Rajesh Mathews vs Director of Education and Others

Valmiki J Mehta, J.—In this writ petition, the petitioner impugns the action of the respondent no. 5-school in denying him a defence assistant in the disciplinary proceedings. Petitioner wanted appointment of his wife as the defence assistant and the wife is an ex-employee of the respondent no. 5-school. As per the guidelines relating to service conditions of employees in unaided unrecognized schools the rules governing government employees will be applicable in view of circular dated 25.3.1991 of the Director of Education. The relevant CCS (CCA) Pension Rules in this regard are Rules 14(8)(a) and 14(8)(b). These provisions read as under:-

Rule 14(8)(a) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant posted in any office either at his headquarters or at the place where the inquiry is held, to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority is a legal practitioner, or, the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits:

Provided that the Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant posted at any other station, if the Inquiring Authority having regard to the circumstances of the case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing so permits.

Rule 14(8)(b) The Government servant may also take the assistance of a retired Government servant to present the case on his behalf, subject to such conditions as may be specified by the President from time to time by general or special order in this behalf.

The charged employee is therefore entitled to have the defence assistant who is either posted in the school or who would be an ex-employee of the school. It may be noted that the aforesaid provisions of Rule 14(8)(a) and (b) have been drafted with respect to central government servants and therefore they have to apply mutatis mutandis with respect to disciplinary proceedings in schools. Accordingly, the expression posting will have to be read as posting in the school i.e. an employee of a school can be a defence assistant and a charged employee is entitled to defence assistant as per Rule 14(8). In terms of Rule 14(8)(b) the charged official can also seek the assistance of a retired government servant. What is canvassed on behalf of the petitioner is that so far as disciplinary proceedings in a school are concerned a retired government servant essentially means a retired school employee or an ex-employee and the expression ''retirement'' should not be interpreted narrowly to mean that an employee who had resigned from the school should not be treated as being a person envisaged under Rule 14(8)(b) to represent a charged employee.

The issue before this Court is what is the meaning to be ascribed to the expression ''retired'' as appearing in Rule 14(8)(b) and as to whether that expression should only refer to a person who superannuated on his ordinary date of retirement or the expression will even include an employee who has even resigned from the school.

No doubt, literal interpretation is the golden rule of the interpretation, however, it is equally well said in various other judgments that golden rule is that there is no golden rule i.e. each provision has to be interpreted as per the intention of the legislature, the purpose of the provision, context in which the same appears and the other relevant factors. In my opinion, there is no rationale in restricting the expression ''retired'' only to a person who retired on the ordinary date of superannuation inasmuch as the issue is really of representation of a charged official by a person who is an employee or who was an employee. An employee who has resigned also would be an ex-employee and therefore I would not seek to give a restricted interpretation to the word ''retired'' that only that person can be a defence assistant who retires on the ordinary date of superannuation. Really, in fact there can be no distinction between two types of employees when we see the object of the provision and which is to ensure representation from a limited class of persons being the present employees and the ex-employees only can be defence assistants. Really, the object of Rule 14(8) is to while ensuring that ordinarily a legal practitioner should not be a defence assistant yet the charged official should always be allowed assistance of a defence assistant who would be an employee or an ex-employee. Therefore I hold that the expression ''retired'' in Rule 14(8) (b) should be read to mean an ex-employee of a school so far as the provision applies to unaided private schools in Delhi and will include ex-employees who have resigned from the school.

Counsel for the respondent no. 5-school sought to refer to the definition of retirement as existing under the CCS (CCA) Rules and FRSR to contend that a strict interpretation may be given to the expression ''retirement'' however in view of the reasoning which I have given above I do not agree with the argument urged on behalf of the respondent no. 5-school. Since the only relief pressed before this Court is entitlement of the petitioner to be represented by his wife Smt. Reeta Mathews and Smt. Reeta Mathews admittedly is an ex-employee of the respondent no. 5-school because she was an employee of the school but she resigned, this writ petition is allowed by holding that the petitioner will be entitled to be represented in the departmental proceedings by his wife Smt. Reeta Mathews. Parties are left to bear their own costs.