Rajeshwar Prasad Singh and Raghuvir Prasad Singh vs The Bihar State Electricity Board and Others

Rakesh Kumar, J.—Two petitioners, while invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, have prayed for following reliefs:-

For quashing the order dated 29-05-1998 passed by the Chairman, Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna (hereinafter referred to as "Board") communicated under the Memo No. 1208 and 1207 both dated 30-05-1998 issued under the signature of Joint Secretary of the Board, Department of General Administration.

For quashing the office Order No. 2010 and 2009 vide Memo No. 802 and 801 both dated 13-04-1996 issued under the signature of Joint Secretary of the Board, Department of General Administration.

For quashing the letter No. 5108 and 5109 both dated 26-09-1996 issued under the signature of Deputy Personnel Director, Tirhut Area Electricity Board, Muzaffarpur by which appeals filed by the petitioners have been rejected.

Short fact of the case is that while petitioner No. 1 (Rajeshwar Prasad Singh) was posted as Accountant, Electric Supply Division (Urban) Chapra was placed under-suspension, vide Board''s Order No. 2029 dated 19-04-1995 (Annexure ''4'' to the writ petition) and the petitioner No. 2 (Raghuvir Prasad Singh), Account Assistant/Bill Superintendent, Electric Supply Sub-Division (Urban), Chapra was placed under-suspension by Board''s Office Order No. 2028 dated 19-04-1995 (Annexure ''4/1'' to the writ petition) and they were proceeded departmentally on the charge of dereliction of duty. It was alleged that in a writ petition filed by a consumer, the High Court had directed the authorities of the Board to correct the electricity bill of the consumer, which was unnecessarily delayed by both the petitioners. Instead of complying the Court''s order and order of superior authority by correcting the electricity bill of the consumer, the petitioners made unnecessary correspondence and delayed the matter. On the aforesaid charges, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against both the petitioners and finally, the disciplinary authority decided as follows:-

(i) To release from suspension with immediate effect,

(ii) ''Censure'' and ''warning'' to be cautious in future, and

(iii) Not to pay anything during the period of suspension. However, to treat the period of suspension ''as period spent on duty'' only for the purpose of pension and gratuity.

The said punishment order was passed against petitioner No. 1, vide Office Order No. 2010 dated 13-04-1996 and in respect of petitioner No. 2, vide Office Order No. 2009 dated 13-04-1996 under the signature of Joint Secretary of the Board.

Against the order of punishment, both the petitioners had approached the Chairman of the Board, however; petitioners also filed writ petitions, vide C.W.J.C. No. 13036 of 1996 and C.W.J.C. No. 13037 of 1996 respectively. However, both the writ petitions were disposed of on 07-04-1998 (Annexure ''8'' and ''8/1'' resp. to the writ petition) with a direction to the Chairman of the Board to dispose of petitioners'' appeal after giving them opportunity of hearing within specified time. After the order passed by this Court, the Chairman of the Board has passed order on 29-05-1998, which was communicated to petitioners vide Memo No. 1208 and 1207 respectively both dated 30-05-1998. Both the petitioners have assailed the order of punishment as well as order of dismissal of their appeal in the present writ petition.

Sri Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, learned senior counsel, who was assisted by Sri Shanti Pratap, learned counsel for the petitioners, at the very outset, has argued that order of punishment is liable to be set aside solely on the ground that before passing of final order in the departmental proceeding, the enquiry report was not communicated to the petitioners. Besides making oral submission, he has specifically referred to paragraph - 16 of the writ petition, wherein, it has been stated that neither the petitioners were served with a copy of enquiry report submitted by the conducting officer nor they were given an opportunity of being heard prior to issuance of the order of punishment i.e. Annexure ''2'' and ''2/1'' respectively to the writ petition. He submits that law on this issue has already been set at rest long back and as such, order of punishment is liable to be set aside. Similarly, the order of appellate authority, according to learned senior counsel for the petitioners, does not give cogent reason for rejection of the appeal. Accordingly, it has been prayed to set aside both the orders with a direction to respondents to pay the salary for the period during which petitioners were placed under-suspension after adjusting the amount of subsistence allowance, which has already been paid to the petitioners.

Sri Vinay Kirti Singh, learned counsel for the respondents/Board though, has opposed the prayer of the petitioners, has taken a fair stand that in absence of supply of enquiry report to the petitioners before passing the impugned order, the punishment to the extent of not paying anything, except subsistence allowance, may not be justified. However, he submits that the other punishments i.e. ''Censure'' and ''Warning'', which have been imposed on the petitioners, are not major punishment and as such, non-supply of enquiry report may not affect the punishment of ''Censure'' and ''Warning''. He submits that for imposing minor punishment, only show cause notice would be sufficient, however; in the present case a regular departmental enquiry was initiated and order of punishment was imposed.

Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have also perused the materials available on record. Of course, in this case counter affidavit has been filed, but in the counter affidavit, there is no denial to the statement regarding non-supply of enquiry report. In view of law settled on the point that in absence of supply of enquiry report either before second show cause notice or order of punishment, the order of punishment may not be justified. The Court is of the opinion that the order of punishment to the extent that petitioners were held not entitled to get anything except subsistence allowance is liable to be set aside and accordingly, punishment order, to the extent of not paying anything except subsistence allowance, is hereby set aside.

Consequently, the order of appellate authority i.e. orders contained in Annexure ''1'' and ''1/1'' are also set aside and writ petition stands allowed, with direction to the respondents/Board to take steps for payment of salary to the petitioners for the period during which they were put under-suspension after adjusting the amount of subsistence allowance, if it was paid.

So far as punishments of ''Censure'' and ''Warning'' are concerned in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no justification to interfere with. With above observation and direction, the writ petition stands partly allowed.