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Judgment
Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.
By this application, the applicant seeks quashing of charge-sheet No. 103/2025 dated 29.04.2025 in Regular Criminal Case No. 4622/2025 pending on the file of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.8, Nagpur, arising out of First Information Report (FIR) bearing Crime No. 06/2025 dated 05.01.2025 registered with Police Station, Hudkeshwar, Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 74, 75, 79 and 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
The case of the prosecution in a nutshell is as under :
i] The applicant is the Headmaster of Sarvashree High School and Junior College, Dighori, Nagpur and also serves as the Secretary of Sudhir Shikshan Sanstha, which runs the said school. The complainant/ non-applicant no.2 was working as Assistant Teacher in the said School. The services of the complainant came to be terminated by the Management after conducting a departmental inquiry in accordance with law. The complainant challenged the order of dismissal before the School Tribunal which allowed the same and directed reinstatement of the complainant. The said order was challenged by the management of the school before this Court. This Court allowed the petition and remanded the matter back to the School Tribunal to decide it afresh. The School Tribunal again directed reinstatement of the complainant. The second order of the School Tribunal was again challenged before this Court which came to be allowed. Consequently, the termination of the complainant came to be upheld by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition filed by the complainant. After two rounds of litigation between the complainant and the management, the termination attained finality.
ii] On 05.01.2025, the complainant lodged a complaint with the concerned police station alleging that the applicant, who was the Secretary of the Management and Headmaster of the School, was harassing her since the beginning of her service. It is further alleged that in spite of directions of the School Tribunal, though there was no stay granted in the first round of litigation before this Court, the applicant did not permit her to resume her duties. The complainant further alleged that in spite of the order of the School Tribunal, the applicant deliberately prevented her from resuming her duty by providing false information to the Education Department. It is also alleged that the applicant continuously subjected the complainant to physical, verbal and sexual harassment at workplace. The applicant abused her in filthy language, made sexually coloured remarks, passed obscene gestures with his hands, fingers, tongue and eyes, showed obscene material on his mobile phone, stared at her in an inappropriate manner, touched her back inappropriately without her consent in the staff room, damaged the tyres of her vehicle by hammering nails into it, put fevikwik in the ignition of her vehicle, put condom on her vehicle and peeked into her mobile phone. It is also alleged that the applicant prevented the other staff members from interacting with her, denied her basic workplace facilities, intentionally outraged her modesty, insulted her in front of the entire staff and caused her mental harassment. On the basis of the said report lodged by the complainant, the FIR came to be registered against the applicant for the aforesaid offences.
Heard Mr. Sumedh R. Kadam, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, Mr. Indraneel Damle, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for non-applicant no.1/ State and Ms. Bhavna K. Meshram, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant /non-applicant no.2.
Mr. Kadam, learned counsel appearing for the applicant vehemently submitted that the prosecution initiated against the applicant is nothing but a counterblast to the disciplinary action taken against the complainant, which culminated into her dismissal from service. It is contended that after the Management filed an appeal before this Court against the order passed by the School Tribunal in the second round of litigation, the complainant filed the impugned FIR just to harass the applicant. Learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that only vague and omnibus allegations are made in the FIR. According to him, the FIR merely contains general allegations attributing various acts of physical, verbal and sexual harassment to the applicant without specifying the date, time, place or other particulars of the alleged incidents. The FIR has been filed just because the applicant filed a writ petition before this Court. The only witness in the charge-sheet is the brother of the complainant who did not even see any of the alleged incidents. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the prosecution launched by the complainant cannot stand in the eyes of law. This is nothing but an abuse of the process of law and therefore, he sought quashing of the FIR.
Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the learned counsel appearing for the complainant objected to the application on the ground that the allegations against the applicant are not only of harassment but also of sexual harassment at workplace by making obscene gestures. They also contended that there are allegations that the applicant showed obscene material to the complainant on his mobile phone as well as allegations of staring at her and touching her inappropriately. Therefore, the ingredients of the offence punishable under Sections 74, 75 and 79 of the BNS are made out. The applicant abused the complainant in filthy language and therefore, the offence under Section 296 of the BNS is also made out. The matter requires full fledged trial. There are other criminal cases registered against the applicant at the instance of the Education Department as well as other persons. Therefore, according to them, the material on record warrants trial of the case and at this stage, the FIR cannot be quashed even on the ground of delay. Therefore, they sought rejection of the application.
The charge-sheet indicates that the applicant is the Secretary of Sudhir Shikshan Sanstha and the Headmaster of Sarvashree High School and Junior College, Dighori, Nagpur. The complainant was working as Assistant Teacher in the said school. A show cause notice was issued to the complainant for her alleged absence from duty without intimation as well as for misconduct. A Departmental Enquiry was conducted against the complainant and she was found guilty of the charge. Consequently, she was removed from service vide order dated 23.02.2022. The said order of termination was challenged by her before the School Tribunal. The School Tribunal, by order dated 25.04.2023, allowed the appeal with a direction to the management and the school to reinstate the complainant with continuity in service and full backwages. The management challenged the order passed by the School Tribunal before this Court by preferring Writ Petition No. 2981/2023. This Court, by order dated 04.12.2023, remanded the matter back to the School Tribunal for deciding it afresh. The School Tribunal again, by order dated 21.03.2024, allowed the appeal with a direction to the Management to reinstate the complainant with continuity in service and full backwages. The said order was again challenged by the Management in Writ Petition No. 4965/2024. This Court, by order dated 08.01.2025, granted stay to the order passed by the School Tribunal and by the judgment and order dated 29.04.2025 allowed the petition, thereby confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
During the pendency of the petition before this Court in the second round of litigation, the present FIR came to be lodged against the applicant alleging commission of the offences in question.
The FIR alleges that the applicant did not allow the complainant to join the service. Moreover, he put nails in the tyre of the vehicle driven by the complainant, put Fevikwik in the ignition, peeked into her mobile phone, asked the other staff members not to speak to the complainant, denied her basic facilities like table and chair at the workplace, locked the bathroom and insulted her in front of the entire staff. However, the aforesaid acts do not come under the purview of Sections 74, 75 or 79 of the BNS. The only question before this Court is whether the allegations of abusing the complainant in filthy language, making gestures using hands, fingers, tongue and eyes, touching the back of the complainant inappropriately, showing obscene content on the mobile phone and staring at the complainant in an inappropriate manner would come under the purview of Sections 74, 75 and 79 of the BNS after considering the contents of the FIR.
It is the case of the complainant that a departmental enquiry was initiated against her on the allegations of dereliction of duty while serving as Assistant Teacher. The First Information Report alleges that the applicant, inter alia, subjected her to physical, verbal and sexual harassment, used obscene and sexually coloured language, made obscene gestures, and showed her obscene material on his mobile phone etc. However, the complainant has not given specific details with regard to the date, time, year and place of the incidences as alleged. Only general allegations have been levelled against the applicant without any corroborative or supporting material in the entire charge-sheet. Though, it is alleged that the applicant touched her inappropriately, showed her obscene content on the mobile phone, abused her in filthy language and stared at her inappropriately on multiple occasions, the charge-sheet is conspicuously silent as to the specific place where these incidents allegedly occurred and the precise overt act attributable to the applicant. There is no material indicating as to how or in what manner the applicant is alleged to have committed these acts. Likewise, though the allegations of placing a condom on her vehicle, hurling abuses, making indecent gestures are made against the applicant, no details with regard to the place of incidence and the manner in which the alleged acts were committed by the applicant are mentioned. There is no supporting evidence in the entire charge-sheet with regard to the alleged acts of the applicant. The allegations made in the FIR depict that the alleged acts of the applicant occurred over an unspecified and prolonged period without mentioning any vital details as to the time and place of the same.
It appears from the allegations against the applicant that the act of the applicant placing his hand on her back with an intention to outrage her modesty had happened with her continuously, but there is nothing on record in the entire charge-sheet to show that the complainant resisted such acts of the applicant at any point of time prior to lodging of the report. That apart, if the FIR is perused minutely, it appears that the applicant did the alleged acts repeatedly for a considerable period of time, but still, no step was taken by the complainant to lodge the report instantly. Rather, the FIR suggests that all these acts allegedly happened during her entire tenure of service, but she did not make any allegations until 05.01.2025.
It is a matter of record that the complainant was terminated by the applicant in the year 2021. Had the alleged incidents really taken place, the complainant would have reported the incident at the earliest. Even if the arguments of the learned counsel for the complainant are accepted, it is preposterous and incomprehensible that she remained silent for a considerable period with regard to the indecent behaviour committed with her by the applicant at the workplace.
The dispute between the applicant and the complainant is palpable from the FIR itself wherein, it has been stated that the applicant had terminated the complainant from service. Even after the order of the School Tribunal directing the management to reinstate her was passed, she was allegedly not allowed to join her duty, which indicates that the relationship between the applicant and the complainant was strained due to the service and salary related dispute pending before the Court.
In this background of the case, even if the allegations made by the complainant without any specific details such as the date, time and place of the incidents, without any supporting material in the charge-sheet are taken at their face value, the same appear to have happened over a considerable period of time. A lady disgruntled by the applicant who has shown any obscene material to her on his mobile phone, would have immediately taken some action, more particularly, when the litigation between them was already pending in the Court of law. The fact that the complainant did not lodge any complaint with regard to the indecent and inappropriate behaviour of the applicant towards her up until the second round of litigation between them, even when she was being subjected to continuous harassment at the hands of the applicant goes to show that the FIR is an afterthought and therefore, the possibility that the applicant is being falsely implicated as a pressure tactic to settle the score of the service related litigation between the parties cannot be ruled out.
Surprisingly, the spot panchanama also has been prepared merely depicting the school premises as a whole, without identifying or demarcating the specific place where the alleged incident is stated to have occurred. The complainant did not point out any particular location within the school premises as the place of occurrence. In addition to this, there are no eye-witnesses to the incident despite of the fact that it occurred in the staff room of the school. The statement of the witness who is not connected with the school, namely Hitesh M. Sapate, who is the brother of the complainant also appears to be hearsay evidence. All these aspects reflect that the impugned FIR appears to have been lodged by the complainant out of a grudge, with a purported motive of wrecking vengeance against the applicant who is the Secretary of the Sanstha and Headmaster of the School, at whose instance, she was terminated. In this regard, it will be apposite to refer to the decision in the case of Vineet Kumar and others Vs. State of U.P., reported in (2017) 13 SCC 369 wherein, it has been held in para 41 as under :
“41.Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335”
A reference can also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Naresh Aneja alias Naresh Kumar Aneja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 604 wherein, it has been held as under :
“20.A bare perusal of Section 354 IPC reveals that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty. [See: Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 4 SCC 371)]
21."Criminal force" is defined in Section 350 IPC, however, what exactly does modesty mean, which is an essential aspect for this section to apply, has not been defined so as to constitute an offence under Section 354 IPC. Any discussion on this section is incomplete without reference to Rupan Deol Bajaj V. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194) wherein the learned Judges observed: (SCC pp. 205-206, paras 14-15)
"14.Since the word "modesty" has not been defined in the Penal Code, 1860 we may profitably look into its dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn.) modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means 'womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct'. The word "modest" in relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as ‘decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shamefast'. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as 'freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct’. In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.) the meaning of the word "modesty" is given as ‘womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions'.
15.…. From the above dictionary meaning of "modesty" and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in State of Punjab V. Major Singh [1966 SCC Online SC 51], it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman."
22.While we hold the above observations as also the discussion made in Major Singh (supra) in the highest esteem and regard, it must not escape us that the observations were made in the societal context and milieu of that time and its import today should be interpreted in our present context. Reference in this regard may be made to observations by Bhat, J. in Attorney General v. Satish (2022) 5 SCC 545 (Satish case, SCC pp. 582-83, paras 66-67)
"66.…. These require an element of application of physical force, to women. The expression "modesty" was another limitation as older decisions show that such a state was associated with decorousness of women. This added a dimension of patriarchy and class. … One cannot be unmindful of the circumstances in which these provisions were enacted by a colonial power, at a time, when women's agency itself was unacknowledged, or had limited recognition. Further, women in India were traditionally -- during the time of enactment of IPC, in the mid-Nineteenth Century -- subordinated to the care of their fathers, or their husbands, or other male relatives. They had no share in immovable property; notions of gender equality were unheard of, or not permitted. Women had no right to vote. Quite naturally, the dignity of women -- or indeed their autonomy, was not provided for.
67.The advent of the Constitution of India revolutionised -- at least in law, all that. Regardless of gender, race, caste, religion or region, or all of the acknowledged sectarian and discrimination enabling barriers, everyone enjoyed equality of law, and equal protection of law (Article 14). Further, the provision in Article 15(1) proscribed discrimination by the State (in all its forms) on various grounds, including gender. Article 15(3) enabled the State to enact special provisions for women and children." (emphasis in original)
23.Turning to the facts of the instant case, keeping in view the contents of the FIR, the statement in the final report of the investigating officer, and the statement under Section 164 CrPC of the complainant, we are of the view that even prima facie the ingredients as referred to supra, are not met. The record is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant.
24.It is well-settled that for mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court. As evidenced by the annexures referred to above i.e. the FIR, the preliminary investigation report as also the concluding portion of the charge-sheet, no direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant. It cannot be said, then, that a case under Section 354 IPC is made out against the appellant.
There are no allegations of any assault or use of criminal force by the applicant with an intention to outrage the modesty of the complainant by touching her inappropriately. No details whatsoever have been provided by the complainant with regard to the sexual harassment that she was subjected to by the applicant. Thus, the ingredients of Sections 74, 75 and 79 of the BNS are not made out.
Moving to the allegations under Section 296 of the BNS, it will be appropriate to reproduce the Section, which reads as under :
296. Obscene acts and songs.—
Whoever, to the annoyance of others—
(a)does any obscene act in any public place, or (b)sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.
It appears from the reading of Section 296 of the BNS that if any person does any obscene act in any public place or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words in or near any public place, which causes annoyance to others, he will be guilty of the offence. The test of obscenity is the substantial tendency to corrupt those minds which are open to such immoral influences by arousing lustful desires, which corrupt thoughts. (see N.S. Madhanagopal and another Vs. K. Lalitha [(2022) 17 SCC 818] and Ranjit D. Udeshi Vs. State of Mah.[1964 SCC Online SC 52]
It will be appropriate to make a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others [(2026) 2 SCC 622], wherein it has been observed that the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 296 of the BNS. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 296 of the BNS. The Supreme Court has observed that mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient, there must be further proof to establish that it caused annoyance to others.
Here, in the present case, except the allegation of uttering abusive and filthy language, there is no other allegation of obscenity by virtue of which the applicant corrupted the mind of the complainant to such immoral influences. Besides that, the applicant merely used abusive language, there is nothing on record to suggest that it caused annoyance to anybody. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that there exists prima facie material against the applicant to attract the offence under Section 296 of the BNS.
Since, no specific date, time, or place of any alleged incident has been mentioned, the allegations are vague and generalized. The complaint merely narrates the alleged acts as recurring over an unspecified and prolonged period without attributing any particular incident to a definite point of time or place without any details even with regard to abuse or gesture, which indicates that the chances of success of the prosecution at trial are very bleak. Therefore, there are very low chances of conviction and the entire allegations made against the applicant would not stand to the test and scrutiny of the judicial mind during the course of trial. The material on record suggests that the complainant, owing to her personal grudge against the Headmaster/Secretary of the school, has lodged the instant complaint.
All the factors mentioned above show that the complaint filed by the complainant was out of frustration and with malicious intent to wreck vengeance upon the applicant on account of the salary and service related dispute wherein, the applicant had played a key role in justifying the complainant’s termination from service.
At this stage, a reference can be made to Clause 7 of para 102 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 wherein, it has been observed as under :
“102.In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. …….
(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
On careful consideration of the above referred judicial dictum, I find that the complaint against the applicant has been filed with an ulterior motive to seek vengeance owing to the service related dispute and therefore, the present case is squarely covered by clause (7) of para 102 of the decision of Bhajan Lal (supra).
In view of the above, a case is made out for exercising the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the FIR and the charge-sheet as well as the consequent proceedings against the applicant. Hence, I proceed to pass the following order :-
Accordingly, the application is allowed.
Charge-sheet No. 103/2025 in Regular Criminal Case No. 4622/2025 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.8, Nagpur, arising out of First Information Report bearing Crime No. 06/2025 registered with Police Station, Hudkeshwar, Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 74, 75, 79 and 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, are quashed and set aside.
Rule is made absolute. The application stands disposed of.