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Judgment
Alok Sharma, J—The Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation (RIICO) has challenged the impugned award dated 29-1-2015 passed by Labour Court No. 1, Jaipur, whereby the learned Labour Court held the termination of service of the respondent workman as violative of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter ''the 1947 Act'') but instead of reinstating him directed that the petitioner RIICO pay a compensation of Rs. 1 lac to the workman, now the respondent, with liberty to recover the same from defaulting officers.
The facts of the case are that the respondent workman raised an industrial dispute with regard to his termination from the service. On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the matter was referred to the Labour Court. Statement of claim followed stating that on 1-9-1997 the workman was engaged as helper in RIICO''s office and worked till 31-1-2000. Thereafter he was removed from service. That removal was impugned as violative of Sections 25F, 25G, 25H of the 1947 Act as also the Rules 77 and 78 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957. RIICO opposed the claim and denied the allegations stating that the workman had no privity of contract with RIICO but his engagement was through placement agencies from time to time and hence no claim on whatever ground cold be laid against it.
The learned Labour Court considering the pleadings and evidence both oral and documentary, of the parties before it vide impugned award dated 29-1-2015 concluded that the workman was indeed engaged by the officers of RIICO albeit a shroud was sought to be created by using different placement agencies. The Labour Court found a clear master-servant relationship between the workman and RIICO. Yet the removal of the worker was non-compliant with the statutory provisions of the 1947 Act and vitiated. However instead of directing the reinstatement of the worker, the Labour Court directed RIICO to pay compensation of Rs. 1 lac to the respondent workman with liberty to recover the compensation paid from the defaulting officers after affixing responsibility.
Heard. Considered.
The petitioner RIICO has sought to challenge the impugned award before this court by resort to the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Such jurisdiction can be exercised only when a subordinate court or Tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, or the subordinate court has exercised its jurisdiction in a manner not permitted by law resulting in the failure of justice. Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has been unable to make out any such ground. Further a perusal of the award passed by the Labour Court indicates that it is a well reasoned and well balanced one. No fining is even remotely perverse. The fact of the respondent workman''s engagement by RIICO was admitted but escape sought in the sham arrangement of his services being routed through placement agencies. Yet the master-servant relationship over a period of over two years put paid to RIICO''s defence and rightly so exposing the fact of the respondent being a workman with RIICO. There is no good ground for this court to interfere with Labour Court''s conclusion. The labour court yet has not granted reinvent of the workman, after a long period of his removal from service, and only awarded compensation. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic) Bhopal Vs. Santosh Kumar Seal and Others, (2010) 3 LLJ 600 : (2010) 4 SCALE 333 : (2010) 6 SCC 773 while not reinstating the employees has similarly granted compensation. Senior Counsel appearing for RIICO sought to argue that compensation was excessive. It was submitted that the Hon''ble Apex Court has only allowed a compensation of Rs. 40,000/- odd where a workman was found to have been retrenched contrary to Section 25F of the 1947 Act after having worked three and half years. I find the contention untenable. The Judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court where compensation has been granted in lieu of reinstatement, has not enunciated law as such. The amount of compensation determined was in the court''s discretion. It is hence not binding. The Labour Court has in law where it finds contravention of Section 25F of the 1947 Act, discretion to determine extent of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. There can be no occasion to interfere therewith unless the quantum shocks the conscience. This is not so in the present case and not in fact so argued. An argument of excessive compensation is not of the, same genre as of a shockingly excessive compensation in a given case, by itself generating a ground of perversity.
In the context of the factual matrix of the case and law obtaining, I find no perversity or misdirection in law to warrant interference with the impugned award dated 29-1-2015 passed by the Labour court. The writ petition is without any force and liable to be dismissed. Dismissed.
