Ram Autar Verma vs District Administrative Committee and Another

R.R.K. Trivedi, J.—Petitioner Ram Autar Verma was serving as Secretary of Faridpur Sabji Sadhan Sahkari Samiti. He was a member of Centralised Service and his services were governed by U.P. Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Societies (Centralised Services) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). He was suspended from service on 25.6.1988 on serious charges. A charge sheet was served on him on 25.11.1989. He submitted his reply to this charge sheet on 24.12.1990. One Shri K. N. Mishra, Branch Manager was appointed Inquiry Officer, who submitted his report on 8.3.1991. Out of 21 charges, 20 charges were found proved against Petitioner. District Administrative Committee, Respondent No. l, perused the inquiry report and issued a show cause notice to the Petitioner on 6.5.1991 as to why Petitioner may not be dismissed from service. Along with this show cause notice, a copy of the inquiry report dated 8.3.1991 and resolution of the District Administrative Committee, dated 1.4.1991 were also served. Petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 20.6.1991. After receipt of the reply of Petitioner, the District Administrative Committee held meetings on 30.7.1991 and 5.10.1991. However, as Petitioner failed to appear, 25.11.1991 was fixed as the next date. On this date, Petitioner appeared. He was heard by the Committee. The Committee resolved that Petitioner may be dismissed from service. On 9.12.1991 Petitioner was accordingly dismissed. Thereafter he filed appeal before the Regional Administrative Committee. The appeal was dismissed on 8.2.1993. Both the aforesaid orders were challenged in a writ petition before this Court which was allowed on 18.2.1993 and the order of the appellate authority was set aside on the ground that appellate authority had not given reasons for dismissing the appeal. The appellate authority was required to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner. Liberty was also given to Petitioner to raise fresh grounds. The order of this Court dated 18.2.1993 has been filed as Annexure 8 to the writ petition. In pursuance of the direction of this Court the appellate authority, Regional Administrative Committee, held its meeting on 5.6.1993. Petitioner appeared before the appellate authority and was heard personally. The appellate authority again resolved that appeal is liable to be dismissed and accordingly in pursuance of the resolution, order dated 19.6.1993 was passed dismissing the appeal of Petitioner, aggrieved by which this petition has been filed.

I have heard Shri V.M. Sahai, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Shri M. S. Negi, learned counsel appearing for the Respondents. Learned counsel for Petitioner has assailed the orders on the following grounds:

Firstly, that inquiry was illegally entrusted to a person who was equal in rank to Petitioner whereas the inquiry ought to have been entrusted to an officer of the higher rank and on account of this illegality, the entire proceedings stand vitiated. Under Regulation 59 of U.P. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies (Centralised Services) Regulations, 1978, Petitioner was entitled for an opportunity to produce evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses in his defence and also for an opportunity of being heard in person which has not been given to him and for this reason also the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. The proceedings are in violation of the provisions contained in Regulation 59.

It has also been argued that inquiry has been done behind the back of Petitioner. In the impugned orders the explanation of Petitioner has not been considered and sufficient reasons have not been given. Reliance has been placed in case of Gurdial Singh Fijji Vs. State of Punjab and Others, .

Shri M. S. Negi, on the other hand, submitted that the Petitioner has been afforded full opportunity to defend himself in the proceedings. However, he never claimed to adduce any evidence in support of his defence at any stage. In his reply he has not claimed to cross-examine any witness or to examine any witness in support of his defence. In fact, the charges against Petitioner were based on mainly documentary evidence and Petitioner claimed examination of the documents which he was allowed. The inquiry officer in his presence allowed Petitioner full opportunity to examine all the documents relied on against him. It was only after examination of the documents that he submitted his reply and in his reply he did not claim either cross-examination of any witness or examination of any person as his witness. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, district Administrative Committee and the Regional Administrative Committee are based on material on record. The findings are on questions of fact which do not suffer from any illegality. Petitioner has been rightly dismissed from service for the serious charges of embezzlement and misappropriation of funds of the Society and no interference is called for by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. After the order of this Court dated 8.2.1993, appellate authority has recorded valid reasons. The orders do not suffer from any legal infirmity.

We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and for the reasons stated below, we do not find any merit in this petition.

The first submission of learned counsel for Petitioner was against the appointment of the Inquiry Officer of equal rank. It may be noticed at the outset that no prejudice or even embarrassment has been claimed by Petitioner by holding inquiry against him. There is no rule or regulation governing service of the Petitioner of which makes it obligatory that inquiry must be held by an officer of higher rank than the delinquent. The ultimate decision is taken by the appointing authority. The rule that order of punishment should not be passed by an authority lower in rank than the appointing authority cannot be extended in the case of appointment of an Inquiry Officer. Inquiry Officer is appointed by the appointing authority and in the present case a branch Manager of the Society was entrusted this Job. In our opinion, there was no illegality involved and this submission does not require any serious consideration in absence of any prejudice caused to the Petitioner.

The second submission is based on Regulation 59. Regulation 59(1)(a)(ii) of the Regulations provides that the member shall also be given an opportunity to produce at his own cost or to cross-examine witnesses in his defence and shall be given an opportunity of being heard in person, if he so desires. From a perusal of the aforesaid Regulation, it is clear that Petitioner has to express his desire In his explanation or otherwise by making an application before the Inquiry Officer for the purpose of examining any person in his defence or for cross-examination. Admittedly no such claim was made by Petitioner in his explanation or by any application at any stage. For the first time at appellate stage, it was alleged by Petitioner that such claim was made by him orally. However, this has not been accepted by the appellate authority. Petitioner has filed his memo of appeal as Annexure 9 to the writ petition. We have perused the memo of appeal and there is no allegation In this memo of appeal that Petitioner claimed examination of any witness in his defence or an opportunity to cross-examine any witness which was denied to him. In the grounds subsequently filed after the order of this Court dated 18.2.1993, Petitioner has only alleged that he did not receive any communication from the Inquiry Officer nor any evidence was taken by the Inquiry Officer nor the Appellant was afforded an opportunity of adducing any evidence. He has not claimed anywhere that he has expressed his desire to this effect at any stage. In such facts and circumstances, in our opinion, the view taken by the appellate authority is perfectly Justified.

The third submission of learned counsel for Petitioner was that inquiry has been done behind the back of Petitioner. The submission is that the statement of Shankar Lal Sharma, accountant, has been relied on, who stated that relevant Khatas were not prepared by him and they do not bear his handwriting. He also stated that these Khatas were used to be kept by Petitioner in his residence and were being maintained by the Petitioner. This verification from Shankar Lal Sharma appears to have been done by the Inquiry Officer in respect of charge No. 2. Copy of the inquiry report was served on the Petitioner, but he did not claim cross-examination of this witness either before the Respondent No. l or Respondent No. 2. The grievance has been raised at this stage. In fact the evidence against the Petitioner was mostly documentary and for this reason, no witness has been examined. The Inquiry Officer probably has referred to the statement of Shankar Lal Sharma recorded during preliminary inquiry.

From over all consideration, it does not appear that Petitioner was denied any opportunity either by the inquiry office or by the Respondent No. 1 or Respondent No. 2. He was afforded reasonable opportunity at every stage but he himself did not claim cross-examination of any witness. For that matter verification of the receipts was done from 16 members of the Society from whom Petitioner realised Rs. 1,19,701.24 p. by issuing aforesaid receipts under this signatures but did not deposit this amount in the account of the Society and misappropriated the same. A list of all the 26 persons was supplied to the Petitioner. Some of the names were mentioned in the charge-sheet also but the Petitioner did not claim cross-examination of any of the members. Similarly, an amount of more than Rs. two lacs was shown to have been disbursed among 49 members of the society but in fact it was all manipulation of the record and no amount was paid to the members. This amount was not carried forward in the accounts of such members in new Khatas commencing from 1.7.1984. The documents in this regard have been examined in depth by the Inquiry Officer and also by Respondents No. 1 and 2 and, in our opinion, the charges have been sufficiently established against the Petitioner and the findings do not suffer from any apparent error of law. Even assuming for the sake of argument that charge No. 2 was illegally found proved against Petitioner on the basis of the statement of Shankar Lal Sharma, the remaining 19 charges which are equally grave and serious, have been established and the orders do not require any interference by this Court on this ground also.

Lastly, it has been submitted that the explanation of Petitioner has not been considered and reasons have not been recorded by the appellate authority. In our opinion, this contention has no force. This Court by order dated 18.2.1993 allowed the writ petition precisely on the ground that the reasons have not been recorded by the appellate authority and it was directed to decide the appeal afresh. The appellate authority while passing the order dated 19.6.1993, in our opinion, has recorded sufficient reasons for every charge and has also discussed the contentions advanced by the Petitioner. Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case relied on by the learned counsel for Petitioner (supra) has observed as under:

True, that it is not expected that the Selection Committee should give anything approaching the judgment of a Court, but it must at least state, as briefly as it may, why it came to the conclusion that the officer concerned was found to be not suitable for inclusion in the Select. List. In the absence of any such reason, we are unable to agree with the High Court that the Selection Committee had another ''reason'' for not bringing Appellant on the Select List.

From perusal of the aforesaid observations of Hon''ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the administrative authorities like Respondents No. 1 and 2 are not expected to record reasons in support of their order like a judgment of a Court. The requirement is only to record reasons in brief which may indicate the application of mind to the matter under consideration. In our opinion, to this extent, Respondents No. 1 and 2 have discharged their legal obligation and have recorded sufficient reasons in support of their conclusion. The judgment relied on does not help Petitioner in any way.

For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this writ petition and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

B.K. Sharma, J.

I agree.