Rajammal vs Tyagaraja Aiyar and Another

We regret we cannot uphold this order. The application that was made was no doubt in terms for the appointment of a Receiver, but its purpose

was not to safeguard any property. The plaintiff who is a widow sued the defendants, her husband''s co-parceners, for maintenance and obtained a

decree in her favour. The defendants have filed an appeal to this Court and complain that the rate of maintenance awarded is too high. They are

themselves, as may be expected, in possession of the property. They applied to this Court for the appointment of a Receiver and obtained an

order in their favour. They do not conceal their object in making the application, and indeed it is apparent from every paragraph of the affidavit in

support of it.

They complain that they for some reason or other were unable to adduce the best evidence possible in the lower Court and in order to make up

the deficiency they wanted a Receiver to be appointed so that the management by the Receiver may furnish the appellate Court the data for the

fixing of maintenance. In other words, they say that they intend to apply to the Court that eventually hears the appeal for additional evidence being

received, and, in the meantime, they want the aid of the Court to prepare in advance that additional evidence. The order of the learned Judge is

equally clear on the point. It begins thus:

Petitioner wishes to have some impartial person to keep accounts of the estate so that the real income may be impartially ascertained. I see no

objection to this.

The short question is : Can such an application be allowed? The respondents answer that the order in question does not hurt the plaintiff. If we

could take that view, we would probably rot interfere with the order, but unfortunately we find it very difficult to accede to this argument. The

plaintiff is a party to the order, and if she should safeguard her interests, the order, casts upon her the duty of closely watching the proceedings of

the Receiver and scrutinizing his accounts and gathering material for the purpose of attacking them. Why should this unnecessary obligation be

imposed upon the plaintiff? What, in effect, the Court has done by making the order in question is, that it has given the defendant facilities for

preparing evidence that may be available to them at a later stage so that they may be in a position to tell the appellate Court that the evidence is

ready and that it should be received.

We wish to say nothing as regards the course open to the defendants when arguing the appeal. What application they may make to the appellate

Court it is not for us to say. The Court may or may not give the defendants permission to file additional evidence. If it decides that they shall be

permitted, it will also, no doubt, say what kind of evidence may be relied upon. All this may be true, but in our opinion the provisions of the Code

relating to the appointment of Receivers cannot be invoked for such a purpose as this. The course is unprecedented and we feel constrained to

reverse the order appointing the Receiver and allow the aril peal.

There will be no order as to costs.