Raj Kumar & Anr. vs Munish Jain & Ors.

DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL)

The present revision pe''on has been filed by the tenants assailing the concurrent orders passed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority, whereby the pe''on filed by the respondent-landlord under Sec'on 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Evic'on) Act, 1973 has been allowed and the order of ejectment passed against the pe''oners has been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 26.02.2026.

The ejectment pe''on was filed by the respondent-landlord on, inter alia, the grounds of bona fide personal necessity and the demised premises having become unsafe and unfit for human habita'on. The learned Rent Controller accepted the pe''on vide order dated 23.04.2024. The appeal preferred by the pe''oners was dismissed by the learned Appellate Authority on 26.02.2026, resul'ng in the present revision. The learned Appellate Authority has recorded concurrent findings that the landlord established his bona fide requirement as also the condi'on of the building warran'ng ejectment.

At the outset, learned counsel for the pe''oners fairly submits that by the 'me the present revision came to be filed, the respondent-landlord had already obtained possession of the demised premises.

It is, however, submiAed that the pe''oners s'll seek to assail the finding regarding bona fide necessity. According to learned counsel, the case of the landlord was that his wife required the demised premises for star'ng a coaching centre, whereas the evidence on record did not establish that she was already running any coaching classes from her residence or that she had been receiving any amount from students. It is, therefore, contended that the alleged requirement was merely a desire and not a bona fide necessity.

The submission, though aArac've at first blush, cannot be accepted. The ques'on before the Rent Controller was not whether the wife of the landlord was already running a coaching centre, but whether the requirement pleaded by the landlord for establishing such a centre was genuine and bona fide. The dis'nc'on is material. A landlord seeking evic'on for commencing a new business or voca'on cannot be expected to first establish that the very business for which the premises are sought is already being carried on elsewhere. Such an approach would put the cart before the horse.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119, has held that when a landlord asserts a requirement for occupa'on of the premises, the Rent Controller should not proceed with the presump'on that such requirement is not bona fide. Once a prima facie case of requirement is made out, the presump'on operates in favour of the landlord, and it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how else he should adjust himself.

The same principle applies with equal force where the requirement is for commencing a new business. In Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) by LRs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co., (1999) 8 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a bona fide requirement need not amount to a compelling or dire necessity and that the requirement may be one in presen' or within reasonable proximity in the future. The Court further rejected the approach of requiring proof of capital or previous experience as a pre-condi'on for establishing bona fide requirement.

More specifically, in Ram Babu Agarwal v. Jay Kishan Das, (2010) 1 SCC 164, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person can start a new business even without previous experience in that par'cular business and that lack of experience, by itself, cannot be made a ground to reject the claim of bona fide requirement.

Consequently, the mere fact that the wife of the respondent was not already conduc'ng coaching classes from her residence cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that her proposed requirement of establishing a coaching centre in the demised premises was fic''ous or mala fide.

In the present case, the landlord specifically pleaded that the demised premises were required for his well-qualified wife for opening a coaching centre. He entered the witness box and reiterated the said requirement. The record further shows that the landlord relied upon the educa'onal qualifica'on of his wife as also her income-tax returns and profit and loss accounts. The Appellate Authority, aEer examining the evidence, specifically recorded that nothing material had been elicited in cross-examina'on to establish that the requirement pleaded by the landlord was not bona fide.

The conten'on that no evidence was produced regarding receipt of fees from students is equally of no assistance to the pe''oners. If the coaching centre was already being run, such evidence might have had relevance for assessing the exis'ng ac'vity. But where the pleaded case is that the premises are required for star'ng a coaching centre, the absence of receipts from students is en'rely consistent with the very case set up by the landlord. The pe''oners cannot insist upon proof of an ac'vity which, according to the landlord, was yet to commence.

It is also significant that the Courts below have concurrently appreciated the evidence and returned a finding of fact that the requirement was bona fide. The revisional jurisdic'on of this Court under Sec'on 15(6) of the Act is not equivalent to appellate jurisdic'on. While exercising revisional jurisdic'on under rent-control legisla'on, the High Court is en'tled to examine whether the finding is according to law and whether it suffers from perversity, non-considera'on of material evidence, misreading of evidence or such gross error as would result in miscarriage of jus'ce; however, the revisional jurisdic'on cannot be converted into an appellate power for reassessing evidence merely to arrive at a different factual conclusion.

Tested on the aforesaid parameters, no perversity or illegality can be found in the concurrent finding regarding bona fide necessity. The argument of learned counsel for the pe''oners essen'ally seeks a reappraisal of the evidence and subs'tu'on of the view taken by the two authori'es below with another possible view. That exercise is impermissible in the limited revisional jurisdic'on of this Court.

There is another, and in the facts of the present case, equally significant aspect. The ejectment order is not founded merely upon the ground of bona fide necessity. The respondent-landlord had also sought ejectment on the ground that the demised premises had become unsafe and unfit for human habita'on. On this aspect, the landlord produced the report of the building expert, Ex.PW4/1, along with photographs Ex.PW4/10 to Ex.PW4/29. The building expert, aEer inspec'ng the premises upon no'ce to the par'es, opined that the building as a whole was absolutely unfit and unsafe for human habita'on, had outlived its normal span of life and was beyond repairs. He further opined that the appropriate course was complete demoli'on and reconstruc'on from the founda'on level.

The said finding has also been affirmed by the Appellate Authority and has not been demonstrated to suffer from any perversity or legal infirmity. Thus, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the pe''oners' challenge to the finding of bona fide necessity were to be examined with greater la'tude, the independent concurrent finding regarding the unsafe and unfit condi'on of the demised premises would con'nue to sustain the order of ejectment.

The fact that the landlord has already obtained possession of the demised premises before ins'tu'on of the present revision also materially affects the relief which can now be granted. The pe''oners admiAedly do not seek restora'on of possession in the present proceedings; their grievance is essen'ally directed against the finding of bona fide necessity. In the face of the independent ground of ejectment, which remains undisturbed, no effec've relief can flow from seLng aside the finding on bona fide necessity alone.

For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no illegality, perversity or material irregularity in the concurrent orders passed by the learned Rent Controller and the learned Appellate Authority. The finding that the requirement of the respondent-landlord was bona fide is based upon apprecia'on of the evidence and is fully consistent with the seAled principles governing bona fide requirement. The mere fact that the landlord's wife was not already conduc'ng coaching classes from her residence or had not produced receipts showing collec'on of fees from students does not render the proposed requirement mala fide.

Consequently, the present revision pe''on is found to be devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The concurrent orders of ejectment passed by the Courts below are affirmed.

Pending applica'ons, if any, also stand disposed of.