Raghbir Chand vs Rent Controller and Others

Teja Singh, C.J.—Reghbir Chanel got a house situate in Patiala on rent from Bachan Singh on 6-10-1948. One of the conditions was that so long as the tenant continued to pay rent to the landlord he would not be evicted. On 4-11-1949 Bachan Singh applied to the Controller of Rent for the eviction of Raghbir Chand from the house u/s 13, Patiala and E.P. States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (No. 8 of 2006) as amended by Ordinance No. 22 of 2006. He alleged, inter alia, that previously he and his son had been living together in his housed but since the son had got married and because of constant quarrels that took place between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law the two families could not live together, he required the house which he had let out to Reghbir Chand for his own residence. The Controller, after making inquiries into the matter, accepted Bachan Singh''s application and ordered Raghbir Chand to vacate the house. From this order, Reghbir Chand preferred an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner but failed. He has now come to this Court with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the prayer that the orders of the Controller and the Deputy Commissioner be cancelled and writs be Issued to the respondents that they, should not disturb his possession.

The first point urged by the Petitioner''s counsel before me is that because of the term contained in the rent-deed that the Petitioner .shall not be evicted so long as he went on paying the monthly rent the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance had no applicability and in view of the fact that the Petitioner has not made any default in payment of the rent the order made by the Controller was without jurisdiction. He admits that .according to Section 13 of the Ordinance (No. 8 of 2006) as amended by the later Ordinance, a tenant can be ordered to put the landlord in possession of it in the case of a residential house if the same is required by the landlord for his own occupation or in the case of any building if the landlord requires it for the use of his son, but his argument is that it is open to a landlord and a tenant in a particular case to contract themselves out of the provisions of law and since this has been done by the parties in the present case Bachan Singh had no right to evict . the Petitioner and the Controller was not authorised to order his eviction. The contention, in my opinion, is wholly devoid of force. In the first place, it is important to note that the opening words of Section 13 are "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" and by implication they rule out all private contracts between the parties, because the terms of a contract are binding upon the parties and can be enforced under the provisions of the Contract Act and those provisions cannot be allowed to stand in the landlord''s way of making use of the provisions of Section 13 of the Ordinance, except when the case falls under the first proviso to Sub-section 13. This proviso reads as below:

Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this sub-section before the expiry of such period.

I may mention here that apart from the implication of the opening words of the section to which I have already referred this proviso also shows that the landlord as well as the tenant are bound by Section 13 notwithstanding the terms of any contract that they might have made except the term laying down that the tenancy shall be for a specified period. If the intention of the framers of the Ordinance had been that it was open to landlords and tenants to agree among themselves that one should be free to evict the tenant, and the other should have the right to prolong the period of his tenancy, even in cases that were covered by Section 13 there would have been no use in adding the proviso to Sub-section 13. Secondly, the tenancy in this case came into existence before the Ordinances were enacted and accordingly no question of the parties contracting themselves out of the provisions of the Ordinance arises.

The Petitioner''s counsel placed his reliance upon - S. Raja Ghetty and Others Vs. Jagannathadas Govindas and Others, In that case the lease deed expressly provided that if the rent remained unpaid for two tenancy months after it became payable the landlord would be entitled to re-enter upon the demised premises. The lease was entered into long after the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, No 15 of 1046. The learned Judges held that the Act did not apply us the parties had expressly entered into a contract inconsistent with it and that their rights would, therefore, be governed by their express contract. The mere fact that the Act was in existence when the parties entered into the contract of tenancy distinguishes this case from the present one. The case that is really in point is - George Oakes Ltd. Vs. The Chief Judge, Small Causes Court and Another, in which the lease was executed before the passing of the Act No. 15 of 1946. Rajamannar C.J. who was a party to: both the decisions distinguished his previous decision in the following words:

I only wish to add a few words on the point raised by Dr. John purporting to rely upon the decision in - S. Raja Ghetty and Others Vs. Jagannathadas Govindas and Others, to which I was a party. I do not think that the doctrine of contracting out of the statute can possibly be of any help to Dr. John in this case for two reasons which are, in my opinion, conclusive. The first reason is that the lease in his client''s favour was executed on 22nd June 1946, i.e. before the passing of Madras Act 15 of 1946. On the date oil the execution of the lease, the landlord had no right under the Rent Control Order then in force to'' apply to the Controller for fixation of a fair rent... Obviously a person cannot be said to have abandoned a right by reason of an agreement when on the date of that agreement the law did not confer on him that right. I must confess that this aspect was overlooked during the course of arguments.

The second point argued by the Petitioner''s counsel is that conditions of Section 13 were not fulfilled in the present case and the Controller failed to note that the landlord had a house in which he was residing and his allegation that he required the house occupied by the Petitioner for his own residence was not correct. Now the position of the landlord, as mentioned above, was that because of his son having got married and the change brought about by the marriage in the affairs of the family, it was not possible for the son and his wife to live amicably with the landlord and .his wife and accordingly he needed another house. When he contended that the house in question was required for his own use, evidently his intention was to give his present house to his son and himself shift to the house that was occupied by the Petitioner. But suppose that he wanted to remain where he was and give the other house to his son, there was nothing wrong in this because the two families could not live together. In whatever way the matter is looked at there can be no doubt that the landlord required the Petitioner''s house and whether he required it for himself or for his son, the case was covered by Section 13 of the Ordinance and there was nothing wrong with the Controller''s decision.

The result is that the petition fails and is therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee as regards respondent No. 3 will be assessed according to the certificate filed by him, and in the case of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is fixed at Rs. 100/-.