Rajendran vs Syndicate Bank and Others

K.K. Usha, J.—The challenge in this original petition is against the difference in the scale of pay between scale I Law Officer and scale III Law Officer in the service of the first Respondent Syndicate Bank Petitioner had applied for appointment to the post of Law Officers in the scale of pay of Rs. 700-1800 applicable to officers m Junior Management Grade Scale I pursuant to an invitation of application by the Banking Service Recruitment Board, Bangalore. Petitioner, among Ors. , were selected and recommended by the Board for appointment in the service of the first Respondent bank. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner was appointed by order dated 13th February 1981 (Ext. P-1) in the officer cadre of the bank in the Junior Management Grade Scale I. He joined duty as Law Officer at the regional office of the Syndicate Bank at Ahamadabad on 12th March 1981. He continued in the post even after conversion of the regional office into a zonal office till 1986. Thereafter, he was transferred to Zonal Office, Trivandrum on 5th May 1986 and was working in the above office at the time of filing this original petition.

Petitioner and similarly situate six other Law Officers selected and appointed along with him, made representations to the bank for placing them in a suitable scale on the basis of Pillai Committee Recommendations. Ext. P-2 is copy of such representation dated 27th November 1986.

Scale of pay of Scale I Officer was Rs. 1175-2675 and that of Scale III Officer was Rs. 2650-3250. It is contended in the original petition that for a Scale I Officer to become Scalc II by promotion, a minimum service of 12 years is required. According to the petitioner, a Law officer in the grade of Scale I Officer is discharging the very same functions and'' duties as a Law Officer in Scale III. Both categories are liable to be posted in Zonal Offices. So long as they are discharging very same functions and duties, it is contended by the petitioner that there is no justification in placing them on different scale of pay. Contending that such differentiations would amount to discrimination, Ext. P-3 representation was also submitted by the petitioner to which he received a reply Ext. P-4 dated 12th February 1988 informing him that since his appointment was specifically in a Scale I post, it is riot possible to allow his prayer to grant him the scale of pay due to Scale III offers post.

Petitioner challenges Ext. P-4 on the ground that the stand taken by the first Respondent is in violation of Petitioner''s fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is submitted by him that on the basis of the Pillai Committee recommendations, which has been accepted by the Government of India, Law Officers are entitled to be placed in a scale higher than the lowest scale of pay of probationary officers. The recommendation of the committee as quoted by the Petitioner in his representation Ext. P-2 is as follows:

Para 5.29 (vi) In the case of law officers, it may be necessary for some banks to recruit lawyers with considerable experience at Bar. In such cases, they may be allowed lateral entry into higher grades and provided scales of pay for promotion in their own line comparable to those in general line.

According to the Petitioner, the above mentioned recommendation is not being implemented in the case of the Petitioner and other Law Officers who were recruited along with him to Scale I Officer''s post. Such an action on the part of the first Respondent is against the principle of equal pay for equal wages, which has been held by the Supreme Court as a constitutional right of every citizen of India. In support of the above contention, learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the following decisions of the Supreme Court. Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Surinder Singh and Another Vs. Engineer-in-chief, C.P.W.D. and Others, , Jeet Singh and Others Vs. M.C.D. and Others, , Bhagwan Dass and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, , Jaipal and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, , U.P. Rajya Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., U.P. Vs. Its Workmen, , Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, , and Gopal Krishna Sharma and others,

A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2. It is contended therein that the Petitioner who has applied for a post on a scale of pay applicable to Junior Management Grade Scale I and who has accepted the appointment in a post with the scale of pay of Rs. 700-1800 cannot be heard to contend later that the scale of pay thus granted to him is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The ropy of the appointment order of the Petitioner containing his endorsement dated 2nd April 1981 to the effect that he has received the letter of appointment as a probationary officer in Junior Management Grade Scale I in the bank, he read and understood the contents therein and gave the consent to abide by (hem all. is produced as Ext. R-2(a). In the advertisement inviting applications for appointment to the scale I post, the qualification prescribed is graduation in Law and experience at Bar for 3 to 4 years handling civil and labour cases. On the other hand, when applications were invited in the year 1978 for appointment of Law Officers on the senior grade, the educational qualification and experience prescribed were graduation in Law with a minimum 7 years experience as practicing lawyer in District Courts or High Courts both in civil and criminal side, know3 edge of mercantile law and company law and ability to draft legal documents and contracts, scrutiny of documents etc., were considered as an additional Qualification and the maximum age at the time of their recruitment was not to exceed 35 years. Ext. R-2(b) is a notification dated 10th May 1983 by the Banking Service Recruitment Board, inviting applications for appointment to several posts including? Law Officer Junior Management and Law Officer Middle Management Grade Scale III. It is seen there from that the qualification required for appointment to Scale III is graduation in Law and minimum 10 years experience as a practicing lawyer in District Courts or higher ''courts, both civil and criminal sides, knowledge of mercantile law and ability to draft legal documents and contracts, scrutiny of documents etc., to be considered as an additional qualification and age prescribed was not to exceed 45 years as on 1st January 1983. The same advertisement would show that for the post of Law Officer, Junior Management, the qualification required is a degree in Law of a recognized University, with good knowledge of Company Law, Banking and Commercial Law, Labour Laws and well versed in drafting convincing documents and an experience of minimum 3 years at the Bar in civil and labour cases.

It is contended on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 that going by the qualification itself, it is dear that candidates for Scale III post required higher qualification than Scale I. It is further contended that there can be no comparison between recruitment to different posts of general banking officers and the recruitment of Law Officers. There is written test and interview for selection of general banking officers while there is no written test for selection of Law Officers. As far as the nature of duties of two posts, it is submitted by Respondents 1 and 2 that Law Officers in middle management grade Scale III are officers who are discharging more onerous duties and functions in the bank than Scale I Law Officers. It may be that some of the duties discharged by them are common. But with their longer experience in the Bar, that too in the District Courts and High Courts, Scale III Law Officers will being a better position to take immediate decisions in respect of matters which are to be dealt with by them. The quality of their work is superior to that of Scale I officers. Under these circumstances, it is contended that there is no merit in the allegation that granting a higher scale of pay to Scale III officers is in violation of Petitioner''s fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In support of the above contention, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents 1 and 2 relied on the following decisions of the Supreme Court. Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , P. Savita and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), Ministry of Defence (Department of Defence Production), New Delhi and Others, , Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others Vs. Union of India and others, . State of Utter Pradesh and Ors. v. J.P. Chaurasia and Ors. AIR 1989 S.C. 19, Tarsem Lal Gautam and Anr. v. State Bank of Patiala and Ors. AIR 1989 S.C. 30, Mew Ram Kanojia Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Others, , V. Markendeya and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1989 S.C. 1306, and State of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. G. Sreenivasa Rao and Others, .

The contention raised by the Petitioner that difference in the scale of pay of Law Officers in scale I and the Law Officers in Scale III is discriminatory and in violation of the principle equal wages for equal work has to be appreciated in the background of the following facts. Recruitment to the post of Law Officer in Scale I is separately made from among law graduates with good knowledge of Company Law, Banking and Commercial Law and Labour Laws and well versed in drafting convincing documents. They must have minimum three years experience at the Bar handling civil and labour cases. Whereas recruitment to the post of Law Officers in Scale III is from graduates in law with a minimum of 7 years experience (which is now enhanced to 10 years experience) as a practicing lawyer in District Courts or High Courts both in civil and criminal sides or'' a minimum of 10 years experience in a reputed solicitor''s firm/Bank financial institutions, knowledge of mercantile law and company law and ability to draft legal documents and contracts, scrutiny of documents etc., are considered as additional qualifications. The above wr''to show that superior qualifications are required for appointment to the post of Law Officer Scale III. While the minimum period of 3 years experience in the Bar can be in any of the subordinate courts for appointment t0 the junior category, 10 years experience is insisted in District Courts or higher Courts for Scale III. Additional qualifications are also superior as far as Scale III post is concerned. Therefore, when the first Respondent contends that Law Officers in Scale III have more responsibilities and the quality and reliability of their work are superior to that of Law Officer Scale I, it is not for this Court to take a different view. Respondents 1 and 2 are certainly in a better position to assess the quality and reliability of the services rendered by these two classes of Law Officers. If that be so, the next question to be considered is whether the'' Petitioner can claim same scale of pay as that of Law Officer in the Scale III only j on the ground that both of them discharge identical or similar duties and functions. How far the different decisions relied on by both sides would support their respective contentions T is also to be examined.

Recruitment to the post of Scale I and Scale III Law Officers are not from candidates with similar qualifications. More experienced and more qualified candidates are required for appointment to the post of Law Officer Scale III. The recruitment is also separately done. Even at the time of inviting-applications for selection, it is made clear that these two posts are different carrying different scale of pay. Therefore, I am of the view that Law Officer in Scale I and Law Officer in Scale III belong to two different classes. Merely because at certain point of time they discharge the same duties and functions, it cannot be held that they have been integrated into one category. It is open to Respondents 1 and 2 to grant higher scale of pay to a class of officers who are having higher qualification, bearing higher responsibility and show higher reliability in the discharge of their duties. I find none of the decisions relied on by the Petitioner has struck a note against the above mentioned view. On the other hand, the Apex Court has categorically held that in more than one case that it is open to have a valid classification in the matter of granting scale of pay under above mentioned circumstances.

The first decision of the Supreme Court relied on by the Petitioner is Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . In the above case, the Supreme Court found that Drivers in the Delhi Police Force are performing same functions and duties as other Drivers in the service of Delhi Administration and the Central Government. It was admitted that the duties of the drivers of the Delhi Police force was not less onerous than those of the drivers in the Delhi Administration and Central Government. On the above facts, the Supreme Court held that there is no reapn to give a lesser scale of pay to the drivers in the Delhi Police Force. But, in the very same decision, it is pointed out that, ''there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade- The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal pay .for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them.'' The very same view was taken by the Supreme Court in later decisions. In the decision in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and others Vs. Union of India and others, , Supreme Court observed as follows:

Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental right. But equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done, it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work, there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such, value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is important to emphasise that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right.

The above decision was later followed in AIR 1989 S.C. 30 supra. In AIR 1989 29 (SC) , higher scale granted to Technicians Gr. II with better qualifications than Technicians Gr. Ill was upheld, even though the nature of work of Technicians Gr. II and Gr. III might be the same. But, there would be qualitative difference in the performance. Difference in the scales of pay on the basis of educational qualifications between Hearing Therapist and Audiologist in All India Institute of Medical Sciences was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mew Ram Kanojia Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Others, . There is an elaborate consideration of the earlier, decisions on this aspect in the case between graduate and non-graduate supervisors in Andhra Pradesh Engineering Subordinate Service by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in V. Markendeya and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . Ultimately, it was held in the above case that a lesser scale of pay granted- to non-graduate supervisors cannot be held discriminatory as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

In the decision reported in Surinder Singh and Another Vs. Engineer-in-chief, C.P.W.D. and Others, relied on by the Petitioner, the question considered was the claim for equal wages by the temporary daily wages employees at a par with permanent employees. The above decision cannot have any application in the present case. In the decisions reported in Bhagwan Dass and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, , Jaipal and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, , Karnataka State Private College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, and also U.P. Rajya Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., U.P. Vs. Its Workmen, , there was no contention raised in support of the classification on the ground of difference in qualification and the better reliability and responsibility on that count. In the decision reported in Gopal Krishna Sharma and others, where research associates appointed on ad hoc basis claimed equal remuneration with research assistants, on facts, the Supreme Court found that both research assistants and research associates who were having the same educational qualification had to undergo samfe selection process and are having same job chart. Under these circumstances, directions were given to grant a higher consolidated salary to the research associates on the basis of the minimum scale allowed to research assistants along with other monetary benefits like allowances etc. This decision also would go to show that the qualification attached to the post has also a relevance in considering the question whether two posts are entitled to the same scale of pay.

In the light of the above discussions, I am inclined to come to the conclusion that the different scale of pay allowed to Law Officers Scale I and Law Officers Scale III are justified. The Petitioner who has submitted an application to the post of Law Officer Scale I in the scale of pay attached to that post and has Accepted the appointment as is evidenced by Ext. R-2(a) as per conditions contained in the order of appointment, cannot now turn round and contend that after his selection, he should have been accommodated in a higher scale of pay. I find no merit in the contention raised by the petitioner that the recommendations of Pillai Committee was accepted and implemented in the case of appointment made in the year 1979 and also in the year 1983, but, it was denied only when the petitioner and 6 other persons were appointed in the year 1981. As mentioned earlier, the recruitment for the year 1979 was to the post of Law Officer Scale III inviting applications from persons with higher qualification whereas. the appointment of the petitioner and 6 other candidates in the year 1981 was pursuant to a selection specifically to the post of Law Officer Scale Appointment of Law Officer in the year 1983 belonging to a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheluled Tribe was also in the post of Law Officer Scale III in respect of which applications were specifically invited. Apart from the above, from a reading of the relevant portion in Pillai Committee repoi as quoted by the petitioner, I am not persuaded to hold that the action taken by the respondents in recruiting Law Officers in two scaies is in any way against the recommendation.

I find that the Petitioner has not made out a case of discrimination under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution in the matter of grant of lower scale of pay to Law Officers Scale I which would justify interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the result, the original petition fails and it stands dismissed.

*A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series).