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Judgment
G. Rajasuria, J.—Animadverting upon the common order and decreetal orders dated 10.1.2012 passed by the learned I Additional
Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore in I.A. Nos. 558, 595 and 763 of 2011 respectively in L.A.O.P. No. 120 of 1999, these civil revision petitions
have been focussed. Heard both sides.
Broadly but briefly, narratively but precisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of these three revision petitions would run
thus:
(i) The immovable property concerned was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act; whereupon, proceedings were initiated
for disbursal of the amount and the revision petitioner, who is one and the same, viz., R. Kondasamy Naidu in all these revision petitions, received
the amount without prejudice to his claim for enhancement and got the matter referred to the Sub-Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Before
the Sub Court, he litigated and got order for enhancement of compensation also. As such, after passing of the said order, the respondents/third
parties in these revision petitions, viz., the revision petitioner''s children filed separate applications and objected for releasing of the amount in
favour of the revision petitioner herein mainly on the ground that he is the Kartha of the family and the property acquired by the Government was
the ancestral property, over which, they had respective shares. The Sub Court also in response to the respondents/third parties passed the
common order to the effect that the enhanced amount ordered by it shall not be released to the revision petitioner.
(ii) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said common order passed by the Sub Court concerned, these three civil revision petitions have
been preferred more or less on the same grounds.
The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner would put forth and set forth her arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out
thus:
(a) The Hon''ble Apex Court in the following two decisions,
(i) Shyamali Das v. Illa Chowdhry and Others (2006) 12 SCC 300: LNIND 2006 SC 904 and
(ii) P.K. Sreekantan and Others v. P. Sreekumaran Nair and Others (2006) 13 SCC 574 : LNIND 2006 SC 1077 virtually resolved the
conflicting views, which emerged u/s 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and as such, the points raised by the respondents/third parties in these
revision petitions are no more res Integra
(b) The Reference Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is having no power at the instance of a third party to pass any restraint order to the
effect that the enhanced amount adjudged by it shall not be released in favour of the person, who got the enhancement, in view of the dispute
between such petitioner and the third party.
Accordingly, she would pray for setting aside the order of the lower Court by allowing these revision petitions.
Per contra, in a bid to torpedo and pulverise and to make mincemeat of the arguments advanced on the side of the revision petitioner, the
learned advocates for the respondents/third parties, in unison would pilot their arguments, the pith and marrow of the same would run thus:
(i) The revision petitioner herein is none, but the respondent-third parties'' father, who represented them as Kartha in the land acquisition
proceedings as well as before the Sub Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. However, of late, his attitude got changed and by having a volte
face, he decided to take away the entire enhanced compensation amount for himself without coming forward to share the same with his children
and that alone necessitated the respondents/third parties to file the said applications before the Sub-Court seeking such restraint order, which was
passed in the interest of justice, warranting no interference in these revisions.
(ii) Out of the three children, only the two sons of the revision petitioners, viz., Janagaraj and Selvaraj filed a suit before the Sub Court,
Coimbatore, claiming their shares; as such, pendente lite, if the revision petitioner is allowed to take away the enhanced amount, then certainly, the
respondents/third parties would be left in the lurch and they would not be able to enjoy the fruit of the decree, if any that would be passed in the
suit filed by them.
Accordingly, the learned advocates would pray for the dismissal of the revision petitions.
The point for consideration is as to whether the Reference Court under the Land Acquisition Act, viz., Sub Court, which acquired jurisdiction in
view of the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer u/s 18 of the Act, had jurisdiction to pass the impugned common order dated
10.1.2012 in LA. Nos. 558,595 and 763 of 2011 respectively in L.A.O.P. No. 120 of 1999?
I would like to extract here under the relevant paragraphs from the precedents of the Hon''ble Apex Court
(i) Shyamali Das v. Illa Chowdhry and others (supra)
The Act is a complete code by itself. It provides for remedies not only to those whose lands have been acquired but also to those who claim
the awarded amount or any apportionment thereof. A Land Acquisition Judge derives its jurisdiction from the order of reference. It is bound
thereby. His jurisdiction is to determine adequacy or otherwise of the amount of compensation paid under the award made by the Collector. It is
not within his domain to entertain any application of pro interesse suo or in the nature thereof.
The learned Reference Judge, therefore, was entirely correct in passing its order dated 22.6.2004. A finding of fact was arrived at therein that
the appellant was not a party interested in the proceeding within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. The said order attained finality. It could
not have, thus, been reopened. Another application for impleadment, therefore, was not maintainable. It may be true that in the proceeding of a
suit, the Court can in a changed situation entertain a second application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. But, the learned
Reference Judge having opined, while passing its order dated 26-2-2004, that the appellant was not a person interested, in our opinion, a second
application despite the subsequent event was not maintainable.
It is one thing to say that a proceeding under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act was maintainable at the instance of the appellant. She was given an
opportunity to file the same by the Calcutta High Court in terms of its order dated 22.9.2000. She did not avail the said opportunity. Having not
availed the opportunity, in our opinion, she was not entitled to be impleaded as a party.
This Court had some occasion to consider the question as to who would fall within the ambit of the term ""person interested"".
In Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar it was opined that a State who claims ownership of the land in question was not a party interested stating:
If it was government land there was no question of initiating the proceedings for acquisition at all. The Government would not acquire the land,
which already vests in it. A dispute as to the pre-existing right or interest of the State Government in the property sought to be acquired is not a
dispute capable of being adjudicated upon or referred to the civil Court for determination either u/s 18 or Section 30 of the Act. The reference
made by the Collector to the Court was wholly without jurisdiction and the civil Court ought to have refused to entertain the reference and ought to
have rejected the same. All the proceedings u/s 30 of the Act beginning from the reference and adjudication thereon by the civil Court suffer from
lack of inherent jurisdiction and are therefore a nullity liable to be declared so.
In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran this Court opined:
It is well established that the Reference Court gets jurisdiction only if the matter is referred to it u/s 18 or 30 of the Act by the Land Acquisition
Officer and that the civil Court has got the jurisdiction and authority only to decide the objections referred to it. The Reference Court cannot widen
the scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not referred to it.
We may also notice that prima facie the appellant cannot be said to have any right, title and interest in the property but we do not intend to
express our final opinion thereupon as the matter is pending consideration before the civil Court.
A disputant is entitled to an interim order, provided he is a party thereto. If for one reason or the other, he cannot be impleaded as a party to
the proceeding, the Court would have no jurisdiction to pass any interim order in his favour.
If the impleadment application was not maintainable, it was required to be dismissed in limine. It could not have been entertained only for
pressing an interim order. Law does not contemplate exercise of such a jurisdiction by a Court of law. Any such order passed is coram non judice
and
(ii) P.K. Sreekantan and Others v. P. Sreekumaran Nair and Others (supra).
The Reference Court derives jurisdiction from the reference made. References u/s 18 and Section 30 are conceptually different from each
other. The decree in terms of Section 18 is different from the one in terms of Section 30. Remedy available in terms of Section 55 of the Act is
against a decree. The question whether Reference Court can deal with the question covered by Section 30 of the Act in a reference made u/s 18
of the Act and vice versa has been the subject-matter of judicial determination. In Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Secy. of State for India in Council it
was held that the jurisdiction of the Courts under the Act is a special one and strictly limited to the terms of Sections 18, 20 and 21. It only arises
when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector''s award and it is confined to a consideration of that objection. Therefore, it is certain
that when the only objection taken is to the amount of compensation that alone is the matter referred and the Court has no jurisdiction to determine
or consider anything beyond it.
In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran the question related to the exercise of
jurisdiction u/s 30 of the Act vis-a-vis Section 18. Determination in terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition suit. In Ajjam
Linganna v. Land Acquisition Officer it was held that the Reference Court has no power to convert the reference u/s 30 into one in Section 18 of
the Act at the instance of those who did not apply for reference earlier.
Every Tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its
jurisdiction comes within the limits of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such Tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain
facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a Tribunal derives
its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the Tribunal can function, it goes without
saying that before that Tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter
have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan
Bahadoor, wherever jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms
contained in that Act it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not
complied with the jurisdiction does not arise. (See Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra.)
Above being the position, the High Court''s view that it was impermissible to deal with the matter covered u/s 30 of the Act while dealing with
a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act is irreversible.
A mere poring over and perusal of those decisions would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that the Reference Court
u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot exercise its jurisdiction beyond Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Hence, I am of the considered view that in so far as the limited power of the said Court exercising its power u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
is concerned, it is no more res Integra
The above narration of facts would demonstrate and exemplify that the Sub Court, which was seized of the matter u/s 18 of the Act, over
stepped its function by passing such restraint order. The Court had no jurisdiction at all at the instance of the respondents/third parties to pass such
an order. If at all, the respondents/third parties had any right over the said property, then they should have made claim by invoking Section 30 of
the Land Acquisition Act and they should have approached the Collector for getting the claim referred u/s 30 of the Land Acquisition Act to the
Court. But, so far this case is concerned, no reference at all emerged u/s 30 of the Act and only at the instance of the revision petitioner herein, the
matter was referred by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Reference Court u/s 18 of the Act and in such a case, the respondents/third parties had
no locus standi to petition the said Court and the Sub Court also had no jurisdiction to pass such common order.
Needless to say that the parties, who already approached the regular civil Court with a suit should have got their further remedy worked out by
filing appropriate application. However, the learned advocates appearing for the respondents/third parties herein would implore and entreat that
some interim remedy might be given by this Court till they work out their remedy in a wholesome manner before the civil Court, but such an
argument cannot be countenanced and upheld as that would amount to deciding something quite antithetical to what the Hon''ble Apex Court has
laid down as law in the aforesaid two precedents.
The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner would also cite the judgment dated 28.3.2011 passed by the Hon''ble Apex Court in
Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)... 2011 C.C. No. 4549 of 2011, which is extracted here under for ready reference:
Delay condoned.
The SLP is dismissed.
However, four weeks'' time is granted to make payment as per the judgment of the High Court.
and pithily, as per which, the Sub Court was bound to release the amount and in such a case, this Court cannot pass any order quite against the
said provisions of law.
In the result, the common order and the decreetal orders passed by the Sub Court is set aside and all these civil revision petitions are allowed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.