Raja Ram vs State and others

Jagat Narayan, J.C.

This is an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution by one Raja Ram, a head-constable of Police for the setting aside an order for his dismissal passed by the Supdt. of Police which was confirmed on appeal by the Inspector General of Police. The application has been opposed on behalf of the respondents. I have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record.

The applicant was sent to Chittrakut in April, 1953 to arrest an absconder. He is alleged to have told the Supdt. of Police on 26-9-53 when the latter visited his than a that he had seen one Dhani Ram head-constable in Chittrakut when he had gone there in search of the absconder in April, 1953. On this information a departmental inquiry was started against Dhani Ram. In that departmental inquiry Rajaram made a statement on 30-12-53 in which he stated that he did not remember whether he saw Dhani Ram in Chittrakut.

The Supdt. of Police however dismissed Dhani Ram relying on the statement alleged to have been made to him by Raja Ram on 26-9-53. Dhani Ram appealed to the Inspector General of Police who set aside the dismissal on 13-5-54. In the course of his order he made some adverse remarks about the conduct of the inquiry by the Supdt. of Police. As has been mentioned above Raja Ram made a statement in the D. E. against Dhani Ram on 30-12-53 which was in conflict with that which he was alleged to have made before the Superintendent of Police on 26-9-53.

No action was however taken against him till Dhani Ram''s appeal was allowed by the Inspector General of Police on 13-5-54. If Raja Ram had stated in the D. E. against Dhani Ram that he had seen him in Chittrakut, there would have been direct evidence against the latter and his appeal would not have been allowed. Nor would the conduct of the inquiry by the Superintendent of Police have been adversely commented upon. It was but natural for the Superintendent of Police to be annoyed with Raja Ram in these circumstances.

He framed a charge against Raja Ram on 21-5-54 to the effect that he made conflicting statements before himself and in the D. E. against Dhani Ram on 26-9-53 and 30-12-53 respectively. Under the charge was noted that Raja Ram had received a copy of it which had been read over, translated and explained to him and that he pleaded guilty to it. This endorsement is signed by Raja Ram. Raja Ram also handed over an application on the same day admitting the charge and praying for forgiveness.

Raja Ram''s case is that the Superintendent of Police and the Dy. Superintendent of Police got a raise written statement from him under coercion at 9 P. M. on 21-5-54 at the bungalow of the former Where he was called at that hour. This allegation has been denied by the Superintendent of Police. On the very next day the applicant sent a telegram to the Inspector General of Police alleging that the Superintendent of Police and the Dy. Superintendent of Police had obtained a false statement from him under coercion at 9 P. M. on the previous night at the former''s bungalow.

The Superintendent of Police came to know about this telegram on 4-6-54 and suspended him informally. A formal suspension order was passed on 13-7-54 and the charge framed against him for sending a false telegram to the Inspector General of Police on 22-5-54 complaining that the Superintendent of Police and the Dy Superintendent of Police had obtained a false statement from him under coercion. On this charge he was dismissed by the Superintendent of Police. The inquiry was conducted by another Dy. Superintendent of Police against whom no allegation had been made by the applicant.

The above facts however go to show that the Superintendent of Police had such a personal interest in the proceedings as to make it highly probable that he had a real bias. The applicant had sent a telegram to the Inspector General of police charging the Superintendent of Police with obtaining a false statement under coercion from the petitioner. The charge against him was that the allegation made in the telegram was false.

His defence was that the allegation in the telegram was true. The question of fact which arose for decision was whether or not the Superintendent of Police had obtained a statement from the petitioner under coercion. The Superintendent of Police himself was disqualified from acting as a judge in this matter.

It was observed in - ''Gurudeva Narayan v. State of Bihar'', 1955 Pat 131 ((S) AIR V 42) (A).

It is the basic principle of jurisprudence that no one is allowed to be a judge in his own cause. This rule applies not only in the case of Courts of justice but also in the case of administrative tribunals who are required to act judicially. A consequence of the rule is that the least pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a judge. But there is a sharp distinction between a case of pecuniary interest and a case of non-pecuniary interest.

In the case of pecuniary interest, the smallest interest in the subject-matter of the inquiry would result in the disqualification of the judge as a matte" of course. But if the interest alleged is any other kind of interest, it must be shown by the petitioner that the interest is substantial so as to make it highly probable that the Judge has a real bias. A mere possibility of bias is not enough to disqualify the judge.

The above principles have been deduced from some English cases which have been cited in the judgment. In - ''Madhi Ram v. D. F. O. Nabha'', 1955 Pepsu 172 (AIR V 42) (B) in which a forest guard who was charged with permitting illicit grazing had pleaded in his defence inter alia that the cattle were let in under the oral orders of the D. F. O., it was observed:

The story may or may not be true but it did implicate the Divisional Forest Officer and accused him of the responsibility for illicit grazing. Sense of propriety and justice demanded that the D. F. O. on such plea having been taken should have stayed his hands from proceeding with the inquiry or at least stopped short of pronouncing judgment on it.

I accordingly find that the order of dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police is vitiated by bias and set it aside. As it has been alleged that full opportunity to crass examine the prosecution witnesses was not given to the applicant I direct that a fresh inquiry should be held by another officer in which witnesses should be examined afresh and full opportunity given to the petitioner to cross examine them. Parties shall bear their own costs.