Rajesh Choudhary vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Per: Justice B. P. Sharma

This intra-Court appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been preferred by appellant assailing the order dated 07.01.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S) No.4351/2004 whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant challenging his dismissal from service came to be dismissed.

At the outset, we have considered I.A. No.8291/2026 filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act. Considering the reasons assigned in the application and keeping in view the settled principle that a liberal approach is required while considering an application for condonation of delay where no mala fide can be attributed to the litigant, we are satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown. Accordingly, I.A. No.8291/2026 is allowed and delay of 8 days in filing the writ appeal is condoned.

The facts giving rise to the present appeal, in brief, are that appellant was appointed as a Constable on 22.03.1994 in the Police Department. During service, a criminal case being Crime No.108/1996 was registered against him for offences punishable under Sections 332, 333, 353, 506-B and 294 of IPC. After trial, the appellant was convicted under Sections 332 and 294 IPC by judgment dated 09.01.1999 passed by learned Sessions Court. Consequent upon the said conviction, the competent authority passed an order dated 21.01.1999 dismissing the appellant from service. The appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No.263/1999 before this Court. By judgment dated 13.08.2002, the conviction under Section 294 IPC was set aside on the basis of compromise; however, the conviction under Section 332 IPC was maintained. Although, the sentence imposed by the trial Court was modified and appellant was extended the benefit akin to release on bond for good conduct under the Probation of Offenders Act 1958, the finding of guilt under Section 332 IPC remained intact. Thereafter, representations submitted by the appellant seeking reinstatement were rejected. Challenging the order of dismissal and consequential rejection of his claim, the appellant preferred WP(S) No.4351/2004, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 07.01.2026.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that though the conviction under Section 332 IPC was maintained, appellant was not required to undergo imprisonment and was released on furnishing a personal bond. It was submitted that once the appellant had been extended the benefit under the provisions relating to probation and reformative treatment, the conviction ought not to have adversely affected his service career. It was further contended that the learned Single Judge failed to properly appreciate the legal position laid down in Rameshwari Malviya vs. Sushila Dhruwey, 2012 SCC OnLine MP 5465, Sukhnandan vs. State of M.P. (C.G.), 2002 (2) MPHT 34 (CG) and Rajbir vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1278, wherein it was observed that extension of the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act does not necessarily entail adverse civil consequences in service matters. Learned counsel further argued that the dismissal order was passed even before the criminal appeal was finally decided and, therefore, the authorities acted in haste. It was also submitted that the appellant belonged to a disciplined force but had already suffered sufficiently and, therefore, the order of dismissal deserved to be interfered with.

Per contra, learned Government Advocate supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge and submitted that conviction of the appellant under Section 332 IPC admittedly remained intact even after disposal of Criminal Appeal No.263/1999. It was contended that appellant was a member of a disciplined force and had been found guilty of an offence involving assault or use of criminal force against a senior police officer while discharging official duty. It was argued that merely because the sentence was modified or the appellant was released on bond, the conviction itself did not cease to exist.

Learned counsel further submitted that the issue is no longer res integra in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Others, (2023) 19 SCC 588, wherein it has been categorically held that persons serving in or seeking appointment in disciplined forces are required to maintain the highest standards of conduct and that continuation or induction of such persons can legitimately be declined even where they have secured acquittal in circumstances not amounting to honourable exoneration. It was, therefore, submitted that learned Single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition and no interference is called for in the present appeal.

We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and have carefully perused the record. The central issue involved in the present appeal is whether the appellant, whose conviction under Section 332 IPC remained affirmed by this Court in criminal appeal, could claim reinstatement in service merely because the sentence was modified and he was released on furnishing a bond under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The answer, in our considered view, has rightly been rendered by the learned Single Judge in the negative.

The record unmistakably reveals that conviction of the appellant under Section 332 IPC was maintained by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.263/1999. Thus, the finding regarding commission of the offence attained finality. The only modification granted in appeal pertained to the nature of the sentence. The judgments relied upon by the appellant do not advance his case. Those decisions were rendered in entirely different factual contexts and cannot be construed as laying down an absolute proposition that a convicted employee serving in a disciplined force is entitled to reinstatement merely because he was extended the benefit of probation or released on bond. More importantly, none of those judgments dilute the principle that the employer, particularly in a disciplined force, is entitled to assess the suitability and continuance of an employee who stands convicted of a criminal offence.

Learned Single Judge has extensively considered the effect of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that higher standards of integrity, discipline and rectitude are expected from members of police organizations and other disciplined forces. Public confidence in such institutions constitutes a matter of paramount importance. Even where a person secures acquittal, the employer may examine the nature of allegations and surrounding circumstances while evaluating suitability. Thus, the present case stands on a footing stronger than the cases considered in Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla (supra) , where the Court was dealing with the effect of acquittal; here, the appellant continues to remain a convicted person for the offence punishable under Section 332 IPC. Apart from that the appellant did not challenge the order dated 21.09.2019 passed by the disciplinary authority in appeal i.e no appeal was filed against it and directly challenge the same before this Court.

The contention that the dismissal order was passed before disposal of the criminal appeal is equally devoid of substance. On the date when the dismissal order was passed, the conviction recorded by the competent criminal Court was in existence. The subsequent appellate judgment did not set aside the conviction under Section 332 IPC, but modified the sentence and granted the benefit of probation. It is also significant that the appellant cannot derive any benefit from the acquittal under Section 294 IPC. That acquittal was not on merits, but was recorded on the basis of compromise, and therefore, cannot be treated as an honourable acquittal. In Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla (Supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that “honourable acquittal” denotes a complete vindication of the accused, which is absent where acquittal is based on compromise or benefit of doubt. More importantly, the appellant’s conviction under Section 332 IPC was expressly affirmed by the appellate Court and attained finality. Thus, neither the compromise-based acquittal under Section 294 IPC nor the grant of probation under Section 332 IPC erased the finding of guilt or entitled the appellant to reinstatement as of right. Therefore, basis of the dismissal order remained unaffected. The appellant cannot derive any legal advantage from the mere fact that the appellate Court modified the sentence while maintaining the finding of guilt.

Consequently, while affirming the order dated 07.01.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (Service) No.4351/2004 (Rajesh Choudhary Vs. State of MP and Others), we hold that the appellant has failed to make out any case for interference in this intra-Court appeal. We do not find any illegality or perversity warranting interference in appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the writ appeal stands dismissed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is affirmed. No order as to costs.