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Judgment
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOURENDRA PANDEY)
Date : 27-08-2026 Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the order dated 05.10.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 17130 of 2015, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner has been dismissed.
The case of the appellant/writ petitioner is that the Department of Human Resource Development, Government of Bihar, issued an Advertisement vide Notification No./7Appoin.3-02/06/974, Patna, inviting applications for appointment to the post of Teacher, pursuant thereto, the appellant/writ petitioner applied for appointment as a Panchayat Teacher fulfilling all the eligibility criteria prescribed for the said post. After scrutiny of her eligibility, the appellant/writ petitioner appeared in the counseling process, whereupon a panel for appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher under the Untrained Female, Extra Backward Class category was prepared on 07.11.2006. It is the further case of the appellant/writ petitioner that the minimum educational qualification prescribed for appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher was Intermediate. The appellant/writ petitioner, whose date of birth is 12.04.1977, had passed the Matriculation examination from the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna, in the year 1992 securing 508 marks. She, thereafter, passed the Intermediate examination from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna, in the year 1994 obtaining 448 marks. While, on the other hand, respondent no. 6, Guddu @ Guddi Kumari, had passed the Intermediate examination in the year 2002 from the Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna, securing 407 marks. The writ petitioner/appellant subsequently came to know about certain irregularities, infirmities and illegalities having been committed in the appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher in Jatipur, Kurua Panchayat, Block Madanpur, District Jehanabad. The appellant/writ petitioner accordingly submitted a detailed representation before the Block Development Officer, Madanpur, on 25.11.2007, raising her grievance regarding the alleged irregularity in the appointment process. Despite repeated approaches and requests for disposal of her representation, no action was taken by the concerned authority.
Having failed to secure any relief, the appellant/writ petitioner thereafter submitted a representation before the District Magistrate on 26.11.2009. On the following day, a news report was also published in the daily newspaper regarding the alleged irregularity in the appointment in question. Thereafter, being frustrated on account of inaction by the authorities the appellant/writ petitioner submitted another representation before District Magistrate, Jehanabad, who took cognizance of the representation filed by the appellant/writ petitioner and referred the matter to the Additional District Magistrate, Jehanabad, for verification and inquiry into the allegations. The Additional District Magistrate issued notice to the Block Development Officer as well as the appellant/writ petitioner for verification of the relevant documents and fixed 16.04.2010 as the date for appearance.
On 17.04.2010, a notice regarding the proposed verification was also published in the daily newspaper, pursuant to the said notice both the appellant/writ petitioner and the concerned respondent appeared before the competent authority on 16.04.2010 and produced the relevant documents for verification.
The appellant's complaint before the District Teacher Appointment Appellate Authority was filed in the year 2010, i.e. after a lapse of more than four years from the appointment in question. During verification it was found that the respondent no. 6 had produced two certificates of proof of passing Intermediate examination thus a verification with regard to the veracity of such document was suggested. The appellant/writ petitioner approached the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority, Jehanabad by filing Complaint Case No. 437 (38) of 2010. The said complaint, however, came to be rejected by an order dated 30.08.2010, on the ground of limitation and it was held that a complaint raising grievance regarding the appointment in question was required to be filed before the competent higher authority within a period of 30 days, whereas the petitioner had approached the authority beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant/writ petitioner approached this Court by filing CWJC No. 17130 of 2015. The learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 05.10.2023 had dismissed the writ petition, observing that the petitioner had approached the authority after expiry of the prescribed period of 30 days and in fact, had raised the grievance after a considerable delay of more than four years.
The learned Single Judge, therefore, declined to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is against the aforesaid order passed by the learned Single Judge that the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the petitioner/appellant.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the delay ought not to have come in the way of consideration of the appellant's claim on merits. It has next been submitted that the appellant had a better academic qualification and she had obtained higher marks than the respondent no. 6 as also the appointment of respondent no. 6 was irregular.
It has next been submitted on behalf of the petitioner/appellant that the learned Single Judge failed to consider that pursuant to the counseling process, the authorities had prepared the panel for appointment to the post of Panchayat Teacher under the Untrained Female, Extra Backward Class Category on 07.11.2006.
It has further been submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the educational certificate of respondent no. 6 and the several representations submitted by the petitioner/appellant before respondent no. 3, raising her grievance regarding the alleged irregularity in the appointment in question.
The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Additional District Magistrate had forwarded the Intermediate certificate of respondent no. 6 to the Bihar School Examination Board for verification and upon such verification, it was found that the respondent no. 6 had secured 407 marks, which is less than that of the writ petitioner/appellant. According to the writ petitioner/appellant, this material aspect, which goes to the root of the dispute regarding the legality of the appointment, was also not considered by the Learned Single Judge.
It has lastly been submitted that the Learned Single Judge has not considered the case of the petitioner/appellant on its merits and has dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground of limitation without examining the substantive grievance raised by the petitioner regarding the alleged illegality and irregularity in the appointment of respondent no. 6.
We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have perused the materials available on record.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that where an appointment is alleged to have been made in violation of the applicable rules, this Court, in an appropriate case, may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction is discretionary and equitable in nature. A person who seeks such jurisdiction must approach the Court with reasonable promptitude.
In the present case, the appellant admittedly questioned an appointment made in the year 2006, only before the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority in the year 2010. The statute provides for filing or raising objection within 30 days of the publication of merit list, however the complaint was lodged after more than four years. The appellate authority rejected the same on the ground of delay by an order dated 30.08.2010 as contained in Letter No. 1354.
As if the delay of approaching the District Teacher Appointment Authority was not enough, the appellant approached this Hon’ble Court by filing the writ petition, bearing C.W.J.C. No. 17130 of 2015, after almost 5 years of the passing of the order dated 30.08.2010 by the District Teacher Employment Appellate Authority. In such circumstances, the Learned Single Judge was justified in examining whether the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court ought to be exercised at such a belated stage.
In this regard, we would quote a maxim which reads as follows: “Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”, which means that the law assists those who are vigilant and not who sleep upon their rights.
We would first refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) By Lrs. vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & Another reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, paragraph Nos. 26 to 30 whereof are reproduced herein below:-
“26.Basically, the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, p. 266, Para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
“605.Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove the stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
27.Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This Court in Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed: (SCC p. 712, para 18)
“18.The object of law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.”
28.In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] this Court observed that this principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression.
29.It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
30.Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.”
We would also refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, paragraph Nos. 20 to 27 and 30 to 33 whereof are reproduced herein below:-
“20.In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy [(2012) 12 SCC 693] the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful. 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1.(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2.(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3.(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4.(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6.(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7.(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11.(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12.(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13.(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
We are unable to accept the submission that merely because the writ petitioner/appellant seeks to raise certain allegations regarding the comparative marks, qualification of the candidates or the legality of the appointment of respondent no. 6, the issue of delay can altogether be ignored. The appointment, which the appellant seeks to displace, is of the year 2006. The appellant's challenge was not brought before the competent authority within the prescribed period, thereafter the appellant/writ petitioner, after a humongous delay of about five years had filed the connected writ petition leading to the proceedings before this Court also not resulting in a timely adjudication on merits. The learned Single Judge has recorded a categorical finding that, having regard to the appointment being of the year 2006 and the complaint having been filed after more than four years, the Court is not inclined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
It may be apposite to refer to a judgment, rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that in a service matter/ promotion matter, an aggrieved person should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of the arising of a cause of action and it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and such petitions should be dismissed in limine, inasmuch as entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court, the same clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances. Thus, while exercising extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Constitutional Court, while protecting the rights of citizens, should simultaneously keep itself alive to primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court belatedly, at his own leisure or pleasure, the writ Court is not required to grant any indulgence to such indolent person and on the ground of delay and laches alone, the writ Court ought to throw the petition overboard at the very threshold. In this regard, reference be had to the following judgments:-
“(i)State of Tamil Nadu vs. Seshachalam, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 137;
(ii)C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology & Mining & Anr., reported in AIR 2009 SC 264;
(iii)State of Uttranchal & Anr. vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & Ors., reported in 2013 AIR SCW 6627;
(iv)Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board & Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108;
(v)State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri & Others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 3006;
(vi)Union of India v. C. Girija, reported in (2019) 15 SCC 633”
We find no error in the aforesaid approach warranting interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction noting the fact that 20 years has lapsed since the culmination of the appointment process. It is also well settled that the jurisdiction exercised by a Division Bench in a Letters Patent Appeal is not meant to be exercised merely because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from an error of law, perversity or failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Court.
In the present case, no such infirmity has been demonstrated. The learned Single Judge has considered the relevant chronology of events and has exercised discretion on the ground of unexplained and substantial delay.
We do not find and infirmity in the impugned order dated 05.10.2023 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 17130 of 2015, hence the present appeal stands dismissed.
Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.