R. Umraomal and Others vs State of Tamil Nadu and Another

These three appeals, W. A. Nos. 349, 350 and 351 of 1983, are against the common judgment rendered in W.P. Nos. 1837, 1836 and 1835

of 1982 respectively by Mohan J. dismissing the writ petitions of the appellants praying for issuance of writ of certiorari quashing the proceedings

in G.O. Ms. No. 68 Revenue dated 11-1-1982, and the notification dated 15-12-1980 made in G.O. Ms. No. 2753, Revenue.

The father of Umraomal and Jawanthraj, appellants in W. A. 349 and 350 of 1983 respectively, purchased certain buildings in R. S. No. 80

and R. S. No. 882/2 on an extent of 5 grounds and 1030 sq. ft. of Tondiarpet village in the years 1928 and 1931. The Government granted lease

of the land on 12-7-1941, on a yearly rent of Rs. 500. They were living with the members of their families in the buildings constructed by them and

they have also built certain shops in the ground floor and let them out to certain tenants. But the tenants committed default in the payment of rent

which resulted in the appellants taking proceedings in eviction. Orders were passed evicting the tenants, but still they continued to squat on the

property and they formed an association known as ''Royapuram Cemetery Road Merchants Sangam'' consisting exclusively of the tenants under

the appellants. They made certain untrue representations to Government and were able to persuade the Government of Tamil Nadu to terminate

the lease in favour of the appellants. The Government directed the appellants to remove the superstructures. The appellants then moved this Court

and filed W. P. 4154, 4180 and 4181 of 1978 and this Court observed that the proper remedy for them is to approach the Government and also

directed the Government to explore the possibility of acceding to the request of the appellants. In pursuance of this order, the appellants moved the

Government bringing it to the notice of the Government that they have spent nearly Rs. 4,50,000, their life savings. The Government examined the

matter and passed G. O. No. Ms. 2730 Revenue, dated 11-12-1980 giving up the proposal for demolition of the superstructures, but agreed to

pay compensation for the value of the superstructures. Under these circumstances, a notification under S. 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in G.

O. Ms. No. 2753 Revenue dated 15-12-1980 came to be passed. The notification stated that the public purpose for which the acquisition is made

is to provide ''shopping facilities to small traders and self employed persons''. An objection was also filed by the petitioner in W.P. 1835 of 1982,

in response to a notice under S. 5-A of the Act, but it was overruled and a declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made in G.O.

Ms. No. 68 Revenue dated 11-1-1982 and it was also published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette Extraordinary, Part II, S. 2, dated 121-1982. The

declaration is in the usual statutory form stating that the Government has been satisfied that the superstructures on the land have to be acquired for

public purposes. It is under these circumstances, that the writ petitions were filed. The acquisition was attacked on various grounds, the important

of which are- (1) that the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act cannot be resorted to. to acquisition of superstructures alone; (2) that the

Government is actuated by malice, and (3) that the Government should have resorted to proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Requisitioning and

Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1956. The learned single Judge held that the Government can acquire the superstructures as the land

belongs to Government, that there are no mala fides in the case, that the acquisition is for a public purpose, that it is open to Government to take

proceedings having recourse to Central Act or to the Tamil Nadu Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1956 and in the end

the learned Judge dismissed the petitions. These appeals are preferred against that order.

Mr. Dolia, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, attacked the order on almost the same points as were raised before the learned single

Judge, but laid particular stress on the fact that the purpose mentioned in the notification under S. 4(l) of the Land Acquisition Act is not a public

purpose. The other contentions are that the Government cannot resort to Land Acquisition Act, but has to resort to the Tamil Nadu Requisitioning

and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1956, that the acquisition of the building alone under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act will

not be valid and that the proceedings of the Government were motivated by mala fides.

The notification in G.O. Ms. No 2753 Revenue, dated 15-12-1980 shows that the Government of Tamil Nadu intended to acquire ''the

superstructures on the land in R. S. No. 80 and 882/2 in Tondiarpet village, Tondiarpet taluk, Madras Dt, for the purpose of assigning the lands

and the superstructures thereon to provide for ''shopping facilities to small traders and self-employed persons''. The impugned declaration under S.

6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, reads that the superstructures on the lands specified in the schedules are needed for a public purpose, to wit,

for the purpose of assigning the lands and the superstructures thereon to provide for shopping facilities to small traders and self-employed persons.

The contention of the learned counsel Mr. Dolia, for the appellants, is that the Government should have resorted to the Tamil Nadu Requisitioning

and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1956 as that is the special enactment for acquisition of buildings and should not have resorted to the

Land Acquisition Act 1894, which is a Central enactment which provides for acquisition of land for public purposes and for companies, and in fact

in one of the grounds in the memorandum of appeal, it has been pointed out that the notification under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is

void and without jurisdiction. This contention, in our view, is not well-founded for the simple reason that under S. 3 of the Land Acquisition Act

(Act 1 of 1894) the expression ''land'' includes things attached to the earth or things permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

Secondly, it must be noted that the lands in question belong to Government and the appellants are lessees of the land. It is therefore clear that the

Government did not propose to acquire what was already their own, but only the superstructures built upon their lands. In Deputy Collector,

Calicut Dn. v. Aiyavu, (1911) 9 Ind Cas 341, Wallis J. as he then was, observed-

It is, in my opinion, clear that the Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest which already belongs to Government in

land which is being acquired under the Act, but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land as do not already, belong to the Government.

It is, therefore, manifest that when the Government is the owner of the land, it need not acquire the land, because there can be no question of

Government acquiring what is its own. It has therefore to acquire only the superstructures which stood on the land belonging to it and such an

application (acquisition?) can be made under the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894). We are, therefore, of the view that the Government was

not wrong in resorting to Act 1 of 1894. That disposes of one of the challenges made to the impugned notification.

The appellants would state that the Government have been actuated by malice at the instance of the defaulting tenants and the tenants were able

to bring pressure on the Government through political intervention and persuade the Government to take proceedings for acquisition (Paragraph

6(F) of the affidavits in the writ petitions) and that the Government is keen on supporting the tenants for political reasons. It would be very difficult

for the appellants to prove malice. But the learned counsel. Mr. Dolia, for the appellants, pointed out that the Government is only guilty of malice in

law. Viscount Haldane described malice in Shearer v. Shields, 1914 AC 808 . as follows -

A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an innocent mind; he is

taken to know the law, and he must act within the law, He may, therefore, be guilty of malice, in law, although, so far the state of his mind is

concerned, he acts ignorantly and in that sense innocently.

It is likely that the Government have terminated the lease of the appellants and have sought to acquire the superstructure on the representations

made by the Rayapuram Cemetery Road Merchants Sangam which consists of the tenants of the appellant''s premises. But, if the Government uses

the power of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act for fulfilment of an object which, in its view, is for public purpose, then we cannot say that

the act of the Government is actuated by malice in law. But, if the action is graded (sic) by extraneous consideration and the true object is for

different reasons from the one for which the acquisition is allegedly made, then the appellants may have a case that the State is actuated by motives

and intentions which are mala fide. In this case, in the counter-affidavit the State has denied the allegation that they were politically actuated. There

appears to be no prima facie evidence that the Government was influenced by considerations which are bad. We are, therefore, of the view that

the appellants have not proved mala fides, on the part of the Government in starting proceedings for acquisition of the superstructures.

The only question that remains to be considered is whether the acquisition can be upheld as one for public purpose. It has already been pointed

out, that under the impugned notification, the public purpose is said to be to provide for shopping facilities to small traders and self-employed

persons''. According to the appellants, the tenants are not small traders, nor are they self-employed persons, but most of them are Income Tax

assessees, some of them are doctors, jewellers, pawn brokers, and pharmacists. The further contention is that some of them have ceased to be

tenants even before the notification, that the appellants have taken proceedings both under the Rent Control Act and in the Civil Court and have

also obtained orders of eviction and also decrees for possession; that there are only 32 tenants and that the acquisition for providing shopping

facilities to the defaulting tenants of the appellants'' premises will not be ''public purpose''. The fact that the tenants on the appellant''s premises

formed the Rayapuram Cemetery Road Merchants'' Sangam is not disputed. As to what constitutes public purpose, has been the subject matter of

many rulings, the earliest of which is Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secy. of state, AIR 1914 P C 20, where their Lordships of the Judicial Committee,

following Bachelor J. took the view that the phrase ''public purpose'' must include a purpose in which the general interest of the community as

opposed to particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. The expression ''public purpose'' came to be considered in Smt.

Somavanti and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, . Referring to the definition in S. 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, their Lordships

pointed out that it is an inclusive definition and not a compendious one and therefore does not assist very much in ascertaining the ambit of the

expression ''public purpose'' and that broadly speaking the expression public purpose'' would, however, include a purpose in which the general

interest of the community as opposed to particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. In this case, the acquisition is sought to be

made to accommodate the tenants of the premises belonging to the appellants. The learned Advocate General sought to sustain the order of the

learned single Judge on the ground that the tenants of the premises of the appellants also form a section of the society and therefore the purpose in

question will be a public purpose and the Government alone is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is ''public purpose''

or not. In our view, the proper approach would be to consider the scheme as a whole and then examine whether the entire scheme is for a public

purpose or not. As we earlier pointed out, it is only to benefit the tenants who have defaulted to pay rents against some of whom the appellants

have procured orders for eviction and decree for possession. This is not a case of the landless poor being provided with shelter, but

accommodating the very tenants of the appellants who have defaulted. As pointed out already, some of the tenants are pawn brokers, doctors,

chemists and others. All the disgruntled tenants joined together under the banner of Royapuram Cemetery Road Merchants Sangam and moved

the Government for canceling the lease granted to the appellants and acquire the superstructures, by which acquisition the persons to be benefited

will be the tenants of the appellants. In Arnold Rodricks and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, the Supreme Court observed thus-

The main idea in issuing the impugned notification was not to think as the private comfort or advantage of the members of the public but the

general public good. At any rate where a very large section of the community is concerned its welfare is a matter of public concern; and when the

notifications serve to enhance the welfare of this section of the community this is public purpose and the notifications are valid and cannot be

impugned on the ground that they were not issued for any public purpose.

In this case, it cannot be said that the welfare of a large section of the community is concerned. We have not been shown any precedent or incident

where the Government have acquired buildings for accommodating the tenants of those buildings. The acquisition is meant for the particular interest

of the individual tenants of the appellants, and, therefore, in our view, does not involve the general interest of the community as a whole. In our

view, the acquisition is therefore not for a public purpose.

We, therefore, allow the appeals, set aside the order of the learned single-Judge, passed in W. Ps. 1835 to 1837 of 1982, and quash the

notification made in G. O. Ms. No. 68 Revenue, dated 11-1-1982, and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, Extraordinary Part II,

S. 2, dated 12-1-1982, and the Notification made in G. O. Ms. No. 2753 Revenue, dated 15-12-1980, published in the Tamil Nadu Government

Gazette (Supplement) dated 31-12-1980. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

Appeals allowed.