R. Lakshmanan and Indian Overseas Bank vs Indian Overseas Bank and Others

T.S. Sivagnanam, J.—Since the issue involved in these writ petitions are common they are taken up together for disposal.

The matter pertains to an award passed by the Banking Ombudsman in exercise of his powers conferred under the Banking Ombudsman

Scheme 1995.

The Indian Oversees Bank (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) is aggrieved by the said award. The complainant before the Banking

Ombudsman seeks for implementation of the award. One Mrs. V. Indira Stephen, who is also an employee of the bank has challenged the award,

since the award directs funds to be withdrawn from her savings bank account. She has also challenged the charge memo issued to her by the Bank

in W.P. No. 8061/2007. For the purpose of deciding the issue, I propose to take up first W.P. No. 6483/2001 filed by the bank, challenging the

award passed by the Ombudsman.

Mr. R. Lakshmanan, the petitioner in W.P. No. 19008/1998, has made a complaint to the Ombudsman on 29.8.1997. The allegation in the

complaint is that Mrs. V. Indira Stephen, petitioner in W.P. Nos. 8061 & 8062/2007, the employee of the Bank received Rs. 3,00,000/- from

Mr. R. Lakshmanan to repay her housing loan and release the documents and sell the property to Mr. R. Lakshmanan. It is further stated that she

obtained loan from a finance company under the name and style of M/s. Pappu Benefit Fund Ltd., 4th respondent in W.P. No. 8062/2009 and the

finance company gave a cheque in favour of the Indian Oversees Bank, Nungambakkam Branch a/c of Mrs. V. Indira Stephen. Since the cheque

was issued to the bank, and as Mrs. Indira Stephen did not have savings account in Indian Oversees Bank, Nungambakkam Branch at that time

the money was kept in suspense account. According to the said Mr. R. Lakshmanan, he had lodged a complaint with the Vigilance Department of

the Bank and after the complaint was lodged Mrs. V. Indira Stephen had taken the money which was kept in suspense account. Based on these

facts, Mr. R. Lakshmanan claimed the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- with full interest.

The Ombudsman took up the matter and since the complaint remained unsettled by agreement, in exercise of his powers under Clause 20 of the

Scheme proposed to pass award. The Ombudsman by award dated 26.2.1998 issued two directions as hereunder:

(i) directing the bank to refund the sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- with interest at 21% p.a to M/s. Paapu Benefit Fund Limited with instruction to credit to

the loan account of Mr. R. Lakshmanan or to refund to him by M/s. Paapu Benefit Fund Ltd., if he had repaid the loan either wholly or in part.

(ii) bank should pay the compensation of Rs. 1,000/- to the complainant Mr. R. Lakshmanan for the expenses incurred by him in prosecuting his

claim.

Mr. T. Ravi Kumar, Learned Standing Counsel for the Bank assailed the correctness of the award passed by the Ombudsman by contending

that the transaction between Mr. R. Lakshmanan and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen is purely a private dispute and the action of the Ombudsman in

passing the award amounts to improper exercise of jurisdiction. That the Ombudsman ought to have seen that the subject matter does not relate to

any deficiency in banking service. On the date when the cheque was deposited, Mrs. V. Indira Stephen was a staff of the Mount Road Branch and

had availed housing loan from the Nungambakkam branch of the bank and that the bank collects the proceeds of the instrument on behalf of the

beneficiary of the instrument.

Since the instruments was to the account of Mrs. V. Indira Stephen, she had every right, based on that and the bank cannot be held responsible

in respect of any private dispute between Mr. R. Lakshmanan and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen. That Mr. R. Lakshmanan has no locus standi to file a

complaint in the instant case as he is not the customer of the Bank and if there is any dispute between himself and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen, his

remedy is elsewhere. The learned Counsel would further submit that neither Mrs. V. Indira Stephen nor M/s. Paapu Benefit Fund Ltd., were

arrayed as respondents before the Ombudsman and the award is wholly erroneous and without jurisdiction.

8.The complainant Mr. R. Lakshmanan filed a counter affidavit and reiterated the stand taken before the Ombudsman. Mr. R. Maargabandhu,

Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. R. Lakshmanan would contend that Mrs. Indira Stephen and the bank colluded together to benefit

her and transferred the cheque amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the suspense account to her savings bank account on 10.6.1996 and she has

withdrawn the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-. It is further contended that, as per the banking practice, the Bank should have intimated either Mr.

R. Lakshmanan or M/s. Paapu Benefit Fund Ltd., to which account the amounts should be transferred on finding that Mrs. V. Indira Stephen did

not have a savings account in Nungambakkam Branch. In fact, the said Mrs. V. Indira Stephen opened the account on 8.6.1996 and had

withdrawn the money two days later on 10.6.1996, without discharging the housing loan. Therefore, the learned Counsel would contend that the

Bank has committed deficiency of service, as per Clause 13(a)(vii) of the Banking Ombudsman Scheme 1995. Since Mr. R. Lakshmanan is an

aggrieved person, he is entitled to maintain the complaint before the Ombudsman and there is sufficient cause of action in terms of Clause 16(3) of

the scheme to maintain the complaint. On these grounds, the learned Counsel would submit that the writ petition filed by the Bank is liable to be

dismissed and the award should be implemented by allowing the W.P. No. 19008/1998.

Mr. A. Thiyagarajan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mrs. V. Indira Stephen would contend that, she is not a party to the proceedings

before the Ombudsman and has not been impleaded as respondent in both the writ petitions in W.P. No. 6483/2001 and W.P. No. 19008/1998.

The learned senior counsel would contend that the Ombudsman heard the matter without issuing notice to Mrs. V. Indira Stephen. That in terms of

Clause 16(d) of the scheme, the complaint filed by Mr. R. Lakshmanan should not have been proceeded further as in respect of the same subject

matter he has filed criminal complaint and the Crime Branch, Madras had registered a case against the petitioner Mrs. Indira Stephen on 2.9.1997

for offence u/s 420 I.P.C. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would submit that the award of the Ombudsman is liable to be set aside. In

respect of the charge memo issued to Mrs. V. Indira Stephen which is impugned in W.P. No. 8061/2007, the learned senior counsel would submit

that the criminal case which was registered against the petitioner had ended in acquittal by judgment dated 14.12.2004 in C.C. No. 9562/1999 on

the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8. In view of the acquittal, the department proceedings initiated

based on the same set of charges cannot be proceeded. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would submit that the departmental charge memo is

also liable to be set aside.

I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Counsels on either side and perused the entire materials on record.

11.The main contention raised by the Bank is that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and to give directions as

given in the impugned award. It is their further contention that the complainant Mr. R. Lakshmanan has no locus standi to make such complaint as

he is not a customer of the Bank and the dispute is purely a dispute between Mr. R. Lakshmanan and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen and the

Ombudsman, ought not to have entertained such a complaint.

The scheme which is relevant for the purpose of the present case is the Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 1995. Oxford English Dictionary

defines ""Ombudsman"" to be an official appointed to investigate individual complaints against an organisation, especially a public authority.

Pursuant to the notification issued by the Reserve Bank of India, dated 14.6.1995, in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 35A of the Banking

Regulation Act 1949, the Scheme was introduced in public interest and in the interest of banking policy to provide for a system of Banking

Ombudsman for redressal of grievances against deficiency in banking services, concerning loans and advances and other specified matters. In

terms of the Clause 2 of the Scheme, the object is to enable resolution of complaints relating to provision of banking services and to facilitate the

satisfaction, or settlement of such complaints. In terms of Clause 12(a), the powers and duties of the Banking Ombudsman will be to receive

complaints relating to the provision of banking service. Clause 13 of the scheme specifies the ambit of authority of the Ombudsman as regards

banking services and the same shall include complaints pertaining to the operations in any saving, current or any other account maintained with a

bank, such as delays, non-credit of proceeds of parties accounts, non-payment of deposit or non-observance of the Reserve Bank directives, if

any, applicable to rate of interest on deposits. In terms of Clause 16(1) of the Scheme, any person who has a grievance against a bank may himself

or through an authorised representative make a complaint in writing to the Banking Ombudsman within whose jurisdiction the branch or office of

the bank complained against is located.

On a perusal of the provisions as stated above, the object of the Scheme is to enable resolution of complaints and the Ombudsman is entitled

to receive complaints relating to provision of banking services and if the complaint pertains to an operation of savings bank account or current

account maintained by the bank, the Ombudsman would have jurisdiction to entertain such complaint. The provisions of Clause 16(1) are very

widely couched by stating that any person who has a grievance against the Bank could lodge a complaint. Therefore, the objections raised by the

Bank that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint is not tenable. Therefore, I am of the view that the Ombudsman is entitled

to entertain complaint at the instance of any person who has grievance against the Bank and he not be a customer of that Bank and therefore the

complaint filed by the said Mr. R. Lakshmanan cannot be said to be barred under the provisions of the Scheme.

Having held that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to lodge the complaint, the next issue to be seen is whether Mr. R. Lakshman has locus

standi to maintain the complaint. As stated above, Clause 16(1) of the Scheme empowers any person who has grievance against the Bank may

himself or through an authorised representative make a complaint in writing to the Banking Ombudsman within whose jurisdiction the branch or

office of the bank complained against is located. Therefore, it cannot be said that Mr. R. Lakshman has no locus standi to lodge the complaint, as

he would fall within the meaning of the expression ''any person''.

Next, it has to be seen whether the direction issued by the Ombudsman is within the ambit of authority of the Ombudsman and whether it is in

consonance with the procedure of disposal of such complaint in accordance with Clause 16. It is to be noted that the complaint pertains to an

operation in a Bank account with the respondent Bank. It is not in dispute that Mrs. V. Indira Stephen is an employee of the Bank and employed

in Mount Road Branch and availed housing loan in Nungambakkam Branch. The cheque in question was drawn by M/s. Pappu Benefit Fund Ltd.,

in favour of Indian Overseas Bank a/c of Mrs. V. Indira Stephen. It is not in dispute that, on the day when the said cheque was presented before

the Indian Overseas Bank, Nungambakkam Branch M/s. V. Indira Stephen did not have a savings account and there was only loan account.

Therefore, it is contended by Mr. R. Lakshmanan that the cheque in question was intended to close the housing loan account availed by Mrs.

Indira Stephen in the Nungambakkam Branch and that he had obtained the said amount from M/s. Pappu Benefit Fund Ltd., and it is on the

understanding between the Mr. Lakshman and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen such cheque was drawn in such a manner.

However, the said Mr. R. Lakshmanan did not implead Mrs. V. Indira Stephen or M/s. Pappu Benefit Fund Ltd., as respondents before the

Ombudsman. Undoubtedly, both these persons were proper and necessary parties to the proceedings. Therefore in my view, the Ombudsman

committed gross error in proceeding with the complaint without issuing notice and hearing proper and necessary parties. Thus, on this ground itself,

the award ought to be rendered as not binding on persons who were not impleaded as respondents.

Further in terms of Clause 16(3)(d), no complaint to the Banking Ombudsman shall lie unless the complaint is not the subject matter, for which

any proceedings before any Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator or any other forum is pending or a degree or Award or order of dismissal has already

been passed. In the instant case, in respect of the same instrument, the said Mr. R. Lakshman filed a criminal complaint before the Crime Branch,

Chennai and the complaint said to have lodged on 18.9.1997. However on the date of filing the complaint before the Ombudsman i.e., on

29.8.1997, a criminal complaint was not pending as it had been lodged subsequently i.e., on 18.9.1997. In such circumstances, by considering the

scope of Clause 16(3)(d), the Ombudsman ought not to have proceeded further since the same subject matter was pending before another forum.

This view is supported by the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Durga Hotel Complex Vs. Reserve Bank of India and Others, and the

Hon''ble Supreme Court while considering the stage at which the bar of jurisdiction could operate and held as follows:

It is clear that when the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman, the respondent Bank had not approached the Debts

Recovery Tribunal with its application for recovery of the amounts due under the loan transaction. Therefore, this was a case where on the day the

complaint was filed, no proceeding before any Tribunal on the subject-matter was pending or in which a final order had been passed or decision

rendered. At the stage of initiation, there was no impediment in the way of the Ombudsman in entertaining the complaint or in proceeding with it.

The impediment, if any, was caused by the Bank''s subsequent filing of O.A No. 157 of 2000 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The High

Court has taken the view that since by the time the Ombudsman rendered this award, the Bank had already approached the Debts Recovery

Tribunal with its claim under the Recovery of Debts Act, the Banking Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction to render the award, or has lost his

jurisdiction to render the award. Clause 16 of the Scheme in Sub-clause (1) speaks of a person making a complaint in writing to the Banking

Ombudsman. Clause (3) read in conjunction with sub-clause(d) indicates that no complaint to the Banking Ombudsman shall lie if on the subject-

matter that is put forward before the Ombudsman, there is a proceeding pending before a court, arbitrator, tribunal or forum or a decree or final

adjudication had earlier been made by any one of them. This would suggest that the bar is attracted only when on the date of the filing of the

complaint before the Ombudsman, a claim on the subject-matter is pending before, say, the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Here admittedly, on the day

the jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman was invoked, no such claim was pending before any court, arbitrator, the Debts Recovery Tribunal or

any other forum. To that extent, prima facie, there is merit in the contention that Clause 16(3) may not be attracted to the case on hand.

13.Clause 16(3) of the Scheme says, ''No complaint to the Banking Ombudsman shall lie''. According to Black''s Law Dictionary ''lie'' means, ''to

have foundation in the law; to be legally supportable, sustainable, or proper''. In the context of the power conferred on the Ombudsman by the

Scheme read in the light of Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, it would be appropriate to understand the expression as having a

foundation in law in the sense that the claim must have a foundation in law. A Banking Ombudsman, though might initially have jurisdiction to

entertain a complaint on the basis that it has a legal foundation, here in terms of the Scheme, he may be divested of that jurisdiction or the

foundation in law might be lost on either of the parties approaching the court, the arbitrator or the Debts Recovery Tribunal in respect of the same

subject-matter. Dealing with the expression ''entertain'' this Court held in Lakshmiratan Engg. Works Ltd. v. CST that it means to deal with or

admit to consideration. The Court approved the views expressed by some of the High Courts that the word ''entertain'' meant not ''receive'' or

''accept'' but ''proceed to consider on merits'' or adjudicate upon. The Court also accepted the dictionary meaning of the word as ''admit to

consider''. This was also the view that was subsequently taken by this Court in Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu. It was held that

therein that the expression ''entertain'' in Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code meant, to ''adjudicate upon'' or to ''proceed to consider on merits'' and not

''initiation of proceeding'' along. Drawing an analogy, it is possible to say that the complaint must continue to have a foundation in law at the time

the Ombudsman takes up the claim for his consideration and renders his decision or award. The foundation would be lost when a court, arbitrator,

tribunal or any other competent forum is moved on the same subject-matter. When the subject-matter of the complaint is taken to any other

competent forum, the complaint loses its foundation in law. In other words, the subject-matter of the complaint should not be pending in any other

tribunal, or court or before an arbitrator not merely when it is filed but also when it is taken up for consideration and disposal.

Thus, in view of the law declared by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, the bar under Clause 16(3)(d) in the instant case has occurred subsequent

to the filing of the complaint before the Ombudsman since the criminal complaint came to be given on the same subject matter on 18.9.1997 by

Mr. R. Lakshmanan himself. However, there is no record to show whether this fact was brought to the notice of this Ombudsman by the

complainant himself. Had the proper and necessary parties been impleaded before the Ombudsman, this fact would have come to the notice of the

Ombudsman. In any event, the fact that such criminal complaint was pending before the appropriate forum and which also subsequently came to

be registered as C.C. No. 9562/1999 on the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8 for the offence u/s

420 I.P.C. It has to be necesssarily held that the complaint before the Ombudsman loses its foundation and the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman had

been taken away on and after that stage. Therefore, the Ombudsman stands statutorily barred from proceedings further.

Further, it is seen that certain directions have been issued by the Ombudsman to the Bank to effect payment in favour of the complainant Mr.

R. Lakshmanan or in the alternative to refund the money to M/s. Pappu Benefit Fund Ltd. In my view, such directions are beyond the jurisdiction

of the Ombudsman more so in the absence of proper and necessary parties having been made parties to the proceedings. Whether there was a

civil transaction relating to purchase of a property between Mr. R. Lakshmanan and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen is a question of fact which is now

being disputed. Whether at the instance of the said Mr. R. Lakshmanan, M/s. Pappu Benefit Fund Ltd., released the amount and issued the cheque

favouring Indian Oversees Bank account of Mrs. V. Indira Stephen is also a disputed question of fact. Further, was there any civil transaction

between Mr. R. Lakshmanan and Mrs. V. Indira Stephen in respect of the immovable property in question or as to whether any third parties were

involved in the matter are also disputed question of fact. These aspects obviously cannot be adjudicated by the Ombudsman and they would all fall

outside the ambit of authority as enumerated under Clause 13 of the Scheme. Therefore, I am of the view that the award passed by the

Ombudsman is not sustainable. However, it is always open to the parties to work out their rights before the competent forum and if such

proceedings are initiated, it is needless to state that such forum shall independently decide the issue based on oral and documentary evidence

without being in any manner influenced by the observations of this Order.

21.Therefore, W.P. No. 6483/2001 and W.P. No. 8062/2007 are allowed and W.P. No. 19008/1998 is dismissed. There shall be no order as

to costs.

W.P. No. 8061/2007, this writ petition has been filed by Mrs. V. Indira Stephen questioning the departmental charge memo dated 26.2.1998.

The main ground on which the writ petition has been filed is that the Bank has initiated departmental proceedings on the same set of charges as that

of the charge in the criminal case and the same ended in an acquittal before Criminal Court in C.C. No. 9562/1998 dated 14.5.2004 on the file of

the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai-8 and since the charge sheet issued by the Bank has been issued based on same

set of allegations the Bank cannot proceed further in the departmental charge sheet.

23.In the departmental charge, a statement of imputations of misconduct has been mentioned wherein there are fifteen allegations. A perusal of

such allegations clearly reveals that, it not only pertains to the cheque in question which was the subject matter of the complaint before the

Ombudsman and the criminal case, but pertains to various other allegations which prima facie appears to be serious. In fact the allegations 1 to 4

pertains to the validity of the title of the property which is the subject matter of mortgage with the Bank. The said allegations reads as follows:

On 11.2.1995, you have availed a staff housing loan of Rs. 2,13,100/- (Rs. 1,42,100/- as SHL and Rs. 71,000/- as Term Loan for housing) at

out Nungambakkam Branch for purchase of a house at RS No. 468/11 and 469(part), Shenoy Road, Nungambakkam, Madras-600 034 and in

this connection you have wilfully entered into a conspiracy with one Mrs. A. Philomina and/or one Mr. Anwar Basha who impersonated as power

of attorney holder of the owner by entering into an unauthorised ''Agreement for sale'' dated 6.12.1994 and later got the ''sale deed'' executed on

15.12.1995 for the above property by the aforesaid Mr. Anwar Basha which is reported to be a fraudulent transaction.

You have wilfully and with malafide intention deposited the original title deed (sale deed 15.12.1995 referred above) with the branch with an

intention to secure the staff housing loan of Rs. 2,13,100/- available by you as above. The fraudulent nature of the transfer of the ownership of the

property has left the staff housing loan availed by you without the backing of any security.

You have wilfully and with malafide intention failed to disclose to the Bank the fact of your defective title to the property and/or non possession

of the property by you before or after availing the staff housing loan and/or mortgaging the same in favour of the Bank.

You have failed to safeguard the interest of the Bank in the said property purchased under Staff Housing Loan and to obtain possession thereof.

Based on this statement of imputations of misconduct, four charges have been framed against the petitioner under Clause 17.5.(d), 17.5.(e),

17.5.(j) of the Bi-partite Settlement dated 14.12.1966 between the Bank and its workmen. On these, the petitioner has been directed to show

cause in writing as to any disciplinary action should not be taken. However, the petitioner without submitting her explanation to the charge, has

sought for adjournment of the proceedings requesting for copies of the order passed by the Ombudsman. Thereafter, it is seen that notice of

enquiry was issued fixing the enquiry on 10.1.2007. On receipt of notice of enquiry, the petitioner has given a representation on 7.1.2007 stating

that the union representatives are out of station and hence the enquiry may be adjourned to some other date after 1st week of February 2007. The

request has been complied with and the enquiry was postponed to 8.2.2007 and thereafter the petitioner as filed the present writ petition.

As stated above, the departmental charge sheet is not identical to that of the charge in the criminal case. The statement of imputations

encompasses other allegations against the petitioner. Therefore merely because the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case would not be

a ground to quash the departmental charge sheet. It is necessary for the authority to go into the aspects as regards the fact of the criminal copy

judgment on the departmental proceedings. These issues cannot be adjudicated in the present writ petition and it is for the petitioner to submit her

explanation to the charge memo and thereafter the competent authority has to decide the same in the departmental enquiry. It is to be noted that

Mrs. V. Indira Stephen is an employee of the Bank and the Bank has to necessarily conduct an enquiry into the matter, since the same pertains to

matters concering the internal working of the Bank. The acquittal in criminal case will not automatically set aside the punishment or would not

automatically render the Department charge memo as redundant. Further there could be no rigid or inflexible rule that the finding of a Criminal

Court is conclusive in every sense upon the Disciplinary Authority. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the following judgments have decided the effect

of an acquittal by a Criminal Court on Department proceedings as held as follows:

(i) in Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. General Manager (P.J.), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Others,

As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking

an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer

from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely

different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on

the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the

services rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally

inadmisible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is

necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to

appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the

prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ""beyond reasonable doubt"", he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental

enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the deliquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ""preponderance of probability"".

Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of

the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned

order dismissing them from service deserves to be quashed and set aside

(ii) in Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, etc.,

The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distince aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence

in violation of a duty the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the

public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of commission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in

the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as

expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexiblel rules in which the departmental proceedings may or

may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the deliquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts

and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the

criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public, as distinguished

from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the

offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a

departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant

statutory rules of law. That the strict standard of proof of applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in

the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in offence in criminal charge.

It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the

criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former,

prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proos in the departmental

proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of Evidence Act. The evidence required in

the departmental enquiry is not regulated by Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental

enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each

case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention

thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304A and 338 of the I.P.C. Under these circumstances, the High

Court was not right in staying the proceedings.

The award of the Banking Ombudsman has been set aside on technical grounds viz., that proper and necessary parties were not impleaded to

the proceedings, and that a criminal complaint was pending, as a result of which the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman stood divested in terms of

Clause 16(3)(d) of the Scheme, the allegations and averments made by the complainant Mr. R. Lakshmanan against the petitioner herein are

disputed questions of fact which could not have been gone into by the Ombudsman without impleading proper and necessary parties and causing

an enquir into those facts would be outside the scope of his ambit of authority under Clause 13. Since the award of the Ombudsman has been

quashed on these technical grounds, the factual details available with the Bank which has been the basis for the departmental charge sheet could

very well be gone into and the petitioner should have sufficient opportunity to rebutt the allegations made against her and defend herself in the

departmental enquiry. Therefore it is made clear that the Bank is entitled to enquire into the entire charge sheet and during the course of enquiry the

effect of the present in the criminal case on the Departmental charge shall also be considered.

For the above reasons, W.P. No. 8061/2007 challenging the charge memo fails and accordingly the same is dismissed. The petitioner is

granted three weeks time to submit her explanation to the charge sheet and thereafter the respondent Bank shall proceed with the enquiry in

accordance with law.