Ram Chandra Gupta vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Another

S.K. Dhaon, J.—This writ petition is directed against an order dated 30-3-84 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), rejecting the application for interim relief made by and on behalf of the petitioner in an appeal pending before it.

The Regional Transport Authority, Varanasi, rejected the application for the renewal of the permit of the petitioner, Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner prefer red an appeal. Section 134 (1-A) Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) empowers the Tribunal to pass an interim order in an appeal against an order refusing to renew a particular permit. The sheet-anchor of the Act is public interest, i.e., the interest of the travelling public and around it the entire machinery rotates. In this back ground Section 134 (1-A) of the Act should be read. The legislative intent in enacting the said provision is that till the matter of renewal is disposed of finally status quo should be maintained. Therefore, the legislature contemplates that normally the Tribunal should exercise its powers u/s 134 (1-A) in favour of an appellant before it. No doubt, the power vested in the Tribunal is discretionary but it is trite that it exercises a quasi judicial power. It is also axiomatic that even discretionary powers cannot be exercised arbitrarily. Some plausible reason, though in brief, should be recorded while refusing to exercise powers u/s 134 (1-A). If the Tribunal, prima facie, finds that the interest of the public will suffer in any manner by the continued operation of the vehicle of a particular operator it should be a good ground for refusing to exercise the power u/s 134 (1-A). In the instant case, however, the Tribunal has rejected the application on the ground that the grant of interim relief to the petitioner will tantamount to a decision on the merits of the appeal inasmuch as the petitioner will get the same relief which he may get at the final hearing. The approach of the Tribunal is based on an extraneous consideration. It appears that the provisions of Section 134 (1-A) were not focussed before the Tribunal. The impugned order suffers from a manifest error of law.

The impugned order dated 30-3-1984 passed by the Tribunal is quashed. The Tribunal is directed to reconsider the application made by the petitioner for grant of an interim relief to him within three days of the production of a certified copy of the order before it. Needless to say, that the Tribunal will keep in mind the observations made above.

Since I have heard the learned Standing Counsel in opposition to this petition I am passing a final order with out formally admitting the petition. The writ petition, therefore, stands allowed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.