Ralla vs Managing Committee Gurdwara

Kapur, J.—This judgment will-dispose of two second appeals, R.S.A. No. 2162 of 1946, Ralla v. The Managing Committee Gurdwara Anandgarh and R.S.A. No. 190 of 1948, The Managing Committee Gurdwara, Anandgarh v. Ralla. In both the appeals the point in controversy is the same.

Two suits were brought by the Plaintiff, The Managing Committee Gurdwara, Anandgarh against the Plaintiff, one for possession o� land measuring 53 kanals 3 marlas, khewat No. 3, khatauni No. 348 and other for possession'' of 41 kanals 10 marlas of land in the same, kheivat and the same khatauni, but bearing different khasra numbers.

u/s 3, Sikh Gurdwaras Act, a notification dated 12-3-1927, was issued wherein certain rights in regard to these properties wore claimed. In regard to these properties the claim was ''ownership and right of cultivation'' (malkiat wa haq kasht). It was also claimed that the Gurdwara was a maufidar with regard to these lands. Objections were then put in by certain persons, with regard to ownership by those claiming to bo landlords and with regard'' to occupancy rights by one Cbanda Singh, whose objection was that he was tha occupancy tenant of the land and had the right, to cultivate the same, and the third by cert: ragees. Claims with regard to propritary rights were admitted and were so declared those of Chanda Singh and the ragees plain rights of occupancy were dismissed. An appeal to the High Court also failed.

The first suit brought by the Managing Committee Gurdwara, Anandgarh, was for possession on the allegation that the Gurdwara had occupancy rights in the land and the Defendant had taken forcible possession six or sovea years before the suit and he was, therefore,'' merely a trespasser. The suit was resisted by the Defendant on the ground that he was a tenant under the proprietors of the land and that the Gurdwara had no right of occupancy. Plea of limitation was also raised. The only two issues framed in this case were:

Is the suit within time?

Is the Plaintiff an occupancy tenant of this laul and is entitled to eject the'' Defendant?

The trial Judge, Mr. Bhatnagar, held that the Plaintiff was the occupancy tenant, but was only entitled to hold the land for cultivation without payment of rent as this was the only right claimed by it under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act and as it was not in possession, the relief claimed by it was not open to it. Against this decree the Plaintiff took an appeal to the learned District Judge, who reversed'' the finding and held that the claim of the Plaintiff in the notification was not merely to a right of cultivation, but was to a right of occupancy in the land and that it was tins, which was being litigated beforo the Sikh Gurdwaras Tribunal, and as Chanda Singh had failed, the right of the Gurdwara-to occupancy rights, should be taken to have been decided m favoar of the Plaintiff. On this ground he allowed the appeal and decreed the Plaintiff''s suit.

In the other suit the Plaintiff''s suit was as a maufidar and oocupanoy tenant of the land in dispute, on the ground that it had been so held by the Tribunal. The Defendant, Ralla, denied the claim and also that no such declaration had been given by the Tribunal. He pleaded that he was a tonant-at-will under the proprietors, and, therefore,he coidd not be ejected by the Plaintiff. In short his defence was not different in this case from what it was in the other. The learned trial Judge in this case held : (l) that the Tribunal had not decided that the Plaintiff was occupancy tenant of the land; (2) that the Gurdwara did not claim any such right in the notification and (3) that the Tribunal did not make any ''reservation in favour of the Plaintiff regarding occupancy rights''. He also held that the suit was barred by time. Against this decree the Plaintiff went up in appeal to the Senior Subordinate Judge who confirmed the judgment of the trial Judge.

The points for decision in both the appeals are what was the claim made at the timo of the notification, what was hold by the Gurdwaras Tribunal and what is its effect. As I have said above the claim of the plainti If was to ownership and right of cultivation and also that it was a maufidar. The only person who contested the right of the Plaintiff with regard to occupancy tenancy was ono Ghanda Singh and it was hold that he was not the occupancy tenant.

In the present appeal it was contended ''by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that u/s 301(a) (sic), Sikh Gurdwaras Act, as ithe Plaintiff did not claim a right to occupancy in the land it could not now claim it. His submission was that the claim was only to ownership and a right of cultivation was not the same thing as occupancy rights. In the first place, in neither of the two written statements was this plea taken by the Defendant and no issue on this point was stated in the trial Court and oven in the grounds of appeal taken in this Court this point has, in my opinion, not been raised, and, therefore, the Appellant is not entitled to urge this objection before us. But even if he was, in my opinion, if the notification is read as a whole it is quite clear that the Plaintiff was claiming occupancy rights in the land. In Section 6(l) (d), Punjab Tenancy Act, it is said :

(1) A tenant-

(d) who being jagirdar of the estate or any part of 4he estate in which the land occupied by him is situate, has continuously occupied the land for not:dess than 20 years, or, having been such jagirdar, occupied the land while he was jagirdar and has continuously oooupied it for not less than 20 years, has a ight of oooupanoy in the land so oooupieih.

As the claim was to the maufi rights and rights of tenancy it cannot be said that no right of oocupanoy was claimed. Not only this, whon a man claims that he is the owner and has the right of cultivation, surely it cannot be said that he has claimed a right lesser than that of occupancy tenancy. I must, therefore, hold that the District Judge, Mr. Dulat, came to a correct finding that occupancy rights were claimod and that Mr. Sansar Chand, Senior Subordinate Judge, was in error in holding that such rights were not claimed.

For the reasons given above I dismiss R.S.A. No. 2162 of 1946 and allow trie appeal, R.S.A. No. 190 of 1948. The Gurdwara Committee Anandgarh will have its costs in both the appeals in all the Courts.

Harnam Singh. J.

I agree.