Raj Kumar vs Narotam & Anr.

Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26.

At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the settled principles governing interference with an order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.

27.

In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence in the following words:

“25.

Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of the interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”

28.

The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not technical; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29.

In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This Court observed:

“75.

The Trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence; therefore, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly unsustainable.”

30.

The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses.

31.

In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

32.

The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.

33.

Therefore, the question before us is not whether another view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

“12…. The principles aforesaid are not of much debate. In other words, ordinarily, the appellate court will not be upsetting the judgment of acquittal, if the view taken by the trial court is one of the possible views of the matter and unless the appellate court arrives at a clear finding that the judgment of the trial court is perverse, i.e. not supported by evidence on record or contrary to what is regarded as normal or reasonable; or is wholly unsustainable in law. Such general restrictions are essential to remind the appellate court that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judgment of acquittal further strengthens such presumption in favour of the accused. However, such restrictions need to be visualised in the context of the particular matter before the appellate court and the nature of the inquiry therein. The same rule with the same rigour cannot be applied in a matter relating to the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, particularly where a presumption is drawn that the holder has received the cheque for the discharge, wholly or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, the accused is entitled to bring on record the relevant material to rebut such presumption and to show that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his defence, but while examining if the accused has brought about a probable defence so as to rebut the presumption, the appellate court is certainly entitled to examine the evidence on record in order to find if preponderance indeed leans in favour of the accused.

13.

For determination of the point as to whether the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment and orders of the trial court and convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, the basic questions to be addressed are twofold: as to whether the complainant Respondent 2 had established the ingredients of Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, so as to justify drawing of the presumption envisaged therein; and if so, as to whether the appellant-accused had been able to displace such presumption and to establish a probable defence whereby, the onus would again shift to the complainant?”

5.3.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key ingredients as highlighted by this Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; 2000 SCC (Cri) 546: (2000) 100 COMP CAS 755.

“10.

On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act, it is clear that the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under the provision are:

(i)

a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability;

(ii)

that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii)

that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv)

the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v)

the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

11.

If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied, then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence. In the explanation to the section, clarification is made that the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

5.4.

The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are as follows:

i.

The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account.

ii.

The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability.

iii.

Presentation of the cheque to the bank within the period of six months or within the period of its validity.

iv.

The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or because it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account.

v.

A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the receipt of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque.

vi.

Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.

vii.

Filing of the complaint within a month from the date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate not below first class.

“38.

John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows:

“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.”