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Judgment
Saurabh Lavania, J
Heard Shri Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel.
By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following relief :-
"Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to calculate the amount of compensation and rehabilitation amount in respect of the land of the petitioner being Gata No.879 area 0.410 hectare situated in village-Raipur Bilaila, Pargana Bahraich, Tehsil-Ikauna, District-Shravasti, acquired for construction of Dikra Minor of Rapti Main Canal under Saryu Nahar Pariyojna as per the Government Order dated 19.03.2015 by following the different provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 and to pay the same to the petitioner within time frame as stipulated by the Hon'ble Court."
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that opposite party no.4/Executive Engineer, Saryu Nahar Khand, Nanpara, Bahraich has admitted that the determination of the valuation of the land has not been made in accordance with the provisions of Government Order dated 19.03.2015, rather it has been done as per Government Order dated 08.10.2012 and as such, the opposite party nos.1 and 4 have violated the provisions of the Act of the Right to Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 2013). Consequently, the sale deed dated 07.04.2016, which was got executed in duress and by taking undue advantage of the power conferred upon the opposite parties, is void-ab-initio under the provisions of Section 46 (5) of the Act of 2013.
Further, submitted that Section 30 of the Act of 2013 provides the amount of solatium, which is to be paid to the person, whose land is being acquired under the said Act, but in the instant case, no amount of solatium has been paid to the petitioner and as such, the opposite parties are duty bound to make such payments to the petitioner. In case, the land is acquired under the provisions of any other Act, then, in that event also, if the calculation of the amount of Award is higher under the provisions of the Act of 2013, then the person is entitled to such higher rate of Award but in the instant case the opposite parties have acted in a manner, which even is not being done by the private individual for snatching of the property of a person like that of the petitioner.
Learned Standing Counsel has raised a preliminary objection that in respect of the land in dispute which is subject matter of the present writ petition, petitioner has already executed sale deed of the land recorded in his name i.e. Gata No.879 area 0.410 hectare situated in village-Raipur Bilaila, Pargana Bahraich, Tehsil-Ikauna, District-Shravasti in favour of opposite parties, so he is not now the owner of the said land. Further submitted that for the prayers sought, the present writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. After execution of sale deed, for the relief sought, the writ petition would not be maintainable and petitioner has an appropriate forum i.e. Civil Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, in response, submits that the execution of the sale deed by the petitioner is no legal impediment in the way of the petitioner to approach this Court for the main relief claimed by him in the writ petition.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, the admitted position which emerges is that in respect of the land i.e. Gata No.879 area 0.410 hectare situated in village-Raipur Bilaila, Pargana Bahraich, Tehsil-Ikauna, District-Shravasti, petitioner has already executed a "Sale Deed" in favour of opposite parties.
It is also evident from the contents of writ petition and the main prayer sought by the petitioner that the writ petition has been filed for issuing the writ of mandamus/command to the opposite parties to re-calculate the sale consideration of the land in issue, which the petitioner has sold, according to Government Order dated 19.03.2015 and thereafter pay the amount to the petitioner.
The question requires consideration for deciding the present writ petition is that what is "Sale Deed" or/and "Conveyance Deed".
The "Sale" is definded under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short "Act of 1882"), which reads as under :-
"Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.
Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.
Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property."
The "Sale" defined under Section 54 of Act of 1882 is required to be read along with Section 7 of Act of 1882, Section 2 and 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (in short "Act of 1872") and Section 2 (10) and 2 (14) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (In short "Act of 1899"). The same are quoted below :-
Section 7 of the Act, 1882 provides that "Every person competent to contract and entitled to transferable property, or authorized to disposes of transferable property not is own, is competent to transfer such property either wholly or in part, and either absolutely or conditionally, in the circumstances, to the extent and in the manner, allowed and prescribe by any law for time being in force."
Section 2 of the Act, 1872 provides that "In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:
(a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal;
(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise;
(c) The person making the proposal is called the "promisor", and the person accepting the proposal is called the "promisee";
(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise;
(e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement;
(f) Promises which form the consideration or part of the consideration for each other, are called reciprocal promises;
(g) An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void;
(h) An agreement enforceable by law is a contract;
(i) An agreement which is enforceable by law at the option of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option of the other or others, is a voidable contract;
(j) A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable."
Section 10 of the Act, 1872 provides that "All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void."
Section 10 of the Act of 1872 falls in Chapter II of the Act of 1872. Chapter II contains Sections 10 to 30 and from the same it can be ascertained that what agreements are contract, which agreements/contracts are voidable and which agreements/contracts are void. Needless to say that even "Sale Deed", if challenged, has to be tested keeping in view the provisions of Chapter II of the Act of 1872.
Apart from above we would like to refer some other sections/provisions of the Act of 1882, in the context of the present case, such as Sections (s) 6,8,10,11,12,13,14 and 15.
Generally the right to property includes the right to transfer it to another person. Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that property of any kind may be transferred, except as provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force. To this rule clauses (a) to (i) of Section 6 constitute exceptions.
Section 8 lays down the consequences which follow from the transfer of property. All the interests which the transferor is capable of passing, passes forthwith to the transferee. If the property is land, the easements annexed, the rents and profits accruing after the transfer and all things attached to the earth pass to the transferee and if the property is machinery attached to the earth, the movable part thereof. In the case of a house, the easements annexed to it, the rent the locks, keys, bars, doors, windows and all other things provided for permanent use therein pass to the transferee. If the property is a debt or other actionable claim, the securities thereof but not arrears of interest accrued before the transfer and if the property is money or other property yielding income, the interest or income accruing after the transfer passes to the transferee. But it is open to the parties to provide, expressly or by necessary implication, that consequences other than those mentioned above will flow from the transfer.
Section 10 makes void a condition absolutely restraining the transferee from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property. Section 11 provides that in cases of transfers of absolute interest, a condition restricting the enjoyment of the property will be ignored. Section 12 enacts that a condition making the interest of the transferee determinable on insolvency or attempted transfer shall be void. This section does not apply to a condition in a lease for the benefit of the lessor. By Section 13, an interest created for the benefit of an unborn person subject to an interest created by the same transfer, shall not take effect unless the interest created for the benefit of the unborn person extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property. Section 14 lays down the rule against perpetuity. It makes inoperative a transfer which postpones the power of alienation to one or more lives in existence and the period of minority of a person who shall be in existence at the expiration of those lives.
The rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller are set out in detail in Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. These conditions are implied in every transfer and it is not necessary to mention them in the deed of transfer. But it is open to the parties, by agreement, to supplement these or to vary them or any one or more of them. When this is done, specific mention must be made in the deed of the added condition or of the varied condition.
Section 2 (10) of the Act of 1899 provides that "Conveyance" includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I, Schedule I-A or Schedule I-B."
Section 2 (14) of the Act of 1899 provides that "Instrument" includes every document and record created or maintained in or by electronic storage and retrieval device or media by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded."
In order to understand what a "Sale Deed/Conveyance Deed" is, it is also important to look at definition of the term "Deed", "Conveyance" and "Instrument".
"Deed" as per Collins Dictionary, in the context of law/present case means "formal legal document signed, witnessed and delivered to effect a conveyance or transfer of property or to create a legal obligation or contract."
"Deed" as per Merriam Webster Dictionary, in the context of law/present case means "to convey or transfer by a signed instrument containing a legal transfer, bargain, or contract : to convey or transfer by Deed".
One of the synonyms for "Deed" is 'convey and some other are some other are 'alien', 'alienate', 'assign', 'cede', 'make over' and 'transfer'.
Thus a "Deed" is a written document or an instrument that is sealed, signed and delivered by all parties to the contract (buyer and seller). It is a contractual document that includes legally valid terms, and is enforceable in a court of law.
"Conveyance" as per Collins Dictionary means "a transfer of the legal title to property" ; and "the document effecting such a transfer" and as per Merriam Webster Dictionary "means or way of conveying such as an instrument by which title to property is conveyed", "Convey" and "to transfer or deliver (something, such as property) to another especially by a sealed writing".
"Instrument" as per Collins Dictionary means "a formal document, as a deed, contract, etc." and as per Merriam Webster Dictionary, "a formal legal document (such as deed, bond or agreement)".
A conjoint reading of the above quoted provisions and the reasons mentioned herein above, it is crystal clear that "Sale Deed" or "Conveyance Deed" is a "Contract".
Now the question arises that "whether issuing of writ of mandamus in the present case, which relates sale deed, which we have held is nothing but a contract, would be justifiable". In other words "whether the writ of mandamus can be issued in contractual matters."
It is settled law that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India be maintainable for enforcing fundamental rights provided under Constitution of India, statutory rights or legal right. It is also settled that "mandamus" lies against authorities whose duty is to perform certain acts and they failed to do so. The "Mandamus" would not lie in a contractual matter. If a person, enters into contract with open eyes then in that event he cannot be permitted to raise the dispute under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with regard to such contract.
The legal position in this regard is that where the rights which are sought to be agitated are purely of a private character no mandamus can be claimed, and even if the relief is sought against the State or any of its instrumentality the pre-condition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is a public duty. In a dispute based on a pure contractual relationship there being no public duty element, a mandamus would not lie.
The existence of enforceable constitutional, statutory or legal right is condition precedent for invoking writ jurisdiction. (Vide Calcutta Gas Company (Propriety) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.,AIR 1962 SC 1044; Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana,AIR 1977 SC 276; State of Kerala v. Smt. A. Lakshmi Kutty,AIR 1987 SC 331; State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Ors.,AIR 1989 SC 49; Krishan Lal v. State of J & K,(1994) 4 SCC 422; State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma,AIR 1996 SC 1669; Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P.,AIR 1996 SC 2736; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 3104; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors.,AIR 1999 SC 943; State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Shar ma and Anr., AIR 12 2001 SC 2900 ; and Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr (AIR 2003 SC 1561).
Further, the Supreme Court has time and again examined this issue and observed that a writ petition does not lie for recovery of an amount under a contract and even though a Statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions but disputes arising out of the terms of such contracts have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract and the fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body does not affect the principles to be applied. It has also been emphasised that such a contract is not a statutory contract and the disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, whether any amount is due or not and refusal to pay it is justified or not are not matters which can be agitated and decided in a writ petition.
In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 2573, wherein it was observed:-
j"We find that there is a merit in the first contention of Mr. Raval. Learned Counsel has rightly questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature.
A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition."
In the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Ghulam Mohd. Dar and Anr. AIR 2004 SC 510 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under : -
"Furthermore, the respondent herein filed the aforementioned 'writ petition for enforcing a contract qua contract. Although an objection has been taken as regards the maintainability of the writ petition by the appellant herein, the same unfortunately has not been considered by the High Court. It is well settled that writ of or in the nature of mandamus would not ordinarily issue for enforcing the terms and conditions of a contract qua contract. A writ of mandamus would issue when a question involving public law character arises for consideration."
In this regard we may draw reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bareilly Development Authority Vs. Ajay Pal Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 116 wherein it was held that even though the development authority had the trappings of a State, in a matter pertaining to determination of the price of the flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the authority after entering into the field of an ordinary contract was acting purely in its executive capacity, and the right and obligations of the parties inter se would be governed only as per the terms of the contract. The observations made in the judgment are as follows:-
"21. This finding in our view is not correct in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case because in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India [(1979) 3 SCC 489] there was no concluded contract as in this case. Even conceding that the BDA has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the 'authority' or its agent after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity. Thereafter the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of the authority (i.e. BDA in this case) in the said contractual field.
There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple -- Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar (1977) 3 SCC 457, Premji Bhai Parmar & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors, (1980) 2 SCC 129 and Divl. Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Company Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 238."
In the case of Divisional Forest Officer Vs. Vishwanath Tea Company Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 238 the question of maintainability of a writ petition in respect of a claim arising out of the contractual rights and obligations flowing from the terms of a lease was considered, and it was held as follows:-
"8. It is undoubtedly true that High Court can entertain in its extraordinary jurisdiction a petition to issue any of the prerogative writs for any other purpose. But such writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is a denial of equality before law or equal protection of law. The Corporation can also file a writ petition for enforcement of a right under a statute. As pointed out earlier, the respondent (company) was merely trying to enforce a contractual obligation. To clear the ground let it be stated that obligation to pay royally for timber cut and felled and removed is prescribed by the relevant regulations. The validity of regulations is not challenged. Therefore, the demand for royalty is unsupported by law. What the respondent claims is an exception that in view of a certain term in the indenture of lease, to wit, clause 2, the appellant is not entitled to demand and collect royalty from the respondent. This is nothing but enforcement of a term of a contract of lease. Hence, the question whether such contractual obligation can be enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, a party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed, or the party may sue for damages. Such a suit would ordinarily be cognizable by the civil court. The High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would not entertain a petition either for specific performance of contract or for recovering damages. A right to relief flowing from a contract has to be claimed in a civil court where a suit for specific performance of contract or for damages could be filed."
We may also refer to the judgment in the case of LIC Vs. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264 wherein it was held that in a matter relating to the contractual obligations the Court would not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. The observations made in the judgment are as follows:-
"102. ...If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the company, like any other shareholder."
In Premji Bhai Parmar Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (1980) 2 SCC 129 a petition filed under Article 32 before the Supreme Court contending that the surcharge collected by the authority in respect of a flat purchased by the petitioner was illegal, the petition was dismissed with the following observations:-
"8. ...petition to this Court under Article 32 is not a proper remedy nor is this Court a proper forum for reopening the concluded contracts with a view to getting back a part of the purchase price paid and the benefit taken. ..... But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract."
In the case of State of Bihar Vs. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 a grievance was sought to be raised against deduction of an amount from the final bill to be paid to the contractor due to breach of contract by him. The petition was allowed by the High Court. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court wherein it was held that even if it was possible to decide the question raised in the petition on the basis of affidavits and counter affidavits, it would not be proper to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases of alleged breach of contract. The observations made by the Supreme Court are as follows:-
"2. Limited question involved in this appeal is -- whether the High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for granting relief in case of alleged breach of contract.
Settled law -- writ is not the remedy for enforcing contractual obligations. It is to be reiterated that writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract...
x x x x x
...It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs."
In the case of Har Shankar & Ors. Vs. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1121, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under :-
"The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred."
Similarly, in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Narain Prasad & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1493, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under :-
"A person who enters into certain contractual obligations with his eyes open and works the entire contract, cannot be allowed to turn round.... and question the validity of these obligations or the validity of the Rules which constitute the terms of contract. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, which is of a discretionary nature and is exercised only to advance the interest of justice, cannot certainly be employed in aid of such persons. Neither justice nor equity is in their favour."
The general principles which may be culled out from the aforementioned judgments is that in a case where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is of a non-statutory character and the relationship is governed purely in terms of a contract between the parties, in such situations the contractual obligations are matters of private law and a writ would not lie to enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract. The proper remedy in such cases would be to file a civil suit for claiming damages, injunctions or specific performance or such appropriate reliefs in a civil court. Pure contractual obligation in the absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable through a writ.
The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution being an extraordinary remedy, it is not intended to be used for the purpose of declaring private rights of the parties. In the case of enforcement of contractual rights and liabilities the normal remedy of filing a civil suit being available to the aggrieved party, this Court may not exercise its prerogative writ jurisdiction to enforce such contractual obligations.
The basis of instant case is Sale Deed, which is contract, and petitioner's claim, broadly, is that he is entitled to more sale consideration then what has been given.
In view of the above legal proposition and for the foregoing reasons, we do not deem it fit to exercise our extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, in the present case, as we are of the view that the writ petition, for the claim/payer sought by the petitioner in the writ petition, is itself not maintainable.
With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is dismissed.
No order as to costs.