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Judgment
R. Regupathi, J.—The petitioner is the first accused among 13 accused in a case pending in C.C. No. 5666 of 2001 on the file of the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, for offences punishable under Sections 47 and 46 of Tamil Nadu City Police Act and u/s 4(1)(k) of the Tamilnadu Prohibition Act.
The case of the prosecution is that on 28.05.2001 at about 23.30 hours when the complainant raided the premises of Chennai Royal Club situate at 48, Jawahar Nagar, First Cross Street, Peravallur, Chennai, the members of the club were playing cards, as well as consuming liquour, resulting in the registration of the case for the aforementioned offences. On conclusion of the investigation, a final report has been filed for the said offences.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is admittedly the President of the Chennai Royal Club. As he happens to be the elected President of the club, mechanically without application of mind, he has been included as an accused in the case. It is not even the case of the prosecution that profit or gain has been made, using the place for gaming. In such circumstances, since primary element to constitute an offence u/s 45 and 46 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act is absent, the said offence is not made out.
In support of the above contention, the Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a case reported in Ramanathan and others Vs. State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tenkasi (1986 LW Crl. 176), wherein in a previous Judgment of a case decided by this Hon'ble Court by His Lordship Natesan, J. as he then was in C.R. Subramaniam and others in Re, it has been held as follows:
The cardinal constituent for an of grading the admissibility of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. To substantiate his contention, he relied on the judgment in Bipin Shantilal Panchal Vs. State of Gujarat and another (2001 SCC (Cri.) 417 : 2002 1 L.W. (Cri.) 115), which is followed i n State Vs. Navjot Sandhu ( 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545). which reads as follows:
12...the trial Judge has chosen to decide questions of admissibility of documents or other items of evidence, as and when objections thereto were raised and then detailed orders wee passed either upholding or overruling such objections. The worse part is that after passing the orders the trial Court waited for days and weeks for the parties concerned to go before the higher Courts for the purpose of challenging such interlocutory orders.
It is an archaic practice that during the evidence-collecting stage, whenever any objection is raised regarding admissibility of any materials in evidence the Court does not proceed further without passing order on such objection. But the fallout of the above practice is this: Suppose the trial Court, in a case, upholds a particular objection and excludes the material from being admitted in evidence and then proceeds with the trial and disposes of the case finally. If the appellate or the revisional court, when the same question is recanvassed, could take a different view on the admissibility of that materials in such cases the appellate court would be deprived of the benefit of the evidence, because that was not put on record by the trial Court. In such a situation the higher Court may have to send the case back to the trial Court for recording that evidence and then to dispose of the case afresh. Why should the trial prolong like that unnecessarily on account of practices created by ourselves. Such practices, when realised through the course of long period to be hindrances which impede steady and swift progress of trial proceedings, must be recast or remoulded to give way for better substitutes which would help acceleration of trial proceedings.
I have perused the materials available on record including the order impugned. Though lengthy discussion has been made in the impugned order, the learned Judge has concluded as follows:
The veracity and its applicability can be questioned after the trial is over at the time of arguments. As far as marking the extra judicial confession statement recorded by V.A.O. it can be marked and cannot be rejected.
I have considered the rival contentions and perused the materials available on record.
The Supreme Court has clearly observed in the case reported in 2003 SCC (Cri.) 1545 (cited supra) that during the course of trial, the objections can be received but the result could be given at the time of delivering judgment after receiving argument by both the parties. Under such circumstances, I do not find any reason to disturb the finding of the learned trial Judge. However, the petitioner is at liberty to raise all the points, including the points canvassed in this revision and the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the accused, at the time of delivering the judgment, may pass orders in accordance with law.
With the above observation, this revision is dismissed. Consequently, connected M.P. is dismissed.
