RAJA RAJESWARI ESTATES vs NAGRJUNAKONDA SUNDRACHARY S/O VENKATESHWARLU

IA/9129/2015

By this application the petitioner is seeking early hearing. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent/complainant has initiated execution proceedings and warrants have been issued against the petitioner, therefore, it is imperative that the admission haring be expedited and the application filed by the petitioner may be disposed of.

Heard. Request is granted.

This revision has been filed by the petitioner/opposite party against the order of the State Commission dated 9.1.2013 whereby the State Commission allowed the appeal preferred by the petitioner and ordered thus: - " In the result the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the District Forum is set aside. The complaint is allowed, in part, directing the opposite party to execute registered sale deed in favour of the complainant with regard to two allotted plots. The complainant is directed to bear the required registration expenses. The opposite party is further directed to pay a sum of Rs.20,000/- towards compensation and Rs.5,000/- towards cost of the complaint and this appeal. The opposite party is directed to comply with the order within six weeks from the date of this order."

Revision petition, however, has been filed with a delay of 458 days after the expiry of 90 days period for fling of revision petition. The petitioner has thus moved IA/5037/2014 for condonation of delay.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the delay in filing of revision petition is unintentional and it took place only because the counsel for the petitioner at Hyderabad failed to intimate about the order passed against the petitioner on 19.1.2013 and the petitioner all through was under the impression that the matter is pending before the State Commission. The petitioner came to know about the impugned order passed on 9.1.2013 in June, 2014. Thereafter he contacted his counsel at Delhi and filed the revision petition in first week of June, 2014.

Before adverting to the contentions of the petitioner, it would be useful to have a look on the law relating to condonation of delay. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 , it has been observed as under: - "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant".

In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108 Apex Court has observed as follows: - "W e hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) observed as under: - "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras."

We do not find merit in the above contention. On perusal of record we find that there is inordinate delay of 458 days. The explanation given by the petitioner that he was under the impression that his appeal is still pending and he was not informed about the order by the lawyer at Hyderabad, is not acceptable particularly for the reason that it is not expected of a prudent normal person that he would after filing the appeal against an order passed against him would sleep over the matter without contacting his counsel for a period of more than one year to find out about the fate of his case. Otherwise also, the explanation given in the application is highly vague. Neither the name of the counsel at Hyderabad is given which could have enabled us to verify the correctness of the allegation nor any affidavit has been filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. It may not be out of place to mention that even the condonation application has been drafted in a casual manner without mentioning the period of delay in filing of the revision petition. Under these circumstance, we are not satisfied with the explanation for condonation of delay. Application is accordingly dismissed. As a consequence, revision petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation.