although no statutory recruitment or regularisation provision has been identified as the source of such confirmation, and the officer who passed the said order was subsequently proceeded with against for his misconduct.

This Court now proceeds to examine whether the confirmation made vide order dated 13.03.1991 would operate as an estoppel, precluding the State Government to question the continuance of the appellant-writ petitioners based on the order dated 13.03.1991, and if, the same is declared void by the State, would be treated as a review of an administration decision.

According to Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, 'ad hoc' means "for this (special purpose); with respect to this (subject or thing)."

Before examining the nature of the appointment the meaning of the expression ad-hoc is required to be delved into as it has not been defined under the statutory rules. According to Law Lexicon by P. Ramanath Aiyar, the expression ad hoc means “for a particular purpose; made, established, acting or concerned with a particular purpose.”

An ad hoc appointment refers to a temporary position filled outside the standard recruitment process. Such appointments are typically made to address immediate or unforeseen staffing needs and do not guarantee long-term employment or benefits unless regularized through prescribed procedures. An ad hoc appointment refers to a temporary position filled outside the standard recruitment process. Such appointments are typically made to address immediate or unforeseen staffing needs and do not guarantee long-term employment or benefits unless regularized through prescribed procedures.

Appointment made in violation of the statutory mandate and the constitutional scheme governing public employment is a nullity in the eye of law and cannot confer any legally enforceable right upon the appointee. The principle has been succinctly explained by this Court in Kashi Prasad Chature v. State of U.P., 2011 SCC OnLine All 2331. The relevant remarks in Kashi Prasad Chature (supra) are reproduced hereinbelow:

The undisputed fact is that the appellant-writ petitioners claims appointment on an ad-hoc basis under the aegis of the Government Order dated 29.03.1986, followed by their so-called confirmation vide order dated 13.03.1991, passed by the then Sub-Divisional Officer, Farenda, Maharajganj, extracted hereinabove in its entirety. The last mentioned does not indicate the authority/power and the rules under which it has been made. It further does not depict/refer to any applicable recruitment rules, service rules, or regularization rules, which gives the impression that the order is one by ‘a monarch’ in place of a Statutory Authority under a democratic setup.

In any view of the matter, in the interest of justice, we intend to examine the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991, which is claimed by the State respondents to be void ab-initio to find out whether such order could be saved by any authority of law or by the application of any yardstick of a justice-oriented approach.

Harking back to the year 1991 a confirmation made on the Post of a Collection Amin from a seasonal collection amin / ad-hoc Collection Amin could be tested on anvil of the Uttar Pradesh Collection Amins’ Service Rules, 1974 (Rules, 1974), as amended in the year 1984 or the Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 (in short ‘Rules, 1979’).

The enquiry would first proceed to test the validity of the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 on the post of Collection Amin, if tested on the anvil of the statutory requirements contained in the Rules, 1974, it comes out that Part III thereof deals with the recruitment process. Rule 5 prescribes the sources of recruitment, which include 35% of the vacancies to be filled by selection from amongst the Seasonal Collection Amins.

Seasonal Collection Amins are appointed under Paragraph 19 of the U. P. Collection Manual. Paragraph 19 provides that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate shall keep a close watch, on the need for appointment of Seasonal Amins for assistance of the appointed Amins, on an annual basis. It further provides that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate shall submit a report to the Collector seeking sanction for the appointment of additional Seasonal Amins employees by showing cause therefor and presenting region - wise data of the demands to be recovered under various categories, the sanction for the seasonal posts being granted by the Divisional Commissioner on basis of the Collector’s report, founded in turn, on the Sub-Divisional Magistrate’s submission about the requirement. For ready reference paragraph 19 is reproduced hereinbelow:

Having examined the statutory scheme envisaged under the Rules, 1974, the possibility of any exercise undertaken for passing the order dated 13.03.1991 under the Rules, 1974 is ruled out as the said order does not pass muster of statutory recruitment. Upon being confronted with the aforesaid position, learned counsel for the appellant candidly admitted that the recruitment exercise under the 1974 rules qua the appellant-petitioners has not been undertaken; then the same has to be based on a regularization done under the applicable rules i.e., the Rules, 1979.

The order dated 13.03.1991, having failed to pass muster of the requirements contained in the Rules, 1974, would now be tested on the only applicable rules of regularization available in the year 1991 i.e., Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 (in short ‘Rules, 1979’).

The Rules, 1979, have been amended four times. The first amendment was brought in March 1984, by which the cut-off date initially fixed as 01.01.1977 was replaced by 1.05.1983. The second amendment was brought vide notification dated 7.08.1989, by changing the cut-off date extending to 1.10.1986. The third amendment was brought in the year 2001 with the title The Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (on Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001 (in short ‘Rules, 2001’) by which the cutoff date was extended to 30.06.1998. The fourth amendment was brought in the year 2001, known as Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (on Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 2021, vide which the cutoff date was extended to 1.12.2001.

The claimed regularization/confirmation dated 13.03.1991 falls within the period of time when the second amendment to the Rules, 1979 was in force, and the cut-off date for regularization of ad hoc appointees was 1.10.1986; and till 1991, the third amendment (Rules 2001) was not in existence which extended the cut-off date as 30.06.1998. Thus, as on 13.03.1991, the regularization under Rules 1979 was not feasible.

The ad hoc appointment of the appellant-writ petitioners being made in the year 1990, could have been considered for regularization under the Rules, 2001, as the cutoff date was extended to 30.06.1998 and not at any point of time prior to enforcement of aforesaid rules, on 20.12.2001. The claim for regularization by the appellant- writ petitioners could have been considered at any time after 20.12.2001, as their appointment on ad hoc basis being made in the year 1990 was well within the cut-off date fixed by the Rules, 2001, subject to their continuance on the date of enforcement of rules last mentioned and fulfilling the requisite qualification for the post in question, by constituting a Selection Committee and the drawing up of a seniority list. But, no such exercise had ever been undertaken and the appellant- petitioners had never come forward claiming consideration of regularization under the Rules, 2001.

It is not in dispute that the appellant- writ petitioners were initially appointed on an ad-hoc basis in the year 1990. It is further not in dispute that they have been regularized/confirmed on the post of Collection Amin, without specifying the regularization/ recruitment rules, though at the relevant point of time i.e., in the year 1991, the provisions of the U.P. Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979, as amended on 7.8.1989, was occupying the field and in force for the purposes of Regularization. By virtue of Rule 2 of the Rules, 1979, they have overriding effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other rules or orders.

Rule 4 of the Rules, 1979 deals with the regularization of ad hoc appointments and reads as under:

The aforesaid Rules were further amended by the notification dated 23.3.1984, whereby Rule 9 was added in the original Rules, 1979, and the rules were extended and made applicable to any person directly appointed on an ad hoc basis on or before 01.05.1983 and continuing in service as such, on the date of commencement of the U.P. Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) (Amendment) Rules, 1984. The aforesaid rules were further amended by the notification dated 07.08.1989, whereby Rule 10 was inserted and made applicable mutatis mutandis to any person directly appointed on an ad hoc basis on or before 1.10.1986 and continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of the U.P. Regularization of Ad hoc Appointments (On Posts Outside the Purview of the Public Service Commission) (Second Amendment) Rules, 1989, i.e., till 07.08.1989.

Rule 5 of the Rules, 1979 deals with the appointments on recommendation of Selection Committee constituted under Rule 4(3) of the Rules, 1979. Rule 6 provides that the appointments made under these Rules shall be deemed to be under the relevant Service Rules or orders, if any.

For a better appreciation of the controversy, it would be expedient to extract the relevant provisions of Rules 5, 6, 9 and 10 of the Rules, 1979, as amended from time to time:

From a collective reading of Rules 4 to 10 of the Rules, 1979, as amended vide notification dated 7.8.1989, it is clear that any person who was directly appointed on ad hoc basis on or before 01.10.1986 and continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of Rules, 1979 (Second Amendment), possessed the requisite qualification prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment and has completed or as the case may be, after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability and before any regular appointment was made against such vacancy in accordance with the relevant service rules or orders.

The undisputed facts that emerge based on the pleadings are that the appellant – writ petitioners did not qualify the cutoff date fixed by the then applicable regularization Rules, 1979, (second amendment), as they were not appointed prior to 1.10.1986. Apart from this, they could also not complete the statutory requirement of three years continuous ad hoc service on 13-3-1991 (as they were appointed on ad hoc basis on 9-2-1990). Thus, the order dated 13.03.1991, being against the mandate of the statutory rules for regularization is void ab initio and cannot be termed as an order made under the Rules, 1979.

Besides that, the appellant-petitioner's appointment being one made on 09.02.1990 (ad hoc basis), his consideration for regularization under the Rules, 1979, (Second amendment) there being cut-off date as 1.10.1986 was not possible on 13.03.1991 since, by that time Rules, 1979, (third amendment – 2001) were not in existence prescribing the cut-off date as 30.06.1998. Thus, the order dated 13.03.1991 cannot be said to be an order traceable to the Rules 1979.

An initial ad hoc appointment made dehors the prescribed recruitment rules remains a stop-gap arrangement and cannot, by itself, mature into a regular appointment merely by virtue of a subsequent executive order of confirmation. Regularization or permanent appointments must have sanction of the applicable statutory rules and cannot be founded solely upon an executive confirmation order.

An ad hoc employee must first undergo the formal Regularization Procedure (evaluation by a Selection Committee, screening of records, and checking availability of a substantive vacancy). Once regularized, they are placed on probation, after which they can be "confirmed". Directly confirming an ad hoc appointee skips this mandatory legal gateway, which is the case of the appellant-petitioner. Without adhering to the rigorous procedure laid down in the regularization rules and being directly confirmed in service from an Ad-hoc appointee, makes the order 13.03.1991 void ab initio.

In service jurisprudence, confirmation ordinarily presupposes a substantive appointment, which is not the case of the appellant-writ petitioners. At no point have the appellant-writ petitioners claimed to have entered service through a substantive appointment; rather, their case rests upon an ad hoc appointment followed by the purported order of confirmation dated 13.03.1991. Such a course, in the absence of any statutory provision authorizing direct confirmation of an ad hoc appointee, is impermissible. The very concept of a substantive appointment is distinct from, and cannot be equated with, an ad hoc appointment.

The confirmation order dated 13.03.1991, having not been passed under any applicable recruitment rules, Service Rules or statutory regularization rules, is also liable to be tested on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. An appointment made in such manner, without adherence to the prescribed statutory procedure, cannot confer any legally enforceable status upon the person so appointed^. A public appointment made de hors the prescribed recruitment procedure cannot be sustained in derogation of the equality clause enshrined in Articles 14 and 16.

In Shesh Mani Shukla v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria, (2009) 15 SCC 436, the Supreme Court reiterated that an appointment made in contravention of the statutory scheme cannot be treated as a valid appointment merely because the incumbent has continued for a considerable long period of time. In Shesh Mani Shukla (supra) the following observations were made by the Supreme Court.

The principle that an appointment contrary to statutory rules cannot be validated merely by a subsequent executive fiat is also firmly embedded in the service jurisprudence that has the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. In Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission, (2008) 7 SCC 153, the Supreme Court held that an appointment made contrary to the statute or statutory rules is void in law and that an illegality cannot be regularized. In Pramod Kumar (supra) it has been remarked by then Lordships :

The same principle has recently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Hemant Kumar and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, 2026 INSC 88, wherein it was emphasized that an illegality is something contrary to law and wrong from its inception, and that such illegality cannot be cured merely by lapse of time or by subsequent absorption or regularization where the initial appointment itself is contrary to the statutory rules. The distinction is crucial in the present case: the appellant-writ petitioners are not seeking enforcement of a right arising from a valid substantive appointment; rather, they seek to derive their right from the very order dated 13.03.1991 whose statutory foundation is absent. In Hemant Kumar (supra) it was observed :

One of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that one Gulam Hussain, whose services had been terminated in a similar circumstances, as that of the appellant-writ petitioners, approached this Court by means of Writ Petition No. 6537 of 1995 and the termination order was quashed, and therefore the parity may be extended to the appellant-petitioner.

Even if the termination order of Gulam Hussain was quashed, who was similarly circumstanced as the appellant-writ petitioners, no benefit would accrue in favor of appellant-writ petitioners, if they cannot stand on their own legs justifying the alleged confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 which itself is under a cloud. The jurisprudence on negative equality as of now is as clear as daylight that even if in some cases appointments have been made by mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another set of persons who are not entitled in their own right. Negative equality which has no place in Constitutional scheme cannot be permitted to perpetuate and flourish. Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage negative equality, and if the State committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake. (See: Snehprabha v. State of U.P. & Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 540), Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, v. Daulat Mal Jain & Ors. (1997 (1) SCC 35), State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann (1997 (3) SCC 321), Faridabad C.T. Scan Centre v. D.G. Health Services & Ors. (1997 (7) SCC 752), Jalandhar Improvement Trust, V. Sampuran Singh (AIR 1999 SC 1347), State of Punjab and Others v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal (1999 (9) SCC 240), Yogesh Kumar and Ors. v. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Ors. (2003 (3) SCC 548), Union of India and Anr. v. International Trading Co. and Anr. (2003 (5) SCC 437) and Kastha Niwarak G.S.S. Maryadit, Indore v. President, Indore Development Authority (JT 2006 (2) SC 259).

In Chandigarh Administration Vs. Jagjit Singh AIR 1995 SC 705, the Supreme Court held that merely because the respondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over and over again. An illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected if it can be done according to law – indeed, wherever possible. The Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law, but even if that cannot be done, it cannot be made the basis for a repetition. By refusing to direct respondent authorities to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act or order, nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination; giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interest of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law.

A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in several subsequent decisions. In State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh AIR 2000 SC 2306, the Supreme Court held that the concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced negatively. Where an authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favor of any individual or group of individuals, others cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on the ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly, a wrong judgment passed in favor of one individual does not entitle others to claim a similar benefit. The pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Prasad Singh (supra) citing several earlier decisions, are extracted hereinbelow:-

The Learned counsel for the appellant made an attempt to emphasize that with respect to status of the appellant as a permanent employee, the order dated 26.05.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 32381 of 1995 would operate as constructive res judicata but the purport and spirit of the said order has to be appreciated in its correct perspective and legal context. At the time when the said writ petition was decided, the order dated 13.03.1991 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in favour of the appellant-writ petitioners, whereby they were purportedly accorded permanent status, was subsisting. Proceeding on the basis of the then-existing position, the learned Single Judge construed the appointment of the appellant-writ petitioners to be against substantive vacancies and observed that, even in a case of appointment dehors the Rules, a finding was required to be recorded that such appointment was contrary to the provisions of the governing Act and that, before taking any consequential action for termination, the affected employee was required to be afforded a reasonable and fair opportunity of hearing. The learned Single Judge, accordingly, remitted the matter to the competent authority for consideration afresh in accordance with law after following the prescribed procedure of at least observing the principles of natural justice.

The order dated 26.05.2004, therefore, cannot be construed as a final adjudication upholding the legality of the order dated 13.03.1991 or as conferring finality upon the alleged permanent status of the appellant-writ petitioners. On the contrary, the matter concerning the legality of their appointment and continuance was expressly relegated to the competent authority for a fresh determination after due notice and opportunity. Thus, the question whether the appellant-writ petitioners had acquired any legally sustainable status by virtue of the order dated 13.03.1991, remained open for examination in the remanded proceedings. It was in pursuance of such remand that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate issued the show-cause notice dated 25.01.2006 and, after considering the reply submitted by the appellant-writ petitioners, passed the order dated 19.04.2006. The exercise undertaken by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, therefore, was not without jurisdiction merely because the order dated 13.03.1991 had been passed by his predecessor; rather, it was undertaken pursuant to the liberty and direction flowing from the order dated 26.05.2004.

The order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.05.2004 reflects that the appellant-petitioners were treated to be permanent employees during the subsistence of the order 13.03.1991, and no proceedings against them could have been undertaken under Temporary Government Servant (Termination of Services) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules, 1975’). But, at the same time, the learned Single Judge opened a proper window for examination of the validity of appointment followed by the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 made in favour of the petitioner-appellants by observing that in the matter of appointment dehors the rules, a finding has to be recorded that appointment is contrary to the provision of the law, with a further stipulation that unless such finding is recorded the termination order cannot be allowed to stand. The inquiry is to proceed to unveil the character of appointment and confirmation by giving notice to the employee. The necessary inquiry to unveil the character of appointment and confirmation was directed to be followed in terms of judgment of the Supreme Court in Basudeo Tiwari v. Sido Kanhu University, (1998) 8 SCC 194, a reference to which is made in the order of the learned Single Judge. Thus, the only requirement to unveil the character of appointment followed by the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 was compliance of natural justice by putting the employees/appellant- petitioners to notice and after considering their stand an appropriate order could be passed. Thus, the order dated 19.04.2006 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Farenda, Maharajganj cannot be faulted for a procedural lapse. The argument of the appellant- petitioners that this Court while passing the judgment and order dated 26.05.2004 had concluded with regard to the appellant-petitioners’ status that they were permanent is moonshine. The observation of this Court treating the appellant- writ petitioners permanent and not letting the State take recourse of 1975 Rules, was there until inquiry was conducted with regard to the confirmation order dated 13.03.1991, which has been done vide the order dated 19.04.2006 impugned in writ petition decided by the learned Single Judge vide the judgment order impugned in this appeal.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no power to review the order of his predecessor dated 13.03.1991 and order dated 19.04.2006 passed by him is without jurisdiction (though this court vide order dated 26.05.2004 passed in Writ Petition No. 32381 of 1995, did open a small window for examination of order dated 13.03.1991) even then we are not inclined to interfere in the said order dated 19.04.2006 for the reason that it is just and proper and in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court referred herein before, and the earlier order dated 13.03.1991 passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate was contrary to law.

The contention advanced on behalf the appellant-petitioners that administrative authorities cannot review an order of their predecessor even if such order is without jurisdiction or against the settled canons of law is specious. The contention is completely ill founded and misplaced. Even an administrative order against the statue or codified law is a nullity and no estoppel would operate against a statute/codified law. Our view of aforesaid legal proposition is fortified by the authority of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam S.S, (2008) 12 SCC 675. The relevant remarks are reproduced hereinbelow:

Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the appellant-writ petitioners cannot press the doctrine of estoppel into service to defend the order dated 13.03.1991, passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, purporting to confirm the appellants in service. Since the said order is not traceable to any power conferred under the Rules, 1974 or the Rules, 1979, the same would not create a substantive right in favor of the appellant-writ petitioners. After all it is so contrary to the statutory as well as the constitutional scheme. An order which has no sanction of the law cannot become lawful merely by reason of its implementation or continuance over a period. The doctrine of estoppel, therefore, cannot be invoked to sustain the purported confirmation dated 13.03.1991 or defeat the statutory mandate governing appointments and regularization.

In case, this order were to be set aside by this Court, in that eventuality the earlier illegal order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 13.03.1991 would be restored. The aforesaid view taken by us also finds support from the holding of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Swallah Vs. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut AIR 1988 SC 94, which was also reiterated in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 2583. In these authorities the Supreme Court held that the Court under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order, if such striking down results in restoration of another illegal order passed earlier in favor of the petitioner.

The aforesaid approach finds support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation and another v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association and others, (2006) 6 SCC 581, wherein the Supreme Court recognized that the Court, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, should not pass an order which would have the effect of reviving or resurrecting an earlier illegal or unsustainable order. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is not intended to be exercised in a manner that restores illegality merely because a subsequent order suffers from some procedural or technical infirmity. Applying the said principle to the present case, even if the order dated 19.04.2006 were assumed to be vulnerable on the ground of want of power of review, interference therewith would necessarily revive the order dated 13.03.1991, which has already been found to be unsupported by any statutory authority. We, therefore, decline to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction to bring back to life an order which is otherwise contrary to law.

Similarly, the Supreme Court in M/s AL-Can Export Pvt. Ltd Vs. Prestige H.M. Polycontainers Ltd. and another, (2024) 9 SCC 94, has held:

The much-emphasized reliance on the length of service rendered by the appellant-writ petitioners is also unfounded, as petitioners’ services were terminated in the year 1990, which was subject to decision of Writ Petition No. 10010 of 1990 and thereafter confirmation during pendency of writ petition, vide order dated 13.03.1991 without any source, power or authority to pass that order, itself is an institutional fraud practiced by an officer i.e., the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate who has been punished for his such misdeed. The so-called confirmation dated 13.03.1991, that has no statutory backing, is null and void. The mere passage of time or continuance pursuant to interim orders cannot validate an order which was void from its inception.

The answer to the second question as to ‘whether any interim order can render any relief of permanence upon an employee lies in the law declared by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has treated such employees as litigious employees. The relevant observation reproduced hereinbelow:

(emphasis added)

A similar issue on the basis of long service founded on an interim order has been answered by a Five-Judge Full Bench of this Court in Jahaj Pal v. District Inspector of Schools, 2019 SCC OnLine All 6998. The Full Bench examined, inter alia, whether continuance of an ad hoc appointee under an interim order could confer any substantive right or furnish a basis for regularization. The ratio of the said judgment squarely applies to the present case, where the appellant-writ petitioners seek to derive permanence and substantive status from their prolonged continuance during the pendency of successive proceedings and under the protection of interim orders. The relevant observations of the Full Bench in Jahaj Pal (supra) are extracted hereinbelow:

(emphasis added)

The appellant placed reliance upon judgment of the Supreme court in case of Jaggo (supra) particularly relying upon paragraph nos. 10,11,12,13 and 20 which reads hereinbelow:

The aforesaid authority does not save illegal appointments. The petitioner-appellants have not been denied the benefits due to their initial label of engagement; rather their entry as confirmed employees vide order dated 13.03.1991 is void in view of what we have held on facts and the law hereinabove. Further, the entry of appellant- writ petitioners vide order dated 13.03.1991 itself is illegal and one through a surreptitious route.

It is also significant that, even on the premise that long continuance in service could, in an appropriate case, be a relevant consideration for extending the benefit of regularisation, the appellants-petitioners do not stand on the same footing as the employees in Jaggo (supra). The appellants-petitioners were appointed on an ad hoc basis only on 09.02.1990 and their services were terminated on 06.11.1995, thereby leaving them with less than six years of such ad hoc service. In contrast, the employees in Deepak Bajaj (supra) had rendered long and uninterrupted service extending well beyond ten years. Thus, the factual circumstance of prolonged and uninterrupted service, which weighed with the Supreme Court in Jaggo (supra), is conspicuously absent in the present case.

Similarly, reliance has been placed by the appellants upon the case of Bhikhani Devi (supra) particularly paragraph nos. 35, 36,37, 40 and 41 of the report which read:

Bhikhani Devi (supra) takes note of the various earlier authorities of the Supreme Court wherein it was held that there would be travesty of justice to deny pensionary benefits merely on the ground of absence of formal regularization and such an employee is liable to be treated as having attained permanent status. Thus, it can safely be inferred that the aforesaid authority being one related to pensionary benefits does not in any manner sanctify illegal appointment which is the case in hand. Despite bestowing our thoughtful consideration to the matter we could not trace a valid source and authority for the order dated 13.03.1991, which is said to be a blanket confirmation, that lead it to pass muster of any of the recruitment rules or regularization rules. We regret that no benefit is extendable to appellant-petitioners on the strength of aforesaid authorities upon which the appellants have placed emphatic reliance.

Reliance has next been placed by the petitioner upon Satyanarayan (supra) where the Supreme Court in a case related to employment, the employee being underage held both the State and the employee to be at fault. Thus this authority is of little assistance to the petitioners.

The appellant relied upon the Vikas Pratap Singh (supra), wherein, having regard to the long continuance of the employees in service, their appointments were protected by the Supreme Court, particularly in the backdrop of procedural irregularities in the matter of appointment and the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of employees. The procedural lapse was attributable to the State itself. The said precedent, however, has no application to the facts of the present case. In the instant matter, the very order dated 13.03.1991, on the strength of which the appellants-petitioners seek to claim confirmation, was annulled by an order passed in the year 1995, and the dispute has remained the subject matter of litigation ever since. It is, therefore, not a case where the appellants-petitioners continued in service for a long period solely on account of the State's inaction, nor can such continuance be said to have been allowed to operate uninterruptedly to their prejudice.

Similarly, the next authority relied upon by the appellant, namely, Kaluram (supra), involved a challenge to the appointment itself after a lapse of 35–36 years, which is clearly not the factual position in the present case. Likewise, Mohd. Zamil Ahmad (supra) concerned a situation where the State sought to question the initial appointment after a prolonged period of nearly 15 years, thereby seeking to disturb an appointment after having remained in a state of prolonged inaction. The factual foundation underlying the aforesaid authorities is, therefore, materially different from that of the present case. Consequently, none of the aforesaid precedents can be invoked to sustain the claim of the appellants-petitioners in the factual and legal matrix obtaining here.

The next authority relied upon is Buddhi Nath Chaudhary (supra), wherein the question was about qualification which was condoned on, ground of long continuance having translated into experience of long continuance for more than many decades by observing that the lack of experience, if any, at the time of recruitment is made good by efflux of time. But, here is the question of an appointment that is void ab initio in character. Thus the said authority is hardly of any assistance to the appellants. Similarly, in Vivek Kaisth (supra), a judicial officer having rendered service for more than 10 years was found to be rich in experience and his appointment was not the product of favoritism, nepotism or due to any act which could even remotely be called ‘blameworthy’. In that background the appointment was saved but in the case in hand the so called confirmation was not under the statutory rules of regularization or recruitment and the Appointing Authority himself having been punished the appointment cannot be said to be free from blemish. Hence, the said authority also does not come to the assistance of the appellant- writ petitioner.

The appellant- petitioners have also relied upon Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta (supra), where it was held that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred upon it by statute. The said authority has been relied upon to latter the respondents from delving into the validity of the order dated 13.03.1991 and declaring the appointment void but the order dated 13.03.1991, having been found illegal and void ab initio by us cannot be permitted to perpetuate through any order by us in our writ jurisdiction.

Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellant laid greater thrust upon the guidance of the Supreme Court in Debashish Mohapatra and others vs District and Session judge, Jagatsinghpur and others, 2026 INSC 743, and relied upon paragraph nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29 and 30. The said case relates to an employee had been confirmed in service and his termination was under challenge before the High Court of Orissa. The employee there was confirmed in service admittedly having been appointed after an advertisement through a selection process, including written examination. Upon completion of recruitment process the result was declared and he stood appointed on 8.03.2019, followed by confirmation in service. He had been appointed against a substantive post and acquired the status of a confirmed government servant. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in his favor that his termination was bad without holding a departmental inquiry, being violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. It is pertinent to mention that the constitutional protection guaranteed under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India is for confirmed employees who have been substantively appointed through some statutory rules or regularized in service in accordance with the regularization rules. As such the protection is not available to an employee whose appointment/confirmation is not traceable to any statutory rules and defeats the very spirit of Article 14 read with Article 16 of Constitution of India which is the heart and soul of public employment. Thus, by no stretch of imagination the appellant-writ petitioners whose appointment is void can be equated with civil servants who enjoy the constitutional protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The orders impugned, therefore, cannot be said to be faulty in the peculiar facts of this case.

A little difference in the facts or additional facts changes precedential value of an authority. Thus, the ratio of any decision has to be understood in the background of the facts of the case. The Court should not place reliance upon a decision without discussing as to how the factual edifice fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. The judgment of a Court is not to be read mechanically as the Euclid’s theorem nor as if it were a statute. Decisions of cases by blindly relying upon a precedent may lead to a improper decision. (See: Deepak Bajaj vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC 628). In Deepak Bajaj (supra) it was remarked:

In the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and another vs. N.R. Vairamani and another - (2004) 8 SCC 579, the Supreme Court has held hereinbelow: "Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge." In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said: 12 "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case." Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." *** *** *** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."

Likewise, in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Raj Kumari and others, AIR 2008 SC 403, the Supreme Court has held:

None of the judgments relied upon by the appellant-writ petitioners deals with an appointment void ab initio or a purported confirmation made without statutory authority. The said authorities, therefore, have no application to the present case and cannot be relied upon to sustain an appointment which is dehors the statutory scheme.

In view of the material facts marshalled hereinabove and the findings recorded by us, the order dated 13.03.1991, whereby the appointment of the petitioners was purportedly confirmed, being dehors the statutory rules and without lawful authority, is void ab initio and non est in the eye of law. Consequently, the said order could not confer any legally enforceable right upon the petitioners. The consequential order, being founded upon and flowing from the aforesaid void order dated 13.03.1991, cannot acquire an independent legal existence and, therefore, must also fall with its foundation^.

It is well settled that if the basic order goes the consequential order automatically becomes inoperative. In Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 8 SCC 395, the Supreme Court held:

In the factual backdrop as aforesaid, the legal maxim ‘sublato fundamento cadit opus’ is attracted which means that if the foundation is removed being flawed, the superstructure would automatically collapse and this legal principle squarely applies to the present case. (See State of Punjab Vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others, (2011) 14 SCC 770).

In C. Albert Morris Vs. K.Chandrasekaran and others, (2006) 1 SCC 228, the Supreme Court held that a right in law exists only and only when it has a lawful origin. Similarly, in Mangal Prasad Tamoli (dead) by Lr. Vs. Narvadeshwar Mishra (dead) by Lrs. And others, (2005) 3 SCC 422, the Supreme Court held that if an order at the initial stage is bad in law, then all further proceedings, consequent thereto, will be non-est and have to be necessarily set aside.

In view of what we have found hereinabove, it can easily be inferred that the appellant-writ petitioners themselves admit that their initial appointments dated 09.02.1990 was made on an ad hoc basis, followed by their confirmation dated 13.03.1991 which was neither the product/result of any exercise undertaken by the procedure prescribed under the statutory rules viz Rules, 1974, and simultaneously, it also does not pass muster of regularization under the Rules, 1979. The petitioner-appellants appointment being ad hoc and not substantive under recruitment rules or the regularization rules, the question of confirmation does not arise. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the alleged confirmation order dated 13.03.1991 does not confer any legally enforceable right being de-hors the statutory prescription and is void ab initio.

In view of what we have held hereinabove, no error of principle seems to have been crept into the order impugned. We find no such fault with the view taken by the learned Single Judge, so as to merit interference in appeal.

This Special appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

Parties shall bear their own costs.