Raghbir Singh vs State Of Haryana & Ors.

KIRTI SINGH, J. (Oral)

The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the award dated 21.09.2000 (Annexure P-5) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ambala in Reference No.185 of 1998, whereby the reference concerning termination of the petitioner was answered against him.

As per the pleaded case, the petitioner was engaged as a Peon on daily wages with the Municipal Committee, later Municipal Council, Kaithal, and had been working continuously from 01.09.1992 till 31.05.1996. According to him, his services were orally terminated by the President of the Municipal Committee on 31.05.1996 without any written order and without complying with Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner further pleaded that, under the Government policy dated 18.03.1996 relating to regularisation of daily-rated/casual employees, he was eligible for regularisation. His representation in this regard was forwarded by the Municipal Council to the competent authority. Thereafter, he filed CWP No.14934 of 1996, which was disposed of on 29.01.1997 with a direction to decide his representation within six months. In compliance thereof, the Deputy Commissioner, Kaithal, vide order dated 01.06.1997, rejected the cases of the petitioner and other daily wagers on the ground that they did not fulfil the conditions prescribed under the regularisation policy. The petitioner thereafter raised an industrial dispute, which was referred to the Labour Court, Ambala vide notification dated 29.04.1998 and registered as Reference No.185 of 1998. Before the learned Labour Court, the petitioner reiterated his claim of continuous service from 01.09.1992 to 31.05.1996. The management disputed the same and relied upon the muster rolls and the successive sanctions under which the petitioner had been engaged from time to time for specific works, including maintenance of street lights, parks and roads. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Labour Court held that the petitioner's engagement was for specified work and specified periods and came to an end upon expiry of the relevant sanction. It consequently held that cessation of his engagement fell within the exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, did not attract Section 25-F. The Labour Court further found that there was no evidence to establish that any person junior to the petitioner had been retained in service so as to attract Section 25-G.

Learned counsel submits that the learned Labour Court erred in treating the petitioner's case as falling within Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act. It is contended that the petitioner had worked for a substantial period and had completed the requisite number of days, yet his services were discontinued without compliance with Section 25-F. It is further submitted that the petitioner was entitled to regularisation under the Government policy and that persons similarly placed with him were subsequently appointed as Peons and, therefore, he too was entitled to similar treatment.

During the pendency of the present petition, the petitioner has also filed C.M. No.5971-72 of 2006 seeking to place on record the appointment letter dated 01.05.1998 issued in favour of Smt. Shashi Bala and the appointment letter dated 18.09.2000 issued in favour of Sh. Ramesh Chand as Annexures P-6 and P-7 respectively. It is asserted that the cases of both these persons for regularisation had also been rejected along with that of the petitioner vide order dated 01.06.1997 and that, having regard to their lesser period of daily-wage service, they were junior to him. According to the petitioner, their subsequent appointments as Peons demonstrate discrimination and entitle him to appointment with consequential benefits from the respective dates of their appointments.

Per contra, learned State counsel and also learned counsel for respondent no. 4 support the impugned award and submit that the findings recorded by the Labour Court are based upon the muster rolls and successive sanctions governing the petitioner's engagement. It is submitted that the petitioner was engaged from time to time against leave gap arrangements and for specific works and periods and, therefore, cessation of such engagement upon expiry of the relevant sanction did not amount to retrenchment. It is further submitted that there was no evidence of violation of Section 25-G and that the petitioner did not fulfil the conditions of the regularisation policy. As regards the additional documents, it is submitted that the subsequent appointments relied upon by the petitioner do not establish any right in his favour.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

At the outset, it is seen from the case record that the application(s), C.M. No.5971-72 of 2006, seeking to place the additional documents on record, was allowed vide order dated27.04.2006 and Annexures P-6 and P-7 were taken on record. Even upon consideration of these documents, however, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition.

The principal challenge is to the finding of the learned Labour Court that cessation of the petitioner's engagement fell within Section 2(oo)

of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court did not proceed merely on the basis that the petitioner was a daily wager. It examined the muster rolls Ex.M-1 to Ex.M-17 and the successive sanctions produced by the management and, upon appreciation thereof, recorded a specific finding that the petitioner had been engaged from time to time for specified works and periods and that his engagement came to an end upon expiry of the relevant sanction.

The aforesaid finding is based upon documentary evidence and is essentially a finding of fact. No material has been pointed out to demonstrate that the Labour Court ignored any material evidence or arrived at a conclusion which is perverse or wholly unsupported by the record. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any patent error in the manner in which the Labour Court appreciated the evidence. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, does not sit as an appellate Court over the findings of the Labour Court or undertake a fresh appreciation of evidence merely because another view may be possible.

Even assuming that the petitioner had completed 240 days, that circumstance by itself would not establish violation of Section 25-F. The question which was required to be examined was whether cessation of the petitioner's engagement amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo). On appreciation of the material before it, the Labour Court found that the petitioner's engagement was against specific sanctions and for specified work and periods and that its cessation fell within the exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb). Once that finding is sustained, the requirement of compliance with Section 25-F would not arise. No perversity or patent error of law or jurisdictional infirmity in this conclusion has been pointed out.

The challenge under Section 25-G also does not merit acceptance. The Labour Court specifically found that there was no evidence on record to establish that any person junior to the petitioner had been retained in service. The additional documents now placed on record do not dislodge this finding.

Further, the appointment letter of Smt. Shashi Bala is dated 01.05.1998 and that of Sh. Ramesh Chand is dated 18.09.2000, whereas the petitioner's engagement had ceased on 31.05.1996. Their subsequent appointments, by themselves, do not establish that either of them was retained in service in preference to the petitioner at the relevant time. The petitioner's assertion that they were junior also cannot be established merely on the basis of their alleged lesser period of daily-wage service. Their respective service particulars, the nature and terms of their engagement and the circumstances in which they were subsequently appointed have not been shown to be identical to those of the petitioner.

More importantly, the documents do not establish any violation of Section 25-G. The statutory concept of retention of a junior has to be examined with reference to the relevant point of time. A subsequent appointment of another employee, without anything further to establish that such employee was retained in service when the petitioner was discontinued, cannot by itself attract Section 25-G. Thus, even after taking Annexures P-6 and P-7 on record, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any junior to him was retained in service in preference to him.

The subsequent appointments also do not confer any independent right upon the petitioner to seek appointment or reinstatement. The petitioner has to establish his own legal entitlement to the relief claimed. Merely because another person was subsequently appointed as a Peon cannot, by itself, create a corresponding right in favour of the petitioner.

Insofar as regularisation is concerned, the petitioner's case had already been considered by the competent authority pursuant to the order passed in CWP No.14934 of 1996 and was rejected vide order dated 01.06.1997 on the ground that the prescribed conditions of the Government policy were not fulfilled. The petitioner has not demonstrated any error in the said decision warranting interference in the present proceedings. The subsequent appointments relied upon by him also do not establish that he fulfilled the conditions of the policy or that the competent authority was bound to regularise his services.

On an overall consideration, the learned Labour Court examined the evidence produced before it, including the muster rolls and successive sanctions, and recorded cogent findings regarding the nature of the petitioner's engagement, applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) and absence of evidence of retention of any junior so as to attract Section 25-G. Even after taking the additional documents on record and considering the plea sought to be founded upon them, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any perversity, patent illegality or jurisdictional error warranting interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

Accordingly, as a fallout of the foregoing discussion, the present writ petition is dismissed.

Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.