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Judgment
Heard the parties.
The present application has been preferred for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015 dated 13.08.2015, registered for the offence punishable under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code, including the F.I.R. itself, qua the petitioner.
At the outset, it would be apposite to give a brief look to the prosecution case, as disclosed from the F.I.R. and the materials placed on record. The informant, namely, Kamlesh Yadav, is stated to be the driver of Tata Indica vehicle bearing registration No. BR-02AA-3582. On 09.08.2015, the said vehicle was allegedly hired by three persons for bringing the sister of one of them from Sikaria More, Gaya.
It is alleged that, during the journey, the persons traveling in the vehicle stopped at Sagar Restaurant, Masaurhi, for taking dinner. After taking dinner, one of the occupants allegedly vomited and the vehicle was again stopped. At that place, one of the persons is alleged to have removed the driver forcibly from the vehicle by pointing a weapon at him. Thereafter, the three unknown persons allegedly took away the Tata Indica vehicle towards Patna.
It is further alleged that the mobile phones of the informant and of the other occupants were also looted by the miscreants away. The occurrence is stated to have taken place at about 8:45 P.M. on 09.08.2015. The informant is stated to have given written information to the Station House Officer, Dhanarua Police Station on 10.08.2015 and again submitted an application in respect of the occurrence. The formal F.I.R., however, came to be registered on 13.08.2015.
The petitioner was not named in the F.I.R. It is the case of the petitioner that his name subsequently surfaced during investigation, allegedly on the basis of the statement/confession of a co-accused. It is also submitted that no recovery was made from the possession of the petitioner and that no charge-sheet has been submitted against him in the present case.
During the pendency of the present proceeding, counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the State, including the reports of the Inspector-cum-Station House Officer, Deepnagar Police Station and the Superintendent of Police, Nalanda. From the said materials, another case, namely, Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015, instituted in relation to the Tata Indica vehicle and the mobile phones, has also come on record. The State itself has referred to the said case as connected with the present matter.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the present F.I.R. is liable to be quashed, primarily on the ground that it is a subsequent F.I.R. relating to the same transaction in respect of which Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015 had already been instituted on 10.08.2015. It is submitted that the two cases arise from the same Tata Indica vehicle, the same alleged taking away of the vehicle and the mobile phones.
It is submitted that the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 09.08.2015, whereas the formal F.I.R. at Dhanarua Police Station was registered only on 13.08.2015. According to learned counsel, the delay of four days in registration of the F.I.R., despite the written information having been given on 10.08.2015, has not been satisfactorily explained in the counter affidavit.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was not named in the F.I.R. and his implication is subsequent in point of time. It is contended that the materials relied upon against the petitioner are confined to the alleged disclosure/confessional statement of a co-accused and there is no recovery from his possession.
It is further submitted that the State, while filing its counter affidavit, has itself disclosed that Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015 was instituted in connection with the theft of the very same Tata Indica vehicle and three mobile phones. According to learned counsel, the subsequent registration of Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015, on the same factual foundation, amounts to an impermissible second F.I.R.
Learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181, to submit that there cannot be a second F.I.R. in respect of the same occurrence or transaction and that subsequent information relating to the same occurrence has to be dealt with in the course of investigation of the first F.I.R.
Reliance has also been placed upon Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 254 and Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384, to submit that the test of “sameness” has to be applied by examining whether the two F.I.Rs. relate to the same incident or to incidents forming part of the same transaction.
Learned counsel has also drawn attention of this Court to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,2026 SCC Online SC 1384, particularly paragraphs 14 and 15, wherein the law relating to multiple F.I.Rs. has again been considered and the principles flowing from T.T. Antony case (supra), Babubhai case (supra), Anju Chaudhary case (supra) and State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore case (supra) have been reiterated.
It is submitted that the present case does not fall within any of the recognised exceptions permitting a second F.I.R., such as a counter-case, a distinct occurrence, a larger conspiracy subsequently revealed or the discovery of genuinely new facts giving rise to a different crime. Rather, according to the petitioner, the Dhanarua case is only another police case arising from the same chain of events concerning the same vehicle and the same articles.
Learned counsel has further submitted that continuation of such a proceeding would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and would offend the requirement of a fair investigation. It is contended that the constitutional discipline flowing from Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution does not permit the investigating agency to subject an accused to successive investigations in respect of the same transaction.
It is lastly submitted that the petitioner has already been acquitted in the connected Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015 by judgment dated 27.07.2023. Though the said acquittal may not, by itself, determine the validity of the present F.I.R., the same, according to learned counsel, demonstrates the continuing prejudice caused to the petitioner by maintaining another proceeding arising from the same factual occurrence.
Learned counsel, therefore, submits that, in view of the aforesaid facts and the settled legal position, the F.I.R. in Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015 and all consequential proceedings qua the petitioner deserve to be quashed.
Learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State opposes the present application. It is submitted that the police have conducted investigation in accordance with law and that the name of the petitioner surfaced during investigation. It is further submitted that the materials collected during investigation cannot be examined in detail by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
It is submitted that the Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015 and the present Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015 were registered by different police stations and under different provisions of law. The State relies upon the investigation conducted in the connected case and submits that the petitioner was found involved along with other accused persons.
Learned A.P.P. further submits that the occurrence alleged in the present case concerns the forcible taking away of the vehicle from the informant and, therefore, the offence under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code has its own factual and legal ingredients. It is argued that merely because the vehicle subsequently figured in another police case, the present F.I.R. cannot automatically be treated as a second F.I.R. in law.
It is also submitted that the petitioner had approached this Court earlier by filing an application for anticipatory bail, which was subsequently withdrawn. The State further points out that warrants of arrest have been issued in the present case and steps have been taken for execution thereof.
Learned A.P.P. submits that the allegations against the petitioner require investigation and that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly. On such grounds, dismissal of the present application has been prayed for.
Having considered the rival submissions and upon perusal of the materials available on record, the principal issue which falls for consideration before this Court is whether the registration and continuance of Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015, in the facts of the present case, amounts to registration of a second F.I.R. in respect of the same occurrence or transaction which had already been made the subject matter of Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015.
At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The said power is extraordinary in nature; nevertheless, where the continuation of a criminal proceeding is shown to be legally impermissible, the High Court is not precluded from exercising its inherent jurisdiction.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, while illustrating the categories in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, has specifically recognised cases where there is an express legal bar to the institution or continuance of the proceeding and cases where the proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide or is otherwise an abuse of the process of law.
In the present case, the question is not whether this Court should undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence collected by the investigating agency. The question is anterior to that exercise, namely, whether the very registration of the present F.I.R. is permissible when an earlier police case had already been instituted concerning the same factual transaction.
In T.T. Antony case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the scheme of Sections 154, 156, 157, 162 and 173 Cr.P.C. and held that there cannot be a second F.I.R. in respect of the same incident or occurrence. Information received subsequently concerning the same occurrence has to be treated in accordance with the procedure governing further investigation and not as a fresh F.I.R. giving rise to a second investigation.
The principle was explained further in Babubhai case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the test of sameness is the relevant test. The Court is required to examine whether the two F.I.Rs. relate to the same incident, occurrence or transaction. The mere fact that different offences or different versions may be mentioned is not, by itself, decisive.
In Anju Chaudhary case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that there can be no straight-jacket formula for determining whether two F.I.Rs. arise out of the same transaction. The facts and circumstances of each case are required to be examined and rationalised and thereafter the test of sameness is to be applied.
The position has been reiterated recently in Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 14, observed that there cannot be a second F.I.R. in respect of the same incident or occurrence or in respect of incidents forming part of the same transaction, while also recognising exceptions where the subsequent F.I.R. concerns a distinct occurrence or offence, a counter-complaint or a larger conspiracy.
In paragraph 15 of Rutvij Bhagat Singh case Wakhare (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that the question whether a subsequent F.I.R. is a second F.I.R. concerning the same incident or is based upon distinct facts is a mixed question of law and facts and that the facts of each case have to be examined by applying the test of sameness.
The recent decision in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358, also recognizes limited circumstances in which a second F.I.R. may be permissible, including a counter-complaint or rival version, a materially different ambit arising from the same circumstances, a larger conspiracy revealed during investigation, hitherto unknown facts or circumstances, or a separate incident. The exceptions, however, cannot be applied mechanically so as to permit two investigations into the same transaction.
It would also be apposite to reproduce the para no(s). 14 and 15 of Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare case (supra), which is as under:-
14.The law governing registration of multiple FIRs is fairly well settled. This Court has consistently held that there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same incident or occurrence or in respect of the incidents which form a part of the same transaction. At the same time, where the subsequent FIR, inter alia, relates to a distinct occurrence or offence; is a counter-complaint; or reveals a larger conspiracy, the registration of the same is permissible.
14.1.In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala12, this Court held that no successive FIRs could be filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction. It was observed as under:
“18.… All other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt.
20.From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 CrPC.
27.A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”
14.2.Significantly, in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat14 this Court held that the ‘test of sameness’ has to be applied to determine whether two FIRs relate to the same incident or form different parts of the same transaction. It held that if the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR ought to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different or is in respect of a different incident/crime, then a subsequent FIR is permissible. [See also: Arnab Ranjan Goswami (supra)]
14.3.In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P.15 this Court held that registration of a second FIR is permissible where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different; or relate to an incident of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the first FIR. It was observed as under:
“14.… It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. …
15.It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case.
25.… The court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible, …”
14.4.More recently, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore16, through one of us (Sanjay Karol, J.), referring to the earlier decisions of this Court, summarised the principles regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second FIR, in the following terms:
“9.From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second FIR:
9.1When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands registered.
9.2When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may arise from the same set of circumstance es.
9.3When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
9.4When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
9.5Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.”
A conspectus of the decisions referred to above makes it clear, inter alia, that registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible if they relate to the same incident or form part of the same transaction. However, where the subsequent FIR relates to a distinct offence/incident or a separate transaction, its registration cannot be faulted. The meaning of what constitutes ‘same transaction’ or ‘distinct offence’ has been succinctly explained by this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja17, wherein the Court laid down triple tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide whether separate actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ - (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time and place; and (iii) continuity of action. The relevant part thereof is reproduced hereunder:
“10.In Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala v. Union of India6, this Court dealt with the question as to what is meant by ‘every distinct offence’. It was held that ‘distinct’ meant ‘not identical’ and two offences would be distinct if they are not, in any way, inter-related. It was further held that if there is some inter-relation, there would be no distinctness and it would depend upon the circumstances of the case in which the offences were committed whether there be separate charges for those offences or not.
11.In Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that, what is to be ascertained under Section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (equivalent to Section 218(1) CrPC), was whether the offences arise out of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction. It was noted that ‘same transaction’ is not defined anywhere in the 1898 Code and it was held that whether transactions can be regarded as the same transaction would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case. The Bench noted that the general thought is that, where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. The Bench, however, cautioned that it is not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for transactions to be regarded as the same transaction … Noting that a transaction may consist of an isolated act or a series of acts, the Bench held that such series of acts must, of necessity, be connected with one another and if some of them stand out independently, they would not form part of the same transaction but would constitute a different transaction. It was concluded that the ‘same transaction’ means a transaction consisting either of a single act or of a series of connected acts.
12.In State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad7, this Court observed that even if the modus operandi is the same, it would not make it a single offence when the offences are separate. This Court held that, if a conspiracy is furthered into several distinct offences, there have to be separate trials.…
20.As already noted hereinabove, precedential law has laid down triple tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide when separate actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ - 1) unity of purpose and design; 2) proximity of time and place; and 3) continuity of action. These tests may be applied to ascertain whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction or not. … If, however, it is concluded that there are several transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, there have to be separate trials for each offence, subject to Section 219 CrPC/Section 242 BNSS, which allows the Trial Court to try three/five offences of the same kind committed within a year. Once all the incidents are taken to be part of the same transaction and amalgamated into one FIR, the punishment would follow accordingly as per law.”
The aforesaid principle is founded not merely upon technical considerations relating to registration of an F.I.R. The rule against successive F.I.Rs. in respect of the same transaction is intended to preserve fairness in investigation, to prevent repeated exercise of investigative power and to avoid the possibility of conflicting or successive prosecutions on the same factual foundation. The requirement of fairness in State action also forms part of the constitutional guarantee under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Coming to the facts of the present case, the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 09.08.2015 and concerns the Tata Indica vehicle bearing registration No. BR-02AA-3582. The prosecution case in Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015 is that the vehicle was taken away from the informant after he was allegedly removed from the vehicle by use of force and threat and that mobile phones were also taken away.
The material placed by the State itself shows that Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015 had already been instituted on 10.08.2015 in relation to the very same Tata Indica vehicle and three mobile phones. The State has described the said case as connected with the present case. Thus, the connection between the two cases is not a circumstance introduced only by the petitioner; it finds place in the stand taken by the State itself.
It is true that the two cases have been registered for different offences and at different police stations. However, the test under the law laid down in T.T. Antony case (supra) and the cases following it is not confined to a comparison of the sections mentioned in the two F.I.Rs. The Court has to examine the factual transaction which forms the foundation of the two cases.
On such examination, the Tata Indica vehicle is the common and central fact in both proceedings. The taking away of the vehicle from Dhanarua, the subsequent recovery/possession of the same vehicle and the allegation concerning the mobile phones are not shown, on the materials placed before this Court, to be two independent and disconnected occurrences. Rather, they form different stages of the same chain of events.
The fact that the subsequent police case may disclose a different legal characterisation of the conduct does not, by itself, create a new transaction. The investigation into the subsequent stage of the occurrence could have been carried forward in accordance with law in the first case, subject to the statutory provisions governing further investigation and territorial jurisdiction.
Another circumstance which cannot be completely lost sight of is the chronology. The alleged occurrence took place on 09.08.2015. The State's own material refers to written information being given on 10.08.2015, while the formal Dhanarua F.I.R. was registered only on 13.08.2015. Thus, there is an interval between the occurrence and registration of the F.I.R., as also an interval between the written information and the formal registration.
Delay in lodging an F.I.R., by itself, is not invariably fatal to a prosecution. Nevertheless, in a case where the principal question is whether a subsequent F.I.R. was registered after an earlier case concerning the same factual transaction had already come into existence, the chronology assumes relevance. The delay, therefore, is considered by this Court as a surrounding circumstance and not as an independent ground for quashing.
It is also significant that the petitioner was not named in the original Dhanarua F.I.R. and his implication is stated to have emerged during investigation. This Court is conscious that mere absence of the name of an accused in the F.I.R. does not, by itself, furnish a ground for quashing. However, when considered cumulatively with the prior Deepnagar case, the identity of the vehicle and articles, the chronology of registration and the subsequent implication of the petitioner, the circumstance assumes relevance while examining whether the present F.I.R. is a genuinely distinct prosecution or a second investigation into the same transaction.
The State has not been able to demonstrate from the materials placed before this Court that the present case constitutes a counter-case, a rival version, a separate occurrence or a larger conspiracy discovered subsequently so as to bring it within any of the recognised exceptions to the rule against a second F.I.R. The factual foundation remains substantially the same.
The subsequent acquittal of the petitioner in Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015, by itself, may not operate as a statutory bar to every other proceeding arising from the same transaction, particularly where the offences are not identical. However, the said development is a relevant circumstance in the present proceeding because it further demonstrates that the factual transaction concerning the vehicle and the mobile phones has already undergone judicial scrutiny.
This Court is also conscious of the limitation that, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it should not embark upon a detailed appreciation of disputed evidence. The present conclusion is not founded upon an assessment of the credibility of witnesses or the evidentiary value of the alleged confession of a co-accused. The conclusion rests upon the legal character of the present F.I.R. in the light of the prior case and the admitted/common factual substratum disclosed by the record.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the registration and continuation of Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015, insofar as the petitioner is concerned, amounts to a subsequent F.I.R./investigation in respect of the same transaction which had already been made the subject matter of Deepnagar P.S. Case No. 296 of 2015. The case, therefore, falls within the principle recognised in T.T. Antony case (supra) and reiterated in the subsequent decisions noticed above. Continuation of such proceeding would amount to permitting an impermissible second investigation and would consequently be an abuse of the process of the Court.
Accordingly, the F.I.R. in connection with Dhanarua P.S. Case No. 284 of 2015 dated 13.08.2015, registered for the offence punishable under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed qua the petitioner, namely, Rakesh Kumar.
The present application stands allowed.
Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned court below forthwith.