R. Srinivasa Reddy vs M. Dasaratharama Reddy

Devadoss, J.—The point raised in this case is that there was forcible dispossession, according to the petitioner on the 1st June, 1927, and

according to the Sub-divisional Magistrate there was dispossession early in May, within two months of the presentation of this petition; but the

Magistrate has ""found against the* petitioner on the ground that the forcible dispossession was more than two months before the date of his

preliminary order. He has not definitely found whether there was or there was not forcible dispossession. The counter-petitioner''s title to the

property was under a sale-deed obtained by him on 31st May, 1927. He could not have had possession before that. If the Magistrate finds there

was forcible dispossession, then he would have to see whether the 1st proviso to Clause 4 of Section 145 is applicable to the case. The question

he has to consider is this : When a person complains to the Magistrate is of forcible dispossession within a few days after the dispossession and

asks him to take proceedings u/s 145, if the Magistrate either by reason of his sending the petition to the police for enquiry or owing to pressure of

work is not able to pass a preliminary order within two months, whether the opposite party should have the benefit of the delay caused in the

Magistrate''s Court. Though the words of the proviso are capable of the interpretation that the forcible dispossession must be within two months of

the order yet the intent and the object of the section must be taken into consideration before a literal interpretation is put upon it. Where a person

who is entitled to complain of forcible dispossession goes before a Magistrate and complains of forcible dispossession, if for no reason or any fault

of his, the Magistrate does not pass a preliminary order at once but delays the passing of that order though it may be bona fide, the person who

complained to him of forcible dispossession should not be deprived of the benefit of Section 145 by reason of the delay caused in the Magistrate''s

Court. I am supported in this view by my brother Wallace, J., who in Cr. R. C. No. 539 of 1926 observes:

I am not prepared at present to subscribe to the proposition that a party taking possession by force must be retained in possession if owing to

delay after the dispossessed party has asked the Court to take action, on the part of the Court taking action over two months have elapsed before

the Court finally makes up its mind to issue the preliminary order

I think a reasonable interpretation ought to be placed upon the proviso and not a literal interpretation which would defeat the very object of

Section 145 (4) which relates to dispossession of Immovable property. I set aside the order of the Magistrate and direct him to restore the

application to file and dispose of it in the light of the observations made above.