Tribunals and CommissionsSingle Bench(2026) 09 CAT CK 3521

Ram Autar Kashyap vs Union Of India & Ors.

Central Administrative Tribunal · Decided on 8 September 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Pankaj Kumar, Member (A)
CASE NUMBER
Recall Application MA No. 332/2217/2025 in Original Application No. 332/00256 of 2017

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Judgment

19 paragraphs · 1,311 words

Per Hon’ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-Administrative

Heard the learned counsel for the applicant, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the records.

2.

Through MA No. 2217 of 2025, applicant seeks to recall the order dated 20.11.2017 whereby the OA No. 256 of 2017 was dismissed for non-prosecution in the following terms:

“In view of the order dated 28.09.2017 steps have not been taken by the applicant. Even on 08.09.2017 adjournment was sought to move application for condonation of delay but nobody is present for the applicant. It appears that the applicant has lost interest to prosecuting his case. Accordingly, the OA is dismissed in default and for non prosecution.” There is a delay of about 8 years in moving the Recall Application.

3.

The applicant, through MA No. 2218 of 2017 for condonation of delay submits that he was unaware that OA No. 256 of 2017 had been dismissed in default and on enquires with his counsel, he was informed that dates are being fixed in the case. The applicant states further that his counsel passed away in the year 2022 and when he enquired of the matter in March, 2025, he came to know of the demise of his counsel. He states that in the month of August, 2025, he engaged the present counsel and moved the Recall Application through MA No. 2217 of 2025. Finally, the applicant submits that he is an old person and is suffering from various ailments and it has not been possible for him to be present on each and every date before this Tribunal due to his poor health.

4.

The respondents object to condonation of delay pointing out that the applicant became aware in the year 2025 only that his counsel had expired in the year 2022 which shows that he has been negligent towards his case. In support of their contention, the respondents cite Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors vs Katiji & Ors 1987 (2) SCC 107, M/S Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited vs District Board Bhojpur & Ors 1992 (2) SSC 598, Maniben Devraj Shah vs Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 and Balwant Singh vs Jagdish Singh & Ors (2010) 8 SCC 685.

5.

Heard both the parties.

6.1

On the matter of delay, in the case of Chennai Metropolitan water supply and Sewerage Board and others Vs. T.T Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

“15.

In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

16.

Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” (emphasis supplied)

6.2

Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sabarmati Gas Ltd. Vs Shah Alloys Ltd. in Civil Appeal No. 1669 of 2020 decided on 04.01.2023 has held as follows:

“25.

As relates Section 5 of the Limitation Act showing ‘sufficient cause’ is the only criterion for condoning delay. ‘Sufficient Cause’ is the cause for which party could not be blamed.” (emphasis supplied)

7.1

It is noted that the OA No. 256 of 2017 preferred by the applicant was dismissed in default on 20.11.2017. The applicant claims that his previous counsel kept on informing him that dates were being fixed even through the OA had been dismissed for non prosecution. However, it is observed that the applicant has been unable to demonstrate what due diligence he exercised to find out about the progress of his case, except simply relying on his counsel’s word.

7.2

The applicant further claims that his previous counsel passed away in the year 2022, but he came to know about it only in March, 2025. There is no explanation as to why the applicant did not make any enquiry about the progress of his case for a period of about three years, i.e., from 2022 to 2025.

7.3

It is noted that the applicant was a Government servant who retired from the post of Postal Assistant in the Department of Posts in the year 2004. He is expected to be aware of his legal rights and obligations. Such lackadaisical and indolent approach towards his case defies explanation.

7.4

In conclusion, the applicant has failed to show ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of the delay of about 8 years in moving the Recall Application.

8.1

In view of the foregoing, MA No. 2218 of 2025 for condonation of delay is found lacking merit and is dismissed. Consequently, MA No. 2217 of 2025 for recall of this Tribunal’s order dated 20.11.2017 dismissing OA No. 256 of 2017 in default and for non prosecution also stands dismissed.

8.2

Associated MAs stand disposed of.

8.3

Parties shall bear their own costs.