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Judgment
B.N.P. Singh, J.—After petitioner and one Munilal Yadav were put on trial on accusation of hatching conspiracy and executing a deed of sale on 16th April, 1990, the trial Court recorded verdict of guilt under Sections 467 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced both of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a term of six months and also to pay a fine of Rs. One thousand each, in default of which they were to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. When the matter was carried in appeal the 3rd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gopalganj, while affirming the finding of the Court below u/s 467 IPC against the petitioner, acquitted him of the charges u/s 120B IPC. As for Munilal Yadav, finding of guilt and also sentence recorded by the trial Court were set aside.
For appreciation of the issue involved in this proceeding, a brief narration of facts is being made which has also been broadly spelt out in the judgment of the Court below. A deed of sale (Exhibit-2) was executed on 16th April, 1990 by the petitioner allegedly projecting himself to be the son of Mastlal, in favour of Munilal Yadav for consideration of Rs. 15,000/- in respect of 6 dhurs of land, appertaining to R.S. Plot No. 278, and 16 dhurs of land appertaining to R.S. Plot No. 889. It was alleged that shortly after Gulab Prasad (P.W. 4) came to know about execution of the deed by the petitioner, purporting himself to be the son of Mast Lal, he obtained copy of the deed of sale and was shocked to find that though the petitioner happened to be the son of Bharat Lal, who had no interest in the properties, purporting himself to be the son of Mast Lal, had executed the deed in question in favour of Munilal. At trial four witnesses were examined by the complainant including Gulab Prasad (P.W. 4). The witnesses sought to establish at trial that Mast Lal had only son namely, Bankey Bihari Lal and said Gulab Prasad was the only son of Bankey Bihari Lal, and consequently, the petitioner, who happened to be son of Bharat Lal had no interest in the landed property of Mast Lal. The defence of the opposite party at trial was that Mosst. Gangajala Devi was the second wife of Mast Lal and the petitioner Satya Narain Lal and Sudama were the sons of Mast Lal from his second wife, Mosst. Gangajala Devi.
The prosecution had placed on the record a number of documents including Voter''s list and khatiyan. The defence too had placed on the record the certified copy of plaint of T.S. No. 73 of 1977 and certified copy of khatiyan (Exhibit-C), old Age Pension Book (Exhibit-D), the notice issued by the Sub-divisional Officer, Gopalganj to Mosst. Gangajala Devi, (Exhibit-E) and certified copy of family register (Exhibit-F), The trial Court, however, while rejecting the documents and the contentions raised on behalf of the defence, placed implicit reliance on the voters'' list and oral evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution and rushed to conclusion that Exhibit-1, which was certified copy of the voters'' list, would prevail on Exhibits-E and F as there was no scope of inquiry and also that Exhibit 1 was a public document. About compromise entered between the parties, in respect of T.S. No. 73 of 1977, the learned Magistrate held the view that in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the petitioner had relinquished his right in all the properties including those which were the subject matter of the suit, and consequently came to a conclusion that since the petitioner had no interest in the property, the deed of sale executed by him was a forged document.
Though learned Counsel for the petitioner had not opted to appear before the Court despite adjournments, I have perused the records and hence this revision is being disposed of. Even considering Exhibit-1 series, on which implicit reliance was placed by the Court below, that cannot be said to be a conclusive evidence about parentage of the petitioner. Though khatiyans were brought on the record, which are Exhibit-3 series, that would simply show Gulab Prasad to be the son of Bankey Bihari Prasad who had interest in the landed property in R.S.P. No. 152/278. In respect of R.S. Plot No. 1445/1446/889, name of one Shambhu Prasad finds mentioned in the Khatiyan. Though some documents were also placed on the record on behalf of the defence, as has been stated those documents were rejected having been prepared on the statement of the petitioner or his family members.
Certain facts, however, deserve consideration though they may not be of much significance for determination of the issue involved in the proceeding. It is admitted that T.S. No. 73 of 1977 was brought by the petitioner against Gulab Prasad (P.W. 4), Raj Kishore Prasad (P.W. 1) and Ramdas Lal (P.W. 3), which is quite explicit from Exhibit-B. But both Raj Kishore Prasad and Ramdas Prasad denied to have any knowledge about institution of Title Suit in question. It is also not in controversy that the said Title Suit was disposed of in terms of the compromise between the parties and, to crown all, it would appear from the body of the plaint that Ram Kishun Lal had instituted the said title suit with the parentage of Bharat Lal. There is nothing on the record to controvert the recitals made in the body of the plaint and had Gulab Prasad and other defendants questioned the parentage of Ram Kishun Lal, it is expected that they must have controverter this fact in the written statement which is not brought on the record. The question about parentage of Ram Kishun Lal and also whether said Ram Kishun Lal, the petitioner, had any interest in the property, was a question which admittedly could not be decided in such proceeding, that being of civil nature. The whole exercise carried out by the Court below in deciding the suit was beyond the frame of the question, which could not have been decided, and on these premises. I find that the findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be sustained in law which are accordingly set aside and as a consequence of that, the petitioner shall also be discharged from the liability of the bail bonds. Accordingly this revision succeeds.
