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Judgment
S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.04.2026 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Berhampur in S.T. No.149 of 2021, whereby the present appellants were acquitted of the charges under Sections 341, 294 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC, but were convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC. The learned trial Court sentenced each of the appellants to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with a default sentence of one month's simple imprisonment
Heard Mr. Jyotirmaya Sahoo, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Ms. Bijaya Laxmi Tripathy, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the State.
The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10.03.2021 at about 1:30 P.M., the informant, Satyanarayan Ratha, objected to appellant No.1 allegedly peeping into the bathroom where his sister was taking bath. The objection resulted in a sudden quarrel between the neighboring families. It was alleged that appellant No.1 Rajat Kumar Ratha and appellant No.2 Khalli Ratha assaulted the informant and his brother by means of iron rods, while the female members of the families also became involved in the altercation. The injured persons thereafter proceeded for medical treatment and the FIR was lodged on the same day, being Pattapur P.S. Case No.68 of 2021.
Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against both appellants on the alleged commission of the offences under Sections 341, 294, 323 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC, whereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial.
During trial, the prosecution examined ten witnesses, including the informant, the injured witness, the informant's sister, independent witnesses, seizure witnesses, the Medical Officer and the Investigating Officer, besides exhibiting the relevant documentary evidence. The defence adopted a plea of complete denial and false implication, contending that the occurrence had been exaggerated and that a counter-case had arisen out of the existing neighborhood dispute between the parties.
The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence of the prosecution witnesses, held that although the prosecution failed to establish the ingredients necessary to constitute offences under Sections 341, 294 and 307 IPC, the evidence sufficiently proved that both appellants voluntarily caused simple hurt to the injured persons in furtherance of their common intention. Accordingly, the appellants were convicted under Section 323/34 IPC and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- each with a default sentence of one month's simple imprisonment. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below:-
“9.So far as the points for determination for the offences U/s.341/294/34 IPC is concerned there is absolutely no evidence relating to the type of vulgar language used by the accused persons at the time of incident. No one has spoken about the obscene words that they felt annoyed. It cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence U/s.294/34 IPC is made out. Similarly, the FIR story and the evidence on record fails to disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence of wrongful restraint. P.W.I has not deposed that the accused persons obstructed him from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed at the relevant time and place. Over all, there is no case made out against the accused persons for the alleged offence U/s.341/34 IPC. Hence, both the accused persons are entitled an acquittal from the charges U/s.341/294/34 IPC.
10.After going through the vivid discussions above, I am of the considered opinion that prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the accused persons for the offences U/s.341/294/307/34 I.P.C. beyond all reasonable doubt and hence, they are acquitted therefrom as per Sec.235(l) of Cr.P.C. But the prosecution successfully proved the offence U/s.323/34 IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the accused persons are found guilty for commission of minor offence punishable U/s.323/34 I.P.C. and are convicted thereunder as per section Sec.235(2) of Cr.P.C.”
I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants as well as the learned counsel for the State, and perused the entire lower court records, including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, and the reasoning assigned by the learned trial Court.
The conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is not being interfered with. The present consideration is confined solely to the quantum of sentence and the question whether the appellants deserve to be extended the benefit contemplated under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
In the present case, certain circumstances assume considerable significance while determining the question of sentence. Firstly, the conviction ultimately survives only under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC, which concerns voluntarily causing simple hurt. The trial Court itself categorically held that the prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of Section 307 IPC, observing that the injuries sustained by the victims were simple in nature and did not demonstrate the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death. Secondly, the occurrence itself was admittedly a sudden neighborhood quarrel arising immediately after an objection raised by the informant. The trial Court specifically found that the incident was not pre-planned and that the altercation occurred in the spur of the moment. Thirdly, the personal circumstances of both appellants weigh significantly in favour of reformative treatment. Appellant No.2 is an elderly person of about 66 years, while appellant No.1 is a young person. The trial Court itself recorded these facts while hearing on sentence and also noted that both appellants were first offenders earning their livelihood in the locality.
In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that this is a fit case where the benefit contemplated under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 deserves to be extended to the appellants. Moreover, in view of Section 12 of the P.O. Act, the disqualification attached to the conviction will not cause disadvantage to the appellant once the benefit of P.O. Act is extended.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another v. State represented by the Inspector of Police1, wherein the Apex Court has elaborately explained the scope, object and significance of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, while considering the question of extending the benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature, aiming to provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders to reform themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. It has been emphasized that the provisions of the Act are intended to prevent the deleterious effects of imprisonment on individuals who can otherwise be rehabilitated as responsible members of society. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also clarified that it is the statutory obligation of the sentencing Court to consider the applicability of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and that any refusal to extend such benefit must be supported by reasons. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“26.On consideration of the precedents and based on a comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former. Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender, more twenty-one years old, on probation when he is sentenced to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in any case where the offender is found to have committed an offence such that he is punishable with any sentence other than death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante clause in sub-section gives overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 4 over any other law for the time being in force. Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. PC itself, being a subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision that in any case where the court could have dealt with an accused under the provisions of the Probation Act but has not done so, it shall record in its judgment the special reasons therefor.
27.What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361, Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC were not applicable in a particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the Probation Act would not be attracted.
28.Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may upon considering the report of the probation officer impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for the court to record the reasons therefor.”
Having regard to the aforesaid legal position and considering the facts of the present case, particularly the circumstances in which the occurrence arose, the simple nature of the injuries, and the period of incarceration already undergone by the appellants, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellants deserve to be extended the benefit contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
Hence, the present Criminal Appeal in so far as the conviction is concerned is turned down. But instead of sentencing the appellants, this Court directs the appellants to be released under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act for a period of six months on their executing bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) each within one month with one surety each for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence when called upon during such period and in the meantime, the appellants shall keep peace and good behavior and they shall remain under the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer during the aforementioned period of six months.
Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.
Footnotes
- 1.2025 INSC 540
