Rajasthan Public Service Commission vs Durga Ram & Ors.

Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:

The instant batch of intra-court appeals arises out of the common judgment dated 09.01.2025, whereby the writ petitions forming Group ‘A’ were allowed, the merit/select list issued by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission in recruitment to the post of Veterinary Officer was quashed to the extent it included candidates who had neither appeared in the Final Year Examination of B.V.Sc. nor submitted their examination forms by 24.11.2019, and the Commission was directed to prepare a fresh merit list after excluding such candidates. As a consequence, the writ petitions forming Group ‘B’ were dismissed.

Since all the appeals arise from the same common judgment and the principal controversy is common, D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.675/2025, Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Durga Ram & Ors., is taken as the lead case. The factual matrix and rival submissions are being noticed therefrom, and the decision rendered in the lead appeal shall govern the connected appeals.

The appellant in the lead appeal has claimed the following relief:

The lead appeal is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of 13 days’ delay in filing the appeal. The material placed on record also reflects that D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.126/2025 had earlier been preferred at the Jaipur Bench against the same common judgment. By order dated 07.03.2025, the direction for revision of the select list was kept in abeyance and, to protect the interests of the writ petitioners covered by the common judgment, the Commission and the State Government were directed not to fill up 43 posts without leave of the Court.

The connected appeals thereafter came to be heard together with the lead appeal.

Brief facts of the case are that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission issued advertisement dated 22.10.2019 inviting applications for recruitment to 900 posts of Veterinary Officer under the Rajasthan Animal Husbandry Service Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1963”). The prescribed qualification included a Bachelor's Degree in Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry or its equivalent from a recognised University together with the other qualifications prescribed under the Rules.

Rule 11 of the Rules of 1963 contained a proviso enabling a person who had appeared or was appearing in the Final Year Examination of the course constituting the requisite educational qualification to apply, subject to production of proof of acquisition of the requisite educational qualification at the stage prescribed therein. Where the selection was through written examination and interview, such proof was required to be produced before appearing in the interview.

The Commission thereafter conducted a shortlisting test on 02.08.2020 and declared the shortlisting result on 26.11.2020. Litigation concerning other aspects of the same recruitment had already commenced. The material on record shows that an earlier round travelled through a Division Bench of this Court and thereafter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court initially permitted the interviews to proceed while restricting appointments and subsequently, by order dated 31.05.2024, permitted declaration of the result and issuance of appointment letters, expressly making the appointments subject to the outcome of the pending proceedings and clarifying that no equity could be claimed on that basis.

The controversy relevant for the present batch arose when candidates who had been admitted to or were pursuing the Final Year of the B.V.Sc. & A.H. course, but who had neither appeared in the Final Year Examination nor submitted the examination form for such examination by the last date of applications, were treated by the Commission as eligible. The writ petitioners forming Group ‘A’ questioned their inclusion in the selection. The candidates forming Group ‘B’, whose candidature would be affected by acceptance of the challenge, sought protection of their participation and selection.

By the impugned common judgment, it was held that the expression “has appeared or is appearing in the Final Year Examination” could not be equated with mere admission to or pursuit of the Final Year of the course. The impugned judgment treated submission of the Final Year examination form and deposit of the requisite examination fee as the objective stage from which a candidate could be regarded as being in the process of appearing in such examination. It was accordingly held that candidates who had merely entered the Final Year but had neither appeared in the Final Year Examination nor submitted the examination form by 24.11.2019 were not eligible under the proviso to Rule 11.

Learned counsel appearing for the Rajasthan Public Service Commission submitted that the impugned judgment had introduced an eligibility criterion which was not expressly contained in Rule 11. It was submitted that Rule 11 did not require submission of the Final Year examination form or deposit of examination fee by the last date of application as an independent condition of eligibility.

Learned counsel submitted that the expression “appeared or is appearing in the final year examination” had to be understood in the context of the academic structure of the B.V.Sc. & A.H. course. Attention was drawn to the changes made under the Veterinary Council of India Minimum Standards of Veterinary Education Regulations, 2016 as compared with the earlier academic structure. It was urged that the course structure had materially changed and, therefore, the earlier decisions concerning preceding recruitments could not mechanically govern the present recruitment.

It was further submitted that the advertisement itself permitted candidates appearing in the Final Year of the requisite educational qualification to apply, subject to their furnishing proof of acquisition of the complete educational qualification before the interview. According to learned counsel, the substantive requirement was therefore acquisition of the prescribed qualification by the stage of interview, and a candidate who fulfilled such condition ought not to be excluded merely because the examination form had not been submitted by the last date of applications.

Learned counsel further urged that Rule 19 vested the Commission with the authority to scrutinise applications and determine eligibility. It was contended that the Commission had adopted a uniform interpretation and that judicial review could not be employed to substitute an additional eligibility condition for the one prescribed by the recruiting authority.

It was also submitted that Universities follow different practices regarding examination forms and examination fees and that adoption of such a criterion could result in differential treatment between otherwise similarly situated candidates.

Learned counsel further questioned the treatment of the Hindi stipulation contained in the advertisement. It was submitted that the impugned judgment had proceeded on the premise that there was an inadvertent omission in the advertisement and had thereby reconstructed the condition in a manner not warranted by its language.

Learned counsel appearing for the candidate-appellants whose candidature or selection stood affected substantially adopted the aforesaid submissions and urged that they had acquired the prescribed educational qualification before the stage stipulated for interview and ought not to be displaced from the selection.

Reliance was also placed upon Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade, (2019) 6 SCC 362, for the proposition that prescription and determination of eligibility essentially lie within the domain of the employer and that the Court cannot recast the conditions of recruitment by interpretative rewriting.

Further reliance was also placed upon the following judgments:

RPSC, Ajmer Vs. Dr. Rama Singh Chundawat (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.570/2013 & other connected matters, decided by this Hon’ble Court at Jaipur Bench on 11.02.2016);

Babulal Kumawat Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.1657/2017 & other connected matters, decided by this Hon’ble Court at Jaipur Bench on 03.11.2017;

RPSC, Ajmer Vs. Shobha Mutha & Anr. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.674/2016 & other connected matters, decided by this Hon’ble Court on 05.01.2017;

RPSC, Ajmer Vs. Kamlesh Kataria & Ors. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1373/2016 decided by this Hon’ble Court at Jaipur Bench on 10.04.2017;

Madras Institute of Development Studies & Anr. Vs. K. Sivasubramaniyan & Ors., (2016) 1 SCC 454;

Dhanyay Malik & Ors. Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors. (2008) 4 SCC 171;

Ramesh Chandra Shah & Ors. Vs. Anil Joshi & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 309;

Vijendra Kumar Verma Vs. Public Service Commission, Uttarakhand & Ors., (2011) 1 SCC 150;

Manish Kumar Shahi Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 576;

Tajvir Singh Sodhi & Ors. Vs. The State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2023) 3 SCR 714;

Chairman, State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. M.J. James, (2022) 2 SCC 301;

Maharashtra Public Service Commission through its Secretary Vs. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Ors., (2019) 6 SCC 362;

Krishnadatt Awasthy Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No(s). 4806/2011 & other connected matters, decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 29.01.2025;

Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court & Ors. — 2024 INSC 847;

State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. M/s Chotra Bhai Jetha Bhai Patel Co. & Ors. — (1972) 1 SCC 209;

State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhuj Maganlal — (1976) 3 SCC 54;

Ajeet Singh Singhvi v. State of Rajasthan — 1991 Supp (1) SCC 343;

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & Ors. v. Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. — (2025) 3 SCC 183;

A.N. Roy, Commissioner of Police & Anr. v. Suresh Sham Singh — (2006) 5 SCC 745

Pradeep Kumar Rai & Anr. v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey & Ors. — (2015) 11 SCC 493;

EERA v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. — (2017) 15 SCC 133;

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Surendra Singh & Ors. — Civil Appeal No. 5588/2020, decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 01.08.2019;

Bowen & Ors. v. Secular Society Ltd. — [1917] AC 406 (HL); and

Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla & Ors. — 2026 SCC OnLine SC 796.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting private respondents/original writ petitioners submitted that the language of Rule 11 was clear. It was urged that the Rule did not use the expression “studying in the Final Year” or “admitted to the Final Year”, but specifically used the expression “has appeared or is appearing in the Final Year Examination”.

Learned counsel submitted that the proviso to Rule 11 constituted a limited relaxation from the ordinary requirement of possessing the complete qualification at the time of applying and could be invoked only by candidates who fell within the class expressly identified therein. It was urged that acquisition of the complete qualification before interview constituted a subsequent requirement and could not dispense with the anterior requirement of being a candidate who had appeared or was appearing in the Final Year Examination on the relevant date.

Learned counsel further submitted that submission of an examination form was not treated by the impugned judgment as a separate educational qualification but merely as objective evidence that the candidate had crossed the stage of being a student of the Final Year and had entered the process of appearing in the Final Year Examination.

Reliance was placed upon the earlier decisions of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad Choudhary and Manoj Kumar and upon the Division Bench judgment dated 25.08.2017 in the appeal arising from Manoj Kumar, wherein the same statutory expression was considered in the context of earlier recruitment to the post of Veterinary Officer. It was submitted that the statutory Rule had remained unchanged. The impugned judgment also noticed and relied upon those decisions.

It was further submitted that any ambiguity or drafting deficiency in the advertisement could not override the statutory Rules. The advertisement itself referred candidates to the Rules of 1963 and, therefore, eligibility had necessarily to be determined under Rule 11.

On the objection concerning delay and acquiescence, learned counsel submitted that the writ petitioners were not questioning a recruitment condition which had operated against them after they had participated in the process; rather, their grievance was against the Commission's subsequent action of including persons who, according to them, did not satisfy Rule 11. It was therefore urged that the cause for challenge arose upon such inclusion in the select list.

In support of such submissions, reliance has been placed on the following judgments:

Manoj Kumar & Ors. Vs. State & Ors. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.858/2016, decided by this Hon’ble Court on 28.08.2017;

Rameshwar Choudhary Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.931/2024 & other connected matter, decided by this Hon’ble Court on 04.11.2025;

Rakesh Bakshi & Anr. Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2019) 3 SCC 511;

Jomon K.K. Vs. Shajimon P. & Ors., 2025 INSC 425;

The State of Rajasthan & Anr. Vs. Anju Rini Saini (Civil Appeal No.872/2022, decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 02.02.2022; and

RPSC Vs. Lavanshu Sankhla & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.____of 2026 @ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.32964 of 2025) & other connected matters, decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court on 04.05.2026.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

The principal question requiring consideration is whether a person who was merely admitted to or pursuing the Final Year of the B.V.Sc. & A.H. course, but had neither appeared in nor reached the stage of appearing in the Final Year Examination by 24.11.2019, could claim the benefit of the proviso to Rule 11 merely because the requisite educational qualification was subsequently acquired before the interview.

Rule 11, insofar as relevant, reads as under:

This Court finds that the proviso contemplates two distinct stages.

The first determines who is entitled to apply despite not yet possessing the completed educational qualification. For obtaining such benefit, the candidate must be a person who “has appeared or is appearing in the final year examination”.

The second determines the stage by which such candidate must produce proof that the complete educational qualification has subsequently been acquired.

The latter requirement does not obliterate the former.

This Court observes that acceptance of the construction urged by the appellants would result in replacing the expression “is appearing in the Final Year Examination” with the materially wider expression “is studying in the Final Year”.

The Rule does not employ the latter expression.

The words “Final Year Examination” have a definite statutory significance and cannot be rendered redundant while interpreting the proviso.

This Court further observes that the impugned judgment cannot fairly be understood as prescribing the filing of an examination form or payment of examination fee as a new educational qualification. The question before the Court was whether a candidate who had merely entered the Final Year could nevertheless be described as one who “is appearing in the Final Year Examination”.

In that context, submission of the examination form and deposit of the examination fee were treated as objective indicia showing that a candidate had crossed the stage of merely pursuing the Final Year and had entered the process relating to the ensuing Final Year Examination.

In the present controversy, the exclusion was confined to candidates who had neither actually appeared in the Final Year Examination nor even submitted the examination form by the relevant date. The impugned judgment therefore did not substitute a different educational qualification for the one prescribed by Rule 11; it applied the statutory expression to the factual stage reached by the candidates.

The distinction assumes further significance because the proviso is itself an exception to the ordinary requirement of possessing the prescribed educational qualification. The relaxation cannot be extended beyond the class identified by the Rule. A candidate who does not satisfy the first limb cannot invoke the second limb merely because he or she subsequently completed the qualification before the interview.

The contention based upon the changed course structure under the Regulations of 2016 also does not persuade this Court to adopt a construction contrary to the language of Rule 11. The academic structure may have changed, but Rule 11 was not correspondingly amended so as to replace “appeared or is appearing in the Final Year Examination” with “admitted to or studying in the Final Year”.

If the altered academic regime has rendered the existing statutory formulation inappropriate for future recruitments, the matter lies within the domain of the competent rule-making authority. The recruiting agency cannot, through administrative interpretation, alter the class of candidates whom the statutory proviso makes eligible.

The latest reiteration of the governing principle is found in Md. Firoz Mansuri & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2026 INSC 68. In paragraph 59, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:

The same paragraph recognises the employer's domain in determining qualifications while making it clear that such authority cannot be exercised arbitrarily.

The aforesaid principle does not assist the appellants in the manner suggested. This Court is not prescribing a qualification which the employer ought to have prescribed. The qualification and the statutory relaxation already stand prescribed by Rule 11. The judicial inquiry is only whether the Commission's application of that Rule remained within its text. This Court finds that enlarging “appeared or is appearing in the Final Year Examination” so as to include every person merely admitted to the Final Year would itself amount to altering the statutory condition.

Reliance upon Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade (supra), also does not alter the conclusion. The principle laid down therein is that courts cannot, by interpretative rewriting, substitute their own eligibility requirements where the Rules and advertisement are clear. Applied to the present case, the said principle requires fidelity to Rule 11. The Commission's domain under Rule 19 cannot extend to giving the proviso a meaning which removes the words “Final Year Examination” from practical operation.

This Court further finds that Rule 19, which entrusts scrutiny of applications to the Commission and accords finality to its decision concerning eligibility, has to operate subject to the statutory qualifications prescribed by the Rules themselves. The power to scrutinise eligibility is not a power to alter eligibility.

The earlier decisions in Rameshwar Prasad Choudhary (supra), including the Division Bench judgment dated 25.08.2017, were also appropriately noticed in the impugned judgment. Those decisions arose in an earlier academic setting, and the factual distinction urged by the appellants has been considered. Nevertheless, the statutory proposition for which those decisions were noticed remains relevant: mere progression in the academic course is not equivalent to having appeared or being in the process of appearing in the Final Year Examination where the governing Rule specifically uses the latter expression.

This Court also finds no reason to interfere merely because the Hindi stipulation in the advertisement was not happily worded. The decisive source of eligibility is the statutory Rule. Where the advertisement admits of a construction inconsistent with Rule 11, the Rule must prevail.

It is therefore unnecessary for this Court to approve every expression employed in the impugned judgment concerning the drafting of the advertisement. The ultimate conclusion can be sustained on the plain language of Rule 11 itself.

The plea concerning delay and acquiescence also does not warrant interference. The contesting writ petitioners were not seeking to avoid a condition of recruitment after having unsuccessfully participated under it. Their grievance was directed against the Commission's action of treating other candidates as eligible in a manner which, according to them, was contrary to Rule 11. The impugned judgment found that the cause of action arose when such candidates were included in the select list. The distinction drawn from cases relating to participation in a selection followed by a challenge to the procedure of selection is therefore well founded.

The plea of equity on behalf of candidates who subsequently came to be selected or appointed also cannot override the statutory requirement. The order dated 31.05.2024 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as reproduced in the record, expressly permitted declaration of result and issuance of appointment letters subject to the outcome of the pending proceedings, with a further direction that the selected candidates were to be notified that they would not be entitled to claim equity on that ground. Thus, the appointments made during pendency of the litigation were always subject to the adjudication of eligibility.

On consideration of the entire matter, this Court finds that the essential conclusion recorded in the impugned judgment is consistent with Rule 11. A candidate merely pursuing the Final Year, who had neither appeared in the Final Year Examination nor reached the stage reflected by submission of the Final Year examination form by the last date of applications, could not claim the statutory relaxation merely because the complete educational qualification was acquired subsequently before the interview.

This Court accordingly finds no ground warranting interference with the impugned common judgment in exercise of the intra-court appellate jurisdiction.

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.675/2025 is dismissed. The common judgment dated 09.01.2025 is affirmed.

Since the connected appeals arise from the same common judgment and the common question raised therein stands concluded by the determination made in the lead appeal, as indicated above, the rest of the instant appeals are also dismissed in terms of the present judgment.

All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.