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Judgment
M. Jeyapaul, J.—The suit is filed seeking a direction to the defendants to pay jointly and severally a sum of Rs. 10,72,000/= towards past
damages and to pay a further sum of Rs. 10,00,000/= as compensation for the further acts of demolition of the A schedule property, a declaration
that the property set out in the B schedule of the plaint as belonging to the plaintiffs, a direction directing the first defendant to deliver possession to
the plaintiffs and to pay a sum of Rs. 3000/= per month towards future damages from the date of plaint till the date of payment of damages, a
declaration that notice dated 6.12.1983 of the second defendant purporting to be u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act of 1919
is null and void and a direction to the defendants to restore possession of the property set out in A schedule of the plaint.
The plaintiffs are the Trustees of S. Rathnavelu Chettiar Trust constituted under a registered Deed of Trust dated 18.5.1919. The land bearing
the present door No. 76, Gangadhareswarar Koil Street, Purasawalkam was taken on lease from the Gangadhareswarar Koil Devasthanam under
a registered deed of lease on 14.12.1909 by S. Rathnavelu Chettiar. He put up a valuable superstructure in the year 1910. Rathnavelu Chettiar
executed a registered deed of indenture on 18.5.1919 whereby he declared and created Rathnavelu Chettiar Trust for the performance of
religious, educational and secular charities. The leasehold right in the land vested in the Trustees appointed under the said Trust Deed. The Trustees
were paying land rent to Gangadhareswarar Koil Devasthanam. The first defendant took out the premises set out in A schedule property on rent
for carrying on business in Pharmaceutical Distribution business under the registered lease deed dated 7.4.1982. The third defendant, the Executive
Officer acted in connivance of the first defendant and sought for possession of the land on the basis of a purported termination of the tenancy.
Though ''A'' schedule property was proposed to be inspected by the plaintiffs at the request of the first defendant, the latter has not cooperated for
inspection. The plaintiffs representative inspected the premises in the month of November 1983 and found to their shock that the first defendant
had demolished the extensive portions of A schedule property. Costly Burma Teak timber and other valuable materials like marble tiles,
ornamental doors, frames and glass from the premises were removed and taken away by the first defendant. The plaintiffs came to understand that
the said materials have been used for remodelling the B schedule property owned by the first defendant. A police complaint was given on
10.12.1983 on coming to know that the first defendant was further proceeding with the demolition of the premises in the guise of a notice of
demolition received from the second defendant, Corporation of Madras. No notice was received by the plaintiffs from the Corporation. The
superstructure in the A schedule property withstood even the unprecedented heavy rains and cyclones. The demolition notice was invited by the
first defendant from the second defendant. Notice u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act was given only to fence off, take down,
secure or repair the structure if any danger is contemplated. The tenant has no power to demolish the superstructure belonging to his landlord.
Further, the demolition notice issued u/s 258(1) is quite unwarranted. As per the lease arrangement the plaintiffs had with the first defendant, the
latter was bound to keep and restore the property in a good condition. The third defendant, under notice dated 7.7.1983, informed the plaintiffs
that the latter had lost their right under the City Tenants Protection Act. The plaintiffs were not evicted by due process of law nor was the
possession of the land surrendered to temple authority. The unlawful act of the first defendant has caused extensive loss to the plaintiffs. The first
defendant has demolished an extent of 3000 sqft in the first floor and 1000 sqft in the ground floor of A schedule property. The valuable materials
like costly Burma Teak timber and other valuable materials like marble tiles, ornamental doors, frames and glass from the premises removed and
taken away by the first defendant from the A schedule property has been used in the B schedule property. The plaintiffs seek for possession of B
schedule property of the first defendant. On 18.4.1992, the first defendant brought about further demolition with lightening speed and dismantled
the remaining building of A schedule property. Therefore, the plaintiffs seek for the aforesaid reliefs.
The second and third defendants have remained ex parte. The first defendant has contended in the written statement that he was not aware of
the construction of the building set out in a schedule by the Trust. The plaintiffs never informed the first defendant that they were not the owners of
the land. Even in the deed of lease, they had just asserted that they were the owners of the demised property. The building was not strong enough
and the superstructure had to be re-built in order to make it habitable. It is true that the first defendant met the third defendant as the latter made
enquiries about the occupation of the first defendant in the suit property. The first defendant could not use the suit premises for any purpose as the
building was in a dilapidated condition. The proper condition of the building was not known to the first defendant as he had not seen the premises
earlier. The fact remains that the first defendant actually commenced demolition of the premises on 10.12.1983 pursuant to the order issued to the
second defendant on 6.12.1983. The demolition process was stopped as the plaintiffs preferred police complaint. The demolition was undertaken
by the first defendant as there was a direction by the second defendant to demolish the building within ten days of receipt of the notice. There had
been deterioration of the superstructure due to heavy rains that battered in December 1983. The condition of the suit premises even at the very
inception of the tenancy was poor. The third defendant had already terminated the tenancy of the plaintiffs in respect of land of the premises
described in A schedule. The third defendant, having assured the first defendant that the tenancy of the plaintiffs had been terminated, executed a
fresh lease with the first defendant as the first defendant was in possession of the property. Therefore, the first defendant prays that the suit may be
dismissed with costs.
The following issues and additional issues were framed:
Issues
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to declaration as prayed for.
Whether the plaintiffs have sustained any damages.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any amount towards damages, if so to what quantum.
Whether the third defendant is guilty in not taking any action against the first defendant for the alleged illegal acts.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to future damages, if so to what quantum.
Whether the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of notice u/s 80 CPC.
To what relief are the plaintiffs entitled?
Additional Issues
Whether the first defendant had on 18.4.2002 brought about further demolition and dismantled the remaining building in the schedule A
property.
Whether the act of demolition by the first defendant after withdrawal of W.P.No. 11823 of 1983 without instructions by erstwhile counsel of
plaintiff had given any right for the defendant to further alienate the property.
Whether the first defendant is liable to pay further damages and compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/= for the acts of demolition on 18.4.1992 and
further alienating the property which was leased to the first defendant by the plaintiffs.
Whether notice dated 6.12.1983 u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act purporting to be issued by the second defendant to the
first defendant was legal and bona fide.
Whether the third defendant was lawful in sending a notice on 7.7.1983 contravening the lease agreement between the plaintiff and the third
defendant.
Whether not the plaintiffs were not fully aware of the withdrawal of W.P.No. 11823 of 1983.
Whether the first defendant is liable to pay further damages and compensation to the tune of Rs. 60.00 lakhs for the alleged further act of
demolition of the remaining building.
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to question the notice u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act issued by the 2nd defendant and
also to claim damages of Rs. 20.00 lakhs without obtaining leave for raising these issues in the above suit from the Honourable Writ Court while
withdrawing W.P.No. 11823 of 1983.
Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to make out any allegation about the alleged demolition after the withdrawal of W.P.No. 11823 of 1983
without bringing to the notice of the Honourable Writ Court the alleged further demolition.
On the side of the plaintiffs, the fifth plaintiff was examined as PW1 and 45 documents were marked. On the side of the defendants, the first
defendant was examined as DW1 and no document was marked.
Issue No. 6: Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that the Corporation is not entitled to the pre-suit notice u/s 80 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is his further submission that inasmuch as the Corporation of Madras remained ex parte, the aforesaid issue does not arise for
consideration.
Learned Counsel for the first defendant would contend that Corporation of Madras is entitled to pre-suit notice u/s 80 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The expression Government referred to u/s 80 of the CPC does not include a Corporation constituted under the Act of Parliament or the
legislature. Therefore, the suit laid without issuing pre-suit notice u/s 80 of the CPC as against the Corporation of Chennai is very well maintainable.
Further, it is found that the second defendant has remained ex parte. The first defendant cannot take up the cause of the second defendant and
plead for dismissal of the suit on such a ground. Issue No. 6 is answered accordingly.
Issue No. 4: There is no dispute to the fact that the land in respect of A schedule belongs to the third defendant Arulmigu Gangadhareswarar
Koil Devasthanam and the same was demised under the lease deed, Ex.P7 dated 14.12.1909 to Rathnavelu Chettiar. Rathnavelu Chettiar, the
author of the Trust Deed, Ex.P6 dated 18.5.1919, having constructed a bungalow over there in the year 1910, vested the same in Rathnavelu
Chettiar Trust wherein the plaintiffs are the Trustees. The first defendant does not controvert the fact that he was inducted into possession of A
schedule property as per the lease deed, Ex.P28 dated 7.4.1982. Ex.P8 dated 1.6.1983 is a Letter written by the first defendant to the Trust. The
intention of the first defendant to go in for demolition of the entire structure was made known through the said letter. Even under Ex.P4 notice
dated 30.6.1982, the first defendant dropped a hint to go in for re-building of the A schedule property. It is relevant to refer to the reply, Ex.P14
dated 13.2.1984 given by the Corporation of Chennai wherein the Corporation of Chennai has specifically referred to the letter dated 15.12.1983
addressed by the first defendant to the Assistant Executive Engineer calling for action by the Corporation in the light of the Press statement of the
Commissioner of Corporation. Even earlier thereto, the first defendant, by his letter dated 14.10.1983, has requested the Commissioner,
Corporation of Chennai to make an inspection of the building immediately as the walls of the A schedule property were found with cracks. The
extract of the said letter is found incorporated in the reply notice, Ex.P14 issued by the Corporation to the plaintiffs. In this background, the court
will have to see whether the notice issued by the Corporation u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act is legal and bona fide.
The notice of the Corporation dated 6.12.1983 under challenge is marked as Ex.P18. Under the said notice issued u/s 258 of the Madras City
Municipal Act, 1919, the Corporation has communicated the following to the first defendant who was in occupation of A schedule property:
The owner or occupier of premises No. 76, Gangadareswarar Koil Street, Division-70-
Whereas your aforesaid building is deemed by the Commissioner to be in a ruinous state and dangerous to passers by or to the occupier of
neighbouring structures. You are hereby required within 10 days of service of this notice to fence off, take down, secure or repair such building so
as to prevent any danger therefrom.
In default you will be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding Rs. 500/= and the Commissioner may u/s 380 and 381 of the Act cause the
necessary works to be done and recover the expenses thereof from you.
In the bottom of the said communication, an additional message is also found which reads as follows:
You are hereby informed that the building situated at 76, Gangadareeswaar Kail St; is in a very bad condition and it may fall any time. Hence you
are requested to remove the structure forthwith.
The first part of the direction was issued by the official on behalf of the Commissioner. But, the latter part of the direction found in Ex.P18 has been
given by an Engineer. As far as the first part of the communication is concerned, the first defendant had been directed to fence off, take down,
secure or repair such building so as to prevent any damage therefrom. The Commissioner has not given any direction to the first defendant to go in
for demolition of the building. But, it is found that an Engineer attached to the Corporation has come out with a direction to the first defendant to
remove the structure forthwith.
The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that the Engineer has no authority to give such a direction in addition to the original direction
given on behalf of the Commissioner under Ex.P18.
The learned Counsel for the first defendant would submit that the first defendant had carried out the instruction found in the notice Ex.P18
dated 6.12.1983 bona fide.
The very fact that the first defendant had initiated demolition proceedings without putting the lessor on notice would go to show that the action
of the first defendant is not bona fide. Of course, as per Section 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, the Corporation has
every authority to issue such a direction in case it is found, that the building was in a ruinous state or in a dangerous condition. But, the additional
direction found in Ex.P18 smacks of mala fides and is tainted with dishonesty.
The letter dated 24.6.1983 marked as Ex.P9 would go to establish that the plaintiffs wanted to have inspection of the premises as desired by
the first defendant. But, the latter had not cooperated. Inspite of the positive response of the plaintiffs, the first defendant had schemingly brought to
the notice of the Corporation to pull down the structure behind the back of the owner thereof.
Though it is contended that a notice was served on the Watchman of the plaintiffs at the A schedule property, which was demised to the first
defendant, there is no record to substantiate such a plea. It is not as if the plaintiffs have gone underground and their whereabouts were not known.
Time and again the first defendant had corresponded with the plaintiffs expressing his desire to go in for demolition and reconstruction of the
building. The first defendant being the tenant, should have, in all fairness, put on notice the plaintiffs about the direction he has received from the
Corporation. The Corporation officials, in all fairness, should have collected the address from the first defendant and made out all efforts to serve
on the plaintiffs as demolition of a mammoth building was proposed. But, unfortunately, the Corporation had not taken any such steps. No
evidence also is forthcoming to establish that any attempt was made to serve notices on the plaintiffs by the Corporation officials. Of course,
Section 258 of the Madras City Municipal Act, 1919 contemplates notice to the person in occupation or to the owner. The principles of natural
justice warrant service of summons on the owner also as the action of the Corporation would cause untold and irreparable Hardship to the owner
of the building.
Therefore, it is held that though it is quite legal for the second defendant Corporation to issue notice u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal
Corporation Act, 1919, the said notice has been issued with additional direction by an Engineer without any authority and that the mala fide action
of the Engineer attached to the second defendant renders the notice dated 6.12.1983 issued u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation
Act, 1919 illegal. The issue is answered accordingly.
Issues 2 and 3 and additional issues 1, 3 and 7: The fact remains that a part of the building was already demolished by the first defendant in the
guise of a direction received from the Corporation under Ex.P18. As far as the other part of the building is concerned, the plaintiffs would submit
that it was demolished during the pendency of the suit. But, the first defendant sets up a plea that on account of heavy rain and cyclone effect, the
other part of the building had come down on its own.
The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would submit that the evil design of the first defendant to demolish the whole structure and put up a new
structure of his own is writ large in the communications emanated from him. The Corporation had woken up and issued a direction u/s 258 of the
Madras City Municipal Corporation Act only at the instance and instigation of the first defendant. Therefore, even if there is no material to show
that during the pendency of the suit, the other part of the building was wantonly demolished by the first defendant, the court has to come to the
conclusion based on the avaricious conduct of the first defendant that it was only he who had completely demolished the structure.
Per contra, the learned Counsel for the first defendant would contend that there is no iota of evidence to establish that during the pendency of
the suit, the other part of the structure was pulled down by the first defendant. The demolition process undertaken by the first defendant was only
on account of the mandates emanated from the second defendant Corporation. Therefore, the first defendant is not liable to answer the claim for
damages.
As already pointed out by this Court, it is found that the Corporation had issued the notice u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation
Act, 1919, only at the instance of the resourceful tenant, the first defendant herein. Further, the direction issued by the Commissioner does not
contemplate demolition of the building. The other measures to safeguard the dilapidated structure from causing inconvenience to the public have
been directed to be taken by the first defendant or by the owner of the building. The second part of the communication issued by the Engineer
without any authority is not in fact in the form of a direction or mandate. The second part of the message has been couched in a request form. Any
failure to comply with the second part of the instruction does not invite any penal action from the Corporation. There is no evidence to show that
the first defendant informed the plaintiffs about the notice received by them u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919. The
tenant, having engineered the process of demolition in connivance with the officials of the Corporation, has chosen to demolish a part of the old
bungalow. It is true that there is no evidence on the side of the plaintiffs to establish that during the pendency of the suit, the other part of the
building was pulled down by the first defendant. But, the fact remains that the entire structure has been completely erased from the ground. Had the
first defendant not demolished the part of the building, the other part of the building would not have encountered such a fate. Therefore, the first
defendant, in all fairness, is liable to bear the responsibility of obliterating the whole structure from the ground. The prior conduct and subsequent
act of the first defendant also will have to be taken note of by this Court. It is his admission during the course of evidence that he has now entered
into a fresh agreement of lease with the third defendant and put up a superstructure in the suit premises. The first defendant has taken the law into
his hands with the aid of the unholy alliance with the third defendant and acted illegally to advance his personal interest.
Coming to the quantum of compensation, there is no dispute to the fact that the building demolished was a bungalow constructed in the year
1910. PW1 would categorically admit during the course of evidence that costly materials viz., Burma Teak timber and other valuable materials like
marble tiles, ornamental doors, frames and glasses removed from the old Bungalow have been used to put up the construction in the A schedule
property. Considering the old structure with the valuable accessories like, Burma Teak timber and other valuable materials like marble tiles,
ornamental doors, frames and glasses and taking into account the lack of proof to establish the actual value of the damage caused on account of
the demolition of the building, a nominal compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/= and a sum of Rs. 72,000/= towards past arrears of rent is fixed. The said
amount shall be exclusively paid by the first defendant to the plaintiffs. Issues 2 and 3 and additional issues 1, 3 and 7 are answered accordingly.
Issue No. 4: The third defendant Arulmigu Gangadhareswarar Koil Devasthanam remained ex parte in the suit. There is no evidence to show
that the third defendant was informed of the notice issued by the Corporation u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 nor is
there any material to substantiate that the demolition process was undertaken by the first defendant under the very nose of the third defendant. No
evidence is available on record touching the aforesaid issue. Therefore, it is held that the third defendant is not guilty of any inaction for the alleged
illegal act of the first defendant. The issue is answered accordingly.
Issue No. 5: There is no dispute that the first defendant was paying rent of Rs. 3000/= as per the lease agreement, Ex.P28 to the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs are entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 3000/= per month as future damages for the use and occupation of the A schedule property by the first
defendant. Issue No. 5 is answered accordingly.
Additional Issues 2 and 6: The court has already held that there is no evidence worth mentioning that the first defendant'' brought about further
demolition of the building in A schedule property on 18.4.2002. There is no oral evidence or any material to show that the case in W.P.No. 11823
of 1983 was withdrawn behind the back of the plaintiffs by their counsel without authority. The plaintiffs also have not let in any evidence to show-
that the valuable materials viz., Burma Teak timber and other valuable materials like marble tiles, ornamental doors, frames and glasses removed
from the A schedule property were used in his building in B schedule property. Under the above facts and circumstances, issue Nos. 2 and 6 are
answered against the plaintiffs.
Additional issue No. 5: Under Ex.P5 dated 7.7.1983, the third defendant has informed the plaintiffs that the lease period had expired as early
as 14.12.1930. The creation of the Trust by the original lessee Rathnavelu Chettiar was not brought to the notice of the third defendant till the year
1982-83. The arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 11,024.48 was also not paid by the plaintiffs to the third defendant. It has also been brought to the
notice of the plaintiffs under Ex.P5 that the plaintiffs without any authority sublet the premises under a registered lease deed dated 7.4.1982
(Ex.P28) to the first defendant. Therefore, under Ex.P5, the first defendant has sought for delivery of possession receiving a sum of Rs. 9000/=
towards the value of the superstructure put up by Rathnavelu Chettiar. The third defendant also reminded the plaintiffs of the arrears of Rs.
11,024/= payable by the plaintiffs towards land rent upto the month of February 1983.
The rival submissions made at the Bar with respect to the above aspect were heard by this Court. The original registered lease deed Ex.P7
dated 14.12.1909 does not give authority to the lessee to sublet the premises. The plaintiffs have not produced any document to show that they
had paid the rent upto date. But, the plaintiffs have proved by producing Exs.P9 and P20 that the third defendant has recognised Rathnavelu
Chettiar Trust as tenant by issuing rent receipts for the land demised under Ex.P7. The third defendant has recognised the fact that the Trust has
become the lessee of the land demised originally to Rathnavelu Chettiar under Ex.P7.
The landlord is entitled to seek for delivery of possession terminating the tenancy when there was arrears of rent and subletting was also done
without any authority. Therefore, the notice dated 7.7.1983 (Ex.P5) issued by the third defendant to the plaintiffs seeking delivery of possession
terminating the lease agreement is not in contravention of the lease agreement between the plaintiffs and the third defendant. The issue is answered
accordingly.
Additional issues 8 and 9: The Corporation has every authority to issue notice u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 in
case the Corporation, on inspection through its officials finds that the building is in a ruinous or dilapidated condition endangering the human lives.
The court has already held that the latter portion of the instructions was issued by the Engineer attached to the Corporation without any authority
and also in connivance with the first defendant. Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to challenge the notice issued to the first defendant u/s 258 of
the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919. The plaintiffs have lost their building at the instance of the first defendant, they are entitled to
seek for damages for the demolition of the building. As it is found from the evidence on record that the demolition of the building was the brainchild
of the first defendant, the first defendant alone was fastened with liability to bear the damages awarded by this Court. The plaintiffs are entitled to
file a suit before this Court claiming larger reliefs after withdrawing the writ petition filed before this Court. There is no necessity to obtain any leave
from the court to claim such a relief of damages in the suit. The issue is answered accordingly.
Additional issue No. 9: No evidence was let in by the first defendant with respect to the aforesaid issue. When the plaintiffs come to know of
further demolition, they are entitled to level allegation of demolition in the suit even after the withdrawal of the writ petition. The issue is answered
accordingly.
Additional Issues 1 and 7: The learned Counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the first defendant being a sub-lessee cannot attorn
tenancy directly to the paramount title holder viz., the third defendant burying the statutory right flowed under the lease deed Ex.P7 executed by the
third defendant to the Founder of the Trust. The third defendant cannot take law in its own hand and clinch an underhand deal with the first
defendant when the leasehold right is being enjoyed by the plaintiffs.
The learned Counsel for the first defendant would submit that the third defendant has rightly executed a lease deed in favour of the first
defendant after the termination of the lease on account of non payment of arrears of Rs. 11,024.48. After the demolition of the building, only the
land remains to be demised. The first defendant having come to know of the right of the paramount title holder, has clinched a lease agreement with
them. The sum and substance of the submission made by the learned Counsel for the first defendant is that there is no necessity to file any suit by
the third defendant to recover possession from the plaintiffs inasmuch as possession is with the first defendant.
Rathnavelu Chettiar has got leasehold right of the land in respect of A schedule for a period of 20 years. The lease by efflux of time has expired
on 14.12.1930. In the authority reported in The Madura Talkies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The District Collector, Madurai and another, , a Bench of this Court
has held that where a land was taken on lease, the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance if he continues to possess the land even after the expiry of
the lease period in contravention of the terms of lease. But, if the landlord has given consent for continued possession after the expiry of the lease
period, then the tenant becomes tenant holding over. Here, in this case, the third defendant who is the paramount title holder has disapproved the
continued possession of the plaintiffs after the expiry of the lease, Ex.P/7, on 14.12.1930. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not tenants holding over, but,
they are tenants at sufferance. The tenants at sufferance can be evicted only by due process of law and not by resorting to unlawful methods of
clinching surreptitiously a deal with a sub tenant.
The Honourable Supreme Court in Vashu Deo Vs. Bal Kishan, has held as follows:
The plain and simple legal position which flows is that the sub-tenant must discharge his statutory obligation to put his landlord, that is, the tenant in
possession of the premises in view of the latter''s entitlement to hold the tenancy premises until his own right comes to an end and the tenant must
discharge his statutory obligation to put his own landlord, that is, the Trust, in possession of the tenancy premises on his entitlement to hold the
tenancy premises coming to an end.
In the aforesaid judgment, a similar question had arisen and the Honourable Supreme Court has answered that the sub tenant cannot attorn tenancy
directly in favour of the paramount title holder.
The Honourable Supreme Court in M/s. Anamallai Club Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, and State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Others, has come down heavily on the practice of taking possession of the property without resorting
to the due process of law.
It is thus clear from the above referred ratios that the third defendant having completely ignored the right of the tenant-at-sufferance who has
sub let the premises to the first defendant, directly clinched an agreement of lease with the first defendant. The plaintiffs are in possession of ''A''
schedule property demised by the third defendant through the first defendant who is the sub-lessee. On the expiry of the lease period, possession
of the property does not pass on automatically to the paramount title holder. Delivery of possession can be resorted to only through due process of
law by the third defendant. The first defendant has hatched a scheme to knock away the rights of the plaintiffs having tied up directly with the third
defendant.
Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to delivery of possession of the ''A'' schedule property from the first defendant. As there is no evidence to
establish that the valuable materials removed from ''A'' schedule property were used by the first defendant in the property comprised in ''B''
schedule, the plaintiffs are not entitled to seek for declaration that ''B'' schedule property belongs to the plaintiffs and for consequent direction to
the first defendant to deliver possession of ''B'' schedule property to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are also entitled to recover a sum of Rs.
5,00,000/= towards damages for demolition of the building in ''A'' schedule property and a sum of Rs. 72,000/= towards past arrears of rent and
a sum of Rs. 3000/= per month towards future damages. As the Corporation is entitled to issue notice u/s 258 of the Madras City Municipal
Corporation Act, 1919, the relief for declaration that notice dated 6.12.1983 of the second defendant is null and void is not granted.
The suit is decreed in the aforesaid terms with costs. Time for vacating and handing over vacant possession of the land and building set out in
''A'' schedule in the plaint is three months.