Rajeev Mittal vs State Of Odisha & Others Vs

S.S. Mishra, J

1.In the present petition, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the entire criminal prosecution launched against him and also challenged the order dated 25.08.2018 passed by learned S.D.J.M., Athgarh, in 2(c) CC No.08 of 2018, whereby the learned Court below has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 and accordingly summons has been issued to the accused-petitioner to face the trial.

Heard Mr. Haripad Mohanty, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. S.N. Biswal, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the opposite party-State.

The complaint case has been instituted at the instance of the opposite party No.2, the Assistant Director of Factories and Boilers, Cuttack Zone-II, Cuttack.

The allegation in the complaint, inter alia, is that M/s Aarti Steels Ltd. is a registered factory bearing Regn. No. CK-647 which is situated At- Ghantikhala, P.O. Mahakalabasta, Khuntuni, Dist- Cuttack. The incident so happened that one Manas Swain, who happened to be an unloading helper was engaged in unloading of hard coke at the aforementioned factory. He met with an accident at about 12:00 Noon on 04.05.2018 being hit on the abdominal area by a truck and on the next day, i.e., on 05.05.2018, at around 3:00 AM he succumbed to the injuries at M/s Aswini Hospital, Cuttack.

The aforementioned incident had taken place on 04.05.2018 at about 12.00 P.M. at the coke yard area in the Ferro Alloys Plant, which was inside the plant premises. Immediately, on the same day, telephonic information was given by the Management to the concerned authority. Subsequent thereto, the information was also furnished in the prescribed format, i.e., Form No.18 on 05.05.2018.

On the basis of the aforementioned factual scenario, the Opp. Party No.2 had filed a complaint before the learned S.D.J.M., Athgarh on 02.08.2018, which was registered as 2(c) CC. No.08 of 2018. Accordingly, the learned court below has taken cognizance of the offence on 25.08.2018 under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. Subsequently, summonses have been issued to the accused persons.

Section 92 of the Factories Act prescribes penalty for imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with a fine which may extend to Rs.1 lakh or both.

The factual aspects which have been enumerated in the preceding paragraphs are uncontroverted. Learned counsel for the petitioner has questioned the cognizance order on many grounds. However, the prime attack is on the ground of limitation.

Mr. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, has read out Section-106 of the Factories Act, which is reproduced:

“106. Limitation of prosecutions.—No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector:

Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

[Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,—

(a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the offence continues;

(b) where for the performance of any act time is granted or extended on an application made by the occupier or manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the time so granted or extended expired.]”

Learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon Form-18 and the complaint filed by the Assistant Director of Factories and Boilers, Cuttack Zone-II, Cuttack, has submitted that the occurrence took place on 04.05.2018 and was telephonically informed to the authorities under the Factories Act on the same day. Subsequently, Form No.18, as prescribed under the Rules, was submitted on 05.05.2018. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the complaint is time barred as the complaint has been filed beyond the statutory limitation period. A perusal of the records clearly establishes that the complaint was filed within the prescribed time limit, i.e., on 02.08.2018. As the Act mandates that the period of limitation be calculated from the date of knowledge of the accident to the date of filing the complaint and not the date of cognizance, the submission made by the petitioner’s counsel is misplaced.

In this regard, it will be apposite to refer to the judgement of Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 2 SCC 114, in which the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to its many earlier judgements held thus: -

“2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations: (AIR p. 1558)

“It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked.”

In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.

In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para 2)

“2. … Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions.” ”

When the same petitioner was before this Court in a similar matter in CRLMC 2815 of 2024, this Court while allowing the application on the basis of limitation, had authoritatively held that the period of limitation shall be reckoned from the date of the Director of Factories and Boilers obtaining knowledge of the accident to the date the complaint is presented. The relevant part of the judgement reads as under:

“12. The prime consideration to evaluate limitation is the date of ‘knowledge’ acquired by the Inspector. The expression employed in the provision makes it abundantly clear that, once any of the Inspectors working under the jurisdiction acquires the knowledge of the incident the limitation reckons from that day and the complaint must be filed within three months. It is not required under the said provision that the knowledge of the cause required to be known to the Officer in the higher echelons.”

Contrary to the settled position of law, the learned Counsel for the petitioner attempted to persuade this Court that the complaint is time barred as the court has taken cognizance of the offence beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 106 of the Factories Act. This appears to be slightly misleading. Be that as it may, the complaint in the present case has been filed well within time; hence the ground of limitation urged by the petitioner fails. Therefore, the petition deserves no merit.

Accordingly, the CRLMC is dismissed.

However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to raise all other issues before the learned court below at appropriate stage barring the issue of limitation.

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