Raghuraj Singh vs Director Agriculture Gokhale Marg U.P. Lko. & Ors.

Hon'Ble Irshad Ali, J.

Heard Sri D.K. Singh along with Sri Sushil Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shatrughan Chaudhary, learned Additional CSC for the respondent – State.

The present writ petition has been filed on following prayer(s):

Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner was appointed as a member of the Subordinate Agriculture Service, Class-III, on 22.07.1968 by the Joint Director of Agriculture (Administration), Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, in the pay scale of ₹120–220. As reflected in his service book, the petitioner was working under the District Agriculture Officer, Gonda, as Project Officer, Gonda, with effect from 01.10.1981.

Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 is wholly illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is contended that the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the dismissal of the petitioner were conducted in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and without affording him a fair, reasonable and effective opportunity to defend himself against the charges levelled against him.

He submitted that no proper departmental enquiry, in the manner contemplated under the applicable service rules and the settled principles of law, was ever conducted against the petitioner. Neither was any date, time or place fixed or communicated to him for participation in the enquiry, nor was he afforded an effective opportunity of hearing. Instead, the Enquiry Officer proceeded to record a finding that all the charges stood proved merely on the basis of the petitioner's tentative reply and the material available on record, without conducting a meaningful enquiry or following the procedure prescribed by law. It is, therefore, contended that the enquiry report is vitiated by a fundamental procedural infirmity and cannot legally form the basis of the impugned order of dismissal. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the writ petition, Grounds Nos. (i) and (iii), paragraphs 29 and 55 of the counter affidavit and paragraphs 12, 20, 25, 26, 48, 50 and 51 of the rejoinder affidavit.

He next submitted that the petitioner was denied a reasonable and effective opportunity to inspect and obtain copies of the documents relied upon by the department in support of the charges. Although the petitioner inspected certain documents on 20.02.1993, only a part of the required material was supplied to him, whereas copies of 23 additional documents specifically demanded by him were never furnished. It is contended that the withholding of material documents deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to examine the evidence against him, prepare an adequate defence and rebut the allegations levelled against him. Such failure on the part of the disciplinary authorities, according to learned counsel, constitutes a serious breach of the principles of natural justice and has materially prejudiced the petitioner's defence. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon Ground No.(ii) of the writ petition, paragraphs 15, 22, 23, 25, 42 and 47 of the counter affidavit and paragraphs 12, 19, 22, 37 and 42 of the rejoinder affidavit.

He further submits that the department cannot attribute any default to the petitioner in respect of the inspection of documents lying in the custody of the Court in the connected criminal proceedings. It is contended that, whenever the petitioner appeared before the Court pursuant to the directions issued to him, the relevant documents could not be made available for inspection because no departmental officer or authorised Court assistant attended to facilitate the process. The fact that the documents were not made available despite the petitioner's presence was, according to learned counsel, independently certified by the Court itself. It is, therefore, urged that the failure to inspect the documents was attributable to the departmental authorities and not to the petitioner and the respondents cannot rely upon such failure to justify the denial of an effective opportunity of defence. Learned counsel has relied upon Ground No.(v) of the writ petition, paragraphs 15, 26, 48 and 50 of the counter affidavit and paragraphs 12, 23, 43 and 45 of the rejoinder affidavit.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the continued non-supply of the relevant documents had a direct and adverse bearing upon the petitioner's ability to submit a comprehensive reply to the charges and establish his innocence. It is contended that a mere formal opportunity to submit an explanation cannot be regarded as sufficient compliance with the requirements of natural justice when the material necessary for preparing such explanation is withheld by the very authority conducting the disciplinary proceedings. According to learned counsel, the petitioner was placed at a substantial disadvantage because he was required to defend himself without access to the complete documentary material relied upon by the department. The resulting prejudice, it is urged, vitiates the disciplinary proceedings and renders the consequential order of dismissal legally unsustainable.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge-sheet itself was not validly served upon him in accordance with law. Despite the petitioner's specific written request dated 23.10.1991 seeking a copy of the charge-sheet, the department failed to respond to the request. It is further contended that the respondents' explanation regarding publication of the charge-sheet in a newspaper suffers from material inconsistencies, inasmuch as the communication was allegedly addressed to one newspaper, whereas the publication is stated to have appeared in another newspaper and on a date different from the date pleaded by the department. Learned counsel submits that these inconsistencies cast serious doubt upon the alleged service of the charge-sheet and the fairness of the proceedings initiated against the petitioner. In the absence of proper service and a meaningful opportunity to answer the charges, the disciplinary proceedings, it is urged, cannot be sustained.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the very foundation of the departmental case is rendered doubtful by the chronology of the preliminary enquiry and the events relating to the sealing and reopening of the godown. It is contended that the preliminary enquiry report is stated to have been submitted on 09.01.1991, whereas the godown in question was sealed on 10.01.1991 and reopened on 24.01.1991. According to learned counsel, where the allegation of shortage necessarily depends upon the condition and contents of the godown at the relevant time, the preparation of the preliminary enquiry report before the sealing and reopening of the godown raises a serious question regarding the factual basis and reliability of the departmental allegations. It is, therefore, urged that the said chronology casts doubt upon the genuineness of the preliminary enquiry and demonstrates the need for a proper and independent examination of the material relied upon by the respondents.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the charges forming the subject matter of the departmental proceedings are identical to those involved in the criminal case instituted against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is contended that, at the time of institution of the writ petition, charges had not even been framed in the criminal proceedings and the allegations were yet to be tested through the criminal trial. In these circumstances, learned counsel submits that the disciplinary authority ought, in the interests of fairness, to have considered awaiting the outcome of the criminal proceedings, particularly when the allegations were stated to be founded upon the same factual circumstances and documentary material. The petitioner, accordingly, contends that the haste with which the disciplinary proceedings were concluded, resulting in the extreme penalty of dismissal, reinforces the challenge to the legality and fairness of the impugned action.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner's inability to submit a further detailed representation in response to the show-cause notice cannot legitimately be treated as a circumstance warranting an adverse inference against him. It is contended that the failure to furnish the requisite documents and facilitate their inspection was attributable to the department itself and the petitioner could not reasonably be expected to submit a comprehensive and effective representation without access to the relevant material. Learned counsel further submits that the serious illness of the petitioner's wife during the relevant period constituted an additional genuine and compelling circumstance that ought to have been considered by the disciplinary authority with due sensitivity. It is, therefore, urged that the petitioner's inability to furnish a further detailed representation was neither deliberate nor wilful and could not cure the earlier procedural irregularities or justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.

In conclusion, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the cumulative effect of the aforesaid procedural irregularities, including the absence of a proper enquiry, denial of an effective opportunity of hearing, non-supply of material documents, failure to facilitate inspection of documents in the custody of the Court, serious doubts regarding service of the charge-sheet and the inconsistencies in the chronology of the preliminary enquiry, renders the entire disciplinary process fundamentally unfair. It is contended that the impugned order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 is vitiated by non-compliance with the principles of natural justice and by material infirmities affecting the sustainability of the findings recorded against the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the impugned order of dismissal be quashed and such consequential relief as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case be granted in favour of the petitioner. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon following judgments:

On the other hand, learned Additional Csc for the respondent – State submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order and the same is just and valid.

He submitted that the impugned order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 has been passed upon completion of disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner in respect of serious charges relating to misappropriation and embezzlement of Government stock, falsification of records and other financial irregularities. The legality of the impugned order is required to be examined with reference to the applicable service rules, the procedure followed in the disciplinary inquiry and the principles governing judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court is not that of an appellate authority over disciplinary findings and interference is warranted only where a legally sustainable ground, such as violation of a mandatory procedural requirement, denial of reasonable opportunity, perversity of findings or a penalty prohibited by law, is established.

He submitted that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings was founded upon allegations concerning the petitioner’s tenure as In-charge of the Government Agricultural Seed Store, Paraspur, District Gonda. Following the verification of stock and the handing over of charge on 24.01.1991, an alleged shortage of Government stock valued at Rs.1,55,043.47 came to light. A preliminary inquiry was conducted and an FIR was registered under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the State respectfully submits that the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings operate in distinct legal fields. The departmental charges were required to be determined on the evidence and material available in the disciplinary inquiry, independently of the outcome of the criminal case, subject to any applicable legal principle governing the particular circumstances.

He submitted that the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 04.07.1991 and the Deputy Director of Agriculture (Extension), Gonda, was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner challenged the suspension order in Writ Petition No.6065 (SS) of 1991, wherein an interim order dated 18.09.1991 was passed staying the suspension. The Director of Agriculture, thereafter, reinstated the petitioner with effect from 18.09.1991 vide order dated 12.05.1992.

He submitted that reinstatement pursuant to an interim judicial order did not, by itself, extinguish the disciplinary charges or preclude their adjudication in accordance with law. Equally, the mere pendency or disposal of proceedings concerning suspension would not determine the validity of the subsequent dismissal order unless the relevant judicial directions or applicable rules had been violated.

He submitted that the record, as pleaded in the counter affidavit, indicates that the charge-sheet dated 15.08.1991 was initially returned with the endorsement that the petitioner was away for treatment. Thereafter, the charge-sheet was sent again to the petitioner’s residential address and steps were taken to publish it in the newspapers. The petitioner ultimately obtained the charge-sheet on 14.05.1992. The State submits that the validity of service of the charge-sheet must be assessed in the light of the applicable service rules and the evidence of actual service or legally permissible substituted service. Mere non-receipt on an initial occasion would not automatically invalidate the entire inquiry if the charges were subsequently communicated and a reasonable opportunity to defend was afforded. Conversely, publication in a newspaper cannot be treated as conclusive proof of valid service unless the governing rules and the circumstances legally justified that mode of service.

He further submitted that the petitioner sought copies of documents by his letter dated 23.05.1992 and the correspondence pleaded by the State indicates that opportunities were extended to him to inspect the relevant records and submit his defence. According to the counter affidavit, the petitioner inspected records relating to certain charges in February 1993 and was supplied with copies of documents on different dates, thereafter. The State submits that the legal question is whether the petitioner was afforded a reasonable and effective opportunity to meet the charges and whether any denial of relevant material caused prejudice to his defence. The mere fact that every document was not supplied on the date initially requested would not, by itself, vitiate the proceedings. At the same time, the State does not contend that repeated notices or formal opportunities can cure a demonstrated denial of material evidence essential to a fair defence. The issue must be determined with reference to the documents sought, their relevance, their availability and the prejudice, if any, established by the petitioner.

He submitted that the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998, whereafter the Inquiry Officer considered the defence and the relevant records and submitted the inquiry report dated 22.08.1998, holding the charges proved. The State respectfully submits that the mere delay in submitting a reply does not dispense with the obligation of the disciplinary authority to examine the charges and evidence in accordance with law. Nevertheless, where the employee has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate in the proceedings and the findings are supported by relevant evidence, the mere fact that the proceedings continued over a considerable period would not, without more, render the inquiry or its outcome illegal. The petitioner must establish a legally material defect in the procedure or findings warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

He submitted that upon completion of the inquiry, the petitioner was informed vide letter dated 04.03.1999 of the opportunity to submit his representation against the inquiry report within fourteen days, along with a copy of the report. The petitioner, thereafter, sought time up to 15.05.1999 on the ground of his wife’s medical condition. According to the counter affidavit, no representation was submitted within the extended period and a further opportunity was afforded vide letter dated 16.08.1999.

The State submits that the governing legal requirement is that the disciplinary authority must afford the delinquent employee a meaningful opportunity to respond to the findings of the inquiry before imposing the penalty, wherever required under the applicable rules and principles of natural justice. If such opportunity was duly afforded and the petitioner failed to avail himself of it despite reasonable opportunities, he cannot claim that the disciplinary proceedings are invalid merely because he did not submit a representation. The decisive consideration is compliance with the applicable legal requirements, rather than the number of notices issued.

He next submitted that the petitioner’s failure to submit a representation against the inquiry report, as asserted by the State, must be considered separately from the obligation of the competent disciplinary authority to apply its mind to the inquiry report and the material on record. The State submits that non-submission of a representation does not automatically establish the correctness of every finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, nor does it absolve the disciplinary authority of its statutory responsibilities. Nevertheless, where the inquiry has been conducted in accordance with the applicable rules, the charges are supported by evidence and the competent authority has lawfully considered the matter before imposing punishment, the absence of a representation despite a reasonable opportunity cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for setting aside the penalty.

He submitted that the impugned order dated 22.02.2001 imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, directed recovery of the amount stated therein and dealt with the treatment of the suspension period and payment beyond subsistence allowance. The State submits that the legality of these directions must be tested independently against the applicable service rules and the provisions governing recovery and treatment of the suspension period. The power to impose a major penalty must be exercised by the competent disciplinary authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Similarly, recovery of an alleged financial loss must have a lawful foundation and cannot be sustained solely because a departmental charge has been held proved. The State, therefore, relies upon the impugned order subject to the demonstration from the applicable rules and the record that the authority was competent and the directions issued were legally permissible.

He submitted that, in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Hon’ble Court ordinarily does not reappreciate the evidence as though hearing an appeal against the disciplinary findings. Judicial review is concerned principally with the decision-making process, the authority’s jurisdiction, observance of the prescribed procedure, compliance with the principles of natural justice and the existence of relevant material supporting the conclusions reached. Interference may nevertheless be warranted where the findings are unsupported by any evidence, are perverse, disclose consideration of irrelevant material, or where a material procedural illegality has occasioned prejudice. The State respectfully submits that the petitioner must establish such a ground from the inquiry record and cannot obtain relief merely by inviting this Hon’ble Court to substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that of the competent disciplinary authority.

He submitted that the fact that an FIR was registered against the petitioner concerning the alleged misappropriation does not, by itself, establish the departmental charges; equally, the existence of criminal proceedings does not automatically invalidate or suspend the departmental inquiry. The legal effect of any judgment in the criminal case, if relied upon by the petitioner, would depend upon its nature, the findings recorded therein, the identity of the charges and evidence and the applicable legal principles. In the absence of material establishing that the disciplinary findings are legally unsustainable for a reason recognised in law, the mere reference to the criminal proceedings would not be sufficient to invalidate the impugned order.

He submitted that the petitioner’s date of birth is stated in the counter affidavit to be 10.05.1944 and he would ordinarily have attained the age of superannuation on 31.05.2002 had he continued in service. The State submits that the petitioner’s proximity to retirement does not, by itself, invalidate a disciplinary penalty otherwise imposed in accordance with law. The validity of the impugned order must be determined by reference to the applicable rules, the competence of the authority, the procedure followed and the legality of the findings and punishment. Any consequential claim concerning retiral benefits or the treatment of the period of suspension would arise for consideration in accordance with the applicable service rules and the ultimate determination of the validity of the impugned order.

In view of the foregoing legal position, learned Additional CSC submits that the impugned order dated 22.02.2001 ought not to be interfered with merely on the basis of procedural objections stated in general terms or a request for reappreciation of the departmental evidence. The petitioner must establish a specific and material violation of the applicable service rules, the principles of natural justice or another recognised ground for judicial review. If the record demonstrates that the competent authority acted within its jurisdiction, the prescribed procedure was substantially and lawfully followed, the petitioner received a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and the findings and punishment are supported by law and the material on record, no ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would arise.

In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned disciplinary proceedings and the consequential order of termination are vitiated by a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the petitioner was repeatedly denied access to the documents and evidence relied upon by the department to substantiate the charges. Despite repeated requests and directions issued by the departmental authorities, the relevant records, including documents lying in the custody of the criminal court, were neither supplied nor effectively made available for inspection. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of a meaningful opportunity to controvert the allegations and defend himself.

He submitted that the mere supply of certain documents cannot be treated as substantial compliance with the requirements of a fair disciplinary inquiry when material documents specifically demanded by the delinquent employee remain undisclosed. The petitioner has consistently asserted that, out of the documents inspected on 20.02.1993, only eight were initially supplied and that the remaining documents necessary to meet the charges were not made available despite repeated representations. Such incomplete disclosure materially impaired the petitioner's ability to submit an effective defence and renders the proceedings procedurally unfair.

He submitted that the respondents cannot justify the denial of inspection merely on the ground that the original documents were in the custody of the criminal court. Once the department relied upon such documents to sustain the disciplinary charges, it was incumbent upon the competent authorities to take appropriate steps to facilitate inspection or provide legally permissible copies. The correspondence placed on record, including the communications dated 17.10.1994 and 28.07.1998, demonstrates that the petitioner continued to seek access to the relevant material. The failure to resolve these requests cannot legitimately be used to the petitioner's prejudice.

He submitted that the disciplinary inquiry is further vitiated by the alleged failure to conduct a proper oral inquiry. The petitioner specifically disputes that any effective inquiry was held in which the date, time and place were duly fixed and a meaningful opportunity was afforded to him to participate, examine the evidence, challenge the material relied upon by the department and establish his defence. An inquiry report founded merely upon an incomplete or tentative reply, without adherence to the prescribed procedure and the requirements of natural justice, cannot constitute a legally sustainable basis for imposing a major penalty.

He submitted that the allegations concerning shortage of stock could not lawfully be determined without a proper and comprehensive verification of the relevant records and the actual stock position. The petitioner has consistently maintained that the godown was undergoing a process of transfer and that substantial quantities of fertilizer, seeds and other material had been shifted to a new godown, the stock of which was allegedly not accounted for while determining the shortage. In the absence of a fair verification of the stock at both locations and consideration of the contemporaneous official correspondence, the alleged shortage could not be treated as conclusively established merely on the basis of the departmental assessment.

The submitted that the respondents' reliance upon the initiation of criminal proceedings or the lodging of an FIR does not, by itself, establish the disciplinary charges. Criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings operate in distinct legal spheres and the allegations against the petitioner were required to be established independently in accordance with the applicable disciplinary rules. The existence of an FIR or an investigation could not dispense with the obligation to conduct a fair inquiry or cure procedural defects arising from the withholding of material evidence.

His submission is that the repeated representations made by the petitioner seeking the charge-sheet and the documents relied upon by the department demonstrate that the petitioner was seeking a reasonable opportunity to defend himself rather than deliberately avoiding the disciplinary process. The respondents were required to consider these requests fairly and ensure that the petitioner received the material necessary to answer the charges. The subsequent reliance upon the absence of a complete reply, without first ensuring meaningful access to the relevant evidence, would amount to penalising the petitioner for a procedural deficiency attributable to the department itself.

He submitted that the petitioner's contention regarding bias and arbitrariness must be examined cumulatively in the light of the repeated failure to facilitate inspection, the non-supply of relevant documents despite departmental correspondence and the alleged submission of the inquiry report without an effective oral inquiry. If these circumstances are borne out by the record, they disclose more than a mere technical irregularity and raise a substantial question regarding the fairness and impartiality of the disciplinary process.

His submissions is that the impugned order of termination cannot be sustained merely because the respondents issued a charge-sheet or subsequently afforded an opportunity to respond to a show-cause notice. Compliance with the requirements of natural justice must be real and effective, rather than formal or illusory. Where the employee is denied access to material evidence and the findings are returned without a procedurally fair inquiry, the consequential punishment becomes legally vulnerable, particularly when the disputed material forms the foundation of the charges.

In view of the aforesaid legal infirmities, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the disciplinary proceedings and the consequential order of termination warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He, accordinglyc prays that the impugned order be quashed and appropriate consequential relief be granted in accordance with law.

I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law reports cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.

To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is being quoted below:

Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-State and having carefully examined the pleadings and material placed on record, this Court finds that the controversy does not turn merely upon the sufficiency of the evidence or the correctness of the factual conclusions recorded by the departmental authorities. The principal question is whether the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure and the fundamental requirements of a fair inquiry.

The petitioner has specifically challenged the absence of a proper oral inquiry, the non-supply of material documents, the failure to facilitate inspection of records lying in the custody of the criminal court and the consequential prejudice caused to his defence. These objections go to the root of the decision-making process and, therefore, require substantive consideration in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

At the outset, it is necessary to clarify that judicial review of a disciplinary order does not ordinarily authorise this Court to sit in appeal over the findings of the Inquiry Officer or to substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that of the competent authority. Nevertheless, the limitations governing judicial review cannot be invoked to shield disciplinary proceedings from scrutiny, where the prescribed procedure has not been followed or where the delinquent employee has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The distinction between reviewing the merits of the departmental findings and examining the legality of the process by which those findings were reached is fundamental. Where the decision-making process suffers from a material breach of natural justice or a mandatory procedural requirement, interference is not only permissible but necessary to ensure that the exercise of disciplinary power remains consistent with law.

The contention of learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that the impugned order concerns serious allegations of misappropriation, embezzlement of Government stock, falsification of records and financial irregularities cannot, by itself, sustain the order of dismissal. The gravity of an allegation and the legality of the procedure adopted to establish it are separate considerations. Serious charges require a careful and fair inquiry precisely because the consequences of an adverse finding may be grave. The seriousness of the allegations cannot relieve the department of its obligation to establish the charges in accordance with the applicable service rules, nor can it justify dispensing with the examination of evidence, the disclosure of relevant material or the opportunity to controvert the case presented against the employee. Accordingly, the State's reliance upon the nature of the charges does not answer the petitioner's objections concerning the legality of the inquiry.

The first substantial infirmity arises from the petitioner's specific assertion that no regular oral inquiry was conducted by fixing and communicating a date, time and place for his effective participation and that the Inquiry Officer returned findings holding all the charges proved without recording the evidence of departmental witnesses in his presence or affording him an opportunity to cross-examine them. The State has relied upon the fact that the petitioner ultimately submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998 and that the Inquiry Officer, thereafter, submitted the report dated 22.08.1998. However, the submission of a written reply to the charges is not, by itself, proof that a regular inquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure. A written explanation and an oral inquiry serve distinct purposes. Where the charges are denied and the applicable rules require the department to establish them through evidence, the Inquiry Officer cannot substitute the employee's written explanation for proof of the allegations by the department.

In this regard, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyendra Singh (Supra) assumes considerable significance. As reproduced in the material placed before this Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, where a major penalty is proposed and the applicable rules require oral evidence, the Inquiry Officer is required to call the witnesses proposed in the charge-sheet, record their evidence in the presence of the charged employee, afford him an opportunity to cross-examine them and, thereafter, permit the employee to produce evidence in his defence. The judgment further recognises that a finding based merely upon references to documents, without examination of witnesses where such examination is mandatory, cannot be regarded as a legally sustainable determination of the charges.

The principle enunciated in the case of Satyendra Singh (Supra) directly supports the petitioner's contention to the extent that the impugned proceedings disclose an absence of a proper evidentiary inquiry. The present case culminated in the imposition of dismissal from service, a major penalty, accompanied by a direction for recovery of the alleged financial loss and adverse treatment of the suspension period. In such circumstances, the Inquiry Officer was required to comply with the procedure applicable to the imposition of a major penalty. If, as asserted by the petitioner and not satisfactorily answered by the State's general reliance upon the inquiry report, no departmental witness was examined and no meaningful opportunity of cross-examination or defence evidence was afforded, the findings cannot be sustained merely because the Inquiry Officer declared the charges proved. The legality of the inquiry must be demonstrated by the procedure actually followed, not by the conclusion recorded in the report.

The same conclusion is reinforced by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (Supra). The relevant extracts reproduced in the supplied material emphasise that the Inquiry Officer occupies the position of an independent adjudicator and is not a representative of the department or the disciplinary authority. Even where the employee does not participate in the inquiry or fails to submit an explanation, the Inquiry Officer must examine the evidence produced by the department and determine whether it is sufficient to establish the charges. Documentary material cannot automatically be treated as proved merely because it forms part of the departmental record. The inquiry officer cannot assume the role of both prosecutor and adjudicator.

Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court finds that the State's submission that the Inquiry Officer considered the petitioner's reply and the relevant records does not sufficiently meet the specific objection concerning the absence of an evidentiary inquiry. The State has emphasised the ultimate result of the inquiry without demonstrating, in response to the petitioner's detailed allegations, that the witnesses necessary to establish the charges were examined in accordance with the applicable procedure and that the petitioner was afforded an effective opportunity to challenge their evidence.

The distinction is material; consideration of a reply is not equivalent to proof of the charges and the existence of official records does not dispense with the obligation to establish their evidentiary value in the manner required by law. The petitioner's objection, therefore, cannot be dismissed as a mere invitation to reappreciate evidence.

The second and equally substantial infirmity concerns the non-supply of documents relied upon by the department. The record of events, as set out in the pleadings, indicates that after receiving the charge-sheet on 12.05.1992, the petitioner repeatedly requested copies of the documents necessary to prepare his defence. These requests were allegedly made from 23.05.1992 onwards and were followed by further correspondence and attempts to inspect the departmental records. Although the petitioner inspected certain documents between January and February 1993, he maintained that only a portion of the material demanded was supplied and that several documents, including documents specifically identified in his requests, remained unavailable. The petitioner also returned the incomplete set of documents and continued to seek the remaining material. These circumstances indicate that the objection was neither isolated nor raised for the first time after the conclusion of the proceedings; rather, the petitioner consistently sought access to the material during the disciplinary process itself.

In the case of State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a situation in which the delinquent employee had made persistent efforts to obtain copies of official documents relied upon by the department, but the documents were withheld. The Court held that denial of such documents, in breach of the applicable procedural requirement, vitiated the inquiry. The underlying principle is that an employee cannot be expected to effectively answer charges founded upon documentary material when the department withholds that very material. The opportunity to submit a reply must be meaningful and cannot be reduced to a formality requiring the employee to respond to allegations without access to the evidence upon which they rest.

The aforesaid principle squarely addresses the petitioner's complaint. The State has submitted that opportunities were extended for inspection and that certain documents were supplied on different dates. However, the question is not whether some documents were made available at some stage; it is whether the material necessary for an effective defence was supplied or made accessible and whether the petitioner was afforded a fair opportunity to controvert the case against him. Partial disclosure does not necessarily satisfy the requirements of natural justice, where material documents relied upon in support of the charges remain undisclosed. Equally, the number of letters issued by the department cannot establish fairness if the substance of the employee's repeated requests remained unaddressed. In the circumstances pleaded, the State's reliance upon the partial supply of records does not, without a satisfactory explanation of the missing material and its relevance, cure the procedural defect.

The third issue relates to documents allegedly lying in the custody of the competent criminal court. The petitioner has consistently asserted that the original documents relating to Crime No.37 of 1991 were in police custody and had been produced in the criminal proceedings. He further contends that, despite appearing before the court on the dates fixed for inspection pursuant to the directions of the departmental authorities and the Inquiry Officer, no departmental representative or authorised court assistant appeared to facilitate inspection. The petitioner relies upon the certification of the court and the subsequent correspondence to establish that the inspection could not be completed for reasons beyond his control.

Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the department afforded the petitioner opportunities to inspect the records and that the proceedings cannot be invalidated merely because every document was not supplied on the date initially requested. The proposition that every procedural irregularity does not automatically vitiate a departmental inquiry is not in dispute. Nevertheless, where the employee specifically alleges that the department relied upon documents, which were unavailable to him and that the department itself failed to facilitate inspection despite repeated requests, the question must be examined in the context of the employee's actual ability to defend himself. If the relevant documents were essential to establish or rebut the allegations, the department was required to take reasonable steps to secure lawful access to them or explain why such access could not be provided. Their custody with another public authority could not, without more, justify proceeding as though the employee had enjoyed an effective opportunity of inspection.

The petitioner's case is further strengthened by the correspondence which, according to the pleadings, continued over several years, including communications dated 27.08.1993, 27.09.1993, 25.10.1993, 17.03.1994, 10.06.1994 and 29.07.1998. The petitioner relies upon these communications to show that the issue of inspection remained unresolved despite directions from the departmental authorities. The cumulative significance of these events lies in the fact that the petitioner did not simply decline to inspect the material or remain absent from the process. Rather, he asserts that he repeatedly attempted to obtain the documents and that the inspection could not be completed because the necessary arrangements were not made. If established by the material on record, such circumstances cannot fairly be attributed to the petitioner as a failure to avail himself of the opportunity of defence.

The fourth issue concerns the effect of the aforesaid procedural deficiencies upon the petitioner's ability to submit an effective reply to the charge-sheet. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has emphasised that the petitioner eventually submitted his reply on 24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998 and that the Inquiry Officer, thereafter, considered the defence before submitting the inquiry report. This submission, however, overlooks the specific qualification recorded by the petitioner in his reply that the documents relied upon by the department had not been supplied completely and that he reserved his right to submit a further and comprehensive explanation upon receipt of the remaining material. Such a reply cannot be construed, in isolation, as an unconditional admission that the documents had been supplied or that the petitioner had received a fair opportunity to defend himself. The substance of the opportunity afforded to the petitioner must be assessed in the context of his persistent requests for disclosure and inspection. Where an employee is compelled to submit a reply without access to material evidence, the mere filing of such a reply cannot extinguish the underlying grievance concerning procedural unfairness.

This Court is conscious of the principle that a breach of procedural requirements must be assessed in the context of the applicable rules and the prejudice caused to the employee, rather than on the basis of technical objections divorced from the facts. In the present case, however, the prejudice asserted by the petitioner is neither abstract nor unrelated to the charges. The allegations concerned an alleged shortage of Government stock valued at ₹1,55,043.47, while the petitioner disputes the stock verification, the completeness of the inventory and the failure to account for material allegedly shifted to another godown. The documents relating to stock verification, transfer of charge, inventory and the departmental assessment were, therefore, potentially material to the determination of the charges. In the absence of a fair opportunity to inspect and controvert the relevant records, the petitioner was placed at a substantial disadvantage in establishing his defence. The procedural deficiencies, considered cumulatively, consequently disclose material prejudice.

The fifth issue relates to the service of the charge-sheet. The material indicates that the charge-sheet issued in August 1991 was returned undelivered with an endorsement that the petitioner had gone out for medical treatment. The petitioner thereafter approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 6065 (S/S) of 1991 and following the interim order dated 18.09.1991, was reinstated in service with effect from that date. According to the petitioner, he subsequently requested that a copy of the charge-sheet be supplied to him and ultimately received it through the District Agriculture Officer on 12.05.1992.

The State, on the other hand, relies upon subsequent steps allegedly taken to communicate the charge-sheet, including publication in a newspaper and submits that the initial failure of service did not invalidate the proceedings once the petitioner acquired knowledge of the charges.

This Court accepts the submission of the State to the limited extent that the initial non-service of a charge-sheet does not invariably invalidate all subsequent proceedings, if the charges are subsequently communicated and the employee receives a reasonable opportunity to answer them. The decisive consideration is not the initial failure of service in isolation, but whether the proceedings, thereafter, complied with the requirements of natural justice.

In the present case, the petitioner ultimately received the charge-sheet and participated in the proceedings by submitting his reply. Therefore, this Court does not consider it necessary to rest its conclusion solely upon the disputed mode of service or the alleged inconsistencies concerning newspaper publication. Nevertheless, subsequent communication of the charge-sheet could not cure the independent defects arising from the alleged non-supply of material documents and the absence of a proper evidentiary inquiry. The State's submission on service, therefore, does not remove the fundamental infirmities otherwise established in the disciplinary process.

The sixth issue concerns the alleged inconsistency in the chronology of the preliminary inquiry and the verification of the stock. The petitioner has pointed out that the preliminary inquiry report is stated to have been prepared on 09.01.1991, whereas the godown was sealed on 10.01.1991 and reopened on 24.01.1991, when the inventory was prepared and the alleged shortage was ascertained. According to the petitioner, the chronology raises a serious question as to the factual basis of the preliminary report and the reliability of the allegations subsequently levelled against him.

It is true that the chronology of a preliminary inquiry, by itself, may not conclusively establish that the departmental charges are false. A preliminary inquiry may, depending upon the circumstances, be based upon information or records collected before a physical verification is completed. However, where the alleged shortage is disputed and the employee specifically questions the sequence in which the preliminary report, sealing of the godown and subsequent inventory were prepared, the department cannot rely upon the preliminary conclusion as a substitute for proof in the regular inquiry. The discrepancy assumes significance when read with the petitioner's further contention that stock had been shifted to another godown and that the relevant records were not made available for inspection.

In these circumstances, the discrepancy reinforces the necessity of a fair and comprehensive inquiry in which the documentary and oral evidence is properly established and the defence is duly considered.

The seventh issue concerns the State's submission that the criminal proceedings and the departmental inquiry operate in distinct legal fields. On this aspect, the legal proposition advanced by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel is substantially correct. The pendency of criminal proceedings does not, as a general rule, automatically prohibit or invalidate departmental disciplinary proceedings, since the purpose and standard of proof in the two proceedings are distinct. Equally, the mere registration of an FIR does not establish the charges in a departmental inquiry. The legality of the impugned order must, therefore, be examined independently of the mere existence of Crime No.37 of 1991 under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

In the present case, the petitioner's challenge does not succeed merely because criminal proceedings were instituted on the same factual allegations. The material consideration is that certain documents relied upon by the department were allegedly in the custody of the authorities dealing with the criminal case, while the petitioner repeatedly sought their inspection and supply. The State's submission that the departmental and criminal proceedings are independent does not answer the question whether the petitioner was given access to the material relied upon against him. Indeed, the independence of the two proceedings reinforces the requirement that the department establish its charges through a procedurally valid inquiry rather than treating the institution of criminal proceedings or the existence of an investigation as sufficient proof of departmental misconduct. Accordingly, the petitioner's case is accepted on the ground of procedural unfairness and not on the proposition that the departmental inquiry was necessarily required to remain suspended until the criminal case concluded.

The eighth issue concerns the opportunity afforded to the petitioner to submit his representation against the inquiry report. The record indicates that a show-cause notice dated 04.03.1999, accompanied by the inquiry report, was issued to the petitioner, granting him fourteen days to submit his representation. The petitioner sought extension of time on 05.04.1999, citing the illness of his wife and requested time up to 15.05.1999. Thereafter, a further opportunity was allegedly granted on 16.08.1999, but no representation was submitted within the extended period. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that the petitioner cannot challenge the dismissal merely because he failed to avail himself of the opportunities extended to him.

The aforesaid submission must be considered in its proper perspective. Where an employee is afforded a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to respond to the inquiry report, his failure to submit a representation despite such opportunity cannot, by itself, invalidate the final order. Nevertheless, the failure to submit a further representation does not absolve the disciplinary authority of its obligation to act in accordance with law, nor does it retrospectively cure procedural defects committed during the inquiry.

In the present case, the petitioner had consistently asserted that the documents necessary for his defence remained unavailable and that his earlier reply was submitted subject to the receipt of the remaining material. The opportunity to respond to the inquiry report was, therefore, required to be considered against the background of those unresolved objections.

This Court does not consider the illness of the petitioner's wife, by itself, to be determinative of the legality of the impugned order, particularly when the record indicates that a further opportunity was granted. The material question is whether the disciplinary authority could lawfully proceed to impose the major penalty without addressing the substantial procedural objections arising from the inquiry itself. The answer must be in the negative. Even assuming that the petitioner failed to submit a further representation within the extended period, such failure could not transform an inquiry conducted in breach of mandatory procedural requirements into a valid one. The State's reliance upon the petitioner's omission to submit a subsequent representation, therefore, does not defeat the challenge to the legality of the underlying proceedings.

The ninth issue concerns the State's objection that this Court should not reappreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that judicial review is not an appeal on facts and that the High Court ordinarily does not substitute its own conclusions for those of the disciplinary authority merely because another view of the evidence may be possible. However, the petitioner is not seeking interference solely on the ground that the Inquiry Officer reached an incorrect factual conclusion. His challenge is directed principally against the process by which the conclusions were reached, including the alleged absence of an oral inquiry, the withholding of material documents and the failure to facilitate inspection of records relied upon by the department.

The distinction assumes particular significance in view of the judgments in the casees of Satyendra Singh (Supra) and State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). These judgments support the proposition that the requirements governing a disciplinary inquiry cannot be reduced to empty formalities and that the Inquiry Officer must act as an independent adjudicator on the basis of evidence established in accordance with the applicable rules. Consequently, examination of whether witnesses were examined, whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine them where required, whether material documents were supplied and whether the Inquiry Officer acted in accordance with the prescribed procedure does not amount to impermissible reappreciation of evidence. It constitutes legitimate judicial review of the decision-making process. The State's objection founded upon the limited scope of Article 226, therefore, cannot be accepted as a bar to interference in the facts of the present case.

The tenth issue concerns the nature and consequences of the penalty imposed. Vide impugned order dated 22.02.2001, the petitioner was dismissed from service; recovery of ₹1,57,043.47 was directed; the suspension period was treated as non-qualifying service and the petitioner was denied further payment for that period. The State has correctly submitted that each of these directions must derive authority from the applicable service rules and a lawful determination of the underlying facts. However, the validity of the recovery and the consequential service directions cannot be considered independently of the validity of the inquiry, where the same findings form the foundation for those directions.

Once the disciplinary inquiry is found to be materially vitiated by the denial of a fair opportunity of defence and failure to comply with the procedure applicable to a major penalty, the consequential findings cannot be treated as conclusively established for the purpose of sustaining dismissal and recovery. The impugned order does not become valid merely because the alleged loss relates to Government property or because the department considers the misconduct serious. The direction for recovery, in particular, must rest upon a lawful determination of the employee's responsibility for the loss and cannot be sustained solely by reference to findings reached through an inquiry that is legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the dismissal order and its consequential directions cannot be permitted to operate on the basis of the defective inquiry.

The cumulative effect of the circumstances discussed above is decisive. The petitioner repeatedly sought the documents relied upon by the department; the supply of records, according to his consistent pleadings, remained incomplete; attempts to inspect documents in the custody of the criminal court allegedly failed despite his appearance and the departmental correspondence and the petitioner specifically disputed the absence of a regular oral inquiry in which the departmental case could be tested through evidence. These objections relate directly to the fairness of the disciplinary process and to the petitioner's ability to defend himself against allegations involving a substantial alleged financial loss. The State's reliance upon the filing of a reply, partial supply of documents, subsequent show-cause notice and failure to submit a further representation does not satisfactorily answer these fundamental objections.

The Court is also conscious that disciplinary proceedings ought not to be invalidated for every technical or inconsequential irregularity. The conclusion in the present matter does not rest upon an isolated defect in correspondence, the initial non-service of the charge-sheet, the mere pendency of criminal proceedings or the petitioner's failure to submit a further representation. Rather, it rests upon the combined effect of the material procedural objections concerning the conduct of the inquiry and access to the evidence relied upon by the department. The alleged defects are substantial because they affect the very means by which the charges were required to be established and the petitioner's ability to rebut them. The inquiry, therefore, cannot be sustained merely by invoking the seriousness of the charges or the deference ordinarily accorded to departmental findings.

For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds merit in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, particularly those founded upon the case of Satyendra Singh v. State of U.P. and another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3325 and State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772. The legal principles emerging from these authorities, as applicable to the facts pleaded in the present case, require that a major penalty be founded upon an inquiry conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure, with the department establishing the charges through legally admissible and properly proved material and the delinquent employee receiving a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. The failure to satisfy these requirements cannot be treated as a mere procedural irregularity when it materially affects the fairness and reliability of the resulting findings.

Consequently, the submissions advanced by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel concerning the seriousness of the allegations, the distinction between criminal and departmental proceedings, the opportunities allegedly extended to the petitioner, the submission of his reply, the subsequent show-cause notice and the limited scope of judicial review do not furnish sufficient grounds to sustain the impugned order. The principles invoked by the State are not rejected in the abstract; rather, they are held inapplicable as a complete answer to the material procedural defects arising in the present case. The limitation upon judicial review does not prevent this Court from setting aside a disciplinary order where the process itself is found to be contrary to the requirements of a fair inquiry.

It is, accordingly, held that the impugned order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 is unsustainable in law on account of the material infirmities in the disciplinary proceedings preceding its issuance. The consequential directions concerning recovery of the alleged loss, treatment of the suspension period and denial of other payments, insofar as they rest upon the findings recorded in the impugned proceedings, cannot independently survive. The impugned order dated 22.02.2001 is, therefore, liable to be quashed.

Before determining the consequential relief, this Court takes note of the fact that the petitioner died on 06.02.2004 during the pendency of the writ petition. The relief of reinstatement in service, being personal in nature, cannot now be implemented in the ordinary manner. Nevertheless, the death of the petitioner does not render the challenge to the dismissal order infructuous, since the impugned order has consequences for his service record, the alleged recovery, the treatment of his suspension period and the service or retiral benefits, if any, payable to his lawful heirs or beneficiaries under the applicable rules. The validity of the dismissal order must, therefore, be determined notwithstanding the subsequent death of the petitioner.

The petitioner has also disputed the date of his superannuation, asserting that the correct date was 31.05.2004, whereas the State has relied upon the date of birth recorded in the service book and contended that his notional date of superannuation would have been 31.05.2002. Since the supplied material does not conclusively resolve this disputed question, it would not be appropriate for this Court to record a definitive finding on the petitioner's notional date of retirement or to direct payment of a quantified amount without verification of the relevant service record and applicable rules. The consequential service and financial benefits shall, therefore, be determined by the competent authority in accordance with law, treating the impugned dismissal order dated 22.02.2001 as having been quashed and giving due effect to the findings recorded herein.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.02.2001, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service and consequential directions were issued regarding recovery of the alleged financial loss and treatment of the suspension period, is hereby quashed.

The consequential claims arising from the quashing of the dismissal order, including the treatment of the petitioner's service and suspension period, the alleged recovery of ₹1,57,043.47 and the determination of any admissible retiral or other service benefits payable to his lawful heirs or beneficiaries, shall be considered and determined by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable service rules and law, consistently with the findings recorded in this judgment. Any amount already recovered pursuant to the quashed order shall be reconsidered for refund in accordance with law. The competent authority shall pass a reasoned order after verifying the relevant service records and the entitlement of the persons claiming such benefits.

Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has died during the pendency of the writ petition and that the determination of consequential financial benefits requires verification of the service record and applicable rules, the competent authority shall complete the aforesaid exercise within four months from the date a certified copy of this judgment is produced before it by the lawful heirs or beneficiaries, subject to their furnishing the documents reasonably required for such determination. The authority shall not deny consideration of the consequential claims merely on the ground that the impugned dismissal order had earlier been passed.

It is clarified that the quashing of the impugned order is founded upon the procedural infirmities discussed herein and does not amount to an independent factual declaration that every allegation levelled against the petitioner was necessarily false. The consequential service and financial claims shall be determined in accordance with the applicable rules and the findings recorded in this judgment, without treating the quashed dismissal order as a subsisting legal basis for denying such claims.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.