R. Sundaram vs A.D. Peter

Natesan, J.—This revision has been preferred under S. 25of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred

to as the Act by the landlord whose application under S. 14 (1) (b) of the Act, for eviction of the respondent with a view to demolish and re-

construct, has been rejected in limine by the authorities below, in the view that the provisions of S. 14 (1) (b) can be availed of, only when the

landlord seeks possession of the entire building for the purpose of demolition and re-construction and not when only possession of apart of the

building is sought. The brief facts may be stated. The petitioner owns a building in the city with an open terrace. The ground floor is let out to a

tenant who is not a party to this proceeding. On the terrace, there is a thatched shed, of which the respondent is stated to be the tenant. The

landlord applied for possession of this terrace with the thatched shed under S. 14 (1) (b), submitting that he intended immediately demolishing the

shed and putting up a pucca structure thereon. Whether it is bona fide required by him for demolition and re-construction has not as a fact been

gone into. Learned Counsel for the respondent-tenant does not admit before me that the shed belongs to the landlord. These are questions on the

merits. The simple question for consideration now in this revision is whether the petition for possession of this portion of the building which is stated

to have been separately let out and is in the occupation of the respondent in maintainable under S. 14 (1) (b) of the Act. The authorities below

have taken the view that in the context of S. 14(1) (b) the building must refer to the entire building and not to any part of it though separately let.

Reliance is placed for this contention on the language of S. 14 (1) (b)which runs thus :

that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the

purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished.

The reasoning is that, when reference is made to the word ''site'' it can only refer to a building on the ground, that is, on terra firma or earth. It is

reasoned that the petitioner-landlord must claim and intend, demolishing the building as a whole from the ground; otherwise, it would not come

within the scope of S. 14 (1) (b). Confirmation for this view is sought from the language employed in S. 14Sub-Cl. (2) (b) which runs thus:

No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed.....

(a).........

(b) on the ground specified in Cl. (b) of Sub-S. (1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of

the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the

date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in

writing, allow.

Emphasis is laid on the language used in the above sub-clause; ""entire building.

Now ""building"" is defined in the Act in S. 2 (2), unless the context otherwise requires, thus :

''building'' means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes-

(a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with such

building or hut,

(b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house;

In limiting the scope of S. 14 (1) (b), the authorities below also appear to be of the view that the Legislature intended to encourage the construction

of new houses only in the place of old buildings. It may here be pointed out that this Court has recently in more than one case emphasised that it is

not always the essential requisite for the application of S. 14 (1) (b) that the building should be old and decrepit. Old and decrepit state of the

building may, in certain cases, be the requirement for demolition. There may be other grounds also for requiring possession of the building for

demolition and re-construction.

In my view, the Courts below have overlooked that the apparent object of the Legislature in making this provision in S. 14 of the new Act is to

give alto scope for more accommodation and fresh buildings being provided by landlords who have the requisite finance, to relieve the persistent

shortage of accommodation. In this connection the provision in the Act exempting buildings constructed after the commencement of the Act from

its provisions may be noticed. While seeking to economise available accommodation the Act encourages fresh building activities. It is, bearing

these in view, that one has to interpret the provisions of S. 14 (1) (b). The Act itself defines a building as part of a building let or to be let

separately. Stately in this case, the terraced portion with the thatched shed has been let separately. It would, therefore, be a building as defined in

the Act. This meaning is sought to be taken away by reliance on the language of S. 14 (1) (b) where the requirement is that the new building must

be erected on the site of the building sought to be demolished. The question is whether ""site"" should necessarily be interpreted in this provision as

referring only to the earth or place at ground level, or it can mean also a place where the ""building"" sought to be demolished stands. In the Shorter

Oxford English Dictionary, of the meanings given to the word ""site"" the following may be referred to :

The place or position occupied by some specified thing; the situation of position of a place, town, building etc.; the ground or area upon which a

building, town, etc., has been built, or which is set apart for some purpose, also a plot, or number of plots, or land intended or suitable for building.

If the shed can be deemed to be a building under the Act, the terrace would certainly be the place or position occupied by the shed, and will be

covered by the word ""site"" used in the section. At any rate, it is an area upon which the building stands. The conception of buildings has changed in

the past few decades. We have now premises built in flats one over the other, where the flats are not merely enjoyed separately, but acquired,

conveyed and owned separately. As the Earl of Halsbury, Lord Chancellor, observes in Grant v. Langston (1900) A.C. 383 at p. 390.

A hundred years ago there was not much difficulty in saying what was a ""house"" but builders and architects have so altered the construction of

houses, and the habits of people have so altered in relation to them, that the word ""house"" has acquired an artificial meaning, and the word is no

longer the expression of a single idea; but to ascertain its meaning one must understand the subject-matter with respect to which it is used in order

to arrive at the sense in which it is employed in a statute.

What is the sense in which the Legislature can be deemed to have used the word ""site"" in S. 14 (1) (b) of the Act? In my view there can be little

difficulty in holding that the building now sought to be demolished certainly does stand on a site, namely, the terrace over the ground floor of the

premises in question. Reference in this connection may also be made to Rowland Burrows, ""Words and Phrases judicially defined"" wherein giving

the possible meaning of the word ""site,"" the learned editor relies upon Re Feeney Inglis v. Birmingham Corporation (1906) 24 T. L. R. 314 at 315,

where for the meaning to be attached to the word ''site'' in a Will whereby the testator bequeathed a sum of money to the Birmingham Corporation

to be applied towards the cost of erecting an art gallery on a ""site"" to be provided by the Corporation. It is stated thus:

The executors...... contend that what the testator contemplated was a separate building, erected and directly resting on a plot of land to be

provided by the Corporation, and they insist that the word ""site"" means the ground upon which the building has been or is to be erected, and

cannot be read as applicable to an artificial base upon which the new erection is to be superimposed. The Corporation, on the other hand, argue

that, although the word ""site"" may as a general rule be held to refer to an area on the ground level, it is not confined to that level and does under

some circumstances signify the superficial space on which the building stands, even though that space be at a higher level than the ground level.

The question, therefore, is whether the word ""site"" so necessarily imports an area or plot of land as to preclude its being judicially applied to a

superficial area which includes no land or ground as popularly understood. I have looked again at all the dictionary quotations to which my

attention has been called, and having given the best consideration I can to what was urged on both sides, I have come to the conclusion that I

ought not to attach to the word the restricted meaning for which the executors contend.

To accept the arguments on behalf of the respondent and to affirm the view of the Courts below would, in my view, practically nullify the

beneficial provisions of the section. One can envisage a case where a landlord having a plan to build three storeys has to stop construction after

finishing the ground-floor by reason of shortage of building materials. For the time being he might have let in one tenant in the ground floor and put

up a temporary shed on the terrace above and lodge another tenant there. If he wants to re-start construction and complete the construction

according to the plan when building materials became available, then, according to the view of the lower Courts he will have to evict the tenant in

the ground-floor also and pull down the entire construction. Otherwise on this interpretation he cannot secure possession for demolition and re-

construction, however, bona fide he may be in his requirement. But all that is actually needed by him in that case is to get possession of the shed on

the terrace of the first floor. If he can secure possession of the terrace with the shed thereon, he can demolish the shed and put up two or three

flats. In my view, it would be in keeping with the policy of the Legislature as may be read in Ss. 14 (1) (b) and 30of the Act, to interpret S. 14 (1)

(b) as entitling the landlord in such a case to secure possession of the terraced portion for purposes of demolition and re-construction. He will be

demolishing the superstructure or shed that might have been put up on the terrace and he would be constructing thereon. No doubt the building

site "" would be not on the ground. As observed in the extract made above, the word "" site "" can have an extended as well as a restricted meaning.

Site "" here would be the place where the shed stands. Such an interpretation takes a sensible view of the provision. Of course, on principle it will

make little difference if instead of the shed there is a brick and Morten structure. The Courts below have, therefore, in my view, erroneously

rejected the application in limine. The matter has not been gone into the merits. It will have to be decided whether the petitioner bona fide requires

the building (portion separately let to the respondent) for the purpose of immediate demolition and re-construction. I shall therefore say nothing on

the merits of the case. When the case was taken up, it was submitted by the respondent''s Counsel that, according to his instructions, the landlord

had parted with the premises by sale to a third party and that he might not in the circumstances be entitled to maintain the petition. The case has

been pending for three years in this Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has no instructions in the matter. I therefore do not consider the

effect, if any, the alleged sale may have on the maintainability of the petition. The order of the Tribunals below are set aside and the matter remitted

to the first authority for disposal on the merits. There will be no order as to costs.