Rajesh Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Others

Harpreet Singh Brar, J

The present civil writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing of order dated 19.11.2020, whereby, the petitioner has been terminated from services (Annexure P-1).

Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that the petitioner had been appointed on the post of ALM in the year 2008 at DC rate and since then, he has been continuously working with the respondents. The petitioner was served with a notice dated 14.05.2020 stated receiving of anonymous complaint against him alleging theft of energy in connivance with Nigam officials. The petitioner filed a reply to the said notice on 20.05.2020 and submitted that he is not responsible for erecting the unauthorized line and rather that was installed through a private labourer. He has also annexed the affidavit of the person who is using the connection, with the reply. Thereafter, without considering his submissions, a non-speaking order of termination of his services was passed on 22.05.2020.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation submits that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. It is contended that an identically circumstanced Assistant Lineman, namely Joginder Singh, had approached this Court in CWP No. 21534 of 2020, which was dismissed; however, liberty was granted to the petitioner therein to challenge the order of termination by filing a civil suit. The present petitioner and the aforesaid Joginder Singh were jointly involved in the alleged misconduct in question and this fact is concealed from this Court and the petitioner has raised disputed questions of fact further disciplinary action has been taken against the petitioner after due process of law.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

A two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, speaking through Justice Kurian Joseph, made the following observations in this regard:

“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal.

In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” (emphasis added)

Reliance in this regard may also be made to the judgments rendered in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. vs. Ashok Kumar Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72.

Furthermore, a two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari vs. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 602, speaking through Justice B.S Chauhan, made the following observations in this regard:

“ 29. In Union of India v. R.K. Sharma [(2001) 9 SCC 592 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 767 : AIR 2001 SC 3053] , this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warrant interference. However, the said observations in Ranjit Thakur [Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113 : AIR 1987 SC 2386] are not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on compassionate grounds.

The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805] , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : AIR 1999 SC 677] , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [(2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC 589] and Babu v. State of Kerala [(2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] .)

Hence, where there is evidence of malpractice, gross irregularity or illegality, interference is permissible.” (emphasis added)

This Court cannot re-appreciate the matter on merits and substitute the conclusion drawn by the concerned authority with its own. Tritely, a High Court cannot sit in appeal with respect to the decision arrived in pursuance of disciplinary proceedings. As such, this Court must confine itself to ensuring that the findings rendered are justified by the material available on record, that the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the prescribed procedure as well as the principles of natural justice and that the penalty imposed is proportional to the misconduct.

It appears that the disciplinary action was taken against the petitioner after following due process of law. This Court finds no ground to interfere in the impugned order termination. Moreover, an identically placed employee, namely, Joginder Singh, has already been denied similar relief by this Court in CWP No.21534 of 2020, with liberty to avail the remedy by filing a civil suit. In these circumstances, the present writ petition is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed.