R. Velmurugan vs The Commissioner, The Corporation of Chennai

K.N. Basha, J.—Mr. T. Mathi, learned standing counsel takes notice for the respondent. By mutual consent of the learned Counsel on

either side, this writ petition is taken up for final disposal at this stage.

The petitioner has come forward with this petition seeking for the relief of quashing the Order of the respondent in No. G.D.C. No.

E1/15394/2008 dated 24.04.2008 and consequently directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner with all monetary benefits.

Mr. Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is under prolonged suspension right from 24.04.2008

and on that ground itself the impugned order of suspension is liable to be quashed. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the

impugned order of suspension reveals that the said order was passed as an order of deemed suspension. It is contended by the learned Counsel

for the petitioner that the petitioner was arrested and immediately released on 22.04.2008 and the impugned order of suspension was passed on

24.04.2008 stating specifically in the order itself that the petitioner is deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of detention, i.e.,

from 22.04.2008. The learned Counsel would contend that as per Rule 10(e)(ii) of the Madras Corporation Service (Classification, Control and

Appeal) Rules, 1970 in order to pass an order of deemed suspension, the concerned delinquent officer should have been under the custody

exceeding the period of 48 hours and as far as the instant case is concerned, the petitioner was arrested on 22.04.2008 and released immediately

on the same day and as such the impugned order is liable to be quashed on that ground also.

Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent herein contended that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. It is submitted that

the respondent also filed a counter affidavit and it is stated in the counter affidavit that the representations of the petitioner dated 29.01.2009 and

06.03.2009 were considered and rejected on the ground of implication of the petitioner in a criminal case for the alleged offences under the

Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent would further contend that in view of the pendency of the criminal case it

cannot be stated that the petitioner was kept under prolonged suspension. It is contended that as the petitioner has been implicated in a criminal

case, though it is stated in the impugned order that the petitioner was deemed to have been suspended with effect from 22.04.2008, the impugned

order would not become invalid.

I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forward by either side and also perused the materials available on record.

A perusal of the impugned order discloses that the petitioner has been under prolonged suspension right from 24.04.2008. It is seen that the

criminal case is pending as on date and it may not be over in the near future and as such this Court is of the considered view that there is no

justification for keeping the petitioner under prolonged suspension. It is pertinent to note the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in State of

Madras v. K.A. Joseph reported in AIR 1970 SC 155), wherein it has been held as follows:

there is a very clear and distinct principle of natural justice, that an Officer is entitled to ask, if he is suspended from his office because of grave

averments or grave reports of misconduct, that the matter should be investigated with reasonable diligence, and that charges should be framed

against him within a reasonable period of time. If such a principle were not to be recognised, it would imply that the executive is being vested with a

total, arbitrary and unfettered power of placing its officers under disability and distress, for an indefinite duration.

In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the decision cited supra, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order of

suspension is liable to be quashed on this ground alone.

Further, the learned Counsel for the petitioner also raised yet another contention to the effect that the petitioner was arrested and released on the

same day, i.e., on 22.04.2008 and the impugned order of suspension was passed on 24.04.2008 and it is specifically mentioned in the impugned

order that the petitioner is deemed to have been suspended from service with effect from the date of detention, i.e., from 22.04.2008. It is seen

that in the affidavit itself, it is specifically stated by the petitioner that the petitioner was arrested on 22.04.2008 and he was released on the same

day by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police. It is relevant to note that Rule 10(e)(ii) of the Madras Corporation Service (Classification,

Control and Appeal) Rules, 1970 contemplates passing an order of deemed suspension only in the event of the delinquent officer undergoing the

custody exceeds the period of 48 hours. As already pointed out the petitioner has not at all undergone custody exceeding the period of 48 hours

as the petitioner was arrested on 22.04.2008 and released on the same day. Therefore, even on this ground, the impugned order is liable to be

quashed.

Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by the respondent in his proceedings No. G.D.C. No. E1/15394/2008

dated 24.04.2008 is hereby quashed. Consequently, connected M.P. is closed. No costs.